nep-com New Economics Papers
on Industrial Competition
Issue of 2005‒08‒13
thirty-six papers chosen by
Russell Pittman
US Department of Justice

  1. Antitrust in Innovative Industries By Ilya Segal; Michael Whinston
  2. Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information: On the Role of Participation Constraints By Antonio Acconcia; Riccardo Martina; Salvatore D'Amato
  3. Virtual Capacity and Competition By Christian Schultz
  4. The economic theory of quasi-exclusive territory By Daisuke Nikae; Takeshi Ikeda
  5. Imports and Productivity By Halpern, László; Koren, Miklós; Szeidl, Adam
  6. Business Dynamics, Regulation and Performance By Nicola Brandt
  7. Market Structure in Services and Market Access in Goods By Francois, Joseph; Wooton, Ian
  8. Market Definition in the Printed Media Industry: Theory and Practice By Argentesi, Elena; Ivaldi, Marc
  9. Demand Estimation for Italian Newspapers: The Impact of Weekly Supplements By Elena Argentesi
  10. Estimating market power in a two-sided market: the case of newspapers By Elena Argentesi; Lapo Filistrucchi
  11. R&D and Patenting Activity and the Propensity to Acquire in High Technology Industries By Panayotis Dessyllas; Alan Hughes
  12. An Analysis of the Extent and the Means of Entry into Local Telecommunications Markets By Troy Quast
  13. Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions By Yvan Lengwiler; Elmar G. Wolfstetter
  14. Russia’s Gas Sector: The Endless Wait for Reform? By Rudiger Ahrend; William Tompson
  15. Restructuring Russia’s Electricity Sector: Towards Effective Competition or Faux Liberalisation? By William Tompson
  16. Competition, Consumer Welfare, and the Social Cost of Monopoly By Yoon-Ho Alex Lee; Donald J. Brown
  17. Bank Concentration and Fragility: Impact and Mechanics By Thorsten Beck; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt; Ross Levine
  18. Mergers and Acquisitions Waves in the U.K.: a Markov-Switching Approach By Marcelo Resende
  19. Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation By Ingo Vogelsang
  20. How the Internet Lowers Prices: Evidence from Matched Survey and Auto Transaction Data By Florian Zettelmeyer; Fiona Scott Morton; Jorge Silva-Risso
  21. The Revealed Preferences of High Technology Acquirers: An Analysis of the Characteristics of their Targets By Panayotis Dessyllas; Alan Hughes
  22. Direct to Consumer Advertising in Pharmaceutical Markets By Kurt R. Brekke; Michael Kuhn
  23. The Impact on Farmers of the Privatization of Integrated Agricultural Monopsonies By Paul Makdissi; Quentin Wodon
  24. Merger without Cost Advantages By Steffen Huck; Kai A. Konrad; Wieland Müller
  25. Socially Beneficial Mergers: A New Class of Concentration Indices By Nejat Anbarci; Brett Katzman
  26. Product Market Regulation in OECD Countries: 1998 to 2003 By Paul Conway; Véronique Janod; Giuseppe Nicoletti
  27. Policies Bearing on Product Market Competition and Growth in Europe By Carl Gjersem
  28. Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Japan By Jens Høj; Michael Wise
  29. Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performance économique en Suisse By Claude Giorno; Philippe Gugler; Miguel Jimenez
  30. Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Korea By Yongchun Baek; Randall Jones; Michael Wise
  31. Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Norway By Jens Høj; Michael Wise
  32. Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Switzerland By Claude Giorno; Philippe Gugler; Miguel Jimenez
  33. Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Sweden By Lennart Goranson; Martin Jørgensen; Deborah Roseveare
  34. Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Hungary By Carl Gjersem; Philip Hemmings; Andreas Reindl
  35. Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Finland By Jens Høj; Michael Wise
  36. Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in New Zealand By Annabelle Mourougane; Michael Wise

  1. By: Ilya Segal; Michael Whinston
    Abstract: We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. A more protective antitrust policy may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effect can be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply holding the innovation rate fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrust policies. We show that in some cases, holding the innovation rate fixed, as suggested by our comparative statics results, the tension does not arise and a more protective policy necessarily raises the rate of innovation.
    JEL: L40 O31
    Date: 2005–08
  2. By: Antonio Acconcia (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Riccardo Martina (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF, Università di Salerno); Salvatore D'Amato (Northwestern University, Università di Salerno and CSEF)
    Abstract: We study a manufacturer-retailer relationship where, besides the adverse selection and moral hazard components, it is explicitly considered a type-dependent participation constraint capturing the shadow cost of exclusive dealings. The welfare effects of contracts based on both retail price and sales are compared to those of contracts contingent solely upon sales. When the type-dependent outside option severely aspects the agency problem and contracts are set non-cooperatively, retail price restrictions may be detrimental to consumers. At the same time, if contracts are set cooperatively, we show that whenever sales-based contracts are observed they are detrimental to consumers.
    Keywords: asymmetric information, countervailing incentive, double marginalization, resale price maintenance, vertical restraint, welfare
    JEL: D82 L4 L42
    Date: 2005–07–01
  3. By: Christian Schultz
    Abstract: In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging firm auctions off virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold in the market in competition with the merging firm. The paper compares sale of physical and virtual capacity by the merging firm and shows that virtual capacity leads to a less competitive outcome. The merging firm can build up a reputation for producing little, so that the output price increases in the market, and this increases the auction price on virtual capacity.
    Keywords: virtual capacity, reputation, tacit collusion, antitrust, mergers, competition policy
    JEL: D44 L40 L41
    Date: 2005
  4. By: Daisuke Nikae (Osaka City University); Takeshi Ikeda (Osaka City University)
    Abstract: This paper introduces the economic theory of gquasi-exclusive territory.h We consider vertical dealings with two upstream firms and four downstream firms that compete in two separate markets. Under quasi- exclusive territory, downstream firms are bound to pay additional charges when selling goods beyond their territorial areas. We find that with respect to the two-part tariffs comprising a marginal price and a fixed fee, quasi-exclusive territory is more beneficial for upstream firms and more harmful for consumers than conventional exclusive territory. Moreover, we note that quasi-exclusive territory is in practice in various vertical dealings and that its regulation is a difficult task.
    Keywords: Exclusive territory, Quasi-exclusive territory, Vertical dealings, Two-part tariff
    JEL: D43 L22 L42 R32
    Date: 2005–08–01
  5. By: Halpern, László; Koren, Miklós; Szeidl, Adam
    Abstract: What is the effect of imports on productivity? To answer this question, we estimate a structural model of producers using product-level import data for a panel of Hungarian manufacturing firms from 1992 to 2001. In our model with heterogenous firms, producers choose to import or purchase domestically varieties of intermediate inputs. Imports affect firm productivity through expanding variety as well as improved input quality. The model leads to a production function where the total factor productivity of a firm depends on the share of inputs imported. To estimate this import-augmented production function, we extend the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure for a setting with an additional state variable, the number of input varieties imported. Our results suggest that the role of imports is both statistically and economically significant. Imports are responsible for 30% of the growth in aggregate total factor productivity in Hungary during the 1990s. About 50% of this effect is through imports advancing firm level productivity, while the remaining 50% comes from the reallocation of capital and labour to importers.
    Keywords: imports; intermediate inputs; productivity
    JEL: F12 F14 L25
    Date: 2005–07
  6. By: Nicola Brandt
    Abstract: <P>Building on an earlier study of patterns on firm entry, exit growth and survival based on new data from Eurostat covering nine European Union member countries (Brandt, 2004), this paper takes a closer look at the role of policies and institutions for firm entry and survival and at the link between new firm creation and economic performance. The earlier study revealed that firm entry rates, <I>i.e.</I> the number of new firms in a market in relation to all active enterprises, were particularly high in Information and Communication (ICT) related industries in recent years. This lends some support to the idea present in some theories of economic growth that new firms are important for the development and implementation of new technologies. This paper takes a closer look at the relationship between firm entry and economic performance. Results reveals that high rates of firm entry tend to coincide with rapid productivity, output and employment growth, especially in the ICT related services ...</P> <P>Dynamique de l’entreprise, réglementation et performance <P>S'appuyant sur une étude antérieure concernant les profils d'entrée, de sortie, de croissance et de survie des entreprises, elle-même fondée sur de nouvelles données d'Eurostat portant sur neuf pays membres de l'Union européenne (Brandt, 2004), le présent rapport examine de plus près le rôle des politiques et des institutions dans l'entrée sur le marché et la survie des entreprises, ainsi que le lien entre la création de nouvelles entreprises et les performances économiques. L'étude initiale révélait que les taux d'entrée des entreprises, c'est-à-dire le nombre de nouvelles entreprises en proportion de l'ensemble des entreprises en activité sur un marché, avaient été particulièrement élevés dans les branches d'activité liées à l'information et aux communications (TIC) ces dernières années. Cela tend à confirmer l'idée avancée dans certaines études théoriques sur la croissance économique selon laquelle les nouvelles entreprises jouent un rôle important dans le développement et la ...</P>
    Date: 2004–03–17
  7. By: Francois, Joseph; Wooton, Ian
    Abstract: We examine interaction between goods trade and market power in domestic trade and distribution sectors. Theory suggests a linkage between service-sector competition and goods trade, one supported by econometrics involving imports of 22 OECD countries vis-à-vis 69 exporters. This points to linkages between market access conditions for goods and the structure of the service sector. Competition in services affects the volume of goods trade. Additionally, because of interaction between tariffs and competition, the market structure of the domestic service sector becomes increasingly important as tariffs are reduced. Also, empirically service competition apparently matters most for exporters in smaller, poorer countries.
    Keywords: GATS; market access; services trade; strategic competition policy; trade and competition; trade liberalization
    JEL: F12 F13 F23
    Date: 2005–07
  8. By: Argentesi, Elena; Ivaldi, Marc
    Abstract: This paper first discusses how the market is delineated in some recent antitrust cases in the printed media industry. It evaluates the extent to which the main features of the industry are incorporated into the analysis and affect market definition. In addition we argue that an econometric analysis that does not incorporate these features can lead to biased estimates of elasticities. As demand substitution is a crucial element for defining market, bad estimates of elasticities could blur the boundaries of relevant markets. Second we propose a simple model that encompasses these features and in particular the two-sidedness of the market. Thirdly, we review some empirical papers that analyse the issue of demand estimation in printed media. Finally, we perform a statistical estimation on a dataset of magazines in order to provide a measure of the possible bias that could arise in the estimation of elasticities when one does not use a proper model.
    Keywords: market definition; printed media; two-sided markets
    JEL: K21 L40 L82
    Date: 2005–06
  9. By: Elena Argentesi
    Abstract: This paper looks at a form of non-price competition that has taken place in the Italian newspaper market, whereby weekly supplements are sold with the newspaper at a higher price. I estimate the impact of this selling strategy using a logit and a nested logit model of demand on a panel of Italian newspapers. I show that supplements increase the readership both in the weekday of issue and in the average weekday. This suggests that supplements are a way to attract new readers for the newspaper. This promotional effect is due both to business stealing and to market expansion.
    JEL: L11 L82 C33
    Date: 2004
  10. By: Elena Argentesi; Lapo Filistrucchi
    Abstract: The newspaper industry is a two-sided market: the readers market and the advertising market are closely linked by inter-market network externalities. We estimate market power in the Italian newspaper industry by building a structural model which encompasses a demand estimation for differentiated products on both sides of the market and where profit maximization by the publishing firms takes into account the interactions between them. The question that we address is whether the observed price pattern is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior by competing firms or is instead driven by some form of (tacit or explicit) coordinated practice.
    Keywords: demand estimation, market power, two-sided markets, newspapers, differentiated products.
    JEL: L11 L40 L82 C33
    Date: 2005
  11. By: Panayotis Dessyllas (Said Business School, University of Oxford); Alan Hughes (Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge)
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate the incidence of high technology acquisitions using a large international sample of acquisitions by public high technology firms. Controlling for firms’ financial characteristics, we examine the impact of the following innovation- related factors on the propensity to acquire: R&D-intensity as a proxy for R&D inputs; the citation-weighted patent-intensity as a proxy for R&D output; the stock of citation-weighted patents as a proxy for the accumulated stock of knowledge generated by past R&D efforts. The following conclusions can be drawn with respect to the characteristics of acquirers of non-public targets – mainly private firms and former subsidiaries. First, we find support for the view that the propensity to acquire new knowledge-related assets through acquisitions is driven by declining returns from the exploitation of a firm’s existing knowledge base. Second, we find evidence in favour of the make-or-buy theory that acquisitions are a substitute for in-house R&D activity. Third, our results are in accordance with the theoretical argument that a large stock of accumulated knowledge enhances a firm’s ability to absorb external knowledge through acquisitions. These results suggest that smaller acquisitions can be seen as part of an innovation strategy by acquiring firms with relatively low levels of internal R&D which seek to offset low R&D productivity by exploring a range of potential innovation trajectories in new and smaller business units. Interestingly, we find that these interpretations cannot be made for acquirers of the larger public companies.
    Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, acquisition likelihood, R&D, patents
    JEL: G34 O30 L20
    Date: 2005–07–27
  12. By: Troy Quast (University of Florida)
    Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of both the extent and the means of competitive entry in local telecommunications markets. Panel data are used to analyze the number of lines that competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) lease from regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) using two alternative arrangements: leasing only the wires that connect a customer’s premises to the phone network, or leasing all of the network elements that are needed to provide phone service. The estimates suggest that while the revenue potential of a market tends to have a large impact on the observed level of entry, the effect of the regulated rates at which the CLECs lease the elements is limited. The results suggest that entrants may factor regulatory uncertainty into their entry decisions, and that local conditions may materially affect the implementation of federal regulatory policy.
    Keywords: regulation, telecommunications, entry
    JEL: L
    Date: 2005–08–03
  13. By: Yvan Lengwiler; Elmar G. Wolfstetter
    Abstract: In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimize illegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption.
    Keywords: auctions, procurement, corruption, right of first refusal, numerical methods
    JEL: D44
    Date: 2005
  14. By: Rudiger Ahrend; William Tompson
    Abstract: <P>The gas industry is perhaps Russia’s least reformed major sector. Prices are regulated, exports are monopolised and the domestic market is dominated by a state-controlled, vertically integrated monopolist, OAO Gazprom. Gazprom combines commercial and regulatory functions, and maintains tight control over the sector’s infrastructure and over information flows within it. The sector as it is currently constituted is highly unlikely to be able to sustain sufficient output growth to satisfy both rising export commitments and domestic demand. There is significant potential for accelerating the growth of non-Gazprom production and making gas supply in Russia more competitive, but this will require fundamental reform. The proposals for reform advanced in the paper address two sets of issues. First, there is an urgent need to increase transparency in the sector and transfer many of the regulatory functions now performed by Gazprom to state bodies. Secondly, there is a longer-term need for a ...</P> <P>Le secteur du gaz en Russie : l’attente interminable pour des réformes? <P>L’industrie du gaz est peut être le secteur majeur le moins réformé en Russie. Les prix sont réglementés, les exportations sont effectuées par un monopole, et le marché intérieur est dominé par OAO Gazprom, un monopole verticalement intégré sous contrôle de l’État. Gazprom mélange des fonctions commerciales et de réglementation, et contrôle étroitement aussi bien l’infrastructure que les flux d’information à l’intérieur du secteur. De ce fait il est fortement improbable que le secteur dans sa forme actuelle soit capable d’atteindre une croissance de la production suffisante pour satisfaire aussi bien les engagements croissants d’exportations et la demande domestique. Le potentiel pour accroître la croissance de la production de gaz par d’autres producteurs que Gazprom, et de rendre l’offre de gaz en Russie plus compétitive, est fort. Mais l’exploitation de ce potentiel va nécessiter des réformes fondamentales. Les réformes proposées dans cet article concernent deux types de ...</P>
    Keywords: Regulation, Réglementation, Exports, competition, energy, énergie, gaz, Russia, economy, natural gas, infrastructure, pipelines, monopoly, state ownership, Gazprom, subsidies, ring fence, Russie, économie, infrastructure, pipelines, monopole, compétition, entreprises d’État, Gazprom, subventions, exportations, cantonnement
    JEL: L95 O52 P28 Q32 Q48
    Date: 2004–09–17
  15. By: William Tompson
    Abstract: <P>Russia in 2003 embarked on the restructuring of its electricity sector. The reform is intended to introduce competition into electricity production and supply, leaving dispatch, transmission and distribution as regulated natural monopolies with non-discriminatory third-party access to the networks. The ultimate aim of the reform is to create conditions that will encourage both investment in new capacity and greater efficiency of both production and consumption. The overall approach embodied in the reform is promising. However, there remains a serious risk that its aims could be subverted by special-interest lobbying during the lengthy implementation phase. If the reform is to succeed, the marketised segments of the sector must be characterised by real competition based on economically meaningful prices. There are two dangers here. The first is that private-sector interests will secure strategic holdings that allow them to exercise market power or even local monopoly power. The ...</P> <P>La restructuration du secteur de l’électricité : vers une véritable concurrence ou une fausse libéralisation? <P>En 2003, la Russie a entrepris de restructurer le secteur de l’électricité. L’objectif de ces réformes est d’instaurer la concurrence aux stades de la production et de la fourniture, en laissant le dispatching, le transport et la distribution sous le régime de monopoles naturels réglementés assortis d’un accès non discriminatoire des tiers aux réseaux. Le but ultime de la réforme est de créer les conditions pour encourager l’investissement dans de nouvelles capacités de production aussi bien que l’augmentation de l’efficacité de la production et de la consommation. La stratégie générale de réforme est prometteuse. On ne peut cependant négliger le risque que les objectifs fondamentaux de la réforme soient relégués au second rang par les pressions exercées par des groupes d’intérêt spéciaux pendant tout le temps qui sera nécessaire à sa mise en œuvre. Pour que la réforme puisse réussir, la concurrence doit pouvoir véritablement jouer dans les segments du secteur ouverts aux forces du ...</P>
    Keywords: privatisation, competition, concurrence, privatisation, electricity, électricité, Russia, economy, infrastructure, monopoly, state ownership, Russie, économie, infrastructure, monopole, entreprises d’État, grid, réseau
    JEL: L94 O52 P28 P31
    Date: 2004–09–30
  16. By: Yoon-Ho Alex Lee; Donald J. Brown (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
    Abstract: Conventional deadweight loss measures of the social cost of monopoly ignore, among other things, the social cost of inducing competition and thus cannot accurately capture the loss in social welfare. In this Article, we suggest an alternative method of measuring the social cost of monopoly. Using elements of general equilibrium theory, we propose a social cost metric where the benchmark is the Pareto optimal state of the economy that uses the least amount of resources, consistent with consumers' utility levels in the monopolized state. If the primary goal of antitrust policy is the enhancement of consumer welfare, then the proper benchmark is Pareto optimality, not simply competitive markets. We discuss the implications of our approach for antitrust law as well as how our methodology can be used in practice for allegations of monopoly power given a history of price-demand observations.
    Keywords: Monopoly power, Antitrust economics, Applied general equilibrium
    JEL: D42 D58 D61 L12 L41
    Date: 2005–07
  17. By: Thorsten Beck; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt; Ross Levine
    Abstract: Public policy debates and theoretical disputes motivate this paper’s examination of (i) the relationship between bank concentration and banking system fragility and (ii) the mechanisms underlying this relationship. We find no support for the view that concentration increases the fragility of banks. Rather, banking system concentration is associated with a lower probability that the country suffers a systemic banking crisis. In terms of policies, we find that (i) regulations and institutions that facilitate competition in banking are associated with less not more -- banking system fragility and (ii) including these policy indicators does not change the results on concentration. This suggests that concentration is a proxy for something else besides the competitive environment. Also, we do not find that official capital regulations, reserve requirements, or official prudential regulations lower crises probabilities. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that concentrated banking systems tend to have larger, better-diversified banks, which may help account for the positive link between concentration and stability.
    JEL: G21 G28 L16
    Date: 2005–08
  18. By: Marcelo Resende
    Abstract: This paper further investigated wave behaviours for mergers and acquisitions-M&A in the U.K. during the 1969Q1/2004Q1 period by means of Markov-Switching models. Previous analysis had focused on traditional models that incorporate the potentially limiting assumption of constant transition probabilities across regimes. The consideration of more general models with time-varying transition probabilities across regimes along the lines of Diebold et al (1994) provide a useful route for assessing to which extent M&A waves are driven by economic variables usually considered in the related literature. The empirical implementation considered lagged conditioning variables referring to real output growth, real growth in money supply and real stock market returns. The evidence indicated that one should reject the constant transition probability model in favour of the time-varying transition probability model and therefore the usual aggregate variables considered in the empirical literature on M&A appear indeed to play some role in determining the wave behaviour of M&A in the U.K., though the effects are asymmetric across the different regimes.
    JEL: C32 L12
    Date: 2005
  19. By: Ingo Vogelsang
    Abstract: Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a “used and useful” criterion.
    JEL: L50 L90
    Date: 2005
  20. By: Florian Zettelmeyer; Fiona Scott Morton; Jorge Silva-Risso
    Abstract: There is convincing evidence that the Internet has lowered the prices paid by some consumers in established industries, for example, term life insurance and car retailing. However, current research does not reveal much about how using the Internet lowers prices. This paper answers this question for the auto retailing industry. We use direct measures of search behavior and consumer characteristics to investigate how the Internet affects negotiated prices. We show that the Internet lowers prices for two distinct reasons. First, the Internet helps consumers learn the invoice price of dealers. Second, the referral process of online buying services, a novel institution made possible by the Internet, also helps consumers obtain lower prices. The combined information and referral price effects are -1.5%, corresponding to 22% of dealers' average gross profit margin per vehicle. We also find that buyers with a high disutility of bargaining benefit from information on the specific car they eventually purchased while buyers who like the bargaining process do not. The results suggest that the decisions consumers make to use the Internet to gather information and to use the negotiating clout of an online buying service have a real effect on the prices paid by these consumers.
    JEL: L11 L15 L62 D82 M31
    Date: 2005–08
  21. By: Panayotis Dessyllas (Said Business School, University of Oxford); Alan Hughes (Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge)
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate the motives of high-tech acquirers by analysing their revealed preferences in terms of the high-tech companies they acquire. Using a large sample of acquisitions involving publicly traded firms from various countries we ask whether high technology acquisitions are best understood in terms of acquirers seeking to source externally special innovation-related assets by acquiring firms with “superior” innovative performance; or acquirers seeking to acquire firms with “inferior” innovative performance in order to turn them around. We find evidence that acquisition is a very noisy phenomenon and that economic and innovation related variables explain only a modest part of the probability of becoming a target. We do however find that, compared to non-acquired firms, high-tech targets tend to be somewhat larger, to have poorer profitability, lower Tobin’s q and liquidity. In relation to their innovative profile, targets, in general, seem to have a relatively larger stock of accumulated knowledge (stock of citation-weighted patents), relatively higher R&D inputs (R&D-intensity), but they are more likely to generate no R&D output (citation-weighted patent- intensity) before they are acquired. We conclude that high technology acquisitions reflect a process which is primarily driven by acquirers wishing to exploit the potential for turning around firms which, despite a good past record, appear to be innovatively and economically inefficient before they are acquired.
    Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, acquisition likelihood, R&D, patents
    JEL: G34 O30 L20
    Date: 2005–07–27
  22. By: Kurt R. Brekke; Michael Kuhn
    Abstract: We study effects of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in the prescription drug market. There are two pharmaceutical firms providing horizontally differentiated (branded) drugs. Patients differ in their susceptibility to the drugs. If DTCA is allowed, this can be employed to induce (additional) patient visits. Physicians perfectly observe the patients' type (of illness), but rely on information to prescribe the correct drug. Drug information is conveyed by marketing (detailing), creating a captive and a selective segment of physicians. First, we show that detailing, DTCA and price (if not regulated) are complementary strategies for the firms. Thus, allowing DTCA induces more detailing and higher prices. Second, firms benefit from DTCA if detailing competition is not too fierce, which is true if investing in detailing is sufficiently costly. Otherwise, firms are better off with a ban on DTCA. Finally, DTCA tends to lower welfare if insurance is generous (low copayments) and/or price regulation is lenient. The desirability of DTCA also depends on whether or not the regulator is concerned with firms' profit.
    Keywords: marketing, pharmaceuticals, oligopoly
    JEL: I11 L13 L65 M37
    Date: 2005
  23. By: Paul Makdissi (Département d'économique, Université de Sherbrooke); Quentin Wodon (AFTPM, World Bank)
    Abstract: International Financial Institutions have advocated the privatization of integrated agricultural monopsonies in developing countries with the hope that competition between private firms under a contract farming system would reduce inefficiencies in production and enable farmers to obtain a higher share of world commodity prices. \ Using a very simple theoretical model, this paper shows however that the impact of privatization and contract farming may not be positive for all farmers.
    Keywords: Privatization, Cotton, Africa, Welfare
    JEL: O13 L1 D42
    Date: 2001
  24. By: Steffen Huck; Kai A. Konrad; Wieland Müller
    Abstract: The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as the internal organization of the firm, the time structure of decision making, information aspects of competition, or the imbeddedness of firm competition in a strategic trade competition game between governments. This survey will reveal that the puzzle as in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) may be resolved without recurring to cost savings of merger. Firms interact with each other, with customers, suppliers, their owners, and with governments in many different ways, and inspection of these types of interaction reveals a multiplicity of reasons why merger can be profitable for the merging firms, even in Cournot markets with linear demand and cost.
    JEL: D43 G34 L11 L13 L22 L41
    Date: 2005
  25. By: Nejat Anbarci (Department of Economics, Florida International University); Brett Katzman (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University)
    Abstract: The prominent Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), yields a higher concentration level in response to any merger between firms, implying that any merger will decrease the social welfare. Although HHI is used by the Anti-trust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (AD-DoJ), its merger implications are not fully embraced by the anti-trust authorities. We propose a class of concentration indices that is in line with the spirit of the AD-DoJ’s merger policies and consider different theoretical models which indicate that the AD-DoJ is justified in allowing mergers especially among smaller firms, as they counter the market power of dominant firms.
    Keywords: Horizontal Mergers, Industry Concentration, the Anti-Trust Division, Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Dominant Firm(s)
    JEL: L0
    Date: 2005–03
  26. By: Paul Conway; Véronique Janod; Giuseppe Nicoletti
    Abstract: <P>This paper describes trends in product market regulation in OECD countries over the period 1998 to 2003. The analysis is based on summary indicators of product market regulation that measure the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition. The results suggest that regulatory impediments to competition have declined in all OECD countries in recent years. Regulation has also become more homogenous across the OECD as countries with relatively restrictive policies have, in some areas, moved towards the regulatory environment of the more liberalized countries. Within some countries product market policies have become more consistent across different regulatory provisions, although relatively restrictive countries still tend to have a more heterogeneous approach to competition. In general, domestic barriers to competition tend to be higher in countries that have higher barriers to foreign trade and investment, and high levels of state control and barriers to competition ...</P> <P>Ce document décrit les évolutions de la réglementation encadrant les marchés de produits dans les pays de l'OCDE sur la période 1998-2003. L'analyse est basée sur des indicateurs synthétiques de la réglementation des marchés de produits qui mesurent l’intensité avec laquelle les politiques favorisent ou restreignent la concurrence. Les résultats suggèrent que les entraves à la concurrence résultant de la réglementation ont décliné dans tous pays de l’OCDE ces dernières années. La réglementation est aussi devenue plus homogène à travers l'OCDE, les pays disposant de politiques relativement restrictives, s’étant ralliés, dans certains domaines, à l’environnement réglementaire des pays plus libéraux. Dans certains pays, les politiques concernant les marchés de produits sont devenues plus cohérentes au regard des différents dispositifs réglementaires, même si les pays relativement restrictifs ont toujours tendance à disposer d’une approche plus disparate de la concurrence. De façon ...</P>
    Keywords: product market regulation, Indicators, Indicateurs, Réglementation des marchés de produits
    JEL: K2 L5
    Date: 2005–04–01
  27. By: Carl Gjersem
    Abstract: <P>The strength of product market competition plays an important role in economic growth as it affects economic efficiency and the allocation of resources, and can also lead to improved labour market performance. This paper examines product market competition and economic performance in the European Union. The Community’s competition rules, which apply whenever anti-competitive practices have an implication for cross-border trade, are enforced primarily by the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition, and complement national competition legislation. Reforms have been adopted recently to sharpen the toolkit and to increase the role of national authorities in the enforcement process. However, the toolkit could still be made more effective. Competition policy is complemented by, and partly overlapping with, the regulation of newly liberalised network industries. Despite the EU’s commendable efforts in this area, competition is still undermined by dominant incumbents in some ...</P> <P>Politiques pour la concurrence et la croissance sur les marchés de produits en Europe <P>La vigueur de la concurrence sur les marchés de produits joue un rôle important dans la croissance économique, influence l’efficience économique et l’allocation des ressources, et peut aussi induire de meilleurs résultats sur le marché du travail. Cette étude examine la concurrence sur les marchés de produits et la performance économique dans l’Union Européenne. Les règles de concurrence communautaires, qui s’appliquent chaque fois que des pratiques anticoncurrentielles ont une incidence sur les échanges transfrontières, sont mises en œuvre principalement par la Direction générale de la concurrence de la Commission et viennent compléter le droit national de la concurrence. Des réformes ont été adoptées récemment pour affiner le dispositif et renforcer le rôle des autorités nationales dans le processus d’application. Toutefois, l’efficacité des instruments en place pourrait être encore améliorée. La réglementation des industries de réseau récemment libéralisées complète la ...</P>
    Keywords: regulatory reform, Regulated industries, European Union, competition, concurrence, réforme de réglementation, euro area, antitrust law, integration, protection, trade negotiations, aggregate productivity and growth, l’Union Européenne, la zone euro, loi anti-trust, industries réglées, intégration, protection, négociations commerciales, productivité globale et croissance
    JEL: F13 F15 K21 K23 O47 O50
    Date: 2004–01–12
  28. By: Jens Høj; Michael Wise
    Abstract: <P>Empirical work shows that competition is important for promoting economic growth. However, in Japan the promotion of competition has long been compromised by ministerial guidance and exemptions from the competition law. Thus, the level and growth of productivity have been low in many domestically oriented sectors and consumer welfare has suffered under high prices and the slow introduction of new goods and services. This misallocation of resources contributes to explaining why the Japanese economy had difficulty in coming out of the quasi-stagnation of the past decade. Recognising that gains from more pro-competition policies are substantial, the Japanese government has now made the promotion of competitive markets a cornerstone of its economic policy. Reforms to promote product market competition in Japan should inter alia focus on strengthening the legal framework by increasing fines to a deterrent level and introducing cartel destabilising measures, such as a leniency ...</P> <P>Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performance économique au Japon <P>Des études empiriques montrent que la concurrence est importante pour promouvoir la croissance économique. Mais au Japon, la stimulation de la concurrence a longtemps été compromise par des directives ministérielles et des exemptions au droit de la concurrence. Aussi, le niveau et le taux de croissance de la productivité ont été bas dans de nombreux secteurs tournés vers le marché intérieur, et le bien-être des consommateurs a souffert de prix élevés et d’une diffusion trop lente des nouveaux biens et services. Cette mauvaise allocation des ressources contribue à expliquer pourquoi l’économie japonaise n’est pas parvenue à sortir de la quasi-stagnation de la dernière décennie. Conscient que des politiques plus propices au jeu de la concurrence peuvent s’avérer très bénéfiques, le gouvernement japonais a fait de la promotion des marchés concurrentiels l’une des pièces maîtresses de sa politique économique. Les réformes visant à stimuler la concurrence sur les marchés de produits au ...</P>
    Keywords: télécommunications, regulatory reform, network industries, réforme de la réglementation, industries de réseau, Japan, Japon, anti-trust law, competition law, cartel, productivity and growth, retail sector, energy, telecommunication, postal services, transportation, public procurement, réglementation anti-trust, droit de la concurrence, entente, productivité et croissance, secteur de détail, énergie, services postaux, transports, marchés publics
    JEL: F13 K21 L11 L16 L33 L42 L43 L81 L87 L92 L93 L94 L95 L96 O53 O57 Q18
    Date: 2004–05–06
  29. By: Claude Giorno; Philippe Gugler; Miguel Jimenez
    Abstract: <P>Une concurrence vigoureuse sur le marché des produits constitue un élément essentiel pour assurer une croissance économique dynamique. Cette étude examine les conditions de la concurrence en liaison avec les performances économiques de la Suisse, dont la croissance a été plus faible que dans la plupart des pays OCDE depuis 1980. Elle montre que d’importants progrès de la réforme des marchés des produits sont possibles dans un vaste ensemble de domaines, ce qui pourrait contribuer à réduire l’écart excessif de prix par rapport aux autres pays et renforcer la croissance. Ces réformes devraient concerner le cadre réglementaire de la concurrence, les industries de réseaux, le secteur de la santé, la révision de Loi sur le marché intérieur, les marchés publics, l’agriculture, les restrictions sur les importations parallèles et plus généralement l’ouverture des services à la concurrence étrangère ...</P>
    Keywords: Suisse, Santé, industries de réseau, concurrence, protection, productivité globale et croissance, cartel, importations parallèles, agriculture
    JEL: J18 K21 L42 L8 L9 O47 Q18
    Date: 2004–03–22
  30. By: Yongchun Baek; Randall Jones; Michael Wise
    Abstract: <P>Maintaining rapid economic growth depends increasingly on productivity gains, particularly in the service sector. Competition has an important role to play in achieving such gains. However, Korea’s development strategy has tended to weaken competition and has left a legacy of government intervention. Strengthening competition requires upgrading competition policy, increasing openness to international trade and foreign direct investment and improving the regulatory framework in network industries. In particular, the power of the Korea Fair Trade Commission should be expanded, while raising the level of sanctions and scaling back special treatment for certain sectors. Barriers to imports remain above the OECD average, particularly in agriculture, while the stock of inward direct investment is among the lowest in the OECD area. Restructuring plans in the network industries, notably electricity and gas, have lagged behind schedule. Price distortions and the absence of independent ...</P> <P>Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performances économiques en Corée <P>Le maintien d'une croissance économique rapide est de plus en plus tributaire des gains de productivité, en particulier dans le secteur des services. La concurrence a un rôle important à jouer dans la réalisation de ces gains. Néanmoins, la stratégie de développement de la Corée a eu tendance à affaiblir la concurrence et se traduit par une politique interventionniste héritée du passé. Le renforcement de la concurrence passe par une rénovation de la politique de la concurrence, une ouverture accrue aux échanges internationaux ainsi qu'à l'investissement direct étranger (IDE), et une amélioration du cadre réglementaire dans les industries de réseau. Il conviendrait de renforcer les prérogatives de la Commission coréenne de la concurrence, tout en alourdissant les sanctions prévues par la loi et en revoyant à la baisse les dispositions spéciales prévues pour certains secteurs. Les obstacles aux importations demeurent supérieurs à la moyenne de l'OCDE, notamment dans l'agriculture ...</P>
    Keywords: telecommunications, télécommunications, regulatory reform, network industries, réforme de la réglementation, industries de réseau, commerce de détail, Trade policy, politique commerciale, Korea, Corée, foreign direct investment, investissement direct étranger, anti-trust law, competition law, cartel, retail sector, droit de la concurrence, entente, législation antitrust, South Korean economy, electricity, gas, tariffs, chaebol, économie sud-coréenne, électricité, gaz, tarifs douaniers, chaebol
    JEL: F13 F21 K21 L11 L40 L43 L81 L94 L95 L96 O53 O57 Q17
    Date: 2004–08–09
  31. By: Jens Høj; Michael Wise
    Abstract: <P>Norwegian growth has been strong over the past decade. This development has been supported by the off-shore sector, but depleting oil reserves implies that growth will have to rely increasingly on the mainland economy. Empirical work shows that competition is important for promoting economic growth. Recognising the benefits of competition, the government wants to introduce regulatory reforms to stimulate economic growth. However, the promotion of competition has often conflicted with other policy objectives, such as maintaining a regionally dispersed population and a high degree of public ownership. This has lead to weak competition in a number of sectors, resulting in high prices, weak innovative activity and inefficient resource allocation. Reforms to promote product market competition in Norway should therefore <I>inter alia</I> focus on separating the public sector’s roles and functions as owner and regulator. This requires an increase in the independence of sector ...</P> <P>Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performance économique en Norvège <P>La Norvège a connu une croissance vigoureuse au cours des dix dernières années. Cette expansion a été alimentée par le secteur pétrolier offshore, mais l'épuisement progressif des réserves implique que l'économie continentale va devoir prendre peu à peu le relais pour soutenir la croissance. Des travaux empiriques montrent que la concurrence contribue de manière importante à l'expansion économique. Conscient des bienfaits de la concurrence, le gouvernement entend réformer la réglementation pour stimuler la croissance économique. Néanmoins, la promotion de la concurrence est souvent entrée en conflit avec d'autres objectifs, tels que le maintien d'une population géographiquement dispersée et du contrôle étendu de l'État sur diverses activités. Cela se traduit par un faible niveau de concurrence dans un certain nombre de secteurs, qui a pour corollaires des prix élevés, un manque de dynamisme en matière d'innovation et une allocation inefficiente des ressources. Les réformes ...</P>
    Keywords: Norway, Norvège, regulatory reform, network industries, réforme de la réglementation, industries de réseau, commerce de détail, competition law, productivity and growth, retail sector, public procurement, droit de la concurrence, productivité et croissance, marchés publics, product market competition, public ownership, concurrence sur les marchés de produits, actifs publics
    JEL: K21 L11 L16 L33 L43 L81 L87 L9 O57
    Date: 2004–05–14
  32. By: Claude Giorno; Philippe Gugler; Miguel Jimenez
    Abstract: <P>The strength of product market competition plays an important role in ensuring dynamic economic growth. This paper examines product market competition and its link with economic performance in Switzerland whose growth has been weaker than in most OECD countries since 1980. It shows that substantial progress in reforming product markets can be made in many areas, which would contribute to reduce the excessive price differential vis-à-vis other countries and stimulate growth. These reforms should focus on the legal framework of competition, the network industries, the health sector, the revision of the Domestic Market Act, agriculture, the restriction on parallel imports and, more generally, the opening up of services to foreign competition ...</P>
    Keywords: Switzerland, Health, network industries, competition, cartel, protection, aggregate productivity and growth, parallel imports, agriculture
    JEL: J18 K21 L42 L8 L9 O47 Q18
    Date: 2004–03–19
  33. By: Lennart Goranson; Martin Jørgensen; Deborah Roseveare
    Abstract: <P>Vigorous product market competition plays a central role in bolstering productivity growth. Sweden has strengthened competition legislation and deregulated a number of sectors, including electricity, telecommunications and parts of transport, over the past 10 to 15 years. This paper examines the current state of product market competition and proposes further measures. A stronger institutional framework would facilitate identification and elimination of anti-competitive behaviour, such as hard-core cartels. Efforts to inject effective competition into a range of network industries have been broadly successful, but specific measures could increase competition in several sectors, such as retail and construction. There is also room to boost competition in Sweden’s large and decentralised public sector and in its interactions with the private sector, so that competitive neutrality applies to all public sector activities ...</P> <P>La vigueur de la concurrence sur les marchés de produits joue un rôle central dans la stimulation des gains de productivité. La Suède a renforcé la législation concernant la concurrence et déréglementé un certain nombre de secteurs, dont l’électricité, les télécommunications et certains segments des transports. Cette étude examine l’état actuel de la concurrence en Suède et propose des mesures supplémentaires. Un cadre institutionnel renforcé faciliterait la détection et l’élimination des comportements anticoncurrentiels, don’t les ententes injustifiables. Des efforts ont été accomplis pour introduire un peu plus de concurrence active dans un éventail d’industries de réseau et ils ont globalement été couronnés de succès, mais quelques mesures concrètes seront nécessaires pour améliorer la concurrences dans plusieurs autres secteurs, dont la distribution et la construction. Il y a lieu également d’intensifier les efforts pour stimuler la concurrence dans le vaste secteur public ...</P>
    Keywords: Sweden, Regulation, network industries, Réglementation, industries de réseau, competition, concurrence, public procurement, marchés publics, product markets, retail distribution, construction, public sector, competitive neutrality, La Suède, marchés de produits, grande distribution, construction, neutralité de concurrence
    JEL: H4 K21 L1 L32 L33 L41 L43 L44 L8 L9 O52
    Date: 2004–05–12
  34. By: Carl Gjersem; Philip Hemmings; Andreas Reindl
    Abstract: <P>The establishment of competitive markets has been one of the cornerstones Hungarian economic policy over the past decade, alongside a successful strategy of attracting foreign investment. Broad statistical measures show no signs of endemically weak domestic competition, though the country’s relatively low productivity among domestic business likely signals some sheltering from international competition. The generally healthy level of competition is partly because competition legislation and its enforcement are of a good standard. Nevertheless, room for improvement is suggested in a number of areas. In particular, it is argued that individuals should be able to initiate legal actions directly, <I>i.e.</I> without having to proceed via the competition authority. And, it is suggested that sanctions against individuals in hard-core cartel cases are introduced. In examining specific sectors, this paper is critical of the pace of progress towards competition in the network industries. The rail ...</P> <P>Concurrence sur les marches de produits et performance economique en Hongrie <P>La mise en place de marchés concurrentiels a été l’une des pierres angulaires de la politique économique menée par la Hongrie au cours de la dernière décennie, parallèlement à des mesures qui ont permis d’attirer l’investissement étranger. Bien que les indicateurs statistiques généraux ne mettent pas en évidence d’insuffisance systématique de la concurrence sur le marché intérieur, la productivité relativement faible des entreprises locales témoigne probablement d’une certaine protection vis-à-vis de la concurrence internationale. Le niveau généralement soutenu de la concurrence tient en partie à la qualité de la réglementation en matière de concurrence et de son application. Néanmoins, des améliorations seraient sans doute possibles dans plusieurs domaines. En particulier, il semblerait souhaitable que les particuliers puissent engager directement des actions en justice, sans avoir à passer par l’autorité de la concurrence. De même, il serait probablement utile que des sanctions ...</P>
    Keywords: Hungary, Hongrie, regulatory reform, réforme de la réglementation, Regulated industries, competition, concurrence, antitrust law, protection, aggregate productivity and growth, protection, productivité globale et croissance, competition legislation, législation antitrust, législation en matière de concurrence, secteurs réglementés
    JEL: F13 K21 K23 O47 O52 O57
    Date: 2004–03–02
  35. By: Jens Høj; Michael Wise
    Abstract: <P>Following the deep recession in the early 1990s growth has been strong, but the scope for economic catch-up remains considerable and cross-country empirical evidence suggests that enhancing competition is an important means of achieving this. Structural reforms to strengthen competition in the early 1990s did boost growth and were also ahead of similar developments in the EU. However, indicators suggest that relatively weak competition remains in a number of sectors. Moreover, potential competition is reduced by a sparse population and relative long distances to large markets, which together with the prevalence of local monopolies and public ownership in many network industries, point to the need for greater vigilance to sustain and promote competition. Further reforms to promote product market competition should focus on fundamental changes in the regulatory approach as well as more incremental measures to intensify competition. The competition authority should concentrate ...</P> <P>Concurrence sur le marché des biens et performance économique en Finlande <P>Après la sévère récession des années 1990, la croissance économique a été forte mais la convergence en termes de la productivité est encore loin d’être complète et les comparaisons empiriques internationales suggèrent qu’un renforcement de la concurrence pourrait résorber une part significative de ce retard. Certes, les réformes structurelles mises en œuvre au début des années 1990 pour renforcer la concurrence ont soutenu la croissance et ont même souvent été plus précoces qu’au sein de l’Union Européenne. Néanmoins, divers indicateurs suggèrent que le degré de concurrence reste insuffisant dans de nombreux secteurs. En outre, le degré potentiel de concurrence reste contenu en raison de l’éparpillement de la population et l’éloignement par rapport des longues distances d’accès aux grands marchés, qui, combinés à l’importance des monopoles locaux et de l’actionnariat de l’état dans de nombreuses industries de réseaux, suggèrent la nécessité d’une vigilance renforcée pour ...</P>
    Keywords: regulatory reform, network industries, Finland, Finlande, competition law, productivity and growth, retail sector, public procurement, droit de la concurrence, productivité et croissance, product market competition, public ownership, concurrence sur le marché des biens, réforme structurelle, vente au détail, industries de réseaux, achat public, secteur public
    JEL: K21 L11 L16 L33 L43 L81 L87 L9 O57
    Date: 2004–12–20
  36. By: Annabelle Mourougane; Michael Wise
    Abstract: The paper examines the current state of competition in a number of sectors that are important for the economy. Because of the country’s small size and isolation, the analysis focuses on barriers to entry, investment and external trade, rather than some standard indicators of competition stance. The competition law and institutions are generally well-conceived, although high-profile litigation about mergers and market-power problems hasstretched their capacities and until recently, diverted attention from enforcement against price fixing. Overall, markets appear to function well in New Zealand, but progress towards liberalisation seems recently to have lost momentum. In particular, improvement could be made in three main areas: in the energy sector, lifting current barriers to investment and developing forward markets are necessary to ensure the economy will be able to cope with long-term challenges; in telecommunications markets, concerns have been mounting regarding high prices and slow deployment of broadband; and in the public sector, there is scope for further use of private delivery for public services and reducing state ownership, especially in potentially competitive markets. Some adjustments to the regulatory framework and policies in a number of other sectors would also be beneficial. This Working Paper relates to the 2005 OECD Economic Survey of New Zealand ( <P>Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performance économique en Nouvelle-Zélande Cet article examine l’état actuel de la concurrence dans un certain nombre de secteurs importants pour l’économie. L’analyse est axée sur les obstacles à l’entrée, à l’investissement et au commerce extérieur, plutôt que sur des indicateurs types de l’intensité de la concurrence en raison de la faible superficie et l’isolement du pays. Le droit de la concurrence et les organismes connexes sont généralement bien conçus, même si des contentieux notoires en matière de fusions et des problèmes de pouvoir de marché ont fortement sollicité leurs capacités et, jusqu’à une date récente, détourné l’attention de la lutte contre les ententes sur les prix. Au total, les marchés semblent bien fonctionner en Nouvelle-Zélande, mais le processus de libéralisation a apparemment marqué le pas ces derniers temps. En particulier, des améliorations sont possibles sur trois grands fronts : dans le secteur de l’énergie, il faut supprimer les obstacles actuels à l’investissement et développer les marchés à terme pour permettre à l’économie de relever les défis de long terme ; sur les marchés des télécommunications, le niveau élevé des prix et la lenteur du déploiement du réseau à large bande suscitent des préoccupations grandissantes ; enfin, dans le secteur public, on pourrait recourir davantage à la prestation privée de services publics et réduire les participations de l’État, surtout sur les marchés potentiellement concurrentiels. Des ajustements du cadre et de la politique de la concurrence seraient également bénéfiques dans plusieurs autres secteurs. Ce Document de travail se rapporte à l'Étude économique de l'OCDE de la Nouvelle-Zélande, 2005 (
    Keywords: telecommunications, télécommunications, competition policy, politique de la concurrence, transport aérien, retail trade, commerce de détail, Trade, privatisation, banking, privatisation, agriculture, agriculture, electricity, électricité, natural gas
    JEL: H4 K20 K21 L50 L9 Q1 Q4
    Date: 2005–07–26

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