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on China |
| By: | Heather Hennerich |
| Abstract: | China has focused on innovation and is moving from being a low-cost producer to a high-tech producer and exporter. An economist explains the trajectory. |
| Date: | 2025–11–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:l00100:102781 |
| By: | Fabrice Defever; Emanuel Ornelas |
| Abstract: | We study how the end of the quota system for textiles and clothing products in the American and European markets on January 1, 2005, affected China’s exports to third countries, where policy was unchanged. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the number of Chinese firms exporting previously restricted products to third countries increased sharply after quota removal. The expansion involved many private firms that exported to neither US-EU markets before nor after 2005. This indicates that the policy shock enhanced China’s role as an export base. Conversely, protectionist shifts in large economies would likely generate sizeable negative third-market effects. |
| Keywords: | import quotas, export entry, China |
| JEL: | F13 F14 D22 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12511 |
| By: | Beraja, Martin; Peng, Wenwei; Yang, David Y.; Yuchtman, Noam |
| Abstract: | Venture capital plays an important role in funding and shaping innovation outcomes, characterized by investors’ deep knowledge of the technology, industry, and institutions, as well as their long-running relationships with the entrepreneurship and innovation community. China, in its pursuit of global leadership in AI innovation and technology, has set up government venture capital funds so that both national and local governments act as venture capitalists. These government-led venture capital funds combine features of private venture capital with traditional government innovation policies. In this paper, we collect comprehensive data on China’s government and private venture capital funds. We draw three important contrasts between government and private VC funds: (i) government funds are spatially more dispersed than private funds; (ii) government funds invest in firms with weaker ex-ante performance signals but these firms exhibit growth rates exceeding those of firms in which private funds invest; and (iii) private VC funds follow government VC investments, especially when hometown government funds directly invest on firms with weaker ex-ante performance signals. We interpret these patterns in light of VC funds’ traditional role overcoming information frictions and China’s unique institutional environment, which includes important frictions on mobility and information. |
| Keywords: | venture capital; artificial intelligence; innovation policy |
| JEL: | G24 G28 O38 |
| Date: | 2025–02–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:124143 |
| By: | Nie, Peng (Xi’an Jiaotong University); Spitzer, Sonja (Department of Demography, University of Vienna, Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, OeAW, University of Vienna)); Sousa-Poza, Alfonso (University of Hohenheim) |
| Abstract: | Using panel data on over 17, 000 adults from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), this paper investigates the role of health perception biases for healthcare utilization and related expenditure in China. We measure health perception biases as the difference between objective health outcomes from physical examinations and self-reported health. Leveraging the longitudinal dimension of the data, we address unobserved individual heterogeneity in the relationship between perception biases and healthcare use. We find that individuals who underestimate their health visit the doctor more often and have more hospital stays, while those who overestimate their health are less likely to use those healthcare services. Health perception biases are also strongly associated with total and out-of-pocket expenditures for both outpatient and inpatient care. Importantly, family support – especially the presence of co-resident sons – mitigates the tendency of those underestimating their health to seek more care, highlighting the role of family dynamics in healthcare decisions. Moreover, differences in China’s heterogeneous health insurance schemes appear to influence how health misperception translates into healthcare spending. |
| Keywords: | health perception bias, overconfidence, underconfidence, healthcare utilization, China |
| JEL: | I10 I12 I18 D83 P46 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18384 |
| By: | Tamim Bayoumi ((King’s College); Joseph E. Gagnon (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | Global current account imbalances widened in the past two years, led by growing surpluses in China and deficits in the United States. Most forecasters expect imbalances to stabilize or even narrow in 2026 and 2027. Bayoumi and Gagnon disagree with these projections, concluding that China's surplus will grow considerably, putting downward pressure on surpluses in Europe and the rest of Asia. The global economy may be on the cusp of a second, more intense China shock, with profound geopolitical and economic consequences. |
| Keywords: | Current account; protectionism; tariff; trade tensions. |
| JEL: | F21 F32 F34 F51 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp26-2 |
| By: | Boele Bonthuis; Yongquan Cao; Christoph Freudenberg |
| Abstract: | China is experiencing rapid population aging and a declining workforce, posing significant economic and fiscal challenges, especially to the pension system. This paper examines the evolution of China’s pension system, assesses its gaps relative to international peers, and evaluates the macro-fiscal implications of population aging and various pension reforms. Using a calibrated overlapping generations model that explicitly incorporates the rural–urban disparities, we project that population aging alone can slow annual GDP growth by about 2 percentage points between 2024 and 2050, while pension spending can rise by nearly 10 percentage points of GDP. The 2024 retirement age reform eases some of the long-term growth and fiscal sustainability pressures, raising GDP growth by 0.2 percentage points annually and reducing pension spending from 15.3 percent to 11.9 percent of GDP by 2050. We also use the model to examine a set of policy-relevant reforms—doubling Residents Pension Scheme benefits which are currently inadequate, linking benefits to life expectancy, further increasing the retirement age, and promoting urbanization—and find significant effects on fiscal and macroeconomic outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Population Aging; Pension System; Urbanization; China; Fiscal Policy |
| Date: | 2026–02–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2026/027 |
| By: | Zhu, Kai (Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Beijing 100710, China); Cheng, Xiangran (School of Statistics, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China); Dong, Kangyin (School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China); Jamasb, Tooraj (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School) |
| Abstract: | Amid the global green energy transition, China faces bottlenecks in renewable energy integration due to underdeveloped market-based trading systems. To address this gap, this study investigates the effectiveness of distributed power generation trading (DPGT) using panel data of Chinese cities between 2014 and 2023 and a multi-period difference-in-differences model. The findings show that (1) DPGT has significantly promoted the development of green energy industries; (2) the aggregation of talent and capital elements and green technology cooperation facilitate industrial growth; (3) the policy effects are more pronounced in non-resource-based cities, high energy-consuming cities, and cities that prioritize DPGT industries; (4) DPGT reduces emissions of conventional pollutants by displacing traditional thermal power generation. However, due to the peak shaving of thermal power and rebound effect, its carbon emissions reduction has not met expectations. |
| Keywords: | Distributed power generation trading (DPGT); Market-oriented trading; Green energy industry; Talent and capital aggregation; Green technology cooperation |
| JEL: | C21 H23 Q51 Q58 R12 |
| Date: | 2026–02–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2026_006 |
| By: | Jiayi Hou; Xuan Teng; Xuan Wang |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how commission rates affect app entry across platforms. We examine an increase in Android game commission rate from 30% to 50% in China in 2014 and its impact on Android and iOS app stores, separately, in a difference-in-differences framework. We find a direct negative entry effect on Android by 47%. Meanwhile, the number of new games on the iOS App Store significantly decreased by 30% due to the higher Android commission rate, implying a negative cross-platform spillover effect. Moreover, the share of high-quality new games significantly decreased by 12%, indicating that higher commission rates discourage developers’ quality provision. |
| Keywords: | platform competition, commission rate, complementarity, entry, quality, app stores, mobile applications |
| JEL: | K21 L11 L42 L86 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12378 |
| By: | Yilin Hou; Michael Kumhof; Lei Shao |
| Abstract: | This paper develops an analytical framework for examining land taxation in the context of contemporary urban economies. We dissect the China case for simulation, comparing two model-based scenarios where revenue losses from consumption taxes are replaced by higher income taxes and land taxes. We calibrate the model to year-2015 data and find that higher income taxes cause large losses in output and income, while higher land taxes lead to substantive gains that increase with land share in net wealth. This paper offers empirical explorations in revitalizing the land tax, with simulation results at a large country level for generalization. |
| Keywords: | land value tax, consumption tax, capital income tax, labor income tax, balanced budget |
| JEL: | E62 H21 H61 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12476 |
| By: | Minnich, John |
| Abstract: | What do the geopolitical dynamics of the Trump era mean for future patterns of technology transfer to the Global South? Drawing on theories of oligopolistic competition in economics and historical cases of great power rivalry, I argue China’s rise and U.S.-China competition will likely increase opportunities for technology transfer to developing states, all else equal. However, great powers, like firms in oligopolistic markets, can compete or collude. Given President Trump’s desire for a “deal” with China, the implications of a U.S.-China “grand bargain” for investment and technology flows to other regions must be considered. Any agreement that sustainably lowers U.S.-China tensions could reduce both sides’ incentives to bolster independent spheres of economic influence, and in turn to trade technology for political support from Global South countries. Nonetheless, a stable deal will be hard to reach and harder to sustain. Insofar as U.S.-China rivalry improves low-income countries’ access to and ability to bargain for technology, it would be a small silver lining to an otherwise fraught situation. |
| Keywords: | rise of China; great power competition; technology transfer; Global South |
| JEL: | N0 L81 |
| Date: | 2025–12–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:129983 |
| By: | Joaquin Vespignani; Russell Smyth; Jamel Saadaoui; Yitian Wang |
| Abstract: | We develop novel, stage-specific, geopolitical risk indicators to examine how geopolitical risk is distributed across the supply-chain for lithium and copper, two minerals which are vital for low-carbon technologies. We find that refining is the geopolitical bottleneck for both minerals, reflecting that refining capacity is highly concentrated in China. We examine refining diversification, strategic stockpiling, and AI-driven productivity gains as complementary policy instruments for mitigating exposure to geopolitical risk at the refining stage. We show that reducing China's refining share substantially lowers refining-stage geopolitical risk, with larger gains for lithium than for copper. We find that stockpiling plays a critical role in buffering near-term geopolitical shocks, but significantly increases the projected shortfall in copper and lithium which is needed to realize the clean energy transition under alternative Net Zero pathways. We demonstrate that AI-driven productivity gains will be needed to narrow the projected supply gaps for both minerals. Our results suggest that ensuring effective security of critical minerals requires a coordinated policy mix, combining refining diversification, strategic stockpiling, and productivity-enhancing technological change. |
| Keywords: | critical minerals, copper, lithium, geopolitical risk, refining bottlenecks |
| JEL: | C14 Q20 Q41 Q43 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2026-15 |
| By: | Pau Pujolas; Jack Rossbach |
| Abstract: | We quantify the Tariff Laffer Curve for the U.S. using a multi-sector Ricardian model calibrated to the 2025 US trade war. We find revenue-maximizing tariffs of 20--30 percent and welfare-maximizing rates of 0--10 percent. We define the Marginal Fiscal Efficiency Index to partition tariffs into welfare-improving, trade-off, and revenue-decreasing regions. Expanding the trade war to more partners raises peak revenue even under retaliation, whereas coordinated retaliation sharply erodes welfare. By January 2026, 20 percent of U.S. tariffs exceed their Laffer peaks. Inverse-optimum estimation reveals diminished U.S. concern for foreign welfare, punitive treatment of China, and rising revenue motives. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2602.18938 |
| By: | Ting Chen; Jiajia Gu; L. Rachel Ngai; Jin Wang |
| Abstract: | We study the uneven impacts of reducing mobility barriers arising from land market frictions by leveraging two major land reforms that strengthened land rental rights in China. We construct a novel county-level reform index by tracing the reforms’ spatial and temporal rollout. Combining this index with a large panel dataset, we show that, relative to men, the reforms facilitate rural women’s transition out of agriculture while reducing urban women’s employment and wage income. We embed the reform index in a two-sector model with household-level employment decisions. Interactions between land market frictions and gender roles in market and home production drive these uneven impacts. Counterfactual analyses suggest that alleviating these frictions substantially affects female labor allocation and agricultural productivity. |
| Keywords: | Land; Labor mobility; Household employment patterns; Structural transformation; Agricultural productivity gap |
| Date: | 2026–02–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2026/028 |
| By: | Fang, Tony (Memorial University of Newfoundland); Pracek, Torin (Queen's University); Chen, Jianghua (Hefei University); Chen, Wen-hao (National Taipei University) |
| Abstract: | This paper draws on trade data, academic literature, government reports, and policy documents to contextualize historic trade dynamics and trace the buildup to recent disputes. Using a comparative framework, we analyze how Sino-U.S. and Sino-Canada relations have shaped and continue to shape agri-food trade flows. Our analysis reveals structural vulnerabilities in U.S. and Canadian agricultural exports to China, emphasizing how reliance on a narrow set of commodities exposes both countries to economic losses resulting from China’s trade policies. Simultaneously, China’s dependence on a limited number of suppliers for large volumes of key commodities makes it vulnerable to price volatility and supply uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | agri-trade, bilateral agreements, tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers |
| JEL: | D74 Q11 Q17 Q18 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18362 |
| By: | Loren Brandt; Feitao Jiang; Yao Luo; Yingjun Su |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how the geographic distribution of supply and demand shapes market power in the Chinese steel industry. Drawing on novel data, we develop and estimate an equilibrium model that accommodates spatial demand variations and rich firm heterogeneity—encompassing differences in location, product quality, production coefficients, and cost efficiencies. Using this framework, we simulate the impact of shifts in downstream demand and evaluate the welfare implications of mergers under various market frictions—an issue central to China’s industrial policy. We show that consolidation design is central to welfare outcomes: mergers led by more efficient firms and confined within regions generate substantially larger gains than nationally coordinated consolidation centered on large incumbents. The realized 2018–2024 merger wave achieved only a fraction of attainable welfare improvements. Our simulation results also suggest that as the geographic locus of demand evolves, the effects of industrial reorganization hinge critically on how supply adjusts across regions. |
| Keywords: | Spatial Differentiation, Capacity Misalignment, Market Power, Merger Analysis, Sales Aggregation |
| JEL: | G34 L13 L61 R12 |
| Date: | 2026–02–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-820 |
| By: | Julia Manso |
| Abstract: | Sentiment towards the Chinese real estate sector has deteriorated following the introduction of financing constraints in 2020 with the ''three red lines." Forcing developers to restructure their debt, the policy triggered a cascade of financing troubles, defaults, and reduced housing demand, ultimately culminating in a prolonged real estate crisis. This paper utilizes a network approach in line with Demirer et al. (2018) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) to measure daily time-varying connectedness in the stock return volatilities of major Chinese real estate developers throughout the crisis. Focusing on spillover between companies as reflected by market perception, this paper examines how connectedness evolves over time across firms with different regional exposures and state-ownership statuses, filling a gap in the literature to elucidate where property demand and real estate firm trustworthiness have deteriorated most. An event-study analysis of four key moments of the crisis outlines distinct phases of market sentiment: with the introduction of the three red lines, connectedness primarily reflects shared exposure and a uniform shock to the market. Then, the early unrest surrounding Evergrande exposes strong regional differentiation, with firms concentrated in less developed regions receiving significant spillover. By one year into the crisis, previously stable regions receive higher levels of spillover, and there is evidence of a substitution effect towards private developers. Two years into the crisis, the market has much less homogeneity in effects across regions and state-ownership status: major shocks induce minimal network changes, reflecting how investors have already priced in their beliefs. This paper also offers one of the most extensive timelines of the Chinese real estate crisis to date, and a new R package, GephiForR, was created for the network visualization in this paper. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2602.19740 |
| By: | Carlos Gradín |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I analyze historical trends in the size and composition of the global middle class. To reduce arbitrariness in prior definitions, I propose a new definition of today’s middle class based on the two central income classes in the four-group simplified representation of the world distribution, thereby minimizing information loss (i.e., maximizing class inequality). So defined, the global middle class comprises approximately half of the world’s population and income, roughly encompassing a rising developing middle class (the global lower-middle class) and those aligning with Western European lower-middle-class living standards (the global upper-middle class). I investigate its historical trends using both absolute and relative approaches. I show that the significant expansion of people living with today’s middle-class standards, particularly over the last two decades, was driven by stronger economic growth in emerging economies such as China, only partially offset by changes in income distribution within countries. This expansion resulted in a dramatic shift in the composition of the middle class, which I also document. I compare these trends with alternative approaches to defining the middle class and assess their robustness. |
| Keywords: | Global income distribution, global middle class, income growth, income inequality |
| JEL: | D31 D63 F63 I31 O15 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vig:wpaper:2601 |
| By: | Woo, Hyeyoung |
| Abstract: | Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers - countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events - are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States. South Korea's 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development partners. |
| Keywords: | development cooperation, geopolitics, Central Asia, middle power, Korea, Türkiye |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:diedps:337448 |