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on China |
| By: | Zhang, Bing (Nanjing University); Liu, Mengdi (University of International Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | To cope with the stricter environmental regulation, manufacturing firms need to carry out pollution reduction activities and change their optimal production decisions, which may affect their labor demand. Using a ten-year firm-level panel dataset (1998-2007), we use an estimation technique pairing propensity score matching (PSM) with a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator to examine the impacts of a national air pollution control policy on employment in China. We find that China’s Key Cities for Air Pollution Control (KCAPC) policy effectively lowered sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions by approximately 26%. The new environmental regulation significantly reduced manufacturing labor demand by approximately 3%. Most importantly, firms reduce pollution emission mainly by upgrading production technology so the decline in labor is partly due to the increase in labor productivity brought about by technological progress. As a result of pollution reduction, low-skilled employees, female employees, and workers in domestic manufacturing firms are more affected by environmental regulation in China. |
| Keywords: | Labor demand; Environmental regulation; Air pollution control; Manufacturing firm; China |
| JEL: | Q56 |
| Date: | 2024–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunefd:2024_004&r=cna |
| By: | Antonio Afonso; Valérie Mignon; Jamel Saadaoui |
| Abstract: | We assess the impact of China’s bilateral political relations with three main trading partners—the US, Germany, and the UK—on current account balances and exchange rates, over the 1960Q1- 2022Q4 period. Relying on the lag-augmented VAR approach with time-varying Granger causality tests, we find that political relationships with China strongly matter in explaining the dynamics of current accounts and exchange rates, supporting the “trade follows the flag” view. Such relationships cause the evolution of the exchange rate (except in the UK) and the current account; these causal links being time-varying for the US and the UK and robust over the entire period for Germany. These findings suggest that policymakers should account for bilateral political relationships to understand the global macroeconomic consequences of political tensions. |
| Keywords: | Political relations; time-varying causality; lag-augmented vector autoregression; China. |
| JEL: | C22 F51 Q41 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2024-17&r=cna |
| By: | lunwu Liu; Shi Liu |
| Abstract: | This study adopts the fixed effects panel model and provincial panel data on anticorruption and the innovation efficiency of high-level technology and new technology enterprises in China from 2005 to 2014, to estimate the effects of the anticorruption movement on the innovation efficiency of enterprises at different corruption levels. The empirical results show that anticorruption is positively correlated with the innovation efficiency of enterprises; however, the correlation is differentiated according to different corruption levels and business natures. At a high level of corruption, anticorruption has positive impacts on enterprises' innovation; at a low level of corruption, it negatively affects innovation efficiency. However, anticorruption has negative effects on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises at both high and low corruption levels; for nonstate-owned enterprises, its effects are positive at a high corruption level and negative at a low corruption level. The effects remain the same across different regions. |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2404.09553&r=cna |
| By: | CHOI , Jangho (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); CHOI, Yoojeong (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | This article analyzes North Korea-China trade trends and statistics in 2023 to evaluate the extent of North Korea's trade normalization and its performance. North Korea's trade with China increased by more than 120% compared to the previous year as the country declared a COVID-19 Endemic and gradually eased border controls, but did not recover to 2018-19 levels, the year before the outbreak of COVID-19. Imports to China recorded 2.00 billion, 124.1% higher than the 0.89 billion in 2022. North Korea's imports from China in 2023 are estimated to be the maximum achievable given the lack of a full resumption of over-land trade. However, as the negative impact of UN sanctions on the North Korean economy is ongoing, making it difficult to normalize industrial production. North Korea mainly imported raw materials for processing trade (textile and garment raw materials), staple foods (rice and sugar), agricultural materials (fertilizer), and construction materials from China in 2023. North Korea’s exports to China stood at 0.29 billion, up 118.4% from 0.13 billion in 2023. Exports remain at the 16.9% of the level before the tightening of UN sanctions on North Korea, as the country has failed to diversify its products and expand exports of major export items. Exports were highly dependent on specific products, wigs and false eyelashes, a labor-intensive industry, accounting for 57.1% of total exports. In spite of increasing wigs export, North Korea failed to further expand its amount and diversify the export items in the second half of the year. According to the analysis of trade statistics, the main goals of North Korea's 2023 US foreign economic policy are: (1) resuming smuggling trade in textiles and clothing, (2) building irrigation canals in preparation for summer floods, (3) implementing state-led grain distribution, (4) building living houses in a rural area, and (5) increasing metal production for Russian arms exports. Despite the increase in imports from China in the transition to the coronavirus pandemic, it is difficult to say that it has yet led to the recovery of industrial production and economic development. The future of North Korea's trade with the rest of the world in 2024 will be determined by whether North Korea fully opens its borders and improves its relations with China. In 2024, both North Korea's exports and imports are expected to be slightly higher than in 2023. North Korea's exports are unlikely to increase significantly, as North Korea-Russia military cooperation is expected to continue and China is likely to maintain its checks on the growing Sino-Russian alignment. Increased imports will lead to a larger trade deficit, but it will be within North Korea's ability to manage for one to two years. |
| Keywords: | North Korea; North Korea and China Relation; Trade of North Korea; DPRK |
| Date: | 2024–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2024_009&r=cna |
| By: | Bräutigam, Deborah A.; Huang, Yufan |
| Abstract: | On March 25, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the world, the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank proposed that the leaders of the world's 20 largest economies, the Group of 20 (G20), provide breathing space by suspending the collection of debt service on official loans to 73 of the world's poorest countries. The G20 quickly launched the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) on April 15, 2020. The DSSI was the first big test of the G20's global economic coordination leadership regarding low and middle-income country sovereign debt. The changing pattern of global credit demanded a new architecture for solving debt crises. Since 2008, the G20 has been the premier forum for international economic coordination, but the G20 had not previously worked with the Paris Club. The DSSI was intended by some of its designers to bring China into a well-oiled system for global sovereign debt governance, with the Common Framework as the scaffold upon which a new architecture would be built. Through analysis of available data, process-tracing through over 100 interviews with G20 participants and borrowers, and case studies, we argue, with some caveats, that China fulfilled its role fairly well as a responsible G20 stakeholder implementing the DSSI. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:caripb:290359&r=cna |