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on Computational Economics |
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Issue of 2016‒10‒16
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Tashakori, Zeynolabedin; Mirzaei, Farzad |
| Abstract: | The most common neural network model is the multi-layer perceptron (MLP). This type of neural network is known as a supervised network because it requires a desired output in order to learn. The goal of this type of network is to create a model that correctly maps the input to the output using historical data so that the model can then be used to produce the output when the desired output is unknown. In this paper, a new MLP is proposed for insemination problem. The result of the proposed method, is shown the high performance beside a very fast respond for the problem. Moreover, the conversion of the error is analyzed by the proposed method. All the simulation and result is done in MATLAB environments. |
| Keywords: | A Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), Neural Network, Targets Train, Neuron, Targets Train |
| JEL: | L00 |
| Date: | 2016–10–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:74339&r=cmp |
| By: | Ozana Nadoveza (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb); Marija Penava (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we describe the structure of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and data that enables estimation of certain policy changes in Croatia. Namely, we build a 5-sector (households, firms, government, investors and foreigners) economy model while our economy is disaggregated on three highly aggregated sectors. Afterwards, we present Croatian data which enables us to simulate the model in Nadoveza, Sekur and Penava (upcoming). These data are seen as snapshot of established equilibrium in 2010 in Croatia and they represent the main input for the CGE models. Finally, we conduct the reality check of our calibrated parameters. |
| Keywords: | Computable general equilibrium model, small open economy, social accounting matrix, Croatia |
| JEL: | C60 C68 |
| Date: | 2016–09–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zag:wpaper:1605&r=cmp |
| By: | Alban Kitous (European Commission – JRC); Kimon Keramidas (European Commission – JRC); Toon Vandyck (European Commission – JRC); Bert Saveyn (European Commission – JRC) |
| Abstract: | This report examines the effects on greenhouse gases emissions and energy markets of a Reference scenario where current trends continue beyond 2020, of two scenarios where the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions have been included, and of a 2°C scenario in line with keeping global warming below the limits agreed in international negotiations. The report presents an updated version of the modelling work that supported by DG CLIMA in the UNFCCC negotiations that resulted in the Paris Agreement of the COP21 in December 2015. In the Reference scenario, emissions trigger global warming above 3°C. In the INDC scenarios, regions adopt domestic policies that result in global changes in emissions and energy use, and would result in the long term in a global warming around 3°C; the INDCs cover 28-44% of the cumulated emissions reductions necessary to remain below a 2°C warming. In the 2°C scenario, all regions realise domestic emission cuts to stay below 2°C, with various profiles in 2020-2050 depending on their national characteristics. Reduction of non-CO2 emissions (34% in 2030), energy efficiency (20%) and the deployment of renewable energies (20%) are the main options contributing in the mitigation effort. A significant number of regions draw economic benefits from shifting their expenditures on fossil energy imports to investments. GDP growth rates are marginally affected in most regions by global efforts to reduce emissions. Crucially, high growth rates are maintained in fast-growing low-income regions. Delaying actions to stay below 2°C add large economic costs. The analysis uses the POLES and GEM-E3 models in a framework where economic welfare is maximised while tackling climate change. |
| Keywords: | Climate, mitigation, GHG emissions, energy, international negotiations, COP21, Road to Paris, IPCC, UNFCCC, modelling, GEM-E3, POLES |
| JEL: | C68 Q43 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc101899&r=cmp |
| By: | Baptista, Rafa (Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford); Farmer, J. Doyne (Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford); Hinterschweiger, Marc (Bank of England); Low, Katie (Bank of England); Tang, Daniel (Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford); Uluc, Arzu (Bank of England) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops an agent-based model of the UK housing market to study the impact of macroprudential policies on key housing market indicators. This approach enables us to tackle the heterogeneity in this market by modelling the individual behaviour and interactions of first-time buyers, home owners, buy-to-let investors, and renters from the bottom up, and observe the resulting aggregate dynamics in the property and credit markets. The model is calibrated using a large selection of micro-data, mostly from household surveys and housing market data sources. We perform a series of comparative statics exercises to investigate the impact of the size of the rental/buy-to-let sector and different types of buy-to-let investors on housing booms and busts. The results suggest that an increase in the size of the buy-to-let sector may amplify house price cycles and increase house price volatility. Furthermore, in order to illustrate the effects of macroprudential policies on several housing market indicators, we implement a loan-to-income portfolio limit. We find that this policy attenuates the house price cycle. |
| Keywords: | Agent-based mode; housing market; macroprudential policy; buy-to-let sector |
| JEL: | D31 E58 R21 R31 |
| Date: | 2016–10–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:0619&r=cmp |
| By: | Yuliya A. Veselova (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We consider the problem of individual manipulation under incomplete information, i.e. the whole preference profile is not known to voters. Instead, voters know the result of an opinion poll (the outcome of a poll information function , e.g. a list of scores or a set of winners). In this case, a voter has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences ( -manipulate) if he knows that he will not become worse off and there is a chance of becoming better off. We consider six social choice rules and eight types of poll information functions differing in their informativeness. To compare manipulability, first we calculate the probability that there is a voter which has an incentive to -manipulate and show that this measure is not illustrative in the case of incomplete information. Then we suggest considering two other measures: the probability of a successful manipulation and an aggregate stimulus of voters to manipulate which demonstrate more intuitive behaviour. We provide results of computational experiments and analytical proofs of some of the observed effects |
| Keywords: | voting theory; manipulation; manipulability index; opinion poll; incomplete information. |
| JEL: | C6 D7 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:152/ec/2016&r=cmp |