nep-cmp New Economics Papers
on Computational Economics
Issue of 2006‒07‒21
two papers chosen by
Stan Miles
York University

  1. The Impact of Climate Change on Domestic and International Tourism: A Simulation Study By Andrea Bigano; Jacqueline M. Hamilton; Richard S.J. Tol
  2. Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation By Agnieszka Rusinowska; Rudolf Berghammer; Harrie de Swart

  1. By: Andrea Bigano (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Jacqueline M. Hamilton (Hamburg University and Centre for Marine and Atmospheric Science); Richard S.J. Tol (Hamburg University, Vrije Universiteit and Carnegie Mellon University)
    Abstract: We use an updated and extended version of the Hamburg Tourism Model to simulate the effect of development and climate change on tourism. Model extensions are the explicit modelling of domestic tourism and the inclusion of tourist expenditures. We also use the model to examine the impact of sea level rise on tourism demand. Climate change would shift patterns of tourism towards higher altitudes and latitudes. Domestic tourism may double in colder countries and fall by 20% in warmer countries (relative to the baseline without climate change). For some countries international tourism may treble whereas for others it may cut in half. International tourism is more (less) important than is domestic tourism in colder (warmer) places. Therefore, climate change may double tourist expenditures in colder countries, and halve them in warmer countries. In most places, the impact of climate change is small compared to the impact of population and economic growth. The quantitative results are sensitive to parameter choices, but the qualitative pattern is robust.
    Keywords: Climate Change, International Tourism, Domestic Tourism
    JEL: L83 Q54
    Date: 2006–06
  2. By: Agnieszka Rusinowska (Radboud University Nijmegen); Rudolf Berghammer (University of Kiel); Harrie de Swart (Tilburg University)
    Abstract: A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination of notions from different fields, such as relational algebra, graph theory, social choice and bargaining theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions and visualizing the results. Using relational algorithms, in such a case we break all cycles in each initial strongly connected component by removing the vertices in an appropriate minimum feedback vertex set. So, we can choose an un-dominated government. To achieve unique solutions, we additionally apply social choice rules. The main parts of our procedure can be executed using the RelView tool. Its sophisticated implementation of relations allows to deal with graph sizes that are sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation.
    Keywords: Graph Theory, RELVIEW, Relational Algebra, Dominance, Stable Government
    JEL: D85 C63 C88 D71 D72
    Date: 2006–05

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