By: |
Marco LiCalzi (University of Venice, Italy);
Paolo Pellizzari (University of Venice, Italy) |
Abstract: |
This paper studies the performance of four market protocols with regard to
allocative efficiency and other performance criteria such as volume or
volatility. We examine batch auctions, continuous double auctions, specialist
dealerships, and a hybrid of these last two. All protocols are practically
implementable because the space of messages for traders is simple. We test the
protocols by running (computerized) experiments in an environment that
controls for traders’ behavior and rules out any informational effect. We find
that all protocols generically converge to the efficient allocation in finite
time. An extended comparison over other performance criteria produces no clear
winner, but the presence of a specialist is clearly associated with the best
all-round performance. |
Keywords: |
market microstructure, allocative efficiency, comparison of market institutions, agent-based simulations. |
JEL: |
G19 |
Date: |
2005–04–26 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0504019&r=cmp |