New Economics Papers
on Computational Economics
Issue of 2005‒04‒09
four papers chosen by

  1. Quantum Games and Programmable Quantum Systems By Katarzyna Miakisz; Edward W. Piotrowski; Jan Sladkowski
  2. Adaptive build-up and breakdown of trust : an agent based computational approach By Gorobets,Alexander; Nooteboom,Bart
  3. A numerical algorithm to find soft-constrained Nash equilibria in scalar LQ-games By Engwerda,Jacob
  4. State Dependence in Fundamentals and Preferences Explains Risk-Aversion Puzzle By Fousseni Chabi-Yo; René Garcia; Eric Renaul

  1. By: Katarzyna Miakisz; Edward W. Piotrowski; Jan Sladkowski
    Abstract: Attention to the very physical aspects of information characterizes the current research in quantum computation, quantum cryptography and quantum communication. In most of the cases quantum description of the system provides advantages over the classical approach. Game theory, the study of decision making in conflict situation has already been extended to the quantum domain. We would like to review the latest development in quantum game theory that is relevant to information processing. We will begin by illustrating the general idea of a quantum game and methods of gaining an advantage over "classical opponent". Then we review the most important game theoretical aspects of quantum information processing. On grounds of the discussed material, we reason about possible future development of quantum game theory and its impact on information processing and the emerging information society. The idea of quantum artificial intelligence is explained.
  2. By: Gorobets,Alexander; Nooteboom,Bart (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: This article employs Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to investigate whether, and under what conditions, trust is viable in markets. The emergence and breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers. Agents develop trust in a partner as a function of observed loyalty. They select partners on the basis of their trust in the partner and potential profit. On the basis of realized profits, they adapt the weight they attach to trust relative to profitability, and their own trustworthiness, modeled as a threshold of defection. Trust turns out to be viable under fairly general conditions.
    JEL: C63 D23 L14 L22 L24
    Date: 2005
  3. By: Engwerda,Jacob (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper we provide a numerical algorithm to calculate all soft-constrained Nash equilibria in a regular scalar indefinite linear-quadratic game. The algorithm is based on the calculation of the eigenstructure of a certain matrix. The analysis follows the lines of the approach taken by Engwerda in [7] to calculate the solutions of a set of scalar coupled feedback Nash algebraic Riccati equations.
    JEL: C63 C72 C73
    Date: 2005
  4. By: Fousseni Chabi-Yo; René Garcia; Eric Renaul
    Abstract: The authors examine the ability of economic models with regime shifts to rationalize and explain the risk-aversion and pricing-kernel puzzles put forward in Jackwerth (2000). They build an economy where investors' preferences or economic fundamentals are state-dependent, and simulate prices for a market index and European options on that index. Based on the original nonparametric methodology, the risk-aversion and pricing-kernel functions obtained across wealth states with these artificial data exhibit the same puzzles found with the actual data, but within each regime the puzzles disappear. This suggests that state dependence potentially explains the puzzles.
    Keywords: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing
    JEL: G12 G13
    Date: 2005

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