nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2026–09–21
nine papers chosen by
Alexander Harin


  1. Risk of sanctions By Egorov, Konstantin; Korovkin, Vasily; Makarin, Alexey; Nigmatulina, Dzhamilya
  2. Investment under fire: Firm responses to war in Ukraine By Fungáčová, Zuzana; Heyert, Axelle; Weill, Laurent
  3. Cut off from capital: The impacts of sanctions on portfolio investments By Korhonen, Iikka; Simola, Heli
  4. Distributional and Emission Effects of Temporary Gasoline Subsidies: Evidence from Spain By Xulia González; María J. Moral
  5. "Der NPT ist tot, lang lebe der NPT!": Der Nichtverbreitungsvertrag nach der gescheiterten Überprüfungskonferenz By Horovitz, Liviu; Schneider, Jonas
  6. Territories: Competitiveness, defence and preparedness By Sillero Illanes Carmen
  7. Was Stalin Necessary? Counterfactual Evidence on Soviet Growth By Fern\'andez Salguero; Ricardo Alonzo
  8. Chinas geheime Nukleartests: Wie der Großmächtewettbewerb internationale Testnormen zu erodieren droht By Rombach, Philipp
  9. САНКЦИИ КАК КАТАЛИЗАТОР РОСТА ВНУТРЕННЕГО ТУРИЗМА: ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ПУТИ ИХ РЕШЕНИЯ РОССИИ By , Զախար

  1. By: Egorov, Konstantin; Korovkin, Vasily; Makarin, Alexey; Nigmatulina, Dzhamilya
    Abstract: Does uncertainty created by the risk of sanctions affect trade above and beyond the sanctions actually imposed? While most restrictions on Russian imports were introduced immediately after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the sanctioning countries simultaneously pledged further escalation unless the conflict ended. In line with this threat, we estimate that the subsequent escalations were largely anticipated in advance, with trade flows declining many months before they actually became subject to sanctions. Crucially, this effect was not limited just to sanctioned trade flows: we also estimate a decline for a wide range of never-sanctioned trade flows that nonetheless could have been perceived as being at risk of future sanctions. Overall, our results imply that Russia lost the equivalent of about a month and a half of imports over 2022-23 due to the escalation of sanctions after April 2022, with two-thirds of this loss driven by reductions in never-sanctioned trade flows that were only at risk of sanctions.
    Keywords: sanctions, international trade, Russia-Ukraine war, geoeconomics, uncertainty
    JEL: D22 D74 F14 F51 H56
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:343078
  2. By: Fungáčová, Zuzana; Heyert, Axelle; Weill, Laurent
    Abstract: How do firms adapt their decision-making about strategic investments during a war? We examine this question in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, combining data on almost 500, 000 Ukrainian firms from 2017 to 2023 with detailed conflict data. We argue that war reshapes firm investment through three related mechanisms: exposure to violence, changes in the strategic value of firm resources, and sectoral alignment with wartime demand. Our results show that firms exposed to war strongly reduce their investment, and that this negative investment response is amplified by conflict intensity. Moreover, war reconfigures the strategic value of firm resources: financial resilience preserves firm investments, whereas the investment advantages associated with firm size and leverage weaken as larger firms have more resources at risk and debt creates financial rigidity. Firms in war-related industries increase investment during war, indicating that productive capabilities aligned with wartime demand may create strategic opportunities even under extreme uncertainty. These findings contribute to research on violent conflict and firm strategy by showing that war is not simply a uniform negative shock, but also creates a strategic context in which firms adapt depending on how risks, resources, and opportunities are reconfigured.
    Keywords: Firm investment, War, Ukraine
    JEL: D22 D25 D91 F51
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitp:343534
  3. By: Korhonen, Iikka; Simola, Heli
    Abstract: We examine the impact from sanctions on global capital flows. Sanctions can be understood as an extreme version of geopolitical decoupling that affects economic relations, including trade and foreign direct investment. Specifically, we look at how the introduction of wide-ranging financial sanctions has affected foreign portfolio investment, treating Western sanctions packages on Russia in 2014 and 2022 as a natural experiment. Applying a triple-difference setup and using annual portfolio investment data collected by the IMF, our results show that portfolio investment flows into Russia sharply declined from both sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries particularly after 2022. The decline in investment from sanctioning countries was much more severe, however. Unlike with trade, we find little evidence of investment diversion for Russia after imposition of sanctions.
    Keywords: sanctions, portfolio investment, emerging economies, Russia
    JEL: F02 F2 F51
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitp:343548
  4. By: Xulia González; María J. Moral
    Abstract: In response to the sharp rise in fuel prices following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many governments introduced temporary fuel subsidies to shield households from higher energy costs. This paper evaluates the distributional and environmental effects of Spain’s fuel subsidy policy. We combine household-level estimates of gasoline price elasticities from the Household Budget Survey with weekly retail fuel price data to estimate the pass-through of the subsidy to consumers. We find an average short-run gasoline price elasticity of 0.55 and incomplete pass-through, with only 89% of the subsidy reflected in retail prices. As a result, part of the fiscal transfer was captured by fuel retailers, while the benefits accrued disproportionately to higher-income households: the lowest income quartile received 12.4% of total benefits compared with 28.4% for the highest quartile. We also identify substantial regional heterogeneity in this distribution. The subsidy also increased fuel consumption and carbon emissions. Overall, the findings suggest that uniform fuel subsidies are poorly targeted and can conflict with both equity and environmental policy objectives.
    Keywords: Fuel subsidy, price elasticity, gasoline prices, distributional equity, emissions
    JEL: H22 H23 L11 Q41
    Date: 2026–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vig:wpaper:2603
  5. By: Horovitz, Liviu; Schneider, Jonas
    Abstract: Im Mai 2026 hat die Überprüfungskonferenz des Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsvertrags (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) stattgefunden. Das Treffen scheiterte, weil sich die Delegationen nicht auf ein Abschlussdokument einigen konnten. Dass dies zum dritten Mal in Folge geschah, ist einmalig in der Geschichte des NPT. Im Vorfeld hatten einige Diplomaten und Fachleute gewarnt, ein erneuter Fehlschlag wäre katastrophal für den Vertrag und die gesamte Nuklearordnung. Doch dies ist ein Fehlschluss. Der NPT ist zwar der Kern der nuklearen Ordnung und hat zudem erhebliches Gewicht für die Weltordnung insgesamt. Doch frühere Überprüfungskonferenzen, der Verlauf der diesjährigen Tagung und die Reaktionen auf ihren Ausgang legen nahe, dass der NPT stabil ist. Die wachsende nukleare Ungleichheit, wie sie in dem Arrangement zwischen fünf Kernwaffenstaaten und 186 Nichtkernwaffenstaaten angelegt ist, polarisiert die multilaterale Nukleardebatte in New York, Genf und Wien, doch sie bedroht nicht den Fortbestand des NPT. Gefahr für den Vertrag bestünde indes, wenn Russlands und Chinas Revisionismus weiter zunehmen und der Gestaltungswille der USA noch mehr schwinden sollte.
    Keywords: Nuklearer Nichtverbreitungsvertrag, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Überprüfungskonferenz 2026, Kernwaffenstaaten, Atomordnung, Konferenzpräsident Do Hung Viet, Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation (IAEO), Iran-Krieg, Krieg gegen die Ukraine
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpakt:343133
  6. By: Sillero Illanes Carmen (European Commission - JRC)
    Abstract: A shifting geostrategic landscape — driven by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, disrupted supply corridors, hybrid threats and transatlantic uncertainty — has converged on a single imperative: Europe must assume responsibility for its own security and defence, extending beyond equipment to innovation and preparedness while overcoming defence-market fragmentation. NATO allies are committing to 5% of GDP by 2035, and the EU is mobilising resources on an unprecedented scale — in the order of €800 billion — yet the territorial dimension of this challenge remains uncertain: how place-based innovation policies can foster dual-use ecosystems that strengthen strategic autonomy, sustainable territorial competitiveness and preparedness, particularly in European border regions. REGDUALOSA (Regions Dual-Use Open Strategic Autonomy), a JRC exploratory research activity, addresses this question across three case studies — Estonia (cyber defence), Podkarpackie, Poland (UAVs) and Andalusia, Spain (space) — showing that territorial administrations act as strategic facilitators, setting framework conditions, orchestrating innovation ecosystems, bridging levels of government and driving civil security and preparedness. Dual-use industrial hubs drive regional economic complexity and quality employment, yet territories, in particular peripheral ones, face shared vulnerabilities: an absence of system integrators, human-capital shortages, restricted SME access to the defence market, and weak mechanisms linking civil innovation to defence planning. Conversely, whole-of-government coordination, a whole-of-society approach, clusters, shared testing infrastructures, regulatory experimentation and venture capital prove to be factors of success in the cases analysed. The recommendations underline the value of a dual-use lens in territorial strategies, territorial industrial policy portfolios and cross-regional cooperation. Positioning territorial preparedness as a strategic lever for European resilience and sustainable competitiveness, the brief argues that the forthcoming MFF (2028–2034) should enable regional and national actors to mobilise these ecosystems through improved funding access, simplification and a strengthened human capital.
    Date: 2026–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc147349
  7. By: Fern\'andez Salguero; Ricardo Alonzo
    Abstract: This article evaluates whether the exceptionally rapid growth of the Russian and Soviet economy after 1928 requires a specifically Stalinist explanation. The analysis treats this historical question as a sequence of increasingly demanding counterfactual comparisons rather than a binary comparison between observed growth and a single alternative. Long run output series from the Global Macro Database and the Maddison Project are combined with synthetic control, augmented synthetic control, synthetic difference in differences, interactive factor models, matrix completion, prediction benchmarks, historical analogues, spatial and temporal placebos, donor pool perturbations, endpoint sensitivity, and independent Soviet national account reconstructions. A key methodological contribution is a revised New Economic Policy counterfactual. Instead of extrapolating the rapid recovery observed from 1922 to 1928, the analysis models the recovery gap as a bootstrap process anchored to the pre 1914 trend and calibrated using the observed postwar closure of the Russian output gap. The Russian core estimates exceed the median admissible frontier at every endpoint and surpass the main 90th percentile frontier from the mid 1930s onward, whereas the broader Soviet territorial aggregate remains more conservative. Donor perturbations preserve a positive Russian core premium, but the limited placebo sample, imperfect pretreatment fit, recovery related false positives, source dependence, and hostile upper bounds prevent strong claims of historical necessity. The evidence supports a conditional growth premium but does not identify Stalin as the only institutionally feasible path.
    Date: 2026–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2609.00418
  8. By: Rombach, Philipp
    Abstract: Die USA werfen China vor, geheime Atomwaffentests durchzuführen, die gegen internationale Normen und Testmoratorien verstoßen. Wegen der vergleichsweise kleinen historischen Testbasis besitzt China starke Anreize, zusätzliche Testdaten für die Modernisierung seines Atomwaffenprogramms zu gewinnen. Für Washington wäre es dennoch nachteilig, wenn es als Antwort darauf seine unterirdischen Nukleartests wiederaufnähme, da Russland und China von der Erosion internationaler Testnormen stärker profitieren würden. Deutschland und Europa können nur begrenzt handeln, indem sie auf mehr Transparenz und vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen hinwirken.
    Keywords: China, Russland, USA, Atomtest, Atomwaffe, Vertrag über die Begrenzung unterirdischer Kernwaffentests, TTBT, nuklearer Teststoppvertrag, CTBT, CTBTO, IMS, One-Point Safety, National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpakt:343120
  9. By: , Զախար
    Abstract: Статья посвящена анализу влияния международных санкций на развитие внутреннего туризма в России. Рассматриваются экономические последствия ограничения внешних туристических потоков и перераспределения спроса внутри страны. Особое внимание уделяется тому, как санкции стали стимулом для переориентации туризма на внутренний рынок, росту инвестиций в региональную инфраструктуру и формированию новых туристических продуктов. В работе анализируются ключевые экономические проблемы, возникающие в условиях санкционного давления, и предлагаются возможные решения, направленные на повышение устойчивости и конкурентоспособности Российского туристического сектора.
    Date: 2025–11–30
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:b36at_v1

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