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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Betcherman, Gordon; Honorati, Maddalena; Moessinger, Martin |
| Abstract: | While the literature on the minimum wage is largely retrospective, analyzing impacts of past policy changes, this paper is uniquely forward-looking, forecasting how a proposed reform in Ukraine would affect future employment, earnings, and social contributions. The analysis simulates these effects by mimicking a proposal that would set a minimum wage floor equal to 40 percent of the previous year’s average wage once martial law is over and increasing the minimum wage by two percentage points annually until reaching 50 percent of the previous year’s average wage. The analysis draws on a 10 percent random sample of 2023 worker-level data from the Pension Fund of Ukraine, covering all jobs with pension contributions in the private sector and nonmilitary public sector. The results indicate that, under the proposal, by the end of the five-year transition period, the minimum wage would be 45 percent above the level it would have reached if adjusted only for wage inflation, which serves as the counterfactual. Projected job losses would be modest (0.51–1.03 percent), while total earnings would increase by up to 3.24 percent. The effect on social contributions and taxes would be the same as the effect on earnings since they are a fixed percentage of earnings in Ukraine. Applied to an administrative data set covering all formal sector workers, the methodology developed in the paper offers a useful tool for policy makers to anticipate the likely effects of the minimum wage reforms that are being considered. The paper concludes by discussing policy implications. |
| Date: | 2026–09–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11443 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The Gulf Cooperation Council countries have successfully weathered recent turbulence in the Middle East, and their economic prospects remain favorable. Nonhydrocarbon activity has been strong amid reform implementation, although overall growth has decelerated due to cuts in oil production. The growth outlook is positive, as the envisaged easing of oil production cuts and natural gas expansion spur the recovery in the hydrocarbon sector, while the nonhydrocarbon economy continues to expand. External buffers remain comfortable despite current account balances having narrowed. Risks around the outlook are broadly balanced in the near term. More challenging medium-term risks, especially in the context of geoeconomic fragmentation and climate change, call for action on policy priorities to continue to strengthen the private sector and to diversify the economy. |
| Keywords: | economic diversification; financial stability; fiscal sustainability; GCC; productivity improvements; regional integration; GCC country; policy priority; B. GCC; GCC well; GCC public sector balance sheet; Labor markets; Fiscal rules; Total factor productivity; Global; Middle East; Middle East and Central Asia |
| Date: | 2024–12–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfpps:2024/066 |
| By: | Johann Caro-Burnett; Sebastian Galiani; Gustavo Torrens |
| Abstract: | Why do rising powers survive periods in which established states can still suppress them? Existing theories of preventive war emphasize commitment problems between declining and rising states, which can make adverse power shifts especially dangerous. We show that commitment problems among established rivals can have the opposite effect. Preventive action against a rising power can alter the incumbent’s relationship with another state. Under opportunistic rivalry, prevention temporarily exposes the incumbent to exploitation by an existing rival. Under defensive rivalry, successful prevention strengthens the incumbent by eliminating a potential counterweight, giving its rival an incentive to protect the rising state. In both cases, third-party responses can deter preventive action that would occur in an otherwise identical dyadic setting. Cooperation among established powers can reverse this result when credible arrangements allow them to manage the strategic consequences of suppression. Historical evidence from the American Revolution, China’s nuclear emergence, and U.S.–Soviet bargaining over West German nuclear capabilities illustrates the mechanisms and their limits. The analysis shows how rivalry among established powers can protect vulnerable rising states and thereby facilitate changes in the international distribution of power. |
| JEL: | P0 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35862 |