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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Vuving, Alexander |
| Abstract: | This article examines how Vietnam has responded to the Russia-Ukraine war, how the war has impacted Vietnam’s foreign policy, and why Hanoi has behaved the way it has. It is organized into three major sections. The first discusses the impact of the Ukraine war on Vietnam’s strategic environment and grand strategy. It also outlines the broad contour of Vietnam’s grand strategy and identifies major possible directions along which Hanoi may steer its course in the future. The second section examines Russia’s unique role in Vietnam’s strategic calculus and Russian soft power in Vietnam. It also discusses the pre-war developments that strengthened Russia’s role and soft power, thus providing a larger context without which Vietnam’s responses to the war cannot be fully understood. The third section documents Vietnam’s domestic and foreign policy responses to the war. The article argues that although the Russia-Ukraine war has triggered diverse, even opposing, responses from Vietnam’s ruling elite, it has not changed the general direction of Vietnam’s foreign policy because it has not directly and fundamentally affected Vietnam’s quest for security, resources, and identity. However, the war posed moral and strategic dilemmas for Hanoi, tore the web of geopolitical partnerships upon which Vietnam relied to secure its place in the world, and threatened to shake Russia’s unique and critical role in Vietnam’s foreign relations. Hanoi responded by reinforcing the current paradigm of its foreign policy, performing a delicate balancing act between the great powers, and deepening ties with the major powerhouses in its surrounding region. In the long term, however, the costs of this “bamboo diplomacy” may outweigh its benefits. |
| Date: | 2024–05–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:e3rf4_v1 |
| By: | Korhonen, Iikka; Parviainen, Sinikka; Simola, Heli; Solanko, Laura |
| Abstract: | Russia's war of aggression, which has brought wide destruction and loss to Ukraine, has also transformed the Russian economy in significant ways. The Russian government's role in the economy has grown, with an ever-increasing amount of economic resources allocated to the war effort. The government, abandoning long-standing conservative fiscal discipline, now regards public sector deficits as acceptable. The country has managed to cover its budget deficits by draining the country's financial reserves and increasing domestic borrowing. While the point at which Russia loses its ability to wage war remains remote, its economic troubles are likely to snowball in the longer run. |
| Keywords: | Russia, economy, sanctions, economic policy |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitb:312402 |
| By: | Burilkov, Alexandr; Wolff, Guntram B. |
| Abstract: | Wir liefern erste Schätzungen über die zusätzlichen Waffen und Truppen, die Europa zur Selbstverteidigung benötigen würde, falls sich die USA aus Europa zurückziehen. Die russische Militärproduktion wurde hochgefahren: Es wurden schätzungsweise 1.550 Panzer, 5.700 gepanzerte Fahrzeuge und 450 Artilleriegeschütze produziert oder instand gesetzt. Falls die USA ihre militärische Unterstützung für die Ukraine einstellen, müsste die EU lediglich zusätzliche 0, 12 Prozent ihres BIP aufwenden, um die Lücke auszugleichen - ein machbarer Betrag. Ein amerikanisch-russisches Abkommen über die Ukraine, das zu einer weiteren Aufrüstung Russlands führen würde, würde eine Aufstockung der europäischen Kapazitäten um die Kampfstärke von 300.000 US-Soldaten erfordern. Die europäischen Verteidigungsausgaben müssten erheblich über das derzeitige Niveau von etwa 2 Prozent des BIP hinaus steigen. Erste Schätzungen legen nahe, dass kurzfristig eine Erhöhung um etwa 250 Milliarden Euro jährlich (oder etwa 3, 5 Prozent des BIP) erforderlich ist. |
| Abstract: | We provide initial estimates of the additional weapons and troops Europe will need to defend itself, assuming an effective US withdrawal from Europe. Russia's military production has ramped up: In 2024, Russia produced and refurbished an estimated 1, 550 tanks, 5, 700 armoured vehicles and 450 artillery pieces of all types. If the US withdraws from supporting Ukraine, the EU would have to spend only another 0.12 percent of its GDP to replace the US military contributions - a feasible amount. A US-Russian deal on Ukraine, resulting in a continued Russian military build-up would require an increase in European capacities equivalent to the fighting capacity of 300, 000 US troops, with a focus on mechanised and armoured forces to replace US army heavy units. European defence spending will have to increase substantially from the current level of about 2 percent of GDP. An initial assessment suggests an increase by about €250 billion annually (or around 3.5 percent of GDP) is warranted in the short term. |
| Keywords: | USA, Europa, Deutschland, Ukraine, Verteidigung, Sicherheitspolitik, USA, Europe, Germany, Ukraine, Defense, Security policy |
| JEL: | H56 F51 F52 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:312397 |
| By: | Korhonen, Iikka; Parviainen, Sinikka; Simola, Heli; Solanko, Laura |
| Abstract: | Russia's war of aggression, which has brought wide destruction and loss to Ukraine, has also transformed the Russian economy in significant ways. The Russian government's role in the economy has grown, with an ever-increasing amount of economic resources allocated to the war effort. The government, abandoning long-standing conservative fiscal discipline, now regards public sector deficits as acceptable. The country has managed to cover its budget deficits by draining the country's financial reserves and increasing domestic borrowing. While the point at which Russia loses its ability to wage war remains remote, its economic troubles are likely to snowball in the longer run. |
| Keywords: | Russia, economy, sanctions, economic policy |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitb:312401 |
| By: | Burilkov, Alexandr; Wolff, Guntram B. |
| Abstract: | We provide initial estimates of the additional weapons and troops Europe will need to defend itself, assuming an effective US withdrawal from Europe. Russia's military production has ramped up: In 2024, Russia produced and refurbished an estimated 1, 550 tanks, 5, 700 armoured vehicles and 450 artillery pieces of all types. If the US withdraws from supporting Ukraine, the EU would have to spend only another 0.12 percent of its GDP to replace the US military contributions - a feasible amount. A US-Russian deal on Ukraine, resulting in a continued Russian military build-up would require an increase in European capacities equivalent to the fighting capacity of 300, 000 US troops, with a focus on mechanised and armoured forces to replace US army heavy units. European defence spending will have to increase substantially from the current level of about 2 percent of GDP. An initial assessment suggests an increase by about €250 billion annually (or around 3.5 percent of GDP) is warranted in the short term. |
| Abstract: | Wir liefern erste Schätzungen über die zusätzlichen Waffen und Truppen, die Europa zur Selbstverteidigung benötigen würde, falls sich die USA aus Europa zurückziehen. Die russische Militärproduktion wurde hochgefahren: Es wurden schätzungsweise 1.550 Panzer, 5.700 gepanzerte Fahrzeuge und 450 Artilleriegeschütze produziert oder instand gesetzt. Falls die USA ihre militärische Unterstützung für die Ukraine einstellen, müsste die EU lediglich zusätzliche 0, 12 Prozent ihres BIP aufwenden, um die Lücke auszugleichen - ein machbarer Betrag. Ein amerikanisch-russisches Abkommen über die Ukraine, das zu einer weiteren Aufrüstung Russlands führen würde, würde eine Aufstockung der europäischen Kapazitäten um die Kampfstärke von 300.000 US-Soldaten erfordern. Die europäischen Verteidigungsausgaben müssten erheblich über das derzeitige Niveau von etwa 2 Prozent des BIP hinaus steigen. Erste Schätzungen legen nahe, dass kurzfristig eine Erhöhung um etwa 250 Milliarden Euro jährlich (oder etwa 3, 5 Prozent des BIP) erforderlich ist. |
| Keywords: | USA, Europe, Germany, Ukraine, Defense, Security policy, USA, Europa, Deutschland, Ukraine, Verteidigung, Sicherheitspolitik |
| JEL: | H56 F51 F52 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:312398 |
| By: | David Baqaee; Hannes Malmberg |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the long-run economic consequences of Western sanctions on Russia. Using a new framework for balanced growth path analysis, we find that the long-run declines in consumption are significantly larger when capital stocks are allowed to adjust --- 1.4 times larger for Russia and 2.2 times larger for Eastern Europe. This is contrary to the common intuition that long-run effects should be milder due to greater adjustment opportunities. In our model, Russian long-run consumption falls by 8.5%, Eastern European consumption by 2%, and Western countries' consumption by 0.3% in response to sanctions. The model also reveals important distributional effects: as capital adjusts, Russian real wages fall more than rental prices in the long run. These findings show that accounting for capital adjustment is quantitatively important when analyzing trade sanctions. |
| JEL: | E0 F0 F1 F5 F51 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33506 |
| By: | Vidal Pérez, Esteban |
| Abstract: | Nicholas Spykman contributed to defining the national security strategy of the United States during WWII, which has served as the framework for its foreign policy ever since. This strategy has been adapted to the current international scenario, in which the rise of China represents the main challenge to the US. As a result, the Indo-Pacific region has become the focal point of US security concerns. This paper examines the consistency of US policy towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine with its national strategy, employing a geopolitical approach based on neoclassical realism. To accomplish this, the paper utilizes the analytical concept of geographic mental map to shed light on how US foreign policy-makers comprehend international politics and make decisions. The objective of this article is to test the hypothesis that US policy towards Ukraine is not coherent with its national security strategy, as it has allocated significant resources to a region of lesser geopolitical importance compared to the Indo-Pacific, where the rivalry with China is taking place. Additionally, the article aims to explain this policy by reviewing the contributions of foreign policy advisors and analyzing official statements from US institutions and decision-makers. |
| Date: | 2024–01–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:f4y6s_v1 |
| By: | Kobak, Dmitry; Bessudnov, Alexey; Ershov, Alexander; Mikhailova, Tatiana; Raksha, Alexei |
| Abstract: | In this research note, we used excess deaths among young males to estimate the number of Russian fatalities in the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022--23. We based our calculations on the official mortality statistics, split by age and gender. To separate excess deaths due to war from those due to Covid-19, we relied on the ratio of male to female deaths, and extrapolated the 2015--19 trend to get the baseline value for 2022--23. We found noticeable excess male mortality in all age groups between 15 and 49, with 58, 500±2, 500 excess male deaths in 2022--23 (20, 600±1, 400 in 2022 and 37, 900±1, 500 in 2023). These estimates were obtained after excluding all HIV deaths that showed complex dynamics unrelated to the war. Depending on the modelling assumptions, the estimated number of deaths over the two years varied from about 46, 600 to about 64, 100, with 58, 500 corresponding to our preferred model. Our estimate should be treated as a lower bound on the true number of deaths as the data do not include either the Russian military personnel missing in action and not officially declared dead, or the deaths registered in the Ukrainian territories annexed in 2022. |
| Date: | 2023–11–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:xcrme_v1 |
| By: | Khamitkhanova, Aiganym; Paul, Anju Mary (New York University Abu Dhabi) |
| Abstract: | Russia attained an overall GCPI score of 5.61 out of 10, placing it in the “Maturing” band of the Index. Its score of 6.25 in Sub-Index A is linked to the financial and employment protections provided during pregnancy and maternity leave and its mother-friendly workplace policies, but there is still room for improvement in areas such as dependent care leave, paternity leave policies, and flexible work arrangements. With a score of 4.98 in Sub-Index B, Russia shows some level of support for domestic workers, but coverage and protections for these workers are not as comprehensive as those for other workers. |
| Date: | 2024–06–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:gn73r_v1 |
| By: | Rotte, Ralph (RWTH Aachen University) |
| Abstract: | Given the variously stated „renaissance of nuclear power“, including a number of potential newcomers to the civilian use of nuclear energy, this paper addresses implications of a propagation of nuclear facilities and new reactor technologies for the nuclear nonproliferation and verification regimes. A special focus is on small modular reactors (SMRs) which, despite technological and economic doubts, are currently under development in various countries. Quantitative and qualitative problems in international verification of SMRs are enhanced by the political framework of international great power competition, especially among the U.S., China and Russia with their respective allies, the subsequent global technological and economic conflicts, and the structural, mainly financial weaknesses of the IAEA. This leads to the nuclear technological and energy economic dynamics resulting in potentially serious risks for the stability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. |
| Date: | 2024–02–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:45wh7_v1 |
| By: | Rotte, Ralph (RWTH Aachen University) |
| Abstract: | Currently, three aspects contribute to an increasing complexity of international nuclear security policies. Apart from a controversial “renaissance of nuclear energy” and corresponding technological innovations there is the rise of political and ideological great power conflicts as well as the intensifying structural weaknesses of the existing nuclear non-proliferation and verification regime centered on the IAEA. While the conflict between Russia and the West results in a tendency of declining relevance of potential non-proliferation of nuclear weapons compared to export and alliance priorities, the IAEA is increasingly suffering from underfunding. Given the technological progress and the threat of large-scale proliferation of nuclear facilities this results in the danger of an essential weakening of nuclear non-proliferation policies. |
| Date: | 2024–06–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:et9kc_v1 |
| By: | Khamitkhanova, Aiganym; Paul, Anju Mary (New York University Abu Dhabi) |
| Abstract: | Kazakhstan scored 5.13 out of 10 in the GCPI, placing it in the “Maturing” band of the Index. Its score of 5.40 in Sub-Index A indicates that despite existing financial and employment protections during pregnancy and maternity leave, there are areas that require improvement, such as paternity and dependent care leave policies, and mother-friendly workplace policies. With a score of 4.87 in Sub-Index B, Kazakhstan shows some level of support for domestic workers. However, there are substantial gaps in ensuring fair employment, decent working and living conditions, labor rights, and protections for forced domestic workers. |
| Date: | 2024–06–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:cmqke_v1 |
| By: | Giulia Aliprandi (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, EU Tax - EU Tax Observatory); Kane Borders (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, EU Tax - EU Tax Observatory) |
| Abstract: | Multinational enterprises have risen to become dominant forces in the global economy, accompanied by a troubling trend of aggressive tax avoidance. In 2022 alone, an estimated $1 trillion in profits was shifted to tax havens by multinationals, amounting to 35% of all profits booked outside their headquarters countries (Alstadsæter et al., 2023). Despite tax avoidance being a major public concern, the specific practices employed by individual companies have remained largely opaque to the public due to a lack of transparency and public disclosure obligations. Comprehensive transparency measures promote informed policymaking, accountability, public trust, and sustainable development globally. This report examines the current landscape of corporate tax transparency and evaluates how emerging transparency measures could shape future developments in this critical area. We focus on corporate tax transparency measures via Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR), where multinationals disclose detailed financial and tax-related information for each country of operation. We collected the publicly available CbCR reports and compiled them into a single database: the Public CbCR Database. This new data source highlights that large multinationals, particularly from Western Europe, are leading the way as primary publishers of such reports. Overall, the large multinationals publishing public CbCR account for less than 2% of large companies, and less than 5% of global revenues and global profits. Despite the small numbers, our research reveals an upward trend in voluntary CbCR disclosures, signalling increasing tax transparency practices. However, significant gaps remain, as U.S. multinationals and firms from major economies like China and Russia have only a few CbCR disclosures available. The European Union (EU) made an important step in furthering corporate tax transparency by adopting a mandatory CbCR directive that started applying this year in many EU countries. Our simulations reveal the impact this directive will have. Nearly one-third of large U.S. MNEs will be compelled to publish more disaggregated financial information than ever before publicly available. The increased disclosure from these U.S. corporate giants, who have historically been opaque, could be a breakthrough in tax transparency. However, the directive has serious limitations, as the requirements for geographical disaggregations are largely insufficient to truly evaluate the activity of multinationals. Broader adoption and enhancement of corporate tax transparency initiatives are crucial, we suggest several ways to improve the directive going forward. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-04947447 |