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on Confederation of Independent States |
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Issue of 2024‒07‒15
29 papers chosen by |
| By: | Moreno Bertoldi; Heinz Scherrer; Guergana Stanoeva |
| Abstract: | The current brief revisits G20 developments in the last ten years. A particular focus is put on the G20 response to the pandemic, which for a short period relaunched the centrality of the G20 on the global scene. We then analyse the consequences of growing geopolitical tensions and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on the effectiveness of the G20, both in terms of messaging and deliverables. Finally, we discuss possible ways forward that would allow the forum to still play an important role at global level and continue to deliver much needed global public goods. Our analysis shows that the G20 has continued to deliver, especially in periods of global crises. However, currently the G20 is at a crossroads. In an adverse scenario, where a bloc logic between different parts of the global economy would prevail and economic decoupling and fragmentation would spread, the role of the G20 on the international scene could rapidly decline. There would still be the hope that in such an unfavourable environment, G20 economies would be able to insulate global challenges and be able to deliver remedies to them. In a gradually improving, more positive scenario where Advanced and Emerging Market Economies try to find new common grounds on crucial challenges, and essential global public goods, the G20 could continue to play a central role in global economic governance. Known unknowns that will materialise in the middle of this decade will determine which path it will take and define if and what it can still deliver. |
| Keywords: | G20, pandemic, global crises, Russia, Ukraine, Bertoldi, Scherrer, Stanoeva |
| JEL: | E6 F5 F6 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:euf:ecobri:076&r= |
| By: | Tatiana Shelovanova (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Andrey Sinyakov (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation) |
| Abstract: | Household spending usually accounts for about 70% of total spending in the economy. An important role in the financing of household spending play lending, and Russia is no exception. The aim of this research is to measure the elasticity of the loan request probability in relation to the interest rate with given inflation expectations. Our model is estimated using the unique data obtained from the All-Russian Survey of Consumer Finances, which contains information on more than 6000 households in Russia. We identify a set of Russian households’ characteristics that are key drivers for households’ requests for credit. The results show that growth in inflation expectations positively correlates with demand. It also takes a significant change in interest rates for the interest rate channel of monetary policy (with regard to unsecured loans) to make an impact. The model estimates we obtain are used in scenario forecasting to project the number of households requesting loans. According to a mid-point forecast by Rosstat, demand in terms of household count will be steady and boosted by the growth of the population of 18+ years of age. Even so, this growth is expected to be offset by a changing demographic structure. The results may be specific only to the period under study (2020–2022) and are not necessarily universal. |
| Keywords: | household finances survey, survey of consumer finances, demand for credit, probability of requesting loans, elasticity of demand in relation to the interest rate, credit demand drivers |
| JEL: | G21 G32 D22 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bkr:wpaper:wps120&r= |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Artem Kochnev (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Vincent Stamer; Feodora Teti |
| Abstract: | The marked turnaround in Russia’s foreign trade in 2023 exerted strong downward pressure on the Russian rouble, which lost around 30% of its value. Global oil prices were declining in the first half of the year, the EU import embargo on Russian oil depressed prices even further; and on top of all that, Russia lost a large slice of what has historically been its main gas market – the EU. In response to a weakening rouble, the central bank has tightened policy markedly, although inflationary pressures have remained high so far. Otherwise, the economy continues its recovery on the back of domestic demand, driven in large part by (war-related) fiscal stimulus – officially estimated at around 10% of GDP in 2022-2023. Official data suggest that capacity utilisation has reached very high levels, the labour market is extremely tight, and unemployment has plunged to an all-time low. With no end in sight to the war, the current growth trajectory will likely continue for some time, despite the fact that the economy is suffering from increased labour shortages and is falling behind on the technological front, due to the Western sanctions. |
| Keywords: | Russia, economic growth, labour market, monetary policy, fiscal policy, foreign trade, inflation, exchange rate, econometric modelling |
| JEL: | C53 E24 E31 E52 E62 F10 F31 O52 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rusmon:1&r= |
| By: | Simola, Heli |
| Abstract: | Russia has long aimed at reducing its dependency on imported technology. These aspirations intensified after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and sanctions restricting Russia's access to foreign technology. We analyze Russian company surveys and a small sample of product-level statistical data to evaluate recent trends in Russia's import substitution of technology products. For the goods included in our sample, import substitution seems quite limited. Instead, Russian companies have replaced many sanctioned imports with similar or equivalent goods from other countries. Shortfalls of certain goods suggest unavailability of adequate import substitutes and the inability of domestic production to make up for the lost imports. |
| Keywords: | Russia, imports, sanctions, technology |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitb:297996&r= |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Unlike most other countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe, even prior to the war Russia’s economic model was not really based on attracting foreign direct investment. On top of that, many of the Western firms announced plans to withdraw following the country’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, two years after the war began, only 9.5% of foreign companies have fully exited Russia, while another 32.2% have curtailed their Russian operations. The exodus of foreign capital has slowed markedly over time, to a large degree due to the progressive tightening of the regulatory hurdles for exit. In general, foreign companies that have stayed find themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the regulatory hurdles, the unfavourable exit terms and the non-negligible risk of nationalisation make exit a difficult, costly and potentially risky move; on the other hand, the decision to stay is fraught with risks of its own. |
| Keywords: | foreign direct investments, regulatory hurdles for business exit |
| JEL: | F21 F23 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rusmon:5&r= |
| By: | Marcel Caesmann; Janis Goldzycher; Matteo Grigoletto; Lorenz Gschwent |
| Abstract: | The spread of propaganda, misinformation, and biased narratives from autocratic regimes, especially on social media, is a growing concern in many democracies. Can censorship be an effective tool to curb the spread of such slanted narratives? In this paper, we study the European Union's ban on Russian state-led news outlets after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. We analyze 775, 616 tweets from 133, 276 users on Twitter/X, employing a difference-in-differences strategy. We show that the ban reduced pro-Russian slant among users who had previously directly interacted with banned outlets. The impact is most pronounced among users with the highest pre-ban slant levels. However, this effect was short-lived, with slant returning to its pre-ban levels within two weeks post-enforcement. Additionally, we find a detectable albeit less pronounced indirect effect on users who had not directly interacted with the outlets before the ban. We provide evidence that other suppliers of propaganda may have actively sought to mitigate the ban's influence by intensifying their activity, effectively counteracting the persistence and reach of the ban. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2406.03393&r= |
| By: | Jang, Youngook (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Yoonjung (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); lee, Cheolwon (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Oh, Taehyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Hyun-Jean (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lim, You-Jin (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Cho-Rong (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Jun, Hae-Won (Korea National Diplomatic Academy) |
| Abstract: | 본 보고서에서는 EU가 내세운 ‘개방형 전략적 자율성’ 기조가 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 전후 공급망, 에너지 전환, 인적 교류, 안보 통합의 영역에서 어떻게 구현되는지 고찰하였다. 미중 전략경쟁, 코로나19 팬데믹, 전쟁 등 최근의 통상환경 변화에 대한 EU의 정책 대응을 현지조사, 문헌조사, 통계분석 등을 통해 폭넓게 분석하였으며, 이를 통해 한국 정부와 기업이 활용할 수 있는 기회요인과 맞대응해야 할 도전요인, 그리고 한-EU 협력 유망 영역을 제시하였다. This report examines how EU’s ‘open strategic autonomy’ has been developed and realized facing recent changes in the global trade landscape, especially in areas such as supply chain, energy transition, immigration, and security integration. In response to the fragmentation and blocization of the global economy, which manifested in the US-China strategic competition, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU has sought to strengthen the competitiveness of its own high-tech and strategic industries and reduce its dependence on foreign countries (strategic autonomy). At the same time, it seeks to continue cooperation with like-minded countries with shared values and interests to address challenges that require global effort (openness). Chapter 2 defines open strategic autonomy in more detail and investigates how it has been implemented in the supply chain sector. The industrial and trade policies that have been published since the inauguration of the current EU Presidency in 2019 embody the concept of open strategic autonomy, which is defined as “strengthening competitiveness Executive Summary in the region to defend EU interests without relying on other countries, while continuing to cooperate with partners who share the values and interests.” After the Russia-Ukraine War, the EU continued its efforts to identify areas of weakness in the EU’s competitiveness and to localize and diversify its supply chains. This strategic shift was reflected in a series of supply chain legislation such as the European Chips Act, Critical Raw Materials Act, Net-Zero Industrial Act, and Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. The EU sets targets for the share of home-produced goods and provides various support measures such as subsidies, tax benefits, R&D investment, and workforce training. In addition, the legislation emphasizes bilateral and multilateral strategic partnerships, reflecting the open strategic autonomy of the region to continue cooperation with like-minded countries. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | Russian-Ukraine War; EU; Open Strategic Autonomy; energy transition; refugee influx; security integration |
| Date: | 2023–12–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_008&r= |
| By: | Paul, Michael |
| Abstract: | Russia's war against Ukraine seems to have no immediate end in sight, the strategic competition between China and the US continues, and the expanding military cooperation between China and Russia increases the challenges facing the international community. In this context, the Arctic seems to be a relic of the past, no longer the "zone of peace" that Mikhail Gorbachev described in 1987. Indeed, this Arctic exceptionalism ended long before Russia's war of aggression began. In order to restore at least a minimum level of cooperation, informal talks are needed that could help to provide perspective after the end of the war. Two former relatively uncontroversial projects could serve as starting points: the recovery of radioactive remnants of the Cold War and an agreement to prevent unintentional escalation, namely, another Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA). A return to old approaches to arms control could pave the way to renewed cooperation in the Arctic in the future. |
| Keywords: | Arctic, Arms Control, Russia's war against Ukraine, zone of peace, Vladimir Putin, Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), NATO, Arctic Council, Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:297223&r= |
| By: | Arnold, Sven; Major, Claudia |
| Abstract: | Russia's fullscale invasion of Ukraine since 24 February 2022 has not shaken France's security policy as fundamentally as it has Germany's. France sees its previous goals confirmed, particularly in terms of strengthening Europe's strategic sovereignty. Nevertheless, it has been adapting in many areas in order to continue pursuing its ambitions under changed external conditions. This led to a continuity in security policy objectives - with notable adjustments in the means and direction. These include France's now active support for the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as its increased commitment within NATO. This has also partly dispelled the irritation among European partners that President Emmanuel Macron caused in 2022 with his statements about the need to reach out to Russia. However, substantial differences between Germany and France remain and have intensified in some cases, making bilateral cooperation more complicated. |
| Keywords: | Zeitenwende, French security policy, Revue Stratégique, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, VPR, European Defence Agency, Europe's Defence Technological and Industrial Base, EDTIB, Versailles Agenda, EU enlargement, Ukraine, European Political Community, EPG, European Union Military Assistance Mission, EUMAM, enhanced Forward Presence, eFP, Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, VJTF |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:297229&r= |
| By: | Arsenii Shcherbov |
| Abstract: | Recent years have spurred significant migration movements, underscoring the need to understand their impacts. This study explores a widely-debated correlation between crime and migration. Specifically, I investigate the 2014 migration wave, studying the response of Russian crime rates to the influx of immigrants from Ukraine. I approximate local crime rates using court data on sentencing decisions and describe relevant migration flows with internet search activity. The application of the difference-in-differences method reveals positive effects for property crime sentencing and the heterogeneous response of violent crime sentencing. The findings of this study are policyrelevant and could prove beneficial in understanding and mitigating the effects of future migration waves. |
| Keywords: | Crime, Migration |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp782&r= |
| By: | Carlos Pérez Montes (Banco de España); Alejandro Ferrer (Banco de España); Gabriel Jiménez (Banco de España); Laura Álvarez Román (Banco de España); Henrique Basso (Banco de España); Beatriz González López (Banco de España); Sergio Mayordomo (Banco de España); Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas (Banco de España); Myroslav Pidkuyko (Banco de España); Lola Morales (Banco de España); Pedro Javier Martínez-Valero (Banco de España); Ángel Valentín (Banco de España) |
| Abstract: | The Banco de España uses various microeconomic models, mostly of an empirical nature, to support its decision-making in relation to the analysis of economic and financial risks and economic policy advice. These models, which complement those of a macroeconomic nature, seeks to identify the potentially heterogeneous impact on different groups of agents of certain economic, financial or public policy scenarios. This analysis covers many areas, including the study of the behaviour of households and non-financial corporations, the internal credit rating of companies, the study of the demand for and supply of bank credit, top-down bank stress tests, supervisory review and evaluation processes (SREP) and the study of non-bank financial intermediaries. This paper shows how these models have been applied to analyse two recent crisis events, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, illustrating their practical utility and the need for their development and continuous adaptation. |
| Keywords: | microeconomics, microeconometrics, non-financial private sector, banks, other financial intermediaries, risks, impact |
| JEL: | D12 D22 D40 G10 G21 G28 G32 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:opaper:2313e&r= |
| By: | Güntner, Jochen; Reif, Magnus; Wolters, Maik H. |
| Abstract: | We use a structural VAR model to study the German natural gas market and investigate the impact of the 2022 Russian supply stop on the German economy. Combining conventional and narrative sign restrictions, we find that gas supply and demand shocks have large and persistent price effects, while output effects tend to be moderate. The 2022 natural gas price spike was driven by adverse supply shocks and positive storage demand shocks, as Germany filled its inventories before the winter. Counterfactual simulations of an embargo on natural gas imports from Russia indicate similar positive price and negative output effects compared to what we observe in the data. |
| Keywords: | Energy crisis, German natural gas market, narrative sign restrictions, natural gas price, structural scenario analysis, vector-autoregression |
| JEL: | E32 F51 Q41 Q43 Q48 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:imfswp:299246&r= |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | The Russian authorities have been battling strong depreciation pressures, with the rouble having lost around 30% of its value since early 2023 (and inflationary pressures having risen strongly). The main reason for this is the declining supply of foreign exchange from foreign trade transactions, due to (i) a steady rise in the share of export contracts denominated in roubles, and (ii) the declining share of export earnings in foreign currency converted into roubles. To address the latter problem, on 16 October the authorities imposed a surrender requirement for export proceeds, which has proved highly effective at stabilising the exchange rate. However, despite this and a sharp rise in the policy rate of 7.5 pp in total since June, inflation has continued to accelerate, reflecting the ongoing expansionary fiscal stance, but also the lengthy nature of some monetary transmission mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | surrender requirement, exchange rate, inflation, credit growth |
| JEL: | E31 E5 F31 F32 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rusmon:2&r= |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Carsten Brockhaus; Julian Hinz; Levke Jessen-Thiesen; Hendrik Mahlkow; Patrik Svab |
| Abstract: | This report focuses on Russia's adaptation in its commodity exports during 2023, amidst ongoing international sanctions. It examines the shifts in export and maritime shipping patterns, emphasizing coal, crude oil, and liquefied natural gas, and their redirection towards alternative, non-sanctioning markets. The analysis details Russia's efforts to maintain its commodity exports by leveraging new maritime routes and — possibly — spoofing Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals to avoid detection of ship-to-ship transfers of oil. |
| Keywords: | commodity exports, maritime shipping, ship-to-ship oil transfers |
| JEL: | F14 F51 Q4 |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rusmon:3&r= |
| By: | Théo Aphecetche; Maria Bianchi; Guergana Stanoeva |
| Abstract: | Global imbalances, as measured by current account surpluses and deficits, had been on a narrowing path for several years, before widening in 2020 and 2021. While there is nothing wrong per se, excessive current account imbalances, if unaddressed, might pose serious risks to the global economy. These Brief analyses the recent dynamics in global imbalances in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and discusses the possible effects of the ongoing Russia’ war in Ukraine. It notes that while the recent global imbalances widening appears to reflect mostly transitory shocks, uncertainty and downside risks to the global outlook remain exceptionally high. It also underlines that while Emerging Markets Economies’ macroeconomic fundamentals appear more resilient to the current monetary tightening, weaknesses remain. The Brief also considers how climate change as a systemic risk could jeopardise the fragile equilibrium of macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, the Brief presents possible macroeconomic and structural policy options to reduce excess current account imbalances in a growth-friendly manner and to prevent or cushion possible risks. |
| Keywords: | Global Current Account Imbalances; COVID-19 Pandemic; Russia’s War in Ukraine, Climate Change, Global Economic Governance; International Cooperation; Multilateralism; Economy and Finance, G20, Aphecetche, Bianchi, Stanoeva. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:euf:ecobri:074&r= |
| By: | Khamitkhanova, Aiganym; Paul, Anju Mary (New York University Abu Dhabi) |
| Abstract: | Russia attained an overall GCPI score of 5.61 out of 10, placing it in the “Maturing” band of the Index. Its score of 6.25 in Sub-Index A is linked to the financial and employment protections provided during pregnancy and maternity leave and its mother-friendly workplace policies, but there is still room for improvement in areas such as dependent care leave, paternity leave policies, and flexible work arrangements. With a score of 4.98 in Sub-Index B, Russia shows some level of support for domestic workers, but coverage and protections for these workers are not as comprehensive as those for other workers. |
| Date: | 2024–06–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:gn73r&r= |
| By: | Anna Burova (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Irina Kozlovtceva (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Andrey Sinyakov (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation) |
| Abstract: | We study corporate loan composition in Russia during the pandemic along two dimensions. First, we analyse the quality composition of borrowers of new loans. Like most existing studies, we measure the quality of borrowers at the levels observed before, not during (or after), the pandemic. Using probability of default to measure borrower quality, we find that the share of loans provided by banks to firms with weaker fundamentals, as identified even before the pandemic, increased during the pandemic. This increase is economically significant. The result does not depend on the ’riskiness’ of banks (as measured by the share of nonperforming loans on their balanceÂsheets). We argue that the subsidised loan programmes (with government guarantees) may help to explain this unpleasant result. Second, we analyse the share of loans provided during pandemic through credit line utilisation as compared with new standÂalone loans. We find that credit line utilisation increased during the pandemic irrespective of firms’ ex ante probabilities of default. Thus, credit lines played the role of an automatic stabiliser during the period of high demand for liquidity. At the same time, credit line utilisation decreased during the pandemic among firms in the exposed industries. We also find that financially weaker banks tended to have higher shares of credit line utilisation before and during the pandemic, and this may have implications for the banks’ stability |
| Keywords: | : Corporate credits, credit lines utilisation, credit registery, micro-level data, bank lending, Russia |
| JEL: | G21 G32 D22 |
| Date: | 2022–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bkr:wpaper:wps110&r= |
| By: | Mikaela Gavas (Managing Director & Senior Policy Fellow, Center for Global Development); Samuel Pleeck (Research Associate, Center for Global Development); Andrew Rogerson (Center for Global Development); San Bilal (Senior Executive & Associate Director, European Centre for Development Policy Management); Karim Karaki (Head of Economic Recovery and Transformation, European Centre for Development Policy Management) |
| Abstract: | Already constrained by the economic aftershocks of COVID-19, the impact of the war in Ukraine, and the food and climate crisis, low-income countries and lower-middle-income countries now face a combination of soaring debt and high interest rates. Confronted with insufficient liquidity to respond to these challenges and unable to access capital markets, they need additional concessional finance, in the form of grants and soft loans. The European Union (EU) already provides concessional finance, but it is not nearly enough to respond to their growing needs. With European budgets under more strain than ever, this paper puts forward the case for finding ways to maximise the overall efficiency and impact of European concessional finance and in doing so, better articulating and combining grants and concessional loans in its support and investment toolbox. To remain relevant and maintain relationships and influence with partner countries–even more in a world characterised by the polycrisis and geopolitical fragmentation–the EU will have to step up its game when it comes to providing more strategic concessional finance. The paper sets out six complementary and non-mutually exclusive options for maximising EU concessional finance with a view to a strategic set of decisions to be made for the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework. |
| Date: | 2024–03–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:ppaper:325&r= |
| By: | Bendiek, Annegret; Becker, Max; Borrett, Camille; Bochtler, Paul |
| Abstract: | The political debate over implementing qualified majority voting (QMV) into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is of high political relevance, especially given the shifting geopolitical landscape in Europe, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine and uncertainties regarding the US's engagement post-2024 elections. Germany, along with a group of other EU member states, is leading efforts to integrate a "sovereignty safety net" within the CFSP framework. This initiative is designed to ease the concerns of reluctant member states, by providing enhanced veto options for matters affecting national interests. Moreover, mechanisms like constructive abstention and the "passerelle clause" could be further exploited to facilitate common CFSP actions without requiring treaty reforms. Nonetheless, it is crucial that all measures designed to build political consensus for expanding the use of QMV within the CFSP, strike the right balance between national interests and European solidarity. This balance is essential for strengthening the EU's resilience and operational capability. Cyber foreign and security policy, with its transnational nature and need for swift and unified responses, presents a favorable testing ground for this approach. |
| Keywords: | Qualified majority voting, QMV, Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP, Common Security and Defence Policy, CSPD, constructive abstention, passerelle clause, Group of Friends, cybersecurity, cyberattacks, cyber diplomacy toolbox, CDT, European Peace Facility, Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, EU Cyber Security Strategy, European Defence Union, Coordination Centre for the Cyber and Information Domain, Cyber Rapid Response Teams, European Repository of Cyber Incidents, EuRepoC, European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, emergency brake, blocking minority, Ioannina mechanism, Passerelle-Verfahren |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:297224&r= |
| By: | Rotte, Ralph (RWTH Aachen University) |
| Abstract: | Currently, three aspects contribute to an increasing complexity of international nuclear security policies. Apart from a controversial “renaissance of nuclear energy” and corresponding technological innovations there is the rise of political and ideological great power conflicts as well as the intensifying structural weaknesses of the existing nuclear non-proliferation and verification regime centered on the IAEA. While the conflict between Russia and the West results in a tendency of declining relevance of potential non-proliferation of nuclear weapons compared to export and alliance priorities, the IAEA is increasingly suffering from underfunding. Given the technological progress and the threat of large-scale proliferation of nuclear facilities this results in the danger of an essential weakening of nuclear non-proliferation policies. |
| Date: | 2024–06–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:et9kc&r= |
| By: | Maryna Tverdostup (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Over the past few decades, immigration has become the primary factor contributing to population growth in the European Union (EU) due to rapid population ageing and declining fertility rates. However, the traditional migration source countries – namely, the EU countries in Central and East Europe (EU-CEE) and the EU neighbourhood countries – have limited potential to supply much-needed labour to Western Europe due to own their grim population prospects. Immigration from non-EU, non-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or non-EU candidate countries as of 2015 (i.e. Georgia, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine) appears to be the only factor that can prevent population decline in the long run, as third-country nationals are, on average, younger than natives or immigrants from the EU neighbourhood. However, current evidence suggests that higher immigration has only a limited capacity to stabilise population decline and offset labour shortages in the EU countries most affected by negative demographic trends, as they receive fewer immigrants relative to other EU countries. Moreover, the labour market integration of immigrants from non-traditional source countries, including Middle Eastern and African countries, has proved challenging for both legal and infrastructural reasons. This has resulted in an immense pool of untapped talent and skills, which will require the appropriate policy steps to be fully identified and effectively employed in the labour market. These policies, like the ones proposed in this report, will become increasingly important as the EU moves steadily towards new immigration source regions. |
| Keywords: | demographic trends, labour shortages, migration, refugees, integration policies |
| JEL: | J11 J15 O15 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:78&r= |
| By: | Lech Marcinkowski; Anca Butnaru; Aleksandra Rabrenović |
| Abstract: | Public sector remuneration systems are shaped by an intricate interaction of administrative culture, economic conditions, and political systems. This paper discusses critical considerations to bear in mind when designing, planning and implementing reforms of public service wage systems. It explores key concepts such as job evaluation, pay structures, performance-related pay, market analysis for competitive pay levels and wage bill planning. It provides guidance on the process of reforming public sector salary systems to enhance their competitiveness, equity, transparency and affordability. The paper offers insights drawn from the reform efforts of several EU Member States and SIGMA partners in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, presenting real-life examples and updated guidelines for effective, sustainable salary system changes. The primary focus is on reforms of wage systems within central government administrations, acknowledging the complexity arising from diverse classifications of civil service and public employees, and the varying scope and structure of salary systems. This paper serves as a practical guide, presenting options along with their advantages and disadvantages to aid policymakers in aligning reforms with their national public administration context and strategies. |
| Keywords: | employer branding, gender pay gap, human resource management, job evaluation, pay, pay competitiveness, pay compression ratio, pay equity, pay supplements, pay transparency, performance-related pay, public administration, public sector, remuneration, remuneration systems, salaries, salary policy, salary system reform, salary systems, wage bill planning, wages |
| Date: | 2024–06–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:govaac:71-en&r= |
| By: | Krebs, Tom (University of Mannheim); Weber, Isabella (University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
| Abstract: | In the wake of the global energy crisis, many European countries used energy price controls to fight inflation and to stabilize the economy. Despite its wide adoption, many economists remained skeptical. In this paper, we argue that price controls should be part of the policy toolbox to respond to shocks to systemically important sectors because not using them can have large economic and political costs. We put forward our arguments in two steps. In a first step, we analyze the impact on the German economy and society of the global energy crisis that followed Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022. Our analysis shows that energy shocks matter. Specifically, the one-year GDP loss of the energy crisis 2022 amounts to 4 percent and is comparable to the short-run output losses during the COVID-19 crisis 2020 and the global financial crisis 2008. In addition, during the energy crisis 2022 inflation rates rose dramatically and real wages dropped more than in any other year in post-war Germany. There are also clear signs that the crisis is causing severe long-term economic damage (hysteresis effects). At the beginning of 2024, GDP is 7 percent and real wages are 10 percent below the pre-COVID-19 trend. We argue that the German government handled the immediate response to the energy shock well, but subsequently waited too long to introduce an energy price brake in 2022. This failure to act decisively in response to heightened economic insecurity coincided with a strong rise of the approval rates of the far-right AfD in the summer of 2022. We also show that the German energy price brake was an effective price stabilization policy for households, but did not protect the industrial base appropriately making it more likely that the German economy will continue to stagnate. In a final step, we turn to the use of price controls as an optimal policy response to an energy shock within a general equilibrium framework. We develop a simple production model with an energy sector and shows that price controls are socially optimal whenever self-fulfilling expectations generate endogenous price uncertainty in the wake of an energy shock. We also link our analysis to the so-called sunspot literature that was developed in the 1980s as a response to the rational-expectations revolution in macroeconomics. Finally, we use our theoretical analysis to shed some light on the economic policy debate and the resistance of German mainstream economists to the introduction of energy price controls in 2022. |
| Keywords: | global energy crisis, German economy, endogenous uncertainty, price controls, inflation, stabilization policy |
| JEL: | D52 D84 E12 E32 E64 Q43 Q48 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17043&r= |
| By: | Jenner, Edward |
| Abstract: | Use of nuclear energy is likely to grow in the coming decades, in part to combat climate change. Increased deployment of nuclear energy will likely include use of advanced small reactors, which can facilitate decarbonization, increase nuclear safety, supplement gaps in renewable energy production, provide energy to low-demand communities, help desalinate water, and increase energy security. But there are also risks. Nuclear power, such as that produced by advanced small reactors, put nuclear material in more locations and use higher enrichment fuel for some reactor designs, both of which are security concerns. Moreover, while China and Russia already have operating advanced small reactors and are exploring using reactors aboard floating nuclear power plants, the U.S. will likely not have an operational advanced small reactor until the late 2020s. This brief explores the benefits and risks of advanced small nuclear reactors and describes strategies to mitigate these risks. The bottom line: advanced small nuclear reactors are a beneficial tool for reducing carbon emissions. But their safe deployment and use requires increasing nuclear security expertise and assessing both nuclear fuel and advanced small reactor needs. Moreover, nuclear newcomers need support to adopt nuclear norms and develop domestic nuclear regulatory bodies to lower the potential risks of nuclear energy while maximizing the potential benefits. |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, climate change, nuclear energy |
| Date: | 2022–09–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:globco:qt7w0890jn&r= |
| By: | Wei Wang; Haibo Wang |
| Abstract: | This study uses data from the BRICS stock market index, cryptocurrencies, and investor sentiment indicators from January 6, 2015, to June 29, 2023. BRICS nations emerge as pivotal representatives of emerging economies. This study employs a time-varying parameter vector autoregression model to unravel the intricate interdependence between traditional stock assets and the evolving landscape of cryptocurrencies. The analysis investigates spillover effects between BRICS stock markets and cryptocurrencies, revealing increasing interconnectedness during highly uncertain events like COVID-19, but no significant impact on major US stock market indices. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2406.07641&r= |
| By: | Ádám Kerényi (Institute of World Economics, HUN-REN Centre for Economic and Regional Studies); Csaba Lakócai (Institute of World Economics, HUN-REN Centre for Economic and Regional Studies) |
| Abstract: | Following the collapse of the Soviet-style planned economies, the post-socialist region of Central and Eastern Europe has undergone a process of economic convergence after the initial shock of transition to a market economy. One stage in this process was accession to the European Union. Most of the countries in the region became members, making them eligible for further benefits and financial allocations. The extent to which these funds have been used effectively over the past decades varies from country to country, but overall, the convergence of these countries within the EU has continued. In this study, we examine the distribution of the net EU transfers to the post-socialist member states and their impact on macroeconomic and social indicators between 2004 and 2022. While these effects are clearly visible in terms of the formal economic and consumption indicators, they are less directly visible in terms of the informal wellbeing trends. |
| Keywords: | European Union, post-socialist countries, Central and Eastern Europe, financial transfers, convergence |
| JEL: | I31 O47 O52 P20 P27 Y10 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwe:workpr:274&r= |
| By: | Elliot Aurissergues (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christophe Blot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Edgar Carpentier-Charléty; Magali Dauvin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); François Geerolf (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Eric Heyer (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Mathieu Plane (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | La zone euro a traversé plusieurs crises qui ont parfois menacé sa pérennité mais qui ont aussi entraîné des réformes de sa gouvernance budgétaire et des changements dans la conduite de la politique monétaire. À la veille des élections européennes et 25 ans après sa création, la question se pose de la performance économique de la zone euro par rapport à celle de l'économie américaine. Alors que les trajectoires de PIB par habitant ont été relativement similaires entre 1999 et 2008, elles divergent notablement depuis. Nous étudions les causes possibles de ce décrochage en distinguant les facteurs d'offre et de demande. Côté offre, la zone euro s'est caractérisée sur l'ensemble de la période par une croissance de la productivité nettement plus faible qu'aux États-Unis. À l'inverse, alors qu'il a stagné aux États-Unis, le taux d'emploi de la population en âge de travailler s'est nettement amélioré dans les pays européens même si des disparités au sein du continent demeurent. Plus récemment, la divergence est également liée à l'impact de la crise énergétique et à la hausse plus forte des prix de l'énergie en Europe en lien avec la baisse de l'offre de gaz naturel russe après le déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine. Du côté de la demande, force est de constater qu'il y a un déficit de demande agrégée bien réel en zone euro, avec une épargne qui dépasse nettement l'investissement depuis 2010, alimentant les déséquilibres commerciaux dans le monde. Cette épargne excédentaire s'explique entre autres par une politique budgétaire plus restrictive en Europe qu'aux États-Unis. Cette sous performance agrégée de la zone euro s'accompagne de trajectoires très hétérogènes au sein de la même zone. Sur l'ensemble de la période, les pays du « Nord » ont crû plus vite que la France et que les pays du « Sud ». La période récente a cependant permis à certains pays, notamment l'Italie, de combler une partie de l'écart. L'enjeu des prochaines années sera celui de la consolidation budgétaire et de ses effets sur l'activité. Il est impératif de ne pas reproduire l'erreur de 2011-2014. Une politique de consolidation budgétaire peut-être adaptée en période de reprise de l'activité mais elle est pernicieuse voire inefficace lorsque l'économie est en sous-régime ; si celle-ci doit être menée en période de basse conjoncture, elle sera moins néfaste sur l'activité en étant graduelle, lissée et non synchronisée au sein de la zone euro. Par ailleurs, la priorité de ce côté de l'Atlantique ne peut pas être uniquement le rétablissement des finances publiques, au risque de voir le fossé économique avec les États-Unis continuer à se creuser : avec les nouveaux défis mondiaux et géostratégiques, l'Europe doit financer sa sécurité, la transition écologique et les nouvelles industries vertes. Utilisant son excédent structurel d'épargne, un plan de relance européen ambitieux, ciblé à la fois sur l'offre et sur la demande, permettrait de relever ces défis tout en mettant les économies sous tension, stimulant ainsi la croissance et la productivité. Une croissance potentielle accrue plus élevée est cruciale pour la soutenabilité des dettes publiques à long terme. |
| Keywords: | union monétaire, crises, zone euro, croissance |
| Date: | 2024–06–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04602256&r= |
| By: | Sharofiddinov Husniddin (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology, Japan); Moinul Islam (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology, Japan); Koji Kotani (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology, Japan) |
| Abstract: | Climate change is a global concern, having a negative impact on agriculture, for food security and sustainability. Farmers’ adaptations are known to be key drivers for the resolutions. However, little is established about relationships between farmers’ characteristics and adaptation responses to climate change under irrigated agriculture. We investigate how farm sizes influence the adaptations in consideration to irrigation-related, cognitive and socioeconomic factors reflecting farming culture and history, hypothesizing that large-size farms adapt to climate change as compared to small-size ones in Tajikistan, where collective farming, “Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz, †had been practiced. The data were collected through a questionnaire survey with 800 farmers on their adaptations, farm sizes, climatic perceptions, irrigation water availability and socioeconomic factors. We conduct statistical analyses utilizing the index to characterize farmers’ adaptation responses. The results indicate an importance of farm sizes on adaptations, demonstrating that small-size farms adapt less than large-size farms, but increases their adaptations when they have good climatic perceptions and irrigation water availability. Overall, this research confirms an advantage of large-size farms for adaptations based on Tajikistan farming culture and history. Thus, the ongoing land-fragmentation policy should be reconsidered for possible losses in adaptations, as it has been drastically increasing the number of small-size farms. Otherwise, it is essential to support the small-size farms for acquiring good perceptions and enough water. |
| Keywords: | Farm sizes, adaptation responses, farming culture, history, Tajikistan |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2024-2&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Georgia’s economic performance remains robust. Growth has moderated from double digits but remains high, inflation is low, and fiscal and financial buffers are healthy. EU candidate status has boosted sentiment, but the global environment remains highly uncertain due to ongoing conflicts and shifting geo-economic patterns. Georgia should continue to strengthen its resilience to adverse shocks by maintaining prudent macroeconomic policies and boost its growth potential by addressing long-standing structural challenges, capitalizing on new economic opportunities, and making decisive progress towards EU accession. |
| Date: | 2024–05–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/135&r= |