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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Banat, Maliek |
| Abstract: | Ukraine’s Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA) is the oversight body for sanctioned assets that have been seized in the war due to alleged criminal links to the Russian regime, its economy or support for its war of aggression in Ukraine. As such, it represents a key civilian institution in the war effort, as it aims to manage sanctioned assets for the benefit of the Ukrainian people and its democratic institutions. This report highlights, however, the problem that ARMA has repeatedly failed to convert these assets into sources of economic revenue for the Ukrainian state. This report is a first cut analysis of some of the challenges that Ukraine faces as it seeks to reform its public institutions – protecting them against capture by private and vested interests – while continuing to prosecute the war of national survival against Russia’s invasion. Resource constraints have meant that we have not been able to combine this analysis of public sources with qualitative interviews, which would have allowed us to develop a fuller and more granular picture. This means that the analysis presented necessarily has a provisional character. The report analyses some of the issues facing Ukraine in the governance field and makes some initial recommendations for how they might be overcome through further public interest reform. |
| JEL: | N0 |
| Date: | 2026–08–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:140685 |
| By: | Yuliya Matvyeyeva (Université Gustave Eiffel, DICEN-IDF - Dispositifs d'Information et de Communication à l'Ère du Numérique - Paris Île-de-France - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - Cnam - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [Cnam] - Université Gustave Eiffel, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres) |
| Abstract: | The European Union's 21st sanctions package against Russia, adopted on 23 July 2026, strengthens the protection of European operators facing proceedings before Russian courts. Against the background of the Reibel case, which remains pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union, Thematic Review No. 8/2026 of the Russian Supreme Court and proceedings concerning the enforcement of an arbitral award of nearly EUR 214 million, sanctions litigation reveals a confrontation between two legal architectures that are increasingly being constructed in opposition to one another. This article examines the practical implications for compliance and international litigation professionals. |
| Abstract: | Le 21e paquet de sanctions de l'Union européenne contre la Russie, adopté le 23 juillet 2026, renforce la protection des opérateurs européens confrontés à des procédures engagées devant les juridictions russes. Entre l'affaire Reibel, toujours pendante devant la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, la synthèse thématique n° 8/2026 de la Cour suprême russe et les procédures relatives à l'exécution d'une sentence de près de 214 millions d'euros, le contentieux des sanctions révèle un affrontement entre deux architectures juridiques qui se construisent l'une contre l'autre. Décryptage à l'usage des praticiens de la conformité et du contentieux international. |
| Keywords: | compliance, international litigation, international arbitration, counter-sanctions, jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement, Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, Court of Justice of the European Union, sanctions circumvention, ownership and control, geopolitics, economic sanctions, European Union, Russia, international sanctions, arbitrage international, sanctions internationales, sanctions économiques, Union européenne, Russie, conformité, contentieux international, contre-sanctions, compétence juridictionnelle, reconnaissance et exécution des décisions, règlement (UE) n° 833/2014, Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, contournement des sanctions, propriété et contrôle, géopolitique |
| Date: | 2026–07–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05713192 |
| By: | Haofeng Liao; Xing Wang |
| Abstract: | This paper develops an econometric framework for analysing smooth structural change in cointegrated systems following a known intervention time. We consider a vector error-correction model in which the cointegration rank and the pre-intervention cointegrating structure are identified from a stable pre-intervention subsample. After the intervention, both the adjustment coefficients and the cointegrating vectors are allowed to evolve smoothly as functions of rescaled time, which are estimated using kernel-weighted local reduced-rank methods. The analysis is formulated directly in a cointegrated VAR/VECM system, which preserves the treatment of long-run relations and short-run error-correction dynamics. By working with the decomposition $\Pi(\delta)=\alpha(\delta)\beta(\delta)'$, the method separates changes in the equilibrium relation from those in the speed of adjustment. We also provide two tests for the parameter consistency and the post-intervention parameter smoothness respectively. An empirical application to energy market, foreign-exchange, and gold-market index around the 24 February 2022 Russia's invasion of Ukraine illustrates how the proposed approach distinguishes between a discrete regime shift and smooth post-intervention evolution. The results suggest that cointegrating relation among the price of Brent crude oil, the spot exchange rate (USD/EUR), and the Credit Suisse NASDAQ Gold Price Index has smoothly changed after the outbreak of war, instead of a constant long-run conintegration system in the pre-intervention period. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.03773 |
| By: | Grigoriadis, Theocharis |
| Abstract: | Why does industrialization in some cases generate social consolidation and in other cases political conflict? This paper argues that the answer depends on how industrial finance is allocated. I develop a dynamic political-economy model in which the government channels external liquidity into industry under either centralized or decentralized finance. Under decentralization, adverse shocks harden budget constraints and permit replacement of inefficient incumbents by new entrepreneurs. Under centralization, by contrast, the government is more likely to refinance inefficient incumbents, soften budget constraints, and block entry. Industrialization then generates concentrated rents and a higher risk of conflict. I interpret late imperial Russia as a historically revealing case of this mechanism. Rather than treating Russia as the sole object of interest, the paper uses it to motivate a general theory of industrialization under monopoly. |
| Keywords: | industrialization, soft budget constraints, centralized finance, incumbent protection, political conflict |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:342461 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Since the transition to inflation targeting (IT) in 2015, the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) has substantially improved its transparency and communication practices. The NBK commitment to transparency is embedded in strategic documents—the 2030 Monetary Policy Strategy, Communication Strategy, and Macroprudential Policy Strategy. Stakeholders consistently acknowledged the NBK as a national leader in promoting transparency, commending its proactive stance on openness, timely dissemination of information, and strong commitment to constructive engagement with the public and institutional partners. |
| Date: | 2026–08–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2026/229 |
| By: | Rim Berahab; Sabrine Emran |
| Abstract: | The global energy system has entered a period of acute structural stress following the strikes by the United States and Israel on Iran in late February 2026, and the subsequent disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the International Energy Agency, the resulting shock marks the most severe disruption to global energy markets since the 1970s oil crises, with systemic characteristics comparable to the combined effects of those crises and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine energy shock. This policy paper examines the mechanics of the oil-price shock, then assesses the structural importance of the Strait of Hormuz as a global energy chokepoint, through which an estimated 17.8 million barrels per day of crude oil and LNG transited before the Iran conflict. It highlights the limited substitutability of existing bypass infrastructure under conditions of sustained disruption. It also evaluates the fragmentation of the OPEC+ framework, including the United Arab Emirates’s announced withdrawal from the alliance on May 1, 2026, marking a critical point in the erosion of coordinated production management among major Gulf exporters. Finally, it analyses the role of renewable energy as a structural variable in the crisis, not as a short-term buffer, but as an accelerating force reshaping the geopolitical foundations of energy security. The Hormuz disruption should therefore be understood not only as a price shock, but as a systemic stress test of global energy governance, exposing deep structural fragilities and accelerating realignments across markets, alliances, and the energy transition. |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:pbtrad:pb29_26 |
| By: | Harin, Alexander |
| Abstract: | This is the second part of the systematic introduction to the sub-interval analysis. In particular, an introduction to sub-interval images (or SI-images or S-IIs or SIIs) is presented here. Basic notions of the sub-interval images are formulated. Some concepts of SII-indexing are proposed. A short general outlook of possible use of the SI-analysis for Big Data is given. The S-IIs can be used mainly in approximations and preliminary operations such as preliminary analysis, search, and recognition in databases; in, e.g., accounting and audit, micro- and macroeconomics and, especially, in Big Data. |
| Keywords: | mathematic; databases; Big Data; macroeconomics; microeconomics; accounting; |
| JEL: | C02 C1 M4 |
| Date: | 2026–09–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:130725 |