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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Mellace, Federico; Nishikawa, Taro; Trebesch, Christoph; Frey, Nathanael; Goffi, Ettore |
| Abstract: | * There is growing confusion about how much help the German government has given to Ukraine. To support the public debate, this report presents a comprehensive summary of the available information on German aid to Ukraine. * Germany's total bilateral aid to Ukraine 2022-2026 ranges between EUR 31 and EUR 42 billion, depending on the source and measurement approach. The large range between these estimates stems from limited transparency in Germany's reporting. The EUR 31 billion estimate is based on detailed, verifiable aid data that is reliable enough for international comparisons. The EUR 42 billion is instead based on aggregated government numbers, which are increasingly difficult to verify, because Germany has stopped reporting detailed aid numbers. About 80 per cent of German aid is military. Aid flows were lowest in 2024 and more than doubled in 2025/26. * In addition to bilateral aid, Germany has supported Ukraine via the European Union, which has provided large-scale loans to Ukraine. Germany's share in these EU contributions adds up to another EUR 22.7 billion. * The widely circulated figure of EUR 100 billion for German aid to Ukraine is misleading. It is wrongly reported as "bilateral aid", since only about 40 per cent of this sum actually went to Ukraine. A closer look at the government figures shows that EUR 22 billion consists of future aid promises, which may or may not materialise. Moreover, EUR 35.9 billion was spent domestically in Germany, primarily on social welfare ("Bürgergeld") for Ukrainian refugees. * Compared with domestic spending priorities, Germany's bilateral aid to Ukraine is relatively modest. For example, Germany spent far more on "Mütterrente", a pension add-on for mothers that keeps on expanding (ca. EUR 64 billion over 2022-26). The government also spent far more on domestic energy subsidies introduced after Russia decided to halt its gas deliveries in 2022. The 2022/23 "Doppelwumms" alone cost around EUR 51 billion, more than total bilateral Ukraine aid in five years (even when using the upper-bound aid figure of EUR 42 billion). In addition to that, the government launched several new transport and energy subsidies for households since 2022 (Tankrabatt, Deutschlandticket, Energiepreispauschalen etc.) at a total cost of around EUR 37 billion, almost as much as bilateral aid to Ukraine since 2022. * In international comparison, Germany has become the largest individual donor country in absolute terms in 2025 and 2026. The US has provided more than three times as much in total, but new US aid dropped by 99 per cent since 2024. Also the four Nordic countries together have given more than Germany, even though they total only a third of Germany's population. Relative to GDP, Germany's support ranks twelfth, close to the EU average. * Better German aid reporting is both essential and easily possible. We provide concrete recommendations for the government based on international best practice. |
| Keywords: | Fiscal Policy & National Budgets, Germany, Ukraine, War, Finanzpolitik und Staatshaushalte, Deutschland, Krieg |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:344217 |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Alexandra Bykova (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Selena Duraković (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Meryem Gökten (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Richard Grieveson (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Gabor Hunya (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Branimir Jovanović (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Biljana Jovanovikj (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Jakub Komárek (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Niko Korpar (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Dzmitry Kruk; Isilda Mara (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Michał Możdżeń; Emilia Penkova-Pearson; Emilė Petravičiūtė; Olga Pindyuk (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Sandor Richter (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Bernd Christoph Ströhm (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Marina Tverdostup (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Despite a stronger-than-expected recovery in European industry, the euro area faces a difficult outlook, with renewed inflationary pressures, high interest rates and mounting fiscal challenges expected to constrain growth in 2027. Against this backdrop, most economies in Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE) remain resilient and continue to outperform Western Europe, although differences between countries are widening. The region's traditional growth model, based on cheap labour, foreign investment and German industrial demand, is giving way to one increasingly driven by domestic demand, automation and investment in defence, energy and higher-value industries, creating new opportunities alongside significant geopolitical and economic risks. |
| Keywords: | CESEE Central and Eastern Europe, economic forecast, Western Balkans, CIS, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, EU, business cycle, economic sentiment, euro area, convergence, labour markets, unemployment, Russia-Ukraine war, commodity prices, inflation, price controls, trade disruptions, renewable energy, gas, electricity, monetary policy, fiscal policy |
| JEL: | E20 E21 E22 E24 E32 E5 E62 F21 F31 H60 I18 J20 J30 O47 O52 O57 P24 P27 P33 P52 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:fpaper:fc:autumn2026 |
| By: | Étienne Farvaque; Alexander Mihailov; Piotr Stanek |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether the National Bank of Ukraine’s policy remained rule-like through institutional reform, external constraints, and war. Using monthly data for 2009–2026, we estimate dynamic open-economy Taylor-type rules with inflation, economic activity, exchange-rate, and regime-interaction terms. Policy-rate persistence is strong, while the estimated inflation response changes across regimes and is largest during the full-scale war. The largest rule deviations occur during the 2015 currency crisis, the initial 2022 policy-rate freeze, and the June 2022 tightening. Descriptive event accounting links these episodes to institutional and geopolitical constraints. The evidence is consistent with state-contingent adaptation rather than a wholesale suspension of rules, with implications for monetary credibility and Ukraine’s prospective European integration. Cette étude examine dans quelle mesure la politique monétaire de la Banque nationale d’Ukraine est demeurée fondée sur des règles malgré les réformes institutionnelles, les contraintes extérieures et la guerre. À partir de données mensuelles couvrant la période de 2009 à 2026, les auteurs estiment des règles de politique monétaire dynamiques de type Taylor, adaptées à une économie ouverte, qui intègrent l’inflation, l’activité économique, le taux de change ainsi que des termes d’interaction liés aux différents régimes. Les résultats révèlent une forte persistance du taux directeur, tandis que la réaction estimée de la politique monétaire à l’inflation varie selon les régimes et atteint son niveau le plus élevé durant la guerre à grande échelle. Les écarts les plus importants par rapport aux règles sont observés lors de la crise de change de 2015, du gel initial du taux directeur en 2022 et du resserrement monétaire de juin 2022. Une analyse descriptive des événements permet de mettre ces épisodes en relation avec les contraintes institutionnelles et géopolitiques. Les résultats sont compatibles avec une adaptation de la politique monétaire aux circonstances plutôt qu’avec un abandon généralisé des règles, ce qui soulève des enjeux importants pour la crédibilité de la politique monétaire et les perspectives d’intégration européenne de l’Ukraine. |
| Keywords: | Taylor-type rules, Ukraine, exchange-rate stabilization, inflation targeting, geopolitical risk, wartime monetary policy, National Bank of Ukraine, règles de type Taylor, Ukraine, stabilisation du taux de change, ciblage de l’inflation, risque géopolitique, politique monétaire en temps de guerre, Banque nationale d’Ukraine |
| JEL: | E52 E58 F31 F41 O52 P34 |
| Date: | 2026–10–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2026s-19 |
| By: | Bibilashvili, Mariam (Masaryk University) |
| Abstract: | Challenging the common understanding in the relevant literature, this study reconceptualizes resilience to hybrid threats as a politically mediated process rather than purely a matter of institutional capacity-building. To examine how policy frameworks and political rhetoric interact to shape resilience, it traces Georgia’s security culture in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war. Through intertextual discourse analysis, the article cross-examines the institutional architecture of digital resilience, encompassing cybersecurity (systemic), media regulation (protective) and media literacy (empowerment) measures, with the government’s shifting rhetoric (2023–2025), while interview data provide contextual insights. The analysis reveals a discordant security culture manifested in fragmented governance and discursive struggle over resilience. Although formal policy frameworks normatively align with the West and consistently identify Russia as the principal security threat, governmental rhetoric portrays the same Western actors as sources of foreign interference and prioritizes political autonomy over cooperation while still invoking commitments to the constitutionally enshrined Euro-Atlantic trajectory. This dichotomy between institutional design and political discourse results in strategic ambiguity. It suggests that in hybrid regimes formal frameworks may function symbolically to signal external alignment, while practice is determined by short-term political calculations and discretionary authority, leaving institutions and societies vulnerable to evolving forms of foreign interference. |
| Date: | 2026–10–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:62dj3_v1 |
| By: | Yves Jégourel |
| Abstract: | The outbreak of the war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have had major consequences for a large number of global commodity markets. While media attention has understandably focused on oil and natural gas, as well as on aluminum – owing to the strong dependence of that metal’s supply on energy prices – sulfur, like helium, ethylene, propylene, or urea, has also been caught up in the fallout of this conflict. Far from being a marginal commodity, it is essential to the production of nickel and copper, as well as of fertilizers. Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are among the world’s leading sulfur exporters. Against this difficult backdrop, China has banned exports of sulfuric acid in order to safeguard domestic supply – even though it is the world’s leading supplier – while Russia has sharply restricted its sales to countries outside the Eurasian Economic Union since November 1, 2025. Combined with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, these measures have led to a near-doubling of sulfur and acid prices. If the conflict continues, a shortage could have serious consequences worldwide, particularly for food security. As the world’s largest exporter of phosphate fertilizers and, consequently, heavily dependent on this input, Morocco appears directly exposed, despite a diversification of its sulfur imports toward Kazakhstan and a firm strategy of securing/producing the resource domestically across the various stages of the value chain. |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:pbagri:pb_51-26-1 |
| By: | Evans, Alexander |
| Abstract: | This paper explores whether the US dollar’s dominance in global finance – long a pillar of American geopolitical influence – is being quietly eroded. While the dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency, its centrality in international payments is increasingly contested. The weaponisation of the dollar, particularly through sanctions and the extraterritorial reach of the New York banking licence, has prompted strategic responses from states such as China, Russia, and India. These strategic responses include the development of alternative payment systems, local currency trade settlements, and digital infrastructure. The paper argues that a ‘hollowing’ of the dollar’s infrastructural dominance is underway – (perhaps very) gradual, partial, but geopolitically significant. This shift may not end dollar supremacy, but it could fragment the global financial system, weaken US sanctions leverage, and diminish the centrality of New York and London as financial hubs. The implications for global order are subtle but potentially profound. A less dollar-dependent system may facilitate a more multipolar world yet diminish liberal democratic power. |
| JEL: | F3 G3 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:141656 |
| By: | Malika Azimova (Singapore Institute of Management Development in Tashkent) |
| Abstract: | This article examines the institutional and economic conditions shaping the development of franchising in the Republic of Uzbekistan. Drawing on an analy-sis of the legal and regulatory framework, industry statistics, field research, and comparisons with selected international markets, the study identifies the main fac-tors limiting the sector's growth and proposes a phased model for its institutional development. Particular attention is given to regional disparities, the sectoral composition of the market, and the potential of locally developed franchise sys-tems to support entrepreneurship and expand employment opportunities. The empirical evidence covers the period 2024?2025 and includes an analysis of commercial concession agreements as well as expert interviews with market par-ticipants from eight regions of Uzbekistan. |
| Keywords: | Franchising, Commercial concession, Institutional barriers, Small business, Regional development, Economic modernization |
| JEL: | L26 L53 O17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iefpro:16217331 |
| By: | Yves Jégourel |
| Abstract: | Le déclenchement de la Guerre en Iran et le blocage du détroit d’Ormuz ont eu des conséquences majeures sur un grand nombre de marchés mondiaux de matières premières. Si l’attention médiatique s’est logiquement portée sur le pétrole et le gaz naturel, ainsi que sur l’aluminium, en raison de la forte dépendance de l’offre de ce métal aux prix de l’énergie, le soufre, comme l’hélium, l’éthylène, le propylène ou l’urée, a également été pris dans les rets de ce conflit. Loin d’être une matière première anecdotique, il est indispensable à la production de nickel et de cuivre, mais également d’engrais. Le Qatar, l’Iran et l’Arabie saoudite comptent parmi les grands pays exportateurs de soufre. Dans ce contexte difficile, la Chine a interdit l’exportation d’acide sulfurique pour préserver les approvisionnements nationaux, alors qu’elle en est le premier fournisseur mondial, tandis que la Russie a très fortement limité ses ventes aux pays non-membres de l’Union économique eurasiatique depuis le 1er novembre 2025. Conjuguées à la fermeture du détroit d’Ormuz, ces mesures ont conduit à quasi-doublement des prix du soufre et de l’acide. Si le conflit venait à perdurer, les conséquences d’une pénurie pourraient être majeures à l’échelle mondiale, notamment en matière de sécurité alimentaire. Plus grand pays exportateur d’engrais phosphatés et, en conséquence, largement dépendant de cet intrant, le Maroc apparaît directement exposé, malgré une diversification de ses importations de soufre en faveur du Kazakhstan et une stratégie affirmée de sécurisation/production de la ressource à l’échelle nationale, et ce, aux différents échelons de la chaîne de valeur. |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:pbagri:pb_51-26 |