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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Irakli Barbakadze; Jan Fidrmuc; Martin Hulényi; Ketevani Kapanadze |
| Abstract: | We study Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a natural experiment to determine how sudden disruptions to international market access reshape sub-national economic inequalities. Using remotely-sensed nighttime lights as a proxy for economic activity, we estimate the economic effects of the war at the national and regional levels. We find that Russia experienced an overall economic slowdown after the start of the full-scale invasion. Regions in Western and North-Western Russia experienced significantly larger economic contractions, while Southern and Southeastern regions exhibit relative improvements in performance. These findings suggest that sanctions, a shift toward non-Western markets, and increased military production, have driven significant regional changes in Russia’s economy and urban structure. |
| Keywords: | Russia, regional and local inequalities, resilience, nighttime lights |
| JEL: | F15 P25 R11 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12869 |
| By: | Jashari, Skender |
| Abstract: | The article examines Russia’s long‑standing pattern of expansionist warfare and argues that these historical dynamics, combined with modern geopolitical pressures, are pushing the Russian Federation toward an imminent breakup. Drawing on centuries of conflicts—from the Russo‑Turkish wars to Soviet‑era occupations—the author highlights how Russia has repeatedly used military force, ideological manipulation, and proxy groups to dominate neighboring regions. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the study argues that Vladimir Putin’s restoration strategy relies on tools such as Islamist networks, corruption, organized crime, energy coercion, propaganda, and nuclear intimidation. Russia’s wars in Georgia and Ukraine are presented as extensions of this strategy, with the 2022 invasion marking a turning point that exposes deep structural weaknesses inside the Russian state. The article emphasizes Russia’s extreme ethnic and linguistic fragmentation, noting over 150 languages, 193 ethnic groups, and numerous republics where ethnic Russians are not the majority. Based on these internal divisions, the author predicts that the Russian Federation could fragment into dozens of new states, similar to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The study concludes that a united Europe and Ukraine’s military resilience are accelerating Russia’s decline, framing the Russian Federation as the modern “Sick Man of Siberia.” The author argues that the collapse of Russia would also significantly weaken international terrorism, particularly Islamist networks historically supported by Soviet and Russian structures. |
| Keywords: | Russian expansionism Hybrid warfare Dissolution of the Russian Federation Ethnic fragmentation Soviet legacy Geopolitical instability Russian–Ukrainian war Balkan security International terrorism Putin’s restoration strategy Proxy warfare Post‑Soviet states Ethnolinguistic diversity Russian imperialism |
| JEL: | F5 N4 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:130026 |
| By: | Dmitrii Shchetinin (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Stanislav Avdeev (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | International trade depends on the expectation that courts will protect commercial interests when disputes arise. With the growing number of international conflicts, it is crucial to know whether this expectation is met in practice. We examine the effect of the 2014 annexation of Crimea on the enforcement rate of foreign decisions by Russian and Ukrainian judges. We assemble novel data on the entire universe of Russian and Ukrainian court decisions concerning the enforcement of foreign decisions resolving cross-border commercial disputes. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that the enforcement rate of Ukrainian (Russian) decisions in Russia (Ukraine) fell by 26% (33%) after the annexation. We show that courts increasingly justified refusals through discretionary legal grounds and undue-notification claims. Our findings provide the first causal evidence that international conflict affects both judicial decision-making and compliance with commercial treaties. |
| Keywords: | Arbitration, Armed conflict, Cross-border commerce, Extrajudicial factors, International commercial disputes, Transnational litigation |
| JEL: | D74 F14 F51 F53 K33 |
| Date: | 2026–06–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20260042 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Selected Issues |
| Keywords: | policy lever; labor market informality; staff team; informality in Ukraine; IMF country; Value-added tax; Employment; Social security contributions; Informal employment; Europe |
| Date: | 2026–07–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2026/189 |
| By: | Ibadoghlu, Gubad |
| Abstract: | This article examines Azerbaijan’s transformation from a hydrocarbon exporter into an increasingly important Eurasian transport and logistics hub, situating this shift within the political economy of connectivity rather than treating it as a purely infrastructural achievement. It traces the origins of this strategy to the 1998 TRACECA agreement, well before the post-2022 surge of international interest in the Middle Corridor, and argues that recent geopolitical shocks — the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and instability in the Middle East — have accelerated rather than created Azerbaijan’s transit role. Drawing on recent freight and transit data, the article shows that Azerbaijan has successfully embedded itself within Eurasian trade networks, but that freight growth since 2022 has been driven substantially by external diversion from competing routes rather than by domestic structural transformation. It further examines the European Union’s Global Gateway investments, Azerbaijan’s own infrastructure programme at the Port of Alat and along the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, and the emergence of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as an instrument linking connectivity to regional peacebuilding. The article concludes that Azerbaijan’s long-term competitiveness as a transit hub will depend less on geography or infrastructure than on institutional modernization — customs reform, digitalization, regulatory harmonization, and economic diversification — without which the country risks capturing only a limited share of the value generated by the trade it facilitates. |
| Keywords: | Azerbaijan, Middle Corridor, Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), TRACECA, Global Gateway, Baku International Sea Trade Port, Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, Zangezur Corridor, TRIPP, International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), political economy of transit, institutional reform, regional connectivity |
| JEL: | R41 R42 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:342605 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Austria is a prosperous and stable economy. However, it has structurally weak growth which has been compounded by the pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine, monetary tightening, and weak German demand. The resulting recession was cushioned by fiscal support, but debt rose sharply, triggering the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) in 2025. Despite a modest recovery, the outlook is again clouded by a rise in energy costs. This context and challenging political landscape narrows the window for reforms. |
| Keywords: | staff report; exchange rate arrangement; FSAP mission; Catastrophe Containment and Relief; arrangement of the euro area; authorities note; Inflation; Income; Wages; Middle East; Europe; Global |
| Date: | 2026–07–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2026/180 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Despite the continuation of Russia’s war into its fifth year, Ukraine has maintained macroeconomic stability under extremely challenging conditions supported by large-scale and sustained external financing and prudent policy making. Pressures are intensifying, however, with headwinds from a more challenging external environment following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and spikes in aerial attacks. At the same time, reform momentum has weakened over the past year with slowing structural reform implementation, partly due to gridlock in parliament, delaying progress on reforms essential for European Union (EU) accession, growth, and revenue mobilization to support critical expenditures and reconstruction. |
| Keywords: | data outturn; staff expectation; Cabinet of Ministers; policy decision making; Sob strategy; Exchange rates; Middle East |
| Date: | 2026–07–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2026/188 |
| By: | Hugo Oriola; Jamel Saadaoui |
| Abstract: | International organization loans are often expected to reassure investors, yet market responses to projects and loans vary sharply across recipient countries. We argue that loan approvals function as noisy signals of policy credibility, and that geopolitical alignment with major powers shapes how financial markets interpret these signals--through channels whose sign depends jointly on the institutional basis of the lender's credibility and on which power the recipient is aligned with. Using a monthly dataset covering more than 100 countries, we examine how loan approvals by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) affect financial conditions in non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. We find weaker, only marginally robust evidence that alignment with the US is associated with more favorable currency reactions to IMF lending, tentatively consistent with a shareholder-credibility channel; alignment with Russia is associated with less favorable currency reactions, consistent with a leniency channel, although this result is also only marginally robust to cluster-robust inference. We do not find a comparable effect for alignment with China. For the ADB, whose credibility rests less on conditionality than on continuity of financing, alignment with China or Russia is instead associated with more favorable currency reactions, consistent with a backstop channel. Stock prices and Treasury bill yields display markedly weaker and less consistent conditioning effects. |
| Keywords: | international organizations, United Nations, geopolitical preferences, catalytic effect, Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund |
| JEL: | D78 F30 F42 |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2026-69 |
| By: | Alisherov, Foziljon; Djuraeva, Mukhayyo |
| Abstract: | This paper asks whether the positive association between household shocks and food insecurity is weaker among remittance-receiving households in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The analysis uses the 2019 wave of the Life in Kyrgyzstan Study and Listening to the Citizens of Uzbekistan rounds 49-82. Because the surveys differ in design, unit of observation, reference period and shock measurement, all models are country-specific and observational rather than pooled. Kazakhstan is included only as a regional benchmark context. The preferred Kyrgyzstan model estimates a negative remittance-shock interaction of -0.2140 (95% CI -0.6549 to 0.2269; p=0.3415), which is directionally consistent with a weaker shock-food-insecurity association but imprecise. The preferred Uzbekistan broad-shock model estimates a negative interaction of -0.5406 (95% CI -1.0415 to -0.0398; p=0.03437). Four-group predictions are used to interpret the interaction on the food-insecurity raw-score scale and to separate baseline remittance differences from shock-period differences. The Uzbekistan household fixed-effects estimate remains negative but is smaller and imprecise (-0.1771; 95% CI -0.5515 to 0.1973; p=0.3539). L2CU estimates are unweighted because the available popw documentation was not approved for this analysis. The findings are compatible with remittance-related moderation of household shock vulnerability, especially in Uzbekistan, but the evidence remains associational and subject to selection, timing and measurement limitations. |
| Keywords: | remittances, household shocks, food insecurity, resilience, migration, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Central Asia |
| JEL: | F24 I32 O15 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:342683 |
| By: | Marcel Schlepper; Timo Wochner |
| Abstract: | This paper provides causal evidence that the mere risk of war — absent actual conflict — imposes substantial economic costs. Our setting exploits NATO's Cold War defense line against a potential Soviet invasion, which created a geographic discontinuity in war risk within West Germany. A leak of classified defense plans in 1977 made this discontinuity salient to the public. We show that war risk distorted firm behavior on the exposed side of the defense line: firm entry declined, and incumbent firms reduced investment. These responses caused persistent regional divergence. Decades after the Cold War ended, incomes remain significantly lower in areas once exposed to higher war risk. |
| Keywords: | war risk, conflict, economic growth, firm decisions |
| JEL: | D74 R11 O12 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12915 |
| By: | Khramov, Denis |
| Abstract: | The USSR did not collapse from any single trigger but from the interaction of two structural defects rooted in its founding choice — building socialism in one country by command rather than market. First, administrative pricing left the economy unable to measure its own internal flows: the question of who subsidized whom has no ruler-independent answer and flips sign between domestic and world prices. Second, the ethno-territorial design — fixed by the 1922 Union Treaty and the 1924 Constitution — embedded nations in bordered republics with the right to exit. Drawing on three independent transfer computations (world-price recalculation, budget transfers, long-run capital flows) and the recovered primary Goskomstat 1988 world-price recalculation, the paper shows the RSFSR was the net donor in world prices and in the budget yet roughly balanced in raw domestic prices — its apparent domestic deficit is entirely a foreign-trade artifact of underpriced energy exports that reverses sign under world pricing. The donor direction is robust; its magnitude is an artifact of non-market pricing, and the same measurement defect extends beyond Soviet borders. The dissolution is presented as a structural consequence of the founding choice — an explanatory model, not a theorem. Data and code are open. |
| Keywords: | распад СССР, командная экономика, централизованное планирование, спор о социалистическом расчёте, административные цены, искажения относительных цен, межреспубликанские трансферты, мировые цены, межотраслевой баланс, этнофедерализм, право выхода, энергетические субсидии, СЭВ, кто кого субсидировал, Госкомстат |
| JEL: | B53 F14 F54 H77 N14 N44 P21 P22 P51 |
| Date: | 2026–06–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:129911 |
| By: | Eric Heyer (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Xavier Timbeau (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christophe Blot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Céline Antonin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Elliot Aurissergues (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Amel Falah (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Sabine Le Bayon (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Catherine Mathieu (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | Il y a un peu plus d'un an, le 2 avril 2025, Donald Trump annonçait le « jour de la libération » pour les États-Unis, ouvrant une période de fortes tensions commerciales. En conséquence, les droits de douane imposés par les États-Unis ont fortement augmenté pour l'ensemble des autres pays du monde, ce qui constituait un choc inédit sur le commerce mondial. Les échanges commerciaux en furent de fait fortement perturbés tout au long de l'année. Les économies ont également fait preuve de résilience avec une croissance mondiale en léger recul. D'une part, les évaluations de l'impact de la guerre commerciale suggéraient un effet globalement modéré et, d'autre part, la plupart des économies ont pu bénéficier de l'assouplissement de la politique monétaire amorcé en 2024. Les tensions sur les prix de l'énergie et les prix alimentaires, apparues en 2021 et amplifiées par l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie, s'étant estompées, l'inflation était en net repli et convergeait progressivement vers la cible des banques centrales, sauf aux États-Unis, où la politique de droits de douane a empêché la désinflation. En 2026, en dépit de l'incertitude persistante sur la politique commerciale des États-Unis, l'économie mondiale aurait pu poursuivre sa trajectoire de croissance, soutenue par des politiques monétaires relativement accommodantes et, dans certains pays, notamment l'Allemagne, les États-Unis et le Japon, par une politique budgétaire expansionniste. Le déclenchement du conflit au Moyen-Orient fin février remet en cause cet équilibre fragile. Les conséquences de la guerre contre l'Iran sont directes puisqu'elles ont provoqué une flambée des prix du pétrole et du gaz, ce qui s'est rapidement reflété dans les premières estimations de l'inflation pour le mois de mars 2026. Même sous l'hypothèse d'une crise de courte durée, les prix vont continuer de grimper au deuxième trimestre. L'activité économique mondiale devrait donc ralentir, surtout que la poussée d'inflation va mettre un terme à la baisse des taux directeurs, réduisant ainsi le soutien des politiques monétaires à la demande. Les politiques monétaires pourraient même se durcir en cas de crise prolongée. Contrairement à 2022, le soutien budgétaire devrait être plus limité. Les pays qui avaient annoncé des politiques budgétaires expansionnistes ne devraient pas faire beaucoup plus et ceux qui privilégiaient la consolidation, ne devraient pas vraiment y renoncer. Dans ces conditions, nous anticipons une croissance qui baisserait de 3, 3 % en 2025 à 3 % en 2026, avant de rebondir légèrement à 3, 2 % en 2027, sous l'hypothèse d'une fin des hostilités dans les prochains mois. [Premiers paragraphes] |
| Keywords: | économie mondiale, commerce mondial, droits de douane, inflation, prix |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05695311 |
| By: | Alisherov, Foziljon; Djuraeva, Mukhayyo |
| Abstract: | This study tests several implications of weak-form market efficiency for the Uzbekistan Composite Index (UCI) and the official USD/UZS exchange rate. Corrected daily samples contain 2, 389 UCI returns from 30 August 2016 to 4 May 2026 and 4, 865 FX returns from 2 January 2013 to 5 May 2026. Weekly levels use the last available observation in Friday-ending weeks. The analysis combines descriptive and microstructure indicators, selected autocorrelations, Ljung-Box tests, sign runs tests, robust Lo-MacKinlay variance-ratio tests, unit-root checks, a 5 September 2017 reform split, a precisely defined no-jump robustness sample, and rolling windows. UCI evidence is mixed: robust variance-ratio tests fail to reject a random-walk null at all reported daily and weekly horizons, while the daily runs test and longer-lag Ljung-Box tests reject their distinct randomness nulls; weekly aggregation removes the runs-test rejection but not all serial dependence. Full-sample FX autocorrelations are small, yet runs and selected variance-ratio tests reject non-random adjustment. Pre-reform official-rate changes show pronounced dependence. Post-reform linear autocorrelation is weak when the liberalisation jump is included, but short-horizon dependence remains after that single return is excluded. The results support a partial, test-dependent, frequency-dependent, reform-dependent, and time-varying interpretation. They do not establish profitable trading strategies, and the FX findings describe official exchange-rate adjustment rather than a continuously traded, freely clearing FX market. |
| Keywords: | efficient market hypothesis, random walk, variance ratio test, runs test, thin trading, frontier markets, Uzbekistan, exchange rate liberalization |
| JEL: | C22 G14 G15 F31 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:342597 |
| By: | Christophe Blot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | La reprise post-Covid fut accompagnée d'une hausse de l'inflation, largement amplifiée ensuite par l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie en 2022. Après avoir cherché à stimuler une inflation moribonde entre 2009 et 2020, les banques centrales se sont d'abord montrées prudentes en n'augmentant pas les taux d'intérêt même si l'inflation dépassait leur cible depuis l'été 2021. Le resserrement généralisé des politiques monétaires s'est produit en 2022. L'inflation dépassait alors 8 % aux États-Unis ou dans la zone euro, lorsque la Réserve fédérale, puis la BCE ont augmenté les taux en mars et juillet 2022 respectivement 1 . Après plus de 10 ans de taux d'intérêt proches de zéro, le taux directeur aux États-Unis fut ainsi porté à 5, 5 % en juillet 2023, quand la BCE ou la Banque d'Angleterre allaient jusqu'à 4, 5 % et 5, 25 % respectivement. Au Japon, cet épisode inflationniste fut une aubaine puisqu'il signifiait la sortie d'un épisode déflationniste de près de 30 ans. Pour autant, après quelques tentatives de remontée des taux qui avait fait replonger l'économie japonaise dans la stagnation, la Banque du Japon s'est montrée encore plus prudente que ses homologues, attendant mars 2024 pour repasser le taux directeur en territoire positif. [Premier paragraphe] |
| Keywords: | politique monétaire, inflation, banques centrales |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05695319 |