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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Pawlak, Julian |
| Abstract: | The so-called Russian shadow fleet primarily serves to evade sanctions on oil exports and thereby finance its war of aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, it is increasingly emerging as a security risk with defence implications for Europe. Vessels associated with the shadow fleet are being linked with growing frequency to acts of espionage and sabotage, thereby posing a threat to German and European security as well as to the maritime environment. In close coordination with its partners, the German government should pursue a systematic approach to countering the shadow fleet effectively. The overarching objectives are to preserve the integrity of sanctions regimes, safeguard maritime security, and contain defence-related threats. |
| Keywords: | Schattenflotte, Russian shadow fleet, war of aggression against Ukraine, law of the sea, espionage, sabotage, German and European security, preserve the integrity of sanctions regimes, safeguard maritime security, contain defence-related threats |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:341375 |
| By: | Süß, Juliana |
| Abstract: | Russian attacks and threat posturing are increasingly extending into space as well. This poses risks to infrastructure in Europe, which is becoming ever more dependent on satellite systems. This affects civilian services such as navigation, but also Europe's defence capabilities. The question is therefore increasingly how such manoeuvres by Russia should be countered, and whether weapons systems should be deployed in space as a deterrent. Europe's armed forces are far more dependent on space systems than the Russian armed forces. Given this asymmetry, Germany and its partners should focus primarily on the resilience of their satellite systems. |
| Keywords: | satellite systems, resilience, deterrence, Ukraine, Russian threats, Starlink, jamming, military communication, sabotage, attack, interception, data transfer |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:341369 |
| By: | Hinz, Julian; Schularick, Moritz |
| Abstract: | Ein "'Ukraine-Unterstützungszoll"' auf den verbleibenden EU-Russland-Handel von knapp €60 Mrd. pro Jahr könnte bei Zollsätzen von 30-50% jährlich €6-16 Mrd. (partielles Gleichgewicht) bzw. €3-11 Mrd. (allgemeines Gleichgewicht) erbringen - mehr als die €3 Mrd. aus den Zinserträgen eingefrorener russischer Vermögenswerte Allgemeine Gleichgewichtssimulationen zeigen asymmetrische Kosten: Russlands-Wertschöpfung sinkt erheblich; das Instrument ist als langfristiges Druckmittel tragfähig. Handelsumlenkung nach China bleibt begrenzt. Extreme Sätze (300%+) sind kontraproduktiv. In diesem Papier analysieren wir ein kombiniertes Paket aus Importzöllen und Exportabgaben auf den verbleibenden EU-Russland-Handel. Institutionell ist die Importseite unter dem EU-Handelsrecht unkomplizierter, während die Exportseite rechtlich anspruchsvoller ist und voraussichtlich eine eigene rechtliche Ausgestaltung erfordert. An der ökonomischen Logik des kombinierten Vorschlags ändert diese Asymmetrie nichts - wohl aber an der Umsetzung. |
| Abstract: | A "Ukraine Support Tariff" on the remaining €57.2 billion in EU-Russia trade could generate €6-16 billion per year at moderate rates of 30-50% (partial equilibrium) and €3-11 billion (general equilibrium) - exceeding the €3 billion from frozen Russian asset interest income. General equilibrium simulations confirm that Europe has asymmetric leverage over Russia: Russia's value added falls 3-4 times more than the EU's, making the tariff sustainable as long-term leverage. Trade diversion to China is modest. Extreme tariff rates (300%+) are counterproductive, as long-run revenue falls to near zero. Economically, we analyse a combined import tariff and export-side levy on remaining EU-Russia trade. Institutionally, the import leg is more straightforward under EU trade law, while the export leg is less straightforward and would likely require a distinct legal route. That asymmetry matters for implementation, but not for the economic logic of the combined proposal. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine-Unterstützungszoll, EU-Russland-Handel, Zolleinnahmen, Laffer-Kurve, Allgemeines Gleichgewicht, Ukraine Support Tariff, EU-Russia Trade, Tariff Revenue, Laffer Curve, General Equilibrium |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:341424 |
| By: | Hinz, Julian; Schularick, Moritz |
| Abstract: | A "Ukraine Support Tariff" on the remaining €57.2 billion in EU-Russia trade could generate €6-16 billion per year at moderate rates of 30-50% (partial equilibrium) and €3-11 billion (general equilibrium) - exceeding the €3 billion from frozen Russian asset interest income. General equilibrium simulations confirm that Europe has asymmetric leverage over Russia: Russia's value added falls 3-4 times more than the EU's, making the tariff sustainable as long-term leverage. Trade diversion to China is modest. Extreme tariff rates (300%+) are counterproductive, as long-run revenue falls to near zero. Economically, we analyse a combined import tariff and export-side levy on remaining EU-Russia trade. Institutionally, the import leg is more straightforward under EU trade law, while the export leg is less straightforward and would likely require a distinct legal route. That asymmetry matters for implementation, but not for the economic logic of the combined proposal. |
| Abstract: | Ein "'Ukraine-Unterstützungszoll"' auf den verbleibenden EU-Russland-Handel von knapp €60 Mrd. pro Jahr könnte bei Zollsätzen von 30-50% jährlich €6-16 Mrd. (partielles Gleichgewicht) bzw. €3-11 Mrd. (allgemeines Gleichgewicht) erbringen - mehr als die €3 Mrd. aus den Zinserträgen eingefrorener russischer Vermögenswerte Allgemeine Gleichgewichtssimulationen zeigen asymmetrische Kosten: Russlands-Wertschöpfung sinkt erheblich; das Instrument ist als langfristiges Druckmittel tragfähig. Handelsumlenkung nach China bleibt begrenzt. Extreme Sätze (300%+) sind kontraproduktiv. In diesem Papier analysieren wir ein kombiniertes Paket aus Importzöllen und Exportabgaben auf den verbleibenden EU-Russland-Handel. Institutionell ist die Importseite unter dem EU-Handelsrecht unkomplizierter, während die Exportseite rechtlich anspruchsvoller ist und voraussichtlich eine eigene rechtliche Ausgestaltung erfordert. An der ökonomischen Logik des kombinierten Vorschlags ändert diese Asymmetrie nichts - wohl aber an der Umsetzung. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine Support Tariff, EU-Russia Trade, Tariff Revenue, Laffer Curve, General Equilibrium, Ukraine-Unterstützungszoll, EU-Russland-Handel, Zolleinnahmen, Laffer-Kurve, Allgemeines Gleichgewicht |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:341425 |
| By: | Igor Arlashkin (RANEPA); Barbashova Natalia (RANEPA); Ilya Sokolov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Tatiana Tischenko (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | According to the results of the 2025 execution of the enlarged government budget (EGB), revenue totaled Rb75.6 trillion, or 35.4% of GDP. In constant prices, yearover- |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, intergovernmental relations, fiscal policy, budget system, revenues, expenditures, Bank of Russia |
| JEL: | E62 H5 H61 H62 H68 H7 H72 H77 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1625 |
| By: | Georgy Malginov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Alexander Radygin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Following Rosstat’s discontinuation of the publication of data on the System of Indicators |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, public sector, privatization |
| JEL: | H82 K11 L32 L33 L38 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1617 |
| By: | Alexander Ignatov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Marina Larionova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Irina Popova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Andrey Sakharov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Andrey Shelepov (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | Interaction within the multilateral institutional system in 2025 was characterized by two trends. On the one hand, international organizations continued to weaken |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, international organizations, international institutional arrangements |
| JEL: | F5 F53 F55 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1614 |
| By: | Vera Barinova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Margarita Gvozdeva (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the tourism sector |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, small businesses, tourism, hospotality industry, medium-sized enterprises, sanctions |
| JEL: | C53 E37 I18 I19 L21 L52 L84 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1619 |
| By: | Andrei Kaukin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Anastasia Levchenko (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2025, the trend component of the Russian industrial production index showed signs of slowing growth. In H1 2025, stagnation emerged as a result of mixed trends’ |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, production, external and internal demand, GDP structure |
| JEL: | G28 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1620 |
| By: | Alexander Knobel (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Maria Baeva (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | According to data from the end of 2025, Russia had participated in 130 WTO disputes: in 9 as a plaintiff, in 11 as a defendant, and in 110 as a third party. In 2025, Russia |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, WTO, trade disputes |
| JEL: | F10 F13 F19 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1623 |
| By: | Olga Izryadnova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Over the past three years, the Russian economy demonstrated strong growth potential. GDP growth of 10.3% and a 20.1% increase in final household demand during |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, economic growth, demand and supply, external shocks |
| JEL: | L21 L52 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1621 |
| By: | Georgy Malginov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2025, the Russian real estate market was in relative equilibrium, adapting to the realities |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, residential property prices, housing market, housing construction, mortgage |
| JEL: | H82 K11 L32 L33 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1616 |
| By: | Pawlak, Julian |
| Abstract: | Russlands sogenannte Schattenflotte dient in erster Linie der Sanktionsumgehung für den Ölexport und damit der Finanzierung seines Angriffskrieges gegen die Ukraine. Sie stellt jedoch vermehrt auch ein verteidigungsrelevantes Sicherheitsrisiko für Europa dar. Schiffe der Schattenflotte werden zunehmend mit Spionage- und Sabotageakten in Verbindung gebracht, sie bedrohen deutsche und europäische Sicherheit und die maritime Umwelt. Die Bundesregierung sollte gemeinsam mit ihren Partnern einen systematischen Ansatz verfolgen, um wirksam gegen die Schattenflotte vorzugehen. Ziel ist es, Sanktionsregime aufrechtzuerhalten, die maritime Sicherheit zu gewährleisten und verteidigungsrelevante Bedrohungen einzudämmen. |
| Keywords: | Schattenflotte, Russland, Schattenflotte, Ölexport, Sanktionsumgehung, Kriegsfinanzierung, Spionage, Sabotage, hybride Kriegsführung, Sanktionen, maritime Sicherheit, maritime kritische Infrastruktur, Umweltrisiken |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpakt:341370 |
| By: | Natalia Shagaida (RANEPA); Dmitry Ternovsky (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | According to Rosstat, in January–December 2025, agricultural production in the Russian Federation amounted to 104.9% compared to the same period last |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, agricultural production, food security |
| JEL: | I18 I19 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1618 |
| By: | Pavel Trunin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Alexandra Bozheckkova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Alexander Knobel (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2025, the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy was conducted as the economy gradually |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, monetary policy, money market, exchange rate, inflation, balance of payments, fiscal policy |
| JEL: | E31 E43 E44 E51 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1626 |
| By: | Nadezhda Volovik (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | According to the World Bank’s forecast for commodity markets, global commodity prices are expected to reach their lowest level in six years in 2026. This will be |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, terms of trade, regional pattern |
| JEL: | F10 F13 F19 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1622 |
| By: | Olga Izryadnova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The labor market in recent years has been shaped by demographic trends, shifts in migration flows, and growing demand for labor. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, labor market, unemployment, employment |
| JEL: | J21 J23 J26 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1613 |
| By: | Andrei Makarov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The transportation sector continues to play a vital role in Russia’s socioeconomic development, both in terms of fostering trade and freight transportation and in ensuring territorial connectivity, realizing agglomeration effects, promoting labor mobility, and developing tourism destinations. At the end of 2025, during a speech at the “Transport of Russia†forum, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin noted that the transportation sector’s contribution to Russia’s GDP by year-end could reach about 6% (over Rb13 trillion), and the government will continue large-scale investments in transportation development. Thus, the relevant investments could amount to nearly Rb6 trillion overthree years |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, transportation industry, freight tariffs, passenger traffic, railways |
| JEL: | L91 L92 L93 L99 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2026-1615 |
| By: | Alexander Abramov (RANEPA); Alexander Radygin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Maria Chernova (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2025, despite an extraordinary increase in customs tariffs in the United States, when the average rate amounted to 11% of the value of imported goods — the highest |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, stock market, bond market, corporate bond market, derivatives market, private investors |
| JEL: | G01 G12 G18 G21 G24 G28 G32 G33 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1624 |
| By: | Aleksandrov, Anatoliy |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I build a middle-range theory of territorial resilience. The core argument is straightforward yet frequently overlooked: territorial prosperity and long-term adaptive capacity emerge not from how we pump material and financial resources into a region, but from how we distribute its solution-generation capacity. In the context of polycrisis – intersecting climate, geopolitical, economic, demographic, and institutional shocks – conventional development paradigms centered on spatial and institutional concentration create systemic fragility through single points of failure and limited adaptability. The framework introduces Territorial Cell Theory, which conceptualizes territorial units (ranging from municipalities and hromadas to cities, regions, and autonomies) as functionally defined adaptive socio-ecological systems. This theory is operationalized through the Hive Governance Model – a polycentric, multi-layered architecture – supported by the Development Capacity Engine (comprising Agency, Knowledge, Trust, and Experimentation), Territorial Solution Generation Capacity (TSGC) as a dynamic measure of adaptive flow, the Territorial Resilience Index (TRI) as a composite measure of resilience stock, and the Network Intelligence Principle that governs collective learning and diffusion of successful practices. The Territorial Evolution Cycle describes the iterative process of observation, experimentation, adaptation, replication, and network-level evolution. Drawing on practice-informed comparative illustrations from South Tyrol (a mature European autonomy), Ukraine (a wartime stress-test of decentralization), and Central Asia (resource-constrained traditional community systems), the analysis demonstrates the framework’s cross-scale and context-adaptive applicability. The findings suggest that policy investments oriented toward strengthening distributed solution-generation mechanisms may yield superior long-term resilience and sustainability outcomes compared to traditional resource-concentration strategies. |
| Date: | 2026–06–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:eqmx3_v1 |
| By: | Süß, Juliana |
| Abstract: | Russische Angriffe und Drohgebärden finden zunehmend auch im Weltraum statt. Daraus ergeben sich Risiken für Infrastrukturen in Europa, die mehr und mehr von Satellitensystemen abhängig sind. Dies betrifft zivile Dienstleistungen wie etwa Navigation, aber auch die europäische Verteidigungsfähigkeit. Zunehmend stellt sich daher die Frage, wie solchen Manövern Russlands zu begegnen ist und ob zur Abschreckung Waffensysteme im All platziert werden sollten. Während Europas Streitkräfte von Weltraumsystemen abhängig sind, trifft das auf die russischen aber in sehr viel geringerem Maße zu. Aufgrund dieser Asymmetrie sollten Deutschland und seine Partner vor allem auf Resilienz ihrer Satellitensysteme setzen. |
| Keywords: | Weltraum, Resilienz, Abschreckung, Satellitensysteme, Russland, Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, Weltraumsicherheitsstrategie, Anti-Satelliten-Waffen (ASAT) |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpakt:341366 |
| By: | Smolnik, Franziska |
| Abstract: | Im Kontext sich wandelnder Kräfteverhältnisse, Akteurskonstellationen und Ordnungsmuster im Südkaukasus versucht die armenische Regierung unter Nikol Paschinjan eine Neuverortung des Landes, um die Handlungsfähigkeit Armeniens zu stärken: im Innern durch eine Neuausrichtung armenischer Identitätsdiskurse, nach außen durch eine Neukalibrierung des Verhältnisses zu Russland. Gleichzeitig will Armenien seine bilateralen Beziehungen stärker diversifizieren, insbesondere durch eine weitere Annäherung an die Europäische Union (EU). Die EU sollte gegenüber Armenien eine nachhaltige Politik verfolgen, die die Beziehungen zu Eriwan einbettet in eine breitere regionale Perspektive. Brüssel sollte zudem sensibel sein für die gesellschaftlichen Ambivalenzen in Armenien, auch was die weitere Annäherung an die EU betrifft. Konsequent auf die lokalen Verhältnisse und auf die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung zugeschnittene Angebote können dazu beitragen, dass weder Performativität die Beziehungen überlagert, noch dass sich die EU in Erwartungsmanagement erschöpft. |
| Keywords: | Nikol Paschinjan, J.D. Vance, Russland, Aserbaidschan, Bergkarabach, Multiplexität, 44-Tage-Krieg, Reales Armenien, Historisches Armenien, Vierte Republik, Metsamor, Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit, OVKS, Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, TRIPP, Crossroads of Peace, Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, CEPA, Europäische Politische Gemeinschaft, European Peace Facility, EPF, EU Mission in Armenia, EUMA, EU Neighbours East |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpakt:341365 |