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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Amanda Gregg (Middlebury College); Steven Nafziger (Williams College); ; |
| Keywords: | Russia, colonialism, economic history, imperialism |
| Date: | 2025–08–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2025_111 |
| By: | Berg, Tobias; Lindner, Vincent; Rößler, Denise |
| Abstract: | After years of investigation, the digital euro project has entered the legislative stage. Geoeconomic developments, especially the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the following regime of sanctions against Russia, as well as the economist-nationalist policies of the second Trump administration, have reinforced arguments for EU monetary and infrastructure sovereignty. At the same time, however, the digital euro project is under pressure from private solutions, stablecoins and the European Wero initiative that claim to provide similar benefits as the digital euro. While these may develop into useful tools for payments, they fail to provide the same features, such as universal acceptance and legal certainty, competitive neutrality, and - crucially - EU sovereign control over settlement infrastructure. This Policy Letter calls upon EU policymakers to reject the false dichotomy between private solutions and a public infrastructure and to make swift progress on the legislation and implementation of the digital euro. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safepl:338129 |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Vladislav L. Inozemtsev; Birgit Niessner (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Roman Römisch (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Chart of the Month Russia’s military spending is not as high as you might think by Vasily Astrov The war as the new Russian business model by Vladislav Inozemtsev The largely mercenary army deployed in the war against Ukraine represents a radical break with 300 years of Russian history, when soldiers were very cheap. For the time being, this strategy has allowed the ruling regime not only to avoid a deeply unpopular mass mobilisation, but also to utilise a labour force that would have been of little value to the rest of the economy. However, the longer-term economic and social costs associated with this strategy are likely to be profoundly negative. Opinion Corner A geoeconomic mistake by the EU in Kosovo by Birgit Niessner The EU’s measures taken against Kosovo, which were triggered by disputed municipal elections in 2023, have suspended key agreements and frozen EUR 600m in development funds, leaving the country isolated. These measures are widely seen as unjust and counterproductive, especially given Kosovo’s progress toward European standards and integration. The EU’s stance runs counter to its stated goal of deeper engagement with the Western Balkans, undermines its credibility and opens the way to rival powers like Russia and China. Economic growth and income convergence in the EU by Roman Römisch Why have the EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe caught up so rapidly with Western Europe, and what does this progress truly imply for living standards? This article looks beyond headline GDP figures to explain how economic growth, demographic change and rising price levels have together shaped income convergence in the region over the past two and a half decades. |
| Keywords: | war in Ukraine, defence spending, mercenary army, social mobility, EU measures, EU integration, economic growth, income convergence, demographic trends, purchasing power standards |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:mpaper:mr:2025-12 |
| By: | Ballbach, Eric J. |
| Abstract: | Germany is facing a security policy Zeitenwende whose industrial dimension has not yet been sufficiently addressed. The war in Ukraine, rising military threats in Europe, and the long-term underfunding of the German Armed Forces have exposed the limits of existing defence industrial capacity, while the reliability of the United States (US) as a security guarantor is increasingly uncertain. This creates a strategic need for Germany to quickly rebuild its defence industrial base. Yet, despite the increased demand and funding, German defence industries are struggling to scale production quickly, exposing capability gaps that endanger both national defence and NATO commitments. In this context, cooperation with South Korea gains strategic relevance, as plans for localised production by Korean defence firms in Germany could ease bottlenecks, shorten supply chains, and enhance operational readiness without creating new strategic dependencies. |
| Keywords: | German defence industries, Germany's defence industrial base, German defence market, South Korean defence industry, defence supply chains, defence production, military equipment, armaments, defence industrial cooperation, Germany, South Korea, European Union, EU, Nato, NATO |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:338232 |
| By: | Paul Castañeda Dower (University of Wisconsin); Scott Gehlbach (University of Chicago); Dmitrii Kofanov; Steven Nafziger (Williams College) |
| Abstract: | ""Local violence often accompanies momentous political change, as feelings of political threat intersect with preexisting prejudices to endanger groups popularly associated with reform. We examine the relationship between such violence and settlement characteristics in the context of the 1905 Russian Revolution, which triggered numerous anti-Jewish pogroms. Counter to an extensive literature that emphasizes the contribution to conflict of ethno-religious polarization, we show that the sharp increase in pogroms after October 1905, when publication of the October Manifesto and accompanying anti-Semitic propaganda increased feelings of political threat among many non-Jews, was smaller in settlements with relatively large Jewish populations. We demonstrate that this empirical pattern can be rationalized with an elaborated version of the Esteban-Ray (2008) model of diversity and conflict when, as with the October Manifesto, political reform systematically alters the distribution of benefits across groups."" |
| Keywords: | Russia, Economic History, Political Economy, Confict |
| Date: | 2025–08–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2025_110 |
| By: | Doris Hanzl-Weiss (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Olga Pindyuk (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | FDI in Central, East and Southeast Europe The new trade policies in the US have so far not brought much investment into the country by Olga Pindyuk Mostly gloomy outlook with a few bright spots by Olga Pindyuk and Doris Hanzl-Weiss Most countries in CESEE finished 2024 with foreign direct investment stocks (as a share of GDP) lower than in 2021, the year before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Also more recently, CESEE countries have been struggling to maintain their attractiveness to foreign investors, with the number of greenfield projects announced in the region in January-September 2025 reaching its lowest level for six years. China has further strengthened its role as one of the main investors in CESEE, having significantly increased the capital pledged for greenfield projects this year. Kazakhstan has become the main destination for greenfield capital, accounting for 40% of capital pledged to the entire CESEE region, mostly owing to the influx of Chinese investment. Forecasts of main economic indicators for Central, East and Southeast Europe for 2025-2027 |
| Keywords: | greenfield FDI, import tariffs, FDI inflows, FDI stocks, greenfield FDI, German-Central European supply chain |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:mpaper:mr:2025-11 |
| By: | Ashok Gulati (Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)); Harsh Wardhan; Sulakshana Rao; Raya Das |
| Abstract: | This policy brief assesses the scope of increasing Indian exports to Russia, focusing on select sectors, hard-hit by Trump's tariffs. In T&A, India faces a significant disadvantage due to 13-14 per cent tariffs, compared to zero-duty for Vietnam. In fisheries, although India’s seafood exports total USD 7.4 billion (2024-25), exports to Russia remain limited at USD 138 million, confined to frozen shrimp. Given Russia's USD 2.12 billion import, significant untapped potential exists in mackerel, trout and other value-added products. In case of agriculture, high-value segments, including processed fruits and vegetables and animal products such as bovine meat create clear openings. Yet high tariffs, SPS barriers, certification delays and logistics costs persist. |
| Keywords: | India-Russia Bilateral trade, agriculture, shrimps, textiles, icrier |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdc:ppaper:57 |
| By: | Paul, Michael |
| Abstract: | The acquisition of Greenland has repeatedly been a topic of discussion within US government circles since the 19th century. That is because of the island's strategic location and its resources. In the summer of 2019, US President Donald Trump made his first bid to purchase Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark. Since then, he has declared ownership and control of Greenland to be an "absolute necessity" for US national security. For their part, the Danish intelligence services have responded by identifying the United States - for the first time ever - as a potential threat to the security of the Kingdom since Washington is no longer ruling out the use of military force even against allies. But is Trump really concerned about security or simply acquiring what he sees as the world's largest possible real-estate asset? How should his bid for Greenland be assessed? And what are the implications and policy options for Europe? |
| Keywords: | Greenland, Kingdom of Denmark, "Golden Dome", US government, Donald Trump, NATO, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, Russia's war against Ukraine |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:338242 |
| By: | Kristijan Fidanovski (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Biljana Jovanovikj (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Nóra Kungl (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Leon Podkaminer (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Marina Tverdostup (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Ukrainian refugees – from emergency to long-term strategy by Maryna Tverdostup Three and a half years after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe is still living with the largest refugee movement since the Second World War. The first phase of the crisis was all about speed and compassion, with borders opened, communities mobilised and protection offered on an unprecedented scale. But that urgency is now behind us. What lies ahead is less visible but equally demanding namely how to turn temporary arrangements into long-term strategies that work both for refugees and for the countries that host them. Tobacco taxation in the Western Balkans Aligning with Europe, fighting old challenges by Kristijan Fidanovski, Biljana Jovanovikj, Nora Kungl Tobacco use remains a major public health issue in the Western Balkans, where smoking prevalence is among the highest in Europe. This article reviews recent trends in tobacco taxation, cigarette affordability, illicit trade and the growth of heated tobacco products (HTPs) across the six Western Balkan countries (WB6). While progress has been made in aligning excise structures with EU regulation, tax levels in several countries remain below the current EU minimum and well short of the newly proposed threshold. At the same time, illicit trade in manufactured cigarettes has declined, creating scope for tougher fiscal measures. More ambitious taxation and regulation, particularly of HTPs, could advance public health while supporting the strained public finances of the Western Balkan countries. Inflation and unemployment in Poland Off the Phillips Curve by Leon Podkaminer Phillips Curves, which show the correlation between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment on a scatter plot, often suggest a trade-off between the two. Data for Poland that run from Q1 2001 through Q4 2024 may also suggest the existence of a downward-sloping Phillips Curve. But a closer look at the data indicates the absence of any such trade-off. Instead, one detects asymmetry of causation. While changing inflation rates do indeed affect unemployment, the opposite is not the case changing unemployment rates do not affect inflation. Moreover, the relationship between inflation and unemployment is found to be positive, unlike in the usual interpretations of Phillips Curves. Latest trends in global monetary policy and financial markets by Biljana Jovanovikj Global monetary policy has entered a cautious easing phase as uncertainty increased significantly amid trade tensions, supply-chain risks and softer global demand. In recent months, major central banks have diverged in their responses the US Fed and the Bank of Canada have cut policy rates, while others have paused, reflecting country-specific inflation risks and external vulnerabilities. Markets now expect a slower pace of easing, with additional cuts pushed into late 2025 and 2026 – except in Japan, where policy normalisation is expected to advance gradually. |
| Keywords: | refugees, temporary protection, labour market integration, tobacco-use prevalence, tobacco taxation, illicit trade in tobacco, cigarette affordability, heated tobacco products, inflation, unemployment, Phillips Curve, Granger causality, impulse response function, policy rates, inflation, yield curves |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:mpaper:mr:2025-10 |
| By: | Paweł Macias (Narodowy Bank Polski); Damian Stelmasiak (Narodowy Bank Polski); Karol Szafranek (Narodowy Bank Polski); Krzysztof Makarski (Narodowy Bank Polski) |
| Abstract: | Nominal rigidities play a central role in monetary policy transmission, shaping how inflation and real activity respond to various shocks. Using a large longitudinal dataset of granular price data for Poland covering 2000–2024, we contribute to the literature on price stickiness across several dimensions. First, we document the price-setting behaviour in Poland. Second, we show how the process was affected by the turbulent post-COVID-19 period and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, evaluating the importance of the intensive and extensive margins of price adjustments. Third, we distinguish between sticky and flexible sectors, revealing heterogeneity in prices response to economic variables and shocks. We also compare the price-setting process in Poland with those in the euro area and the US. Finally, we complement these analyses with simulations performed on a two-sector DSGE model. Overall, we provide new, comprehensive evidence on price rigidity and discuss its implications for monetary policy transmission. |
| Keywords: | price rigidity; stickiness; consumer prices; micro data; inflation |
| JEL: | D40 E31 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:383 |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Georg Fischer (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Grzegorz W. Kolodko |
| Abstract: | Western sanctions have pushed Russia into China’s embrace by Vasily Astrov How to revive the Belt and Road Initiative in times of geopolitical turbulence by Grzegorz W. Kolodko We hear increasingly that globalisation is over, especially as we know it. China, however, views matter differently, demonstrating unwavering energy in harnessing globalisation for its own development, while also intentionally striving to give it a more inclusive face. From this perspective, it is worth examining how the Belt and Road Initiative is used for these purposes, and why, in relation to Central and Eastern Europe, it has developed only on a modest scale so far. Social Europe recent developments by Georg Fischer Procyclical fiscal policy, pressures to reduce wages and social-spending cuts pursued in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2009 led to social divergence across the EU and rising inequality within member states. This started to jeopardise the legitimacy of the European project and resulted in the adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) in 2017, which includes important initiatives in such areas as the free movement of workers, labour law, social protection and the creation of targeted EU funds. During the next crisis – the COVID-19 pandemic – the policy response was much more accommodative, resulting in far better economic and social outcomes, notably in Southern Europe. The new European Commission and the future of Social Europe by Georg Fischer Social Europe is currently facing a raft of challenges, including the housing crisis, poverty, the rise of non-standard work, the digital and environmental transition, population ageing and, most recently, the shifting of policy priorities towards security and defence. In order to cope with these challenges, further progress is needed in EU policy-making in such areas as the coverage of unemployment benefits, labour rights and digitalisation, as well as digital skills, adult education and gender equality. |
| Keywords: | economic sanctions, trade dependence, Belt and Road Initiative, R&D, infrastructure investments, European Pillar of Social Rights, Great Recession, COVID pandemics, social and labour market policies, EU budget, digital and environmental transition, population ageing, social and labour market policies |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:mpaper:mr:2025-09 |
| By: | Schularick, Moritz; Binder, Johannes |
| Abstract: | • Europa gab 2025 nach den USA weltweit am meisten für Verteidigung aus - sogar mehr als China. Dennoch verfügt Europa nur über einen Bruchteil der militärischen Fähigkeiten anderer Mächte. Bislang hat es Europa zudem versäumt, seine Aufrüstungsstrategie an neue Verteidigungstechnologien und die damit verbundene Massenproduktion kostengünstiger autonomer Systeme anzupassen. • Im Kern der europäischen Verteidigung steckt weiter eine eklatante Ineffizienz: Europa unterhält 14 verschiedene Kampfpanzermodelle, die USA nur eines; Europa hat 23 Haubitzenvarianten, die USA zwei; bei U-Booten stehen 16 europäische Typen vier amerikanischen gegenüber. Die Fragmentierung der europäischen Verteidigungsplanung und Rüstungsbeschaffung entlang nationaler Grenzen sowie der kleinteilige Charakter nationaler Rüstungsproduktion führen zu geringen Stückzahlen, hohen Kosten und technologischem Rückstand. • In keinem anderen Land ist die Herausforderung, stärker auf die erreichten Fähigkeiten statt auf die eingesetzten Mittel zu fokussieren, drängender als in Deutschland, wo die Verteidigungsausgaben in den kommenden Jahren auf das Dreifache steigen sollen. Wichtig ist dabei aus ökonomischer Sicht, dass Deutschland eine Verteidigungsstrategie verfolgt, die seinen komparativen Vorteilen entspricht: die Mobilisierung seiner Industriebasis - einschließlich des Ausbaus von Produktionskapazitäten - sowie Investitionen in das technologische Potenzial. • Legt man diesen Maßstab an die verfügbaren deutschen Haushaltszahlen sowie an die vom Bundestag verabschiedeten Verpflichtungsermächtigungen an, ergibt sich ein ernüchterndes Bild. Nahezu das gesamte 100-Mrd.-Euro-Sondervermögen der Bundeswehr - rund 95% - wurde für traditionelle bemannte Plattformen gebunden, während der Kapazitätsaufbau gering blieb. Der Anteil der Forschungs- und Entwicklungsausgaben stagniert bei rund 2% - weniger als ein Fünftel des amerikanischen Wertes. • Wir formulieren fünf Grundsätze für deutsche Verteidigungsausgaben: (i) Vorrang für die Beschaffung von Innovationen und Erhöhung der Forschungs- und Entwicklungsausgaben auf mindestens 10% des Verteidigungshaushalts; (ii) Ausbau der Produktionskapazitäten durch Kapazitätsverträge statt klassischer Stückzahlbeschaffung; (iii) Ausweitung der Unterstützung für die Ukraine als kurzfristig kostengünstigster Weg zur Sicherheit in Europa; (iv) Aufbau eines gemeinsamen europäischen Rüstungsmarktes; (v) gemeinsame Finanzierung - einschließlich Eurobonds - für den Aufbau von gemeinsamen europäischen Verteidigungskapazitäten der nächsten Generation als erster Schritt hin zu einer integrierten europäischen Verteidigung. |
| Abstract: | • Europe is the world's second largest defence spender after the U.S., ahead of China. Yet despite substantial financial inputs, Europe has a fraction of the military capabilities of others. So far, it has also failed to update its rearmament strategy to include new defence technologies and associated mass production of low cost autonomous systems. • At the root of European military weakness lies a blatant inefficiency: Europe fields 14 different main battle tank models to America's one, 23 howitzer variants to America's two, 16 submarine types to 4 in the U.S. The fragmentation of European defence planning and procurement along national lines, and the artisanal nature of national defence production condemns Europe to low volumes, high unit costs, limited interchangeability, and technological backwardness. • The imperative to focus on outputs, not inputs, is nowhere more consequential than in Germany, where defence spending is set to triple over the coming years. Germany should pursue a defence strategy in line with its comparative advantage - mobilizing its capital base (i.e., German industry) to allow for the rapid scaling-up of military capabilities, including the expansion of production capacities to sustain a longer conflict. At the same time, Germany must invest massively in upgrading its technological potential to pursue a technology and automation-driven defence strategy. • Taking this yardstick to the publicly available German budget numbers as well as future appropriations passed by the Bundestag leads to a sobering conclusion. Germany so far has neither invested heavily in next generation defence capabilities, nor has it used capital (its industrial base) to substantially increase defence output. Nearly all of the Bundeswehr's €100 billion Special Fund - around 95% - has been committed to traditional crewed platforms while production capacity increases have been slow and small. At the same time, the share of the defence budget allocated to R&D stagnates at around 2% - less than 1/5 of the U.S. share, limiting technological renewal. • We set out five principles for smart German spending on defence: (i) prioritise the procurement of innovation and raise R&D expenditure to at least 10% of the defence budget; (ii) focus on increased production capabilities and industrial scale through capacity contracts rather than classic procurement; (iii) expand support for Ukraine in the short-run as the cheapest and most effective way for security in Europe in the shortrun; (iv) centralise procurement and create a common European defence equipment market; (v) establish joint financing, including Eurobonds, for joint ownership of next generation defence technologies as a first step toward integrated European defence. |
| Keywords: | Verteidigungsausgaben, Governance, Resilienz, Defence spending, NATO burden sharing, Military capability, Defence industrial policy, European integration |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:338121 |
| By: | Hegemann, Hendrik |
| Abstract: | The Euro Area experienced historically high inflation in 2022, with energy prices playing a central role. This paper examines the joint impact of various energy price shocks on inflation in the Euro Area, with a focus on the period encompassing the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. Using a structural VAR model, the analysis identifies shocks to gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, natural gas, and electricity prices and evaluates their effects on headline and core inflation. Historically, before the pandemic, gasoline price shocks had the most substantial impact on the Euro Area HICP, while the effects of other energy price shocks were relatively minor. Spillover effects to non-energy goods were very limited, implying negligible effects on core inflation. Extending the sample to May 2023 reveals a notable change in these relationships. In particular, natural gas price shocks become substantially more important and exhibit significantly more persistent effects on inflation. In contrast to previous findings for the United States, the results suggest that energy prices, especially natural gas price shocks, played a major role in the surge in the HICP and core HICP during 2021 and 2022 within the Euro Area. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:imfswp:338106 |
| By: | Guntram Wolff; Armin Steinbach; Jeromin Zettelmeyer |
| Abstract: | Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. With the US now retreating from its role as Europe s guardian, greater European cooperation will be essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Procurement will need to be pooled to reduce market fragmentation and avoid that additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could halve unit costs. This article discusses how this could be achieved either by scaling instruments in the current institutional framework or by creating a new intergovernmental institution, the European Defence Mechanism. |
| Date: | 2025–08–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/393996 |
| By: | Singh, Rahul |
| Abstract: | This paper constructs a seven-pillar Comprehensive National Power (CNP) Index to provide a transparent, replicable benchmark of the relative power positions of India and China within a ten-country reference group comprising the United States, China, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea. Drawing on twenty-one publicly available indicators sourced from the IMF World Economic Outlook (2024), SIPRI (2025), WIPO Global Innovation Index (2024), Stanford HAI Global AI Vibrancy Tool (2024), UNDP Human Development Report (2025), Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index (2025), the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index (2024), the World Bank World Governance Indicators (2023), and the UN E-Government Development Index (2024), each indicator is subjected to min–max normalisation before being aggregated into pillar scores and a weighted composite index. The results show that China’s CNP score of 62.35 leads India’s 33.83 by 28.5 index points—a gap driven primarily by China’s dominance in the Economic (pillar score: 78.2 vs. 16.9), Technological (57.8 vs. 18.8), and Diplomatic (64.7 vs. 23.6) dimensions. India records superior scores in Human Capital (62.5 vs. 55.5) and Soft Power (68.7 vs. 61.8), suggesting latent assets whose conversion into strategic capability remains the central policy challenge. The paper situates these quantitative findings within the broader theoretical literature on power transition, argues that the gap is structurally significant but not irreversible, and derives policy implications for India’s long-run strategic posture. |
| Date: | 2026–03–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:fhgzj_v1 |
| By: | Hashad, Reem; Jovanovic, Nina; Karachiwalla, Naureen; Kurdi, Sikandra |
| Abstract: | Global food price increases and widespread inflationary shocks negatively affect poor households’ diets, particularly those of women who are more likely to be food insecure compared to men. This study evaluates the relationship between changes in food prices triggered by the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022 and poor mothers’ diets in Egypt, a country that heavily relies on imports of staple foods and is highly vulnerable to increases in international food prices. We combine food group specific governorate-level consumer price index (CPI) data with data on diets of 2, 868 poor mothers in Egypt collected before and after the onset of the war. Additionally, we examine the potential protective effect of Egypt’s large-scale food subsidy program, Tamween, whereby specific foods are sold at subsidized prices at specific retailers. Using two-way fixed effects models, we find that changes in food prices are significantly associated with changes in the composition of mothers’ diets. Mothers were less likely to consume dairy and fish and more likely to consume pulses and sweetened beverages after the war began. Poor mothers decreased consumption of unsubsidized foods, suggesting a protective role of the Egyptian food subsidy program. This paper also provides suggestive evidence that poor mothers from households engaged in agricultural production could be slightly less responsive to changes in food prices compared to mothers from households that do not engage in agricultural production. |
| Keywords: | inflation; diet; gender; poverty; mothers; dietary diversity; price volatility; Egypt; Northern Africa |
| Date: | 2025–12–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:179553 |
| By: | Yuliia Verheliuk (State Tax University) |
| Abstract: | State-guaranteed debt arises from borrowings by economic entities for the implementation of infrastructure projects under state guarantees, offering potential advantages provided that effective control mechanisms are in place and corruption risks are minimized. However, shortcomings in Ukraine's practice of managing guaranteed debt contribute to the growth of residents' indebtedness, which subsequently transforms into guaranteed debt, while a significant share of projects remains unimplemented, underscoring the need to improve the monitoring system. This study assesses the role of state-guaranteed debt within Ukraine's system of obligations, with particular attention to the challenges associated with its management and the provision of state guarantees. The research is grounded in a normative analysis of the legislative framework, the application of statistical methods to evaluate trends in guaranteed debt, and theoretical generalization of the fundamental principles underlying guaranteed debt management and the guarantee-granting process. The findings demonstrate that state-guaranteed debt constitutes a contingent liability arising from the inability of residents to meet debt obligations obtained under state guarantees. The lack of a clear methodology for assessing the creditworthiness of economic entities, the absence of a specialized management body, and non-transparent project selection procedures heighten corruption risks and pose threats to debt security. International experience indicates that ineffective management of guaranteed debt may generate a crowding-out effect on investment, thereby constraining economic development, while insufficient oversight of loan utilization intensifies pressure on the state budget. These circumstances call for a reassessment of existing approaches to the provision of state guarantees in order to ensure their effectiveness. Overall, deficiencies in the management of guaranteed debt in Ukraine, particularly limited transparency and inadequate creditworthiness assessment, create substantial fiscal risks. Addressing these issues requires improvements in the legislative framework, refinement of project selection procedures, and the establishment of a specialized management body to enhance efficiency and strengthen debt security. Further research should concentrate on developing clear criteria for assessing borrowers' solvency and designing an institutional framework for managing guaranteed debt aimed at reducing corruption risks and improving the effectiveness of state guarantees. |
| Abstract: | La dette garantie par l'État résulte des emprunts contractés par des entités économiques en vue de la mise en œuvre de projets d'infrastructure sous garanties publiques, offrant des avantages potentiels à condition qu'un contrôle effectif soit assuré et que les risques de corruption soient minimisés. Toutefois, les imperfections de la pratique ukrainienne en matière de gestion de la dette garantie contribuent à l'augmentation de l'endettement des résidents, lequel se transforme ultérieurement en dette garantie, tandis qu'une part significative des projets demeure non réalisée, ce qui souligne la nécessité d'améliorer le système de suivi et de contrôle. La présente étude vise à évaluer la place de la dette garantie par l'État dans le système des engagements de l'Ukraine, en mettant l'accent sur les défis liés à la gestion et à l'octroi des garanties publiques. La recherche repose sur une analyse normative du cadre législatif, sur l'application de méthodes statistiques afin d'évaluer les tendances de la dette garantie, ainsi que sur des approches théoriques permettant de généraliser les principes fondamentaux de la gestion de la dette garantie et du processus d'octroi des garanties publiques. Les résultats montrent que la dette garantie par l'État constitue un passif éventuel résultant de l'incapacité des résidents à honorer les obligations d'emprunt contractées sous garanties publiques. L'absence d'une méthodologie claire d'évaluation de la solvabilité des entités économiques, le manque d'un organe spécialisé de gestion et l'insuffisance de transparence dans les procédures de sélection des projets accroissent les risques de corruption et menacent la sécurité de la dette. L'expérience internationale démontre qu'une gestion inefficace de la dette garantie peut engendrer un effet d'éviction des investissements et freiner le développement économique, tandis qu'un contrôle inadéquat de l'utilisation des fonds empruntés alourdit la charge pesant sur le budget de l'État. En définitive, les lacunes identifiées dans la gestion de la dette garantie en Ukraine, notamment le déficit de transparence et l'absence d'une évaluation systématique de la solvabilité des emprunteurs, génèrent des risques budgétaires significatifs. Il apparaît nécessaire d'améliorer le cadre législatif, de perfectionner les procédures de sélection des projets et de créer un organe spécialisé de gestion afin d'accroître l'efficacité des garanties publiques et de renforcer la sécurité de la dette. Les recherches ultérieures devraient se concentrer sur l'élaboration de critères clairs d'évaluation de la solvabilité des emprunteurs ainsi que sur la mise en place d'un mécanisme institutionnel de gestion de la dette garantie, dans le but de réduire les risques de corruption et d'améliorer l'efficacité des garanties de l'État. |
| Abstract: | Гарантований державою борг виникає внаслідок запозичень суб'єктів господарювання для реалізації інфраструктурних проєктів під державні гарантії, що створює потенційні переваги за умови належного контролю та мінімізації корупційних ризиків. Водночас недосконалість української практики управління гарантованим боргом призводить до зростання заборгованості резидентів, яка трансформується у гарантований борг, тоді як значна частина проєктів залишається нереалізованою, що свідчить про потребу вдосконалення системи моніторингу. Дослідження спрямоване на оцінку місця гарантованого боргу в системі зобов'язань України з акцентом на проблеми управління та надання державних гарантій. Методологічною основою роботи є нормативний аналіз законодавчої бази, застосування статистичних методів для оцінки тенденцій динаміки гарантованого боргу, а також теоретичне узагальнення базових засад управління гарантованим боргом і процесом надання державних гарантій. Обґрунтовано, що гарантований державний борг має характер умовного зобов'язання, яке виникає у разі неспроможності резидентів виконувати боргові зобов'язання, отримані під державні гарантії. Встановлено, що відсутність чіткої методики оцінки кредитоспроможності суб'єктів господарювання, спеціалізованого органу управління та прозорих процедур відбору проєктів підвищує корупційні ризики і створює загрози борговій безпеці держави. Міжнародний досвід засвідчує, що неефективне управління гарантованим боргом може спричиняти ефект витіснення інвестицій і гальмувати економічний розвиток, тоді як неналежний контроль за використанням залучених позик посилює навантаження на державний бюджет. Узагальнення результатів дає підстави стверджувати, що існуючі недоліки управління гарантованим боргом в Україні, зокрема недостатня прозорість та відсутність належної оцінки кредитоспроможності позичальників, формують суттєві фіскальні ризики. Це зумовлює необхідність удосконалення законодавчої бази, процедур відбору проєктів і створення спеціалізованого органу управління для підвищення ефективності державних гарантій та зміцнення боргової безпеки. Перспективи подальших досліджень пов'язані з розробленням чітких критеріїв оцінки платоспроможності позичальників і формуванням інституційного механізму управління гарантованим боргом з метою зниження корупційних ризиків і підвищення результативності гарантійної політики держави. |
| Keywords: | economic development, investment projects, debt management, debt security, state guarantees, state-guaranteed debt |
| Date: | 2025–10–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05533564 |
| By: | Balthazar de Vaulchier; Lionel Fontagné; Yu Zheng |
| Abstract: | Electricity generation presents distinctive modeling challenges due to the absence of storage, instantaneous demandsupply balancing requirements, and heterogeneous generation technologies with different cost structures. This paper addresses these challenges by incorporating a base--peak load structure into large-scale computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, offering a middle ground between detailed energy system models and multisectoral global economic frameworks. We first develop a transparent toy model inspired by \textcite{bachmann2022} to demonstrate that first-order approximations of cascading effects, following Hulten's theorem, are inadequate when shocks are large and elasticities of substitution are low. Building on the theoretical insights, we embed a base--peak structure into the MIRAGE CGE model, treating electricity as a Leontief production function between base load generation (coal, nuclear, hydro, and part of renewables) and peak load generation (gas, oil, and peak renewables). This refinement captures the merit order dispatch mechanism and bottleneck effects when peak generation is constrained. We apply the enhanced model to assess the 2022 Russian gas shock in Germany and the European Union. Our results demonstrate that the base--peak structure more accurately reproduces observed macroeconomic impacts compared to standard electricity representations, with significantly larger GDP and welfare losses particularly affecting energyintensive industrial sectors, and less possible substitution from variable renewable energies. Theoretically, we show that third-order effects become important under conditions we explicitly identify, complementing recent findings on shock amplification in production networks. For policy, our findings highlight two key levers for responding to energy shocks: supply flexibility through storage and grid interconnection, and demand smoothing through dynamic pricing and interruptible contracts. The paper contributes methodologically by demonstrating how simplified yet realistic electricity representations can be integrated into global CGE frameworks without sacrificing the broader economic feedback mechanisms essential for policy analysis. |
| Keywords: | Electricity Modeling;Base Load and Peak Load;Computable General Equilibrium;Energy Shocks;Russian Gas Crisis;MIRAGE Model |
| JEL: | C68 D58 Q41 Q43 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2026-03 |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; De Weerdt, Joachim; Fang, Peixun; Jones, Eleanor; Nagoli, Joseph; Pauw, Karl; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | This paper is an update of Country Brief 8 in the series of Agrifood System Diagnostics coauthored by De Weerdt et al. (2023). The important addition from the previous country brief is a new section assessing agriculture’s environmental footprint, focusing on water use and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by subsector and over time. Unlike the previous version, this brief does not include a forward-looking analysis—using IFPRI’s Rural Investment and Policy Analysis (RIAPA) model (IFPRI 2023)—of the contribution of productivity growth in agricultural value chains on agrifood transformation, employment, and socioeconomic outcomes. For a recent and extensive value chain ranking analysis that incorporates RIAPA modeling results, readers are referred to Pienaar et al. (2023). Malawi experienced slow growth in the post COVID-19 pandemic period. In addition to the economic impacts of the pandemic itself, the country suffered from high levels of public debt and a sustained balance of payments crisis. Global events such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and adverse weather events such as Cyclone Freddy and the El Niño in 2023–2024 further prevented the Malawi economy from returning to pre-pandemic growth levels. Economic growth rates have dropped from an average of 4.1 percent in 2011–2019 to 2.2 percent since 2020 (World Bank 2025), with an average growth rate of 3.8 percent per year during 2009–2022. |
| Keywords: | agrifood systems; environmental impact; value chains; trade; Malawi; Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Eastern Africa |
| Date: | 2025–12–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:masspp:178668 |
| By: | Heiduk, Felix; Müller, Melanie; Aydın, Yaşar; Kluge, Janis; Scholz, Tobias; Stanzel, Angela; Thimm, Johannes |
| Abstract: | Multipolarität ist in der internationalen Politik zu einem zentralen, aber höchst ambivalenten Bezugspunkt von Debatten über die künftige Weltordnung geworden. Verwendet wird der Begriff sowohl deskriptiv, nämlich zur Beschreibung von Machtverschiebungen, als auch normativ, und zwar als Konzept für eine gerechtere internationale Ordnung. Die vergleichende Analyse von sieben Staaten zeigt jedoch, dass selbst in Ländern, die Multipolarität propagieren, kein kohärentes Verständnis davon vorherrscht. Scharfe Trennlinien verlaufen vorwiegend zwischen einerseits den USA, die das Konzept Multipolarität lange als gegen sich gerichtet verstanden haben, andererseits Russland und China, die mit ihm die Infragestellung der US-Hegemonie verbinden. Dabei strebt Russland eine disruptive und gewalttätige Transformation an, China hingegen eine evolutionäre. Andere Staaten wiederum, allen voran Indien und Südafrika, erhoffen sich von Multipolarität in erster Linie erweiterte außenpolitische Spielräume und leiten daraus teilweise eigene Reformvorschläge auf multilateraler Ebene ab. Deutschland und die EU müssen sich intensiver mit den unterschiedlichen Interpretationen und Verwendungen des Konzepts Multipolarität auseinandersetzen. Es sollte nicht per se als irrelevant oder antiwestlich abgetan werden, da es wesentliche Erkenntnisse über außenpolitische Anschlussfähigkeiten ermöglicht. Auch birgt die unreflektierte Verwendung des Begriffs Risiken, da er hochgradig politisiert ist und von verschiedenen Akteuren mit zum Teil gegensätzlichen Zielen verknüpft wird. Wichtiger als Grundsatzdiskussionen zu führen ist es, konkrete ordnungspolitische Reformansätze in diversen Politikfeldern zu entwickeln, etwa Handel, Gesundheit, Energie und Klima. Deutschland und die EU sollten die Forderung nach Multipolarität auch als Indikator für Reformbedarf verstehen und über die europäische Ebene Aushandlungsprozesse mit anderen Staaten anstoßen. Hierfür müssen sie zunächst klären, welche Ordnungsvorstellungen sie selbst bevorzugen, um darauf aufbauend passende Partner und Institutionen zu identifizieren. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:338077 |