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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Gilles Paché (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon) |
| Abstract: | Russia's response to sweeping Western sanctions since the invasion of Ukraine illustrates how logistical constraints can be transformed into instruments of geopolitical power. Sanctions have reshaped the corridors, hubs, and alternative networks mobilized by Moscow to maintain the continuity of strategic flows despite increasing isolation. Routes through Central Asia, expanding hubs in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the Arctic Northern Sea Route, operate as vectors of State resilience, enabling the circumvention of external pressure while reinforcing territorial and political ambitions. In parallel, gray markets, informal intermediaries, and an expanding "shadow fleet" sustain energy exports and industrial activity, yet generate structural vulnerabilities linked to opacity, safety risks, and dependence on opportunistic actors. This dynamic raises a core research question: how do Western sanctions reconfigure Russia's logistics architecture, and to what extent do adaptive mechanisms-across formal, informal, and illicit channels-produce both resilience and systemic fragility within global supply chains? The article contends that Russia's adjustments do not merely mitigate the effects of sanctions but actively reshape global trade patterns. By combining established corridors with shadow networks, Moscow secures short-term autonomy while accumulating long-term risks, demonstrating that logistics has become a central arena of contemporary geopolitical competition. |
| Keywords: | geopolitics, gray markets, logistics, resilience, Russia, sanctions, shadow fleet, supply chains |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05511589 |
| By: | Olga Pindyuk (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has triggered profound structural changes in the country’s economy, reshaping patterns of foreign trade, foreign direct investment and sectoral specialisation. This paper analyses the shifts in Ukraine’s trade and investment structures over the past three years and assesses their implications for Ukraine’s future competitiveness and for EU-Ukraine economic relations, with particular attention to the EU’s strategic autonomy in an increasingly fragmented global economy. The analysis shows a rapid reorientation of Ukraine’s merchandise exports towards the EU, driven by emergency trade liberalisation and alternative logistics routes, alongside a marked decline in exports to China. At the same time, Ukraine’s dependence on Chinese imports has intensified, especially for machinery and high-tech inputs critical to defence production, creating new security vulnerabilities. Agriculture has emerged as the most resilient export sector, while metallurgy and manufacturing have suffered lasting losses. Ukraine’s FDI inflows remain notably weak compared with regional peers, with limited progress in attracting investment into high-value and strategic sectors. The paper further examines Ukraine’s role in critical raw materials, renewable energy, agriculture and drone production, highlighting missed opportunities and emerging risks for the EU. It concludes that without faster, more co-ordinated EU engagement – particularly in critical minerals, green energy, defence-industrial integration and investment de-risking – the EU risks losing strategic influence in Ukraine and undermining its own long-term economic and security objectives. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine, the EU, China, the US, foreign trade, FDI, renewable energy, critical minerals, agriculture, competitiveness, security, DCFTA, CAP |
| JEL: | F10 F21 F50 F52 F55 O50 Q17 Q34 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:103 |
| By: | Alessandra Faggian (Gran Sasso Science Institute); Alessandra Michelangeli (University of Milan-Bicocca); Kateryna Tkach (Gran Sasso Science Institute) |
| Abstract: | The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has induced a large influx of refugees from Ukraine to the European Union (EU), becoming the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe since the World War II. Despite a growing interest in the topic, little is known about Ukrainian refugees’ skills and their economic integration in the hosting countries. This paper provides novel evidence on this topic by analysing employment patterns and skills of displaced Ukrainians in Italy. Using primary data, our results show that previous employment and proficiency in Italian are essential for refugees’ current employment status. Despite their high educational attainment, professional downgrading seems to be widespread as refugees with tertiary education perceive themselves as overqualified for their jobs. Moreover, regional context, namely the presence of Ukrainian immigrant community, also plays a role in refugees’ employment outcomes and job-related perceptions. Our findings underscore the importance of skill recognition and language training in facilitating economic integration of refugees. |
| Keywords: | forced migration; labour market inclusion; skill profiles; human capital; displaced persons |
| JEL: | F22 J61 R23 J24 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ahy:wpaper:wp77 |
| By: | Trebesch, Christoph; Nishikawa, Taro |
| Abstract: | · This brief provides a big-picture overview of support for Ukraine after four years of war. The key finding from 2025 is that Europe has almost offset the collapse in US support. · US aid fell by 99 percent. At the same time, Europe sharply increased its aid allocations, by 59 percent for financial and humanitarian aid and by 67 percent for military aid compared to the 2022-24 average. As a result, total aid in 2025 remained close to previous years. · Within Europe, financial and humanitarian aid is now dominated by EU institutions, as EU loans and grants account for 89 percent of these flows in 2025. Military aid is ever more concentrated on a few countries. Northern and Western Europe accounted for about 95 percent, in particular Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom. In contrast, the military aid from Southern and Eastern Europe continued to fall. · To help replace US support, NATO launched the PURL initiative, through which donors purchased US weapons for Ukraine worth EUR 3.7 billion in 2025, including HIMARS and Patriot systems. Donors also increasingly procured weapons directly from Ukraine's defense industry. The share of procurement in Ukraine reached 22 percent in late 2025. |
| Abstract: | · Diese Kurzanalyse liefert einen Überblick zur Ukraine-Hilfe nach vier Jahren Krieg. Eine zentrale Erkenntnis ist, dass Europa das Einfrieren der US-Hilfen fast ausgeglichen hat. · Die US-Unterstützung brach 2025 um 99 Prozent ein. Gleichzeitig erhöhte Europa seine Hilfszuweisungen deutlich, um 59 Prozent bei finanzieller und humanitärer Hilfe und um 67 Prozent bei militärischer Unterstützung. Das Gesamtvolumen der Hilfe blieb 2025 damit nahe am Niveau der Vorjahre. · Die finanzielle und humanitäre Hilfe aus Europa wird inzwischen überwiegend über EU-Institutionen geleistet. 90 Prozent der Finanzhilfe für die Ukraine kamen 2025 über EU-Kredite und Zuschüsse. Die militärische Hilfe ist dagegen immer stärker konzentriert. Nord- und Westeuropa trugen etwa 95 Prozent bei, insbesondere aus Skandinavien, Deutschland und dem Vereinigten Königreich. Die Zuweisungen aus Süd- und Osteuropa sanken weiter. · Zur Kompensation der US-Waffenhilfe startete die NATO die PURL-Initiative, über die 2025 US-Waffen im Wert von 3, 7 Mrd. Euro für die Ukraine gekauft wurden, z.B. HIMARS- und Patriot-Systeme. Zugleich gewann die Beschaffung der Geberländer über die ukrainische Verteidigungsindustrie an Bedeutung. Der Anteil wuchs bis Ende 2025 auf 22 Prozent. |
| Keywords: | International Aid, Defense Industry, Geoeconomics, Ukraine, Internationale Hilfe, Verteidigungsindustrie, Geoökonomie, Ukraine |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:336813 |
| By: | Spirin, Victor |
| Abstract: | International consultants and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and a group of American advisors from the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) actively recommended that Russia implement radical economic reforms in the 1990s, which included, among other things, closing inefficient state-owned enterprises. This paper demonstrates that if the only "efficient" industries are raw material extraction and primary processing using imported equipment, then supporting "inefficient" enterprises is the only way to improve the well-being of the population. This goes so far as to suggest that even 100% subsidy, for example, of the automobile industry and the free distribution of Volga and Lada cars to the population, leads to an increase in the standard of living in the country. Furthermore, in this case, subsidizing "loss-making" enterprises leads to a slowdown, not an acceleration, of inflation. Following these same principles, developed countries have been subsidizing their "loss-making" enterprises, such as Airbus and Nokia, for decades. The model presented is greatly simplified and does not take into account numerous other factors influencing economic development. Therefore, much of the article is devoted to discussing why these seemingly obvious mathematical methods won't work when applied to the Russian economy, and why economic development in Russia is impossible, regardless of any measures of government support or stimuli. |
| Keywords: | Vanek-Reinert effect, free trade, macroeconomic effects of globalization |
| JEL: | F0 F6 F62 F63 |
| Date: | 2026–02–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127937 |
| By: | Lisa Scheckenhofer; Feodora Teti; David Torun; Joschka Wanner |
| Abstract: | Key MessagesEU military export bans in 2022-23 were less effective due to gaps in the sanction regimeOnce these gaps were closed, direct EU exports to Russia ceased, but sanctions were circumvented via indirect routesExport bans raised trade costs by only 19 percent, far below the prohibitive levels implied by a fully enforced banStronger enforcement and political pressure on intermediary countries in early 2024 reduced exports to eight percent of pre-war levelComprehensive enforcement can substantially constrain Russiaʼs access to critical inputs |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:econpb:_80 |
| By: | Adrien Fabre (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Using an original survey of 12, 000 respondents representative of eleven high-income countries (the United States, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and seven European countries), I examine public support for international redistribution and climate policies, as well as its sensitivity to key policy features such as the size of transfers and country coverage. Although global inequality is not a salient concern, it is perceived as a significant injustice. There is majority acceptance in every country for nearly all global policies tested, including those that would redistribute 5 percent of global income or entail personal costs for respondents. An information treatment shows that support for global policies causally increases among respondents who perceive them as likely; an effect opposite to warm glow. Support for international policies decreases only slightly as country coverage shrinks. Overall, the results reinforce previous findings and suggest that a broad coalition of countries could feasibly advance sustainable development. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:ciredw:halshs-05514670 |
| By: | Isabella Damiani (LIMEEP – PS - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire sur les Mutations des Espaces Économiques et Politiques – Paris Saclay - UVSQ - Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines - Université Paris-Saclay); Marie Hiliquin (TVES - Territoires, Villes, Environnement & Société - ULR 4477 - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille) |
| Abstract: | This article examines the role of Khorgos, a special economic zone located on the border between China and Kazakhstan, within the framework of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In less than a decade, Khorgos has become a strategic hub for rail freight between China and Europe, increasing from 25 trains in 2013 to more than 8, 700 in 2024, reflecting China's efforts to strengthen overland connectivity and establish alternative corridors to maritime trade. This paper, drawing on satellite data and spatial analysis through remote sensing, focuses on three main dimensions. First, it analyses the peripheral urbanisation of the city of Khorgos, which is embedded in China's territorial strategies to connect the western region to the rest of the country through infrastructure development, securitisation, and territorial control. Second, it situates Khorgos within a regional scale, namely the Khorgos-Yining-Qingshuihe economic complex. This analysis highlights the functional division of employment between Yining, the true administrative centre, Qingshuihe as the production core, and Khorgos, which remains primarily a transit point for Chinese exports, thereby illustrating an asymmetry in cross-border exchanges with Kazakhstan. Third, the paper examines territorial production and environmental differentiation. Remote sensing analyses reveal pronounced asymmetries in land use and ecological transformations between the Chinese and Kazakh sides of the border: China has developed a diversified and tightly regulated territorial model, combining urban and agricultural infrastructures, whereas the Kazakh side remains less structured and less developed. Chinese ecological initiatives, such as photovoltaic projects and urban greening policies, further reinforce cross-border territorial asymmetries and raise critical questions about the actual impacts of the BRI and the associated "win-win" cooperation rhetoric. |
| Keywords: | Climate change, Urban planing, Borders, Kazakhstan, China, Belt Road Initiative, Khorgos |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05486194 |