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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Tilekeyev, Kanat |
| Abstract: | Russia's war in Ukraine caused a spike in basic food costs as well as agro-input prices (fuel, seeds, and fertilizer) in 2022. Fertilizer prices rose double on average compared to 2021, reducing farmer demand and import supply to Kyrgyzstan. Fuel costs increased, while market demand remained constant. Farmers had a seasonal diesel shortage in the second half of 2022. The financial market remained stable and lending in agriculture increased due to the stable interest rates for agricultural lending. Analysis of the four key food markets in Kyrgyzstan (wheat, sugar, potato and meat) demonstrated increase in prices under the external and internal factors - increased input prices, trade restrictions imposed by supply states, increased cost of logistics and growth of domestic production factors. The overall situation demonstrates that agriculture is undergoing a severe shock as a result of rising prices, which feeds into the cascade effect of rising prices. However, the country's population's consumer ability cannot keep up with price increases, resulting in a reduction in demand for more expensive foods. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, Food Security and Poverty |
| Date: | 2024–08–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae24:344314 |
| By: | Korhonen, Iikka; Simola, Heli |
| Abstract: | We examine impact of economic sanctions on Russian import prices using detailed data on other countries' exports to Russia. We find that unit import prices of goods sanctioned by trading blocs such as the European Union have increased, often drastically, and even when imported to Russia from countries that have not formally imposed sanctions on Russia. For some countries, the unit export prices to Russia for non-sanctioned goods have also risen. These results strongly suggest that trade sanctions have been effective in limiting Russia's access to sanctioned goods. |
| Keywords: | Sanctions, foreign trade, Russia |
| JEL: | F12 F14 F51 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitp:333422 |
| By: | Ausrine Armonaite (Former Minister of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania) |
| Abstract: | The past decade in Europe has been marked by recurring crises that have reshaped economies, societies, and policymaking. This paper reflects on the experience of leading Lithuania's Ministry of Economy and Innovation during three major disruptions between 2020 and 2024: the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese coercive trade measures, and energy price inflation following Russia's war in Ukraine. Drawing on first-hand observations, the paper identifies recurring patterns in crisis management, comprising three successive stages-shock and uncertainty; liminality, or temporary measures to buy time; and the implementation of long-term solutions. It argues that while each crisis differed in nature, effective management consistently depended on decisive leadership, institutional cooperation, and the ability to transform challenges into opportunities for structural change. The Lithuanian case demonstrates that diversification, adaptive policymaking, and clear communication can sustain economic resilience even in an era where "normal times" no longer exist. The analysis concludes by outlining broader lessons for democratic governance in the age of permanent uncertainty.I began my political career as a city councillor in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, and went on to spend ten years in professional politics. This included serving for eight years as a member of parliament, founding and chairing the liberal party Laisvės partija (Freedom Party) with more than 3, 000 members that later became a coalition partner, and serving as the Minister of Economy and Innovation from 2020 to 2024.The Lithuanian government I worked in was tested with the 'new normal' numerous times when I was in office, between the years 2020 and 2024. We dealt with COVID-19, Chinese coercive measures in bilateral trade, the illegal migration crisis from the Middle East, energy price inflation, and let alone, the war and instability in the neighbouring region with the whole package of disruptions involved.My experience as the cabinet minister is, of course, related to the case of one country-Lithuania. It involved global events and external actors; however, I understand that the small details of our national policy may not be particularly interesting to the foreign reader. Keeping all that in mind, I want to reveal the broader relevance of my experience. I am going to briefly cover three crises and how we addressed them in the government and at the Ministry of Economy and Innovation of Lithuania: COVID-19, Chinese coercive measures in bilateral trade, and energy price inflation that was caused by the Russian attack on Ukraine. These three events are the focus of this article. |
| Date: | 2025–10–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05337595 |
| By: | Alexeev, Michael V.; Pyle, William; Wang, Jiaan |
| Abstract: | Although it has been speculated that the pain and dislocation of the early 1990s left Russians with an abiding distaste for the values that animated the transition from communism, the quantitative evidence for a lasting effect is thin. Drawing on a large, regionally representative survey from 2010, we show that in regions where the embrace of liberal values declined most in the early 1990s, support for democratic values remained weakest a generation later. Instrumenting for the change in values in the early 1990s with variables that capture Soviet-era economic distortions, we connect the vulnerability of a region to the market liberalization shock of 1992 to its diminished support for liberal political values in both shorter and longer runs, particularly for the older cohorts who would have experienced the early 1990s as adults. The endurance of the effect of the early 1990s economic shock stands in contrast to research from other contexts that the attitudinal effects of economic shocks experienced after early adulthood are short-lived. We speculate that a possible explanation for why the effect of the early 1990s endures in Russia was the amplification of the economic shock by an "identity shock" related to Russia's post-imperial loss of status. In support of this hypothesis, we use multiple waves of the Integrated Values Survey (IVS) to show that in Russia, the demand for democratic values declined in the first half of the 1990s relative to other former communist countries, opening a values gap that persisted through at least 2017. Lastly, we draw on a recent survey experiment to show that respondents primed to consider the economic collapse of the early 1990s, and to a lesser extent the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are less likely to embrace democratic values than those in a control group. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitp:333423 |
| By: | Centre for Policy Dialogue |
| Abstract: | The economy of Bangladesh faces both domestic and international challenges. The Russia-Ukraine war slowed COVID-19 recovery. The economy faces severe external pressures High commodity prices, supply chain disruptions, and tightening of monetary policy around the world affect the economy. |
| Keywords: | Bangladesh economy, FY2023-24, economic challenges, economic reforms, Russia-Ukraine war, post-COVID recovery |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdb:pbrief:66 |
| By: | Plaasch, Jannick; Röthig, Andreas |
| Abstract: | This paper describes a Growth-at-Risk (GaR) model of the Bundesbank for Germany. This model takes the form of a quantile regression that quantifies downside risk to German GDP growth associated with financial developments. A systematic comparison of diverse model specifications is performed to select the most suitable GaR model based on economic criteria and out-of-sample predictive performance. The preferred model relates the 10% quantile of the conditional distribution of GDP growth to financial stress in Germany as captured by the Country-Level Index of Financial Stress (CLIFS), as well as US financial conditions as meas- ured by the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) for the USA. In addition, the preferred specification includes GDP growth of the two preceding periods to account for serial dependence and a business confidence indicator (BCI) of German companies, which underscores that economic sentiment also matters for downside risk to growth. The evaluation shows that the 10% quantile coefficients are more stable than those of the 5% quantile, making the 10% quantile a more robust measure of downside risk for German GDP. Data from the COVID period are excluded, as the pandemic was not a financial system-driven crisis. Estimation results show that financial stress, measured by both CLIFS and NFCI, contributed most strongly to downside risk to GDP growth during the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis. The CLIFS also significantly increased downside risk in the early 2000s and following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In recent years, historically low financial stress has corresponded to moderate downside risk, with economic sentiment acting as the main amplifier. |
| Keywords: | Growth-at-Risk, GDP Growth, Germany, Tail Risk, Financial Conditions |
| JEL: | C53 E23 E27 E32 E44 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubtps:333425 |
| By: | Mabrouki, Mohamed |
| Abstract: | The BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) represent a critical frontier in the global energy transition, balancing rapid economic development with pressing environmental imperatives. This study investigates the determinants of renewable energy adoption in BRICS countries from 2000 to 2022, employing a novel Panel ARDL methodology that addresses critical methodological gaps in existing literature. Using the Pooled Mean Group estimator and robust validation through Mean Group, Common Correlated Effects Mean Group, and Fixed Effects approaches, we analyze the synergistic effects of economic, structural, human capital, and institutional factors. Our findings reveal that gross fixed capital formation emerges as the most significant determinant, exhibiting a robust negative relationship with renewable energy share (coefficient: -0.172, p |
| Keywords: | Energy Transition • BRICS Economies • Panel ARDL • Technological Lock-in • Human Capital • Institutional Quality • Structural Transformation • Renewable Energy |
| JEL: | O57 |
| Date: | 2025–01–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:126562 |
| By: | Perez, Pedro Gurrola; Murphy, David |
| Abstract: | In recent years, many derivatives market participants received large margin calls in episodes of elevated market volatility such as the onset of the Covid-19 global pandemic and the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine. The lack of some market participants’ preparedness to meet these calls resulted in liquidity stress and reinvigorated the policy debate about how reactive margin should be to changes in market conditions. This debate has been hampered by the lack of a generally accepted way of measuring the reactiveness of the models used to calculate initial margin. The first contribution of this paper is to provide such a measure. We consider a step function in volatility, and examine the responses of various initial margin models to paths of risk factor returns consistent with this impulse, introducing the impulse response function as a convenient means of presenting this reaction. The results presented demonstrate that a model's impulse response is a robust and useful measure of its reactiveness. This approach could be used both to measure initial margin model reactiveness, or procyclicality as it is often termed, and to capture the uncertainty in this measurement. It also provides significant, novel insights into the behaviour of some economically important margin models. In particular, the tendency of some filtered historical simulation value at risk models to over-react to sharp stepwise increases in volatility is demonstrated and the reasons for it are explored. The behaviour of two widely-used anti-procyclicality tools, the buffer and the use of a stressed period, are also analysed: the latter is found to be more successful at mitigating procyclicality than the former. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the results presented. |
| Keywords: | anti-procyclicality; impulse response function; initial margin model; margin model response; procyclicality; volatility estimation |
| JEL: | G13 C52 C12 |
| Date: | 2025–11–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:128641 |
| By: | Sutherland, Ewan |
| Abstract: | In November 2024, the Chinese registered bulk carrier, the Yi Peng 3 was found to have been the only vessel in the area where cuts had been made in two telecommunication cables in the Baltic Sea, between Gotland and Estonia. With unexpected rapidity, the Yi Peng 3 was stopped by the Royal Danish Navy and, after delays by Chinese authorities, their offi cials arrived for a cursory examination, then the ship was released. The two cables had already been repaired and evidence collected about the damage, together with evidence of previous attempts by the same vessel to cut electricity and telecommunication cables. Then in December 2024, a vessel belonging to the 'shadow fl eet' used by Russia to breach oil sanctions cut an electricity interconnector and four telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland. The Eagle S, registered in the Cook Islands, was ordered into Finnish territorial waters, where it was boarded by special forces and taken to a port. These incidents highlighted the challenges of responding to attacks on undersea cables conducted by Russia as part of its undeclared war against NATO. It requires rapid notifi cation of breaks to the national authorities (e.g., CERT), passed immediately to coast guard and navy, and consultation with prosecutors, before making immediate interventions to seize the vessels concerned and gather evidence, followed by quick repairs to the broken cables. This is possible only with careful administrative, judicial and political coordination in a complex system of polycentric governance. The international conventions, especially in the Danish Straits, make it diffi cult for coastal states to arrest vessels and to protect cables, especially beyond territorial waters. Nonetheless, the Eagle S incident demonstrated that a rapid response can be eff ective. In the longer term such threats require improvements to network resilience and better coordination amongst operators, government agencies and countries, given the diffi culties in changing international conventions. One crucial change could be the inclusion of cable cutting in the defi nition of piracy. |
| Keywords: | Infrastructure, Russia, Sabotage, Submarine cables, Telecommunications |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331307 |
| By: | Burstedde, Alexander; Risius, Paula; Bardt, Hubertus |
| Abstract: | Deutschland sieht sich mit einer verschärften Bedrohungslage konfrontiert. Infolge des russischen Angriffskriegs auf die Ukraine wurde bereits eine "Zeitenwende" ausgerufen. Die Steigerung der Verteidigungsfähigkeit beinhaltet auch einen deutlichen Personalaufbau bei der Bundeswehr. Die Zahl der Soldaten und Reservisten in Deutschland soll sich bis 2035 von aktuell etwa 230.000 auf 460.000 verdoppeln. Aus den heute knapp über 180.000 Soldaten sollen dann 260.000 werden. Um diese Sollstärke zu erreichen, möchte die Bundesregierung die Zahl der Freiwillig Wehrdienst Leistenden (Schreibweise der Bundeswehr) deutlich erhöhen. Zentral für die Verteidigungsfähigkeit ist die Zahl der einsatzbereiten Soldaten und Reservisten, die aus dem Freiwilligen Wehrdienst hervorgehen. Je nachhaltiger diese Rekrutierung gelingt, desto weniger Freiwillige werden benötigt. Aus ökonomischer Perspektive ist entscheidend, möglichst wenig Personen für den Wehrdienst einzuplanen, die an anderer Stelle produktiver tätig sein könnten. Die Fragestellung der vorliegenden Analyse ist also: Wie kann die Verteidigungsfähigkeit so erhöht werden, dass die volkswirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit möglichst wenig beeinträchtigt wird? Die Studie berechnet dazu Szenarien für den personellen Aufwuchs der Bundeswehr auf Basis unterschiedlicher Annahmen zur Zahl der Freiwilligen und zur Attraktivität des Diensts. Auf Basis des bisherigen Rekrutierungserfolgs der Bundeswehr und den Erfahrungen aus Schweden dürfte, die mit dem Neuen Wehrdienst geplante Erhöhung auf 40.000 Freiwillige jährlich bis 2031 nicht ausreichen, um die Sollstärke zu erreichen. In diesem Basisszenario würde die Zahl der Soldaten und Reservisten bis 2035 um knapp 50 Prozent steigen und bis 2040 um etwa 65 Prozent. Eine Verdopplung erfordert eine Verringerung der Abbrüche, und dass sich mehr Menschen für eine Verpflichtung als Soldat auf Zeit entscheiden. In einem entsprechend optimistischen Szenario mit attraktivem Dienst könnte das Plus bis 2035 knapp 80 Prozent betragen und die Sollstärke bis 2039 erreicht werden. Um die Sollstärke schon wie gewünscht im Jahr 2035 zu erreichen, müsste die Zahl der Freiwillig Wehrdienst Leistenden schneller und deutlicher erhöht werden, bis auf 50.000 im Jahr 2029. Mit mehr Freiwilligen kann der Aufwuchs also beschleunigt werden, für seine Nachhaltigkeit ist jedoch die Attraktivität des Diensts ausschlaggebend. |
| Abstract: | Germany is facing an increased threat level. As a result of Russia's war against Ukraine, a "turning point" (dt.: Zeitenwende) has already been declared. The increase in defense capabilities also includes a significant increase in personnel in the German Armed Forces (dt.: Bundeswehr). The number of soldiers and reservists in Germany is set to double from the current figure of around 230, 000 to 460, 000 by 2035. The current number of just over 180, 000 soldiers is then set to rise to 260, 000. In order to achieve this target, the federal government wants to significantly increase the number of volunteers performing military service (official spelling: Freiwillig Wehrdienst Leistende). From an economic perspective, it is crucial to assign as few people as possible to military service who could be more productive elsewhere. Central to defense capability is the number of combat-ready soldiers and reservists emerging from voluntary service. The more sustainable this recruitment is, the fewer volunteers will be needed. The question is therefore: How can defense capability be strengthened while minimizing the impact on overall economic performance? The study calculates scenarios for personnel growth in the Bundeswehr based on different assumptions regarding the number of volunteers and the attractiveness of service. Based on the Bundeswehr's current recruitment success and Sweden's experience, the planned increase to 40, 000 volunteers annually by 2031 under the new voluntary service model is unlikely to be sufficient to reach the target. In this baseline scenario, the number of soldiers and reservists would increase by just under 50 percent by 2035 and by about 65 percent by 2040. Doubling the total number would require reducing dropout rates and motivating more people to commit to fixed-term service. Doubling the total number would require reducing dropout rates and motivating more people to commit to fixed-term service. In an optimistic scenario with highly attractive service conditions, the increase could reach nearly 80 percent by 2035, with the target strength achieved by 2039. In order to reach the target as desired in 2035, the number of volunteers performing military service would have to be increased more quickly and significantly, to 50, 000 in 2029. With more volunteers, the increase can be accelerated, but the attractiveness of the service is crucial for its sustainability [...] |
| Keywords: | Militär, Wehrdienst, Personalbeschaffung, Personalmarketing, Mitarbeiterbindung, Deutschland |
| JEL: | H56 J24 J45 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:331869 |
| By: | Bothner, Jonathan; Rottmann, Horst |
| Abstract: | Die vergangenen Jahre waren geprägt von verschiedenen Krisen und Disruptionen. Die Covid 19 Pandemie, der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine, die geopolitische Umorientierung der USA und die rasante Verbreitung der Anwendung künstlicher Intelligenz sind nur einige Beispiele für Entwicklungen, die als größtenteils unvorhergesehene exogene Schocks betrachtet werden können. Zudem betrafen sie nicht nur einzelne Länder sondern waren globaler Natur. Allerdings gehen verschiedene Länder unterschiedlich mit diesen Schocks um. Besonders anschaulich sind beispielsweise die verschiedenen Strategien, mit denen verschiedene Regierungen auf die Covid Pandemie reagierten. Der Spielraum, den eine Regierung hat, um auf unerwartete veränderte Umstände reagieren zu können, hängt maßgeblich von der Staatsform des Landes ab. Man kann argumentieren, dass eine Autokratie, in der die Regierung uneingeschränkt und diskretionär Maßnahmen ergreifen kann, gegebenenfalls schneller und zielgerichteter auf exogene Schocks reagieren kann als eine Demokratie, in der Mehrheiten organisiert und Grundrechte eingehalten werden müssen. Andererseits haben auch Demokratien Eigenschaften, die ihnen die Absorption exogener Schocks erleichtern. Zum einen gibt es in Demokratien eine intensivere öffentliche Debatte über politische Maßnahmen. Dies ermöglicht die Mitwirkung verschiedenener Perspektiven und die Nutzung von dezentralem Wissen beim Vergleich von Alternativen. Zum anderen schafft Demokratie Erwartungssicherheit durch die Beschränkung willkürlicher Eingriffe der Exekutive in wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten (North, 1990; Olson u. a., 1991). Diese Erwartungssicherheit ist besonders für private Investitionen relevant, die die Anpassungsfähigkeit einer Volkswirtschafts an exogene Schocks stärken können. Die Rolle von Demokratie als Einflussfaktor von Wirtschaftswachstum ist der Gegenstand von zahlreichen ökonomischen Studien (Robert J Barro, 1996; Acemoglu u. a., 2019; Colagrossi u. a., 2020). Ihre Auswirkung auf die Resilienz des Wirtschaftswachstums ist im Vergleich dazu noch wenig erforscht. In dieser Studie gehen wir der Frage nach, ob Demokratie nicht nur zu mehr Wirtschaftswachtum führt, sondern ob es dieses Wachstum auch stabilisiert. Hierzu werden wir zunächst den Zusammenhang zwischen Demokratie und Wachstum empirisch untersuchen. Das hierfür verwendete Modell erweitern wir dann um einen Ansatz von Blanchard und Wolfers (2000), um herauszufinden, wie Demokratie die Resilienz des Wachstums beeinflussen. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hawdps:333396 |
| By: | Jeremy Srouji (International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Dominique Torre (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Qing Xu (ICL, Junia, Université Catholique de Lille, LITL, Lille, France) |
| Abstract: | This article examines proposals to establish a BRICS Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) aimed at facilitating trade flows among the members, as part of their broader discussions around reforming the international monetary and financial system. It sets these proposals within the context of global CBDC efforts, South-South convergence processes and the challenges the BRICS have faced in navigating global geo-political tensions, while aligning national CBDC efforts with groupwide initiatives. We focus on a Brazilian proposal to establish a unified BRICS cross-border payment system, seen as a first step towards a full-fledged BRICS CBDC. Our main finding is that while this cross-border digital currency can be useful for smoothing payments and reducing the trade deficits of the smaller BRICS members, it does little to redress their asymmetric position vis-à-vis the larger country, China. The implication is that sustainable convergence among the grouping through the adoption of a unified cross-border currency would require a higher level of monetary and policy coordination than that set out in the Brazilian proposal. |
| Keywords: | CBDC, BRICS, cross-border payments, international currency, international trade, stablecoins |
| JEL: | F33 F36 E12 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2025-48 |
| By: | Jesske, Birgit (Infas); Schulz, Sabine (Infas); Torregroza, Sabrina (Infas) |
| Abstract: | "Vor dem Hintergrund der besonderen Zusammensetzung der Personen mit SGB-II-Bezug werden im PASS alle Nationalitäten berücksichtigt und auch fremdsprachige Befragungen durchgeführt. Zu Beginn waren die Erhebungssprachen auf Russisch und Türkisch begrenzt. Seit Welle 10 wurde auf die gesonderte Bereitstellung eines türkischsprachigen Erhebungsinstruments verzichtet, da die Befragungen in türkischer Sprache in den Haushalten nur noch in sehr wenigen Fällen notwendig waren. Dafür wurden aufgrund der verstärkten Flüchtlingszuwanderung seit 2014 aus Syrien und dem Irak, die Haushalte seit Welle 10 auch auf Arabisch befragt. Ab der Welle 17 wurde aufgrund der aktuellen Entwicklungen in der Grundgesamtheit der SGB-II-Haushalte Ukrainisch als weitere Erhebungssprache hinzugenommen. In Welle 18 wurde die Bearbeitung der Stichprobe aus dem Einwohnermelderegister (Bestandsauffrischung) weitergeführt. Dafür wurden alle Adressen der Einwohnermeldestichprobe, die in Welle 17 nicht erreicht oder nicht ausreichend bearbeitet werden konnten, erneut zur Bearbeitung ins Feld gegeben." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku) |
| Keywords: | Bundesrepublik Deutschland ; IAB-Open-Access-Publikation ; Bedarfsgemeinschaft ; Befragung ; Datengewinnung ; Datenqualität ; Geflüchtete ; Fragebogen ; Methodenliteratur ; Interviewereffekt ; Stichprobe ; 10.5164/IAB.PASS-SUF0624.de.en.v1 ; IAB-Haushaltspanel ; 2014-2023 |
| Date: | 2024–11–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabfme:202508 |