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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Bomprezzi, Pietro; Cherepinskiy, Daniel; Irto, Giuseppe; Kharitonov, Ivan; Nishikawa, Taro; Trebesch, Christoph |
| Abstract: | This report takes stock of international support for Ukraine. It is based on almost 3 years of data collection from the Ukraine Support Tracker, stretching from January 22nd, 2022 to December 31st, 2024. Over the past 3 years, Ukraine has received a low but steady inflow of foreign aid, with Europe taking the lead. On military aid, Europe's support of EUR 62 billion is on a similar level to that of the United States, which has allocated EUR 64 billion in total. However, Europe has long surpassed the US when it comes to financial and humanitarian aid allocations (EUR 70 billion vs. 50 billion). Total aid allocations by all donor governments to Ukraine amount to EUR 267 billion as of Dec 2024, or about EUR 80 billion per year. In percent of GDP, only Scandinavian and Eastern European countries, plus the Netherlands, have made a significant effort to support Ukraine. Major donors such as Germany, the US or the UK have allocated less than 0.2% of their GDP on aid to Ukraine per year. This is comparable to minor and questionable domestic subsidy programs such as for diesel fuel or company cars. Southern European countries like France, Spain or Italy have done even less, with just around 0.1% of GDP mobilized for Ukraine per year. Through the lens of Western governments' fiscal budgets, aid to Ukraine thus looks more like a minor political "pet project" rather than a major fiscal effort. The Russia-Ukraine war has become a battle of procurement and military production. In 2022, more than 70% of foreign military aid came from national stockpiles, with little industry procurement. By 2024, that ratio had reversed, as two-thirds of all arms and equipment allocated to Ukraine now come directly from defense industries. This trend underscores the growing relevance for ramping up defense production in Europe. European donors are increasingly collaborating through multilateral procurement initiatives to jointly produce and deliver weapons to Ukraine. Our dataset records a total of EUR 5 billion in military procurement initiatives, including ad-hoc coordinated projects or more institutionalized multilateral funding mechanisms, such as the International Fund for Ukraine, the Czech Ammunition Initiative, and the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package. While these initiatives remain relatively small, they could become a blueprint for the future of aid for Ukraine. Donors such as Denmark have started to purchase weapons directly from Ukrainian producers, in particular drones. Looking ahead, this "Danish model" could help to deliver weapons that are cheaper and delivered more quickly. |
| Keywords: | International aid, military aid, war, geoeconomics, Ukraine |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:320382 |
| By: | Yerimpasheva, Aida; Brauweiler, Hans-Christian |
| Abstract: | Kazakhstan views the implementation of the European Union's Global Gateway strategy as a key element of its foreign economic policy. For Kazakhstan, this strategy is important not only from an economic point of view, since it is aimed at stimulating the country's sustainable growth, but also from the point of view of geopolitical risks, allowing it to move away from excessive dependence on one direction (be it Russia or China) and, ultimately, strengthen multi-vectors. The presence of a strong European track makes Kazakhstan's foreign economic strategy more sustainable. A comprehensive analysis conducted as part of desk research allowed us to make several key conclusions regarding the new European strategy. Thus, the Global Gateway offers Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries a new model of cooperation focused on long-term economic and social progress without sacrificing sovereignty. On the other hand, challenges remain significant, and the success of the Global Gateway depends on how they are overcome. The implementation of Global Gateway projects largely depends on the creation of effective coordination mechanisms between EU institutions and the authorities of Kazakhstan. |
| Keywords: | Global Gateway, sustainable development, cooperation, BRI, geoeconomic strategy |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:opodis:320422 |
| By: | Minot, Nicholas; Vos, Rob; Kim, Soonho; Park, Beyeong; Zaki, Sediqa; Mamboundou, Pierre |
| Abstract: | Recent spikes in staple food prices resulting from the invasion of Ukraine have once again highlighted the difficulty faced by low-income countries that rely on imports for a substantial portion of their food supply. To better understand which countries are most affected by higher world food prices, we propose a food import vulnerability index (FIVI). One version of the index describes the vulnerability of each country to higher world prices for each of 15 major staple foods. Another version of the FIVI is a national index, aggregating across the 15 commodities. Both are based on three components, the caloric contribution of the commodity(ies) in the national diet, the dependence on imports, and the level of moderate and severe food insecurity in the country. The values of the FIVI are calculated for 2020, the most recent year for which data are available. The results indicate that countries are most adversely affected by increases in the world price of wheat, rice, and maize, followed by sugar, and vegetable oil. This is because the five commodities listed are both major contributors to the diet in many countries and because countries often depend on imports for a large share of the domestic requirements of these foods. Yemen, Djibouti, and Afghanistan are most vulnerable to increases in world wheat prices, while Liberia, Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau are particularly vulnerable to spikes in rice prices. In the case of maize, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Eswatini have the highest vulnerability score. These results should help policymakers and development partners target their efforts to reduce food import vulnerability through policies and programs to strengthen resilience. |
| Keywords: | staple foods; food prices; Ukraine; less favoured areas; vulnerability; food security; imports; price volatility |
| Date: | 2024–03–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gsspwp:140444 |
| By: | Martin, Will; Vos, Rob |
| Abstract: | Progress toward reducing global hunger has stalled since the mid-2010s. In fact, hunger is on the rise again, driven by slowing economic growth and protracted conflict, intensified by the impacts of climate change and economic shocks in many low- and middle-income countries. In addition, food systems worldwide have suffered disruptions in recent years, caused by the COVID-19-related global recession and associated supply chain disruptions, and exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. These factors have also jeopardized efforts at addressing the challenges to food system sustainability. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the related sustainable development goals (SDGs), defined in 2015, recognize these challenges and set ambitious targets to end hunger and all forms of malnutrition and to make agriculture and food systems sustainable by 2030. Many other fora have restated and reiterated these ambitions, including the 2021 United Nations Food System Summit (UNFSS). While governments around the world have subscribed to these ambitions, collectively they have not been very specific as to how to achieve the SDGs and related goals and targets, except for three means of implementation (MOI) involving (i) increases in research and development, (ii) reductions in trade distortions, and (iii) improved functioning and reduced volatility in food markets. This paper is part of a wider effort at assessing the international community’s follow-through on the above ambitions and the related (implicit or explicit) commitments made toward action for achieving them. While not presenting new research findings, we bring together available evidence and scenario analyses to assess the progress made toward the ambitions for transforming food systems, the actions taken in regard of the internationally concerted agenda, and the potential for accelerating progress. The number of hungry people in the world has risen from 564 million in 2015, when the SDGs were agreed, to 735 million in 2022. While declines to between 570 and 590 million by 2030 are projected, this is far above the 470 million projected in the absence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war. The share of the world’s people unable to afford healthy diets is projected to decline from 42 percent in 2021 to a still far too high 36 percent by 2030. On the means of implementation, levels of spending on agricultural research and development have increased, particularly in key developing countries such as Brazil, China and India. However, rates of investment remain too low for comfort, particularly in low-income countries. Also, little progress has been made in reducing agricultural trade distortions and many countries continue to use trade policy measures, such as export restrictions, which have proven to increase the volatility of both world and domestic food prices. We conclude that progress toward the SDG-2 targets has been dismal, and that the food system challenges have only become bigger. But we also find that it is not too late to accelerate progress and that the desired food system transformation can still be achieved over a reasonable timespan and at manageable incremental cost. Doing so will require unprecedented concerted and coherent action on multiple fronts, which may prove the biggest obstacle of all. |
| Keywords: | food security; food systems; hunger; nutrition; diet; sustainable development goals |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gsspwp:138940 |
| By: | Lehmici Hicheme (Swiss UMEF University of Applied Sciences) |
| Abstract: | This article examines the erosion of European sovereignty due to growing U.S. influence, particularly in military, economic, and strategic spheres. It traces American involvement in shaping the European project from its inception, focusing on NATO's role as a tool for U.S. power projection and the weakening of European defense autonomy through military dependence on American technology. The article also explores how sanctions on Russia, the energy crisis, and Europe's alignment with U.S. policies limit its strategic autonomy in the context of rising global powers like the BRICS. The analysis is supported by historical and contemporary data, highlighting the challenges Europe faces in regaining sovereignty in an increasingly multipolar world. |
| Keywords: | European sovereignty, American domination, Transatlantic relations, Hegemony, Strategic autonomy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics of sovereignty, Decline of Europe, Multipolar world order, Economy |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05074136 |
| By: | Hinnerk Gnutzmann (Leibniz Universität Hannover); Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan (Leibniz Universität Hannover & CESifo); Tobias Korn (Leibniz Universität Hannover & Heidelberg University) |
| Abstract: | Abstract Empirical models of trade agreements implicitly assume that withdrawal from a trade agreement has an equal and opposite trade effect as accession, i.e., symmetry. With increasing opposition to international economic cooperation, it becomes urgent to test this assumption. We analyze a quasi- natural experiment to explicitly test the symmetry assumption in the context of FTA termination using the gravity model. In 2004, Estonia joined the European Union, which mandated that it withdraws from its FTA with Ukraine. Carefully controlling for possible confounding effects of EU enlargement using a variety of methods, we isolate the FTA withdrawal effect and find strong support in favour of symmetry. Moreover, while import tariffs are part of the impact, the bulk of the effect comes from non-tariff effects of an FTA. General equilibrium estimates suggest that the FTA withdrawal led to a noticeable loss in members’ welfare. |
| Keywords: | Free trade agreement, withdrawal, gravity, welfare analysis, European Union, Estonia, Ukraine |
| JEL: | F13 F14 J13 F15 F17 |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ost:wpaper:407 |
| By: | Montassar Riahi (CEREGE [Poitiers] - Centre de recherche en gestion - UP - Université de Poitiers = University of Poitiers, UMA - Université de la Manouba [Tunisie]); Sophie Nivoix (CEREGE [Poitiers] - Centre de recherche en gestion - UP - Université de Poitiers = University of Poitiers); Olfa Belhassine (UMA - Université de la Manouba [Tunisie]) |
| Abstract: | Financial crises and their contagion are a major area of financial market research. Our study makes a twofold contribution. Not only does it analyze the interdependence between markets in countries that are source of contagion and those suffering from it, but it innovates by focusing on three recent crises, namely the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), the Covid-19 and the Russian-Ukrainian War. To this end we use the wavelet coherence method on a sample of G7 country indices plus the Chinese Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Russian Moscow Exchange indices. The results indicate the presence of contagion from the US market to other financial markets, and significant comovements between stock market indices during the GFC. As regard the Covid-19 crisis, we find that contagion effects are less noticeable, making us unable to identify leader and follower markets. During the Russian-Ukrainian War, the Russian market shows a lower degree of interdependence with other financial markets, and that there is no real contagion from this market to the G7 or Chinese markets. |
| Keywords: | Contagion Effects, Wavelet coherence analysis, Financial markets, Crisis, Effets de contagion, Cohérence en ondelettes, Marchés financiers, Crises |
| Date: | 2025–03–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05050180 |
| By: | von Ondarza, Nicolai |
| Abstract: | Europe must take more responsibility for its defence, if necessary without the United States, given Washington's volatility. In March 2025, the European Union (EU) launched a series of initiatives to strengthen defence industry and defence policy cooperation. With these new instruments also come the outlines of a new partnership strategy. Previous Brussels formats for defence industrial cooperation were only open to members of the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). The Security Action For Europe (SAFE) Regulation - adopted by the EU in May 2025 - on the other hand, provides for a level of integration of Ukraine in this sector that comes close to that of an EU member. With the United Kingdom, the EU has created new opportunities for participation for the first time since Brexit via a security partnership agreement. The EU also wants to offer countries such as Canada, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Australia and even India points of contact via partnership agreements. In order for this strategy to be successful, the EU needs to make itself a more attractive partner. |
| Keywords: | European Union, defence industry, security and defence policy, security partnerships, security partnership agreements, alliance strategy, partnership and alliance strategy, armaments policy, White Paper "Readiness 2030", Security Action For Europe, SAFE |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:320462 |
| By: | Zakirov, Bekzod; Useinov, Akhtem |
| Abstract: | In mainstream economics, there is an assumption that individuals are rational actors whose decision-making is based on incentives, regulations and available information. When such an assumption is translated into designing public policies, authorities designing policies consider individual citizens as rational decision-makers. However, human choices are commonly influenced by various biases, emotional responses and social influences. The biases in human decision-making processes make traditional policy tools like tax incentives, mandatory requirements, and public awareness campaigns ineffective. This paper reviews and argues that behavioral insights can strengthen traditional policy instruments by better aligning interventions and human behavior. The countries in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, can achieve better policy outcomes through evidence-based, behaviorally informed design, complementing assumption-driven approaches. The paper explains the fundamentals of behavioral insights through worldwide examples and provides specific recommendations for implementing BI in policy development with implications for Uzbekistan. |
| Keywords: | behavioral insights; policy design; rationality; nudge; Central Asia; Uzbekistan |
| JEL: | A12 D81 H0 H3 O21 |
| Date: | 2025–06–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:125051 |
| By: | Hugo Morão |
| Abstract: | This paper tackles the urgent issue of how tensions in energy transportation impact oil markets and the global economy. The study introduces an energy transportation uncertainty index, developed from over 50 global newspapers, to monitor fluctuations in uncertainty associated with significant events such as the Tanker War, major US sanctions, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Nord Stream sabotage, the Colonial pipeline cyberattack, and various Gulf incidents. Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model, the analysis shows that these fluctuations in transportation uncertainty cause increases in real oil prices due to supply chain challenges. While oil production dips initially due to perceived risks, it quickly rebounds, though inventories are heavily used. These shocks also heighten geopolitical tensions and reduce global industrial output. |
| Keywords: | Supply chain disruptions, Energy transportation uncertainty, Geopolitical risks, Oil markets, Uncertainty shocks, SVAR. |
| JEL: | C32 D80 E32 F51 Q43 N70 L95 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ise:remwps:wp03842025 |