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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Petrov, Nikolaj V. |
| Abstract: | Russia is going to great lengths to ensure that the war in Ukraine is perceived by its citizens as a distant military operation that does not affect them directly. But the consequences of both the war and the forced integration of the occupied Ukrainian territories are large-scale, diverse and tangible throughout Russia. They include the growing number of human losses, criminalisation and legal nihilism. Moreover, the spread of gangster-like norms and practices from the occupied territories to Russia proper could eventually lead to the "Donbasisation" of Russia. |
| Keywords: | Russia, war in Ukraine, forced integration, human losses, criminalisation, legal nihilism, "Donbasisation", Crimea, Sevastopol |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:319687 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Over three years of Russia’s war in Ukraine have taken a staggering social, humanitarian, and economic toll. Despite efforts for a ceasefire, the evolution of the war remains subject to exceptionally high uncertainty. Nevertheless, the authorities’ commitment to reforms and fulfillment of all necessary Fund policies support completion of the review. First, despite some structural reform delays, the authorities have met all quantitative conditionality for this review and remain committed to the overall program objectives of restoring sustainability. Second, the program remains fully financed. Looking ahead, despite the authorities’ program implementation and the large-scale external support, the program has limited space to absorb any further shocks, including from a more prolonged and intense war, while achieving the restoration of external viability by the end of the program. |
| Date: | 2025–06–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2025/156 |
| By: | Charlotte Emlinger; Kevin Lefebvre |
| Abstract: | While exports from sanctioning countries to Russia declined significantly after February 2022, a third of sanctioned products and two thirds of strategic products have been fully compensated by non-sanctioning countries. However, this trade diversion comes at a cost: Between the first and second quarter of 2022, the price index of Russian imports jumped by 15.7%, breaking a long period of moderate growth. The overall increase in Russia’s import prices is not related to Russian imports switching to more expensive exporters. On the contrary, after 2022, Russia began importing from new origins that are cheaper, suggesting that these new suppliers were offering lower-quality products. The surge in Russian import prices is primarily attributed to suppliers who had been exporting to Russia prior to 2022. This increase is more pronounced for non-sanctioning origins (+22%) compared to other sources and is especially notable for strategic products (+122%). Part of this increase is explained by a rise in transport and insurance costs for Russian imports (3%). Companies supplying the Russian market have also increased their prices, net of freight costs (FOB – free on board) by an average of 9%. Finally, the circumvention of sanctions does not explain the observed overall increase in Russian import prices. This suggests that the rise in Russian import prices is mainly the result of exporters increasing their margins when exporting to Russia. |
| Keywords: | Sanctions;Diversion;Trade;Price;Russia |
| JEL: | F13 F14 F51 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepipb:2025-50 |
| By: | Inaki Veruete Villegas (Charles University, Institute of Economic Studies at Faculty of Social Sciences & The Environment Center, Czech Republic & BETA, CNRS, University of Strasbourg); Milan Scasny (Charles University, Institute of Economic Studies at Faculty of Social Sciences and The Environment Center, Czech Republic.) |
| Abstract: | The current geopolitical landscape, exemplified by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has heightened concerns about energy security. This study delves into the nexus of energy security and natural gas utilization in the Czech Republic, offering a thorough analysis amid these turbulent times. Despite the fact that the environment/energy-extended input-output models have been significantly improved, they still fail to fully capture a sector’s role in an economic system characterized as a network of sectors as they primarily analyze sectors as both ends of the supply chain, ignoring a significant role of transmission sectors. We overcome this gap by applying a multidimensional approach to scrutinize the energy supply chain in order to assess the repercussions of heightened natural gas prices post-Russian invasion. Specifically, we combine domestic energy input-output demand and price models to assess the economic impacts under constrained alternative energy scenarios, particularly relevant given the challenges of replacing Russian gas. Additionally, leveraging network analysis techniques —node and edge betweenness centrality—and the hypothetical extraction method are used to identify critically important structural elements within the country’s natural gas consumption chain. While the former pinpoints vital transmission sectors based on gas flow, the latter gauges sectoral significance by simulating complete disconnections, without being influenced by the number of times the sector appears in the supply chain path. Last, we develop a complete map of the embodied energy flows. Structural Path Analysis traces intermediate product flows, enabling the quantification of embodied energy across the supply chain and its representation as a tree-like structure. Our findings reveal significant implications of natural gas price fluctuations on key manufacturing industries, notably those engaged in international trade which are vulnerable to energy supply and price disruptions. We emphasize the critical role of sectors providing essential household goods and services, like energy, food, and transportation. Strategic interventions may be necessary to safeguard domestic demand and the competitive edge of vital sectors like automotive. As energy security remains a dynamic and evolving challenge, our research contributes significantly to the ongoing discourse on energy resilience, particularly for countries dependent on energy imports. Despite the fact our study is applied to the energy field, this framework is useful to analyze the footprint of any inputs, including usage of critical materials, environmental inputs, or emissions, which face similar complexities. |
| Keywords: | Energy-Extended Input-Output Aanalysis; Energy Supply Chain; Natural Gas Footprint; Embodied Energy; Betwenness Centrality; Hypothetical Extraction; Structural Path Analysis; Input-Output Price Model |
| JEL: | C67 Q43 H56 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2024_18 |
| By: | Alexandr Burilkov; Katelyn Bushnell; Juan Majino-Lopez; Thomas Morgan; Guntram Wolff |
| Abstract: | This report updates and expands the data-driven work of our initial study from September 2024, which concluded that Europe would only be fit for war in several decades. We show that the situation today is even more concerning if Europe aims to be fit for war by 2030. First, Russia continues to outproduce four European countries across multiple weapon systems. We demonstrate that production must increase by a factor of around five to tilt the balance decisively in Europe’s favour. Procurement needs to accelerate and be frontloaded, as delivery delays of threeyears or more persist. Second, transatlantic tensions are weakening the strength of the U.S. security guarantee. Europe depends heavily on the U.S. not only for readily deployable troops but also for strategic enablers. While overall U.S. weapon imports are not excessive, reliance on American systems in critical modern capabilities remains a concern. Third, military strategy and technology are evolving rapidly. Military planners must modernise weapons and strategy while simultaneously scaling existing and effective systems—a major challenge for often slow and bureaucratic procurement structures. Investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market; a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU’s planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable. |
| Keywords: | Defence, Armament, Weapon industry, Budget, Germany, Europe, Russia |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/392194 |
| By: | Bardt, Hubertus; Busch, Berthold |
| Abstract: | Die veränderte und verschärfte Sicherheitslage der letzten Jahre trifft vor allem Europa. Nach den Kriegen gegen Georgien und die Ukraine muss daher die Verteidigung der Europäischen Union (EU) und der Ostflanke der NATO an die neuen Gefahren angepasst werden. Deutliche Anstiege der Verteidigungsausgaben erfolgten erst nach dem vollumfänglichen russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine. Im Zeitraum 2022 bis 2024 ist der Anteil der gesamteuropäischen Verteidigungsausgaben am Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) um rund ein Viertel angestiegen. 2024 konnte damit das NATO-Ziel von 2 Prozent des BIP erstmals für Gesamteuropa erreicht werden. Verglichen mit den USA verfügt Europa über eine ähnlich große Anzahl von Soldaten, aber ein systematisch viel kleineres Budget. Die USA gaben in den letzten Jahren fast drei Mal so viel für die Verteidigung aus wie die EU-Länder. Zuletzt ist der Faktor nur noch auf das 2, 3-Fache gefallen. Verstärkend kommt zu der schlechteren finanziellen Aufstellung hinzu, dass die europäischen Ausgaben tendenziell weniger effizient eingesetzt werden. So findet militärische Beschaffung bisher im Wesentlichen national statt. Dies führt zu zusätzlicher Komplexität aufgrund der deutlich erhöhten Vielfalt von eingesetzten Systemen (Centrone/Fernandes, 2024), aber auch zu höheren Kosten. Skaleneffekte bei Entwicklung und Produktion können nicht genutzt werden, bessere Marktkonditionen einer gemeinsamen Beschaffung werden nicht realisiert. Ein Binnenmarkt für militärische Güter existiert nicht, dabei wäre der effiziente Einsatz öffentlicher Mittel in diesem schnell wachsenden Bereich von hoher Bedeutung. (...) Genauso wichtig wie eine Ausweitung der Finanzierung sind Fortschritte im Binnenmarkt für Verteidigung, der sowohl auf der Angebots- als auch auf der Nachfrageseite stark fragmentiert ist. Wichtig dabei ist eine vermehrte gemeinsame Beschaffung mehrerer Mitgliedstaaten mit einer Gemeinschaftspräferenz. Nur mit europaweiten Ausschreibungen ohne nationale Präferenz können die Chancen des Wettbewerbs im Binnenmarkt genutzt werden. Für die öffentliche Hand wäre mit niedrigeren Preisen und intensiverem Kosten- und Innovationswettbewerb zu rechnen. Die Unternehmen hätten perspektivisch Chancen auf größeren Märkten und könnten sich durch innovative Angebote behaupten und damit auch die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit stärken. Dies würde mutmaßlich zu einer gewissen Konsolidierung führen und damit Kostenvorteilen durch höhere Stückzahlen führen. Neben der Finanzierung und der Organisation einer gemeinsamen oder koordinierten Beschaffung von Verteidigungsgütern kann die EU bestimmte Funktionen übernehmen, die auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene nicht erreicht werden können. Das Papier diskutiert abschließend fünf mögliche Arbeitsschwerpunkte auf europäischer Ebene: Forschung und Entwicklung, Cyber-Abwehr und KI, Luftverteidigung, Logistik und medizinische Versorgung, Nachrichten und Satelliten. |
| Abstract: | The changed and intensified security situation of recent years has particularly affected Europe. After the wars against Georgia and Ukraine, the defence of the European Union (EU) and NATO's eastern flank must therefore be adapted to the new threats. Significant increases in defence spending only occurred after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the period 2022 to 2024, the share of pan-European defence spending in gross domestic product (GDP) rose by around a quarter. In 2024, the NATO target of 2 percent of GDP for Europe as a whole was thus achieved for the first time. Compared to the US, Europe has a similar number of soldiers, but a systematically much smaller budget. In recent years, the US has spent almost three times as much on defence as the EU countries. Most recently, the factor has only fallen to 2.3 times. To make matters worse, the poor financial situation is compounded by the fact that European spending tends to be less efficient. So far, military procurement has essentially taken place nationally. This leads to additional complexity due to the significantly increased variety of systems used (Centrone/Fernandes, 2024), but also to higher costs. Economies of scale in development and production cannot be utilised, and the better market conditions of joint procurement are not realised. There is no single market for military goods, although the efficient use of public funds in this rapidly growing area would be of great importance. (...) Just as important as expanding financing is making progress in the single market for defence, which is highly fragmented on both the supply and demand sides. It is important to increase joint procurement by several member states with a European preference. Only with Europe-wide tenders without national preference can the opportunities offered by competition in the single market be exploited. The public sector would benefit from lower prices and more intensive competition on costs and innovation. In the long term, companies would have opportunities in larger markets and could assert themselves by offering innovative solutions, thereby also strengthening their international competitiveness. This would presumably lead to a certain degree of consolidation and thus to cost advantages through higher unit volumes. In addition to financing and organising joint or coordinated procurement of defence equipment, the EU can take on certain functions that cannot be achieved at the national level. The paper concludes by discussing five possible areas of work at the European level: research and development, cyber defence and AI, air defence, logistics and medical care, intelligence and satellites. |
| Keywords: | Branchen und Unternehmen, Europäische Union, Industrie, Unternehmen und Märkte, Companies and Markets |
| JEL: | F30 F50 H56 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkpps:319643 |
| By: | Park, Byungyul (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) |
| Abstract: | Escalating tensions between the United States and China and the prolonged conflict between Russia and Ukraine in Eastern Europe have pushed supply chain stability to the top of the agenda for South Korean automakers. In August 2022, during the administration of former US President Joe Biden, the US Congress passed two landmark pieces of legislation: the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). These laws were designed to contain China’s expanding influence by reorganizing critical supply chains in semiconductors, batteries, and electric vehicles (EVs) around the US. The IRA offers consumers large federal tax credits on purchases of EVs, but only for vehicles assembled in North America. Moreover, it excludes batteries, parts, and materials produced in so-called “foreign entities of concern, ” principally China, from eligibility for subsidies. This has necessitated a significant realignment of the EV and auto parts supply chains. After the IRA became law, many cars made by automakers instantly became ineligible for subsidies, squeezing Korean EVs’ share of the American market. To mitigate this, Hyundai Motor expedited the construction of its EV plant in the US to ensure that its EVs would qualify for tax benefits. China responded to US sanctions with export controls on key materials critical in the automotive industry. In August 2023, it restricted the export of gallium and germanium, which are important materials used in the manufacture of semiconductors, and in October 2023, Beijing extended these restrictions to include graphite, a core component of lithium-ion batteries. These retaliatory measures have had both direct and indirect consequences on Korea’s automotive supply chains. As the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China heats up, the supply chains around these two superpowers are likely to ossify into two distinct blocs. This exposes Korean automakers to significant risk, given their dependence on China for auto parts and reliance on the US as a destination market for their exports. In this paper, we propose a diversification strategy for Korean automakers that leverages the country’s strong relationship with India in the automotive sector. We argue that such a strategy is required to safeguard the country’s automotive industry, a key strategic sector. |
| Keywords: | supply chains; batteries; electric vehicles; EVs; subsidies; battery industry; manufacturing; India; automotive; Hyundai; Kia; South Korea; Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade; KIET |
| JEL: | F10 L62 L65 |
| Date: | 2025–04–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieter:2025_014 |
| By: | Matthew Collin (EU Tax Observatory, Paris School of Economics, NMBU); Florian M. Hollenbach (Copenhagen Business School); David Szakonyi (George Washington University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of beneficial ownership transparency in the British real estate market. In an effort to reduce illicit investment following the invasion of Ukraine, the UK government announced a new law in 2022 requiring offshore companies that owned domestic real estate to identify their ultimate owners in a public register. Using a difference-in-difference framework, we find that new property purchases by companies registered in tax havens fell relative to those made via non-havens, a result consistent with transparency raising the costs of illicit investment. These declines persist even after dropping tax havens favored by Russians, suggesting that the reform drove the decline, rather than sanctions. We do not find strong evidence of price effects nor substitution into ownership through suspicious domestic companies. While the policy does appear to have been effective at deterring some anonymous investment into the British property market, incomplete implementation led some clients to still successfully shield their ownership information, implying scope for better design and enforcement in the future. |
| Keywords: | Illicit financial flows, tax havens, real estate, transparency, hidden wealth |
| JEL: | D73 F21 K42 R30 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbp:wpaper:028 |
| By: | Mamun, Abdullah; Laborde Debucquet, David |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the drivers of export restrictions on agricultural products based on an original dataset developed at IFPRI. We focus on four food price crises when export restrictions (e.g., ban, tax, licensing etc.) were applied: the 2008 and 2010 food price crises, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 2022 crisis associated with the Russia-Ukraine war. Although the justifications for such trade policies have been discussed in the literature, the ability to forecast their implementation remains understudied. The probit model used in this study suggests that the inflation rate has a higher power to predict export restrictions than do international commodity prices. The probability of export restrictions increases more when price change is measured from a reference level in the long interval than the short interval. Among the covariates, agricultural land per capita, commodity share in production and export, weather condition increases the chances of imposing export restrictions. Per capita income, population density, share of agriculture in GDP, urbanization rate, political economy indicators - all have a negative influence on this likelihood. |
| Keywords: | agricultural products; commodities; COVID-19; export controls; international trade; war; trade liberalization; exports |
| Date: | 2024–03–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gsspwp:140687 |
| By: | Sulaimanova, Burulcha (OSCE Academy, Bishkek); Azhgaliyeva, Dina (Asian Development Bank); Holzhacker, Hans (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Institute); Overland, Indra (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates factors influencing household cooling choices in Central Asia, focusing on air-conditioning and fans/sunscreen films. Using data from the 2023 “Household Access to Energy in the Fergana Valley” survey in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the analysis employs a multinomial probit model to examine socioeconomic, environmental, and power supply factors. Across the three countries, it finds that 48% of households use fans or sunscreen films (without air-conditioning), 30% use no cooling, and 22% use air-conditioning, noting significant variations between countries. Cooling degree days (CDD) significantly impact cooling appliance adoption, with higher CDD regions more likely to use cooling solutions. Power outages negatively affect air-conditioning adoption but not fans/sunscreen films, highlighting the importance of power stability. Robustness checks confirm that power supply reliability is crucial for cooling choices. The findings suggest policy implications, including the potential of solar panels to meet summer energy demands. This research underscores the need to address power sector reliability and climate adaptation in vulnerable regions. |
| Keywords: | heat waves; environmental extremes; infrastructural adaptations; power outages; cooling technologies; Central Asia |
| JEL: | Q41 Q54 R21 |
| Date: | 2025–06–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbewp:0787 |
| By: | Giulia Aliprandi (EU Tax Observatory); Kane Borders (EU Tax Observatory) |
| Abstract: | Multinational enterprises have risen to become dominant forces in the global economy, accompanied by a troubling trend of aggressive tax avoidance. In 2022 alone, an estimated $1 trillion in profits was shifted to tax havens by multinationals, amounting to 35% of all profits booked outside their headquarters countries (Alstadsæter et al., 2023). Despite tax avoidance being a major public concern, the specific practices employed by individual companies have remained largely opaque to the public due to a lack of transparency and public disclosure obligations. Comprehensive transparency measures promote informed policymaking, accountability, public trust, and sustainable development globally. This report examines the current landscape of corporate tax transparency and evaluates how emerging transparency measures could shape future developments in this critical area. We focus on corporate tax transparency measures via Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR), where multinationals disclose detailed financial and tax-related information for each country of operation. We collected the publicly available CbCR reports and compiled them into a single database: the Public CbCR Database. This new data source highlights that large multinationals, particularly from Western Europe, are leading the way as primary publishers of such reports. Overall, the large multinationals publishing public CbCR account for less than 2% of large companies, and less than 5% of global revenues and global profits. Despite the small numbers, our research reveals an upward trend in voluntary CbCR disclosures, signalling increasing tax transparency practices. However, significant gaps remain, as U.S. multinationals and firms from major economies like China and Russia have only a few CbCR disclosures available. The European Union (EU) made an important step in furthering corporate tax transparency by adopting a mandatory CbCR directive that started applying this year in many EU countries. Our simulations reveal the impact this directive will have. Nearly one-third of large U.S. MNEs will be compelled to publish more disaggregated financial information than ever before publicly available. The increased disclosure from these U.S. corporate giants, who have historically been opaque, could be a breakthrough in tax transparency. However, the directive has serious limitations, as the requirements for geographical disaggregations are largely insufficient to truly evaluate the activity of multinationals. Broader adoption and enhancement of corporate tax transparency initiatives are crucial, we suggest several ways to improve the directive going forward. |
| Keywords: | Tax transparency, country-by-country reporting, profit shifting |
| JEL: | H26 F23 M48 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbp:report:005 |
| By: | Aydın, Yaşar |
| Abstract: | Die geopolitisch motivierte Industrie- und Lieferkettenpolitik der Türkei impliziert die enge Anbindung an Deutschland sowie die sicherheits- und wirtschaftspolitische Ausrichtung an der EU. Ankara will Produktion und Vertrieb an EU-Standards anpassen und eine grüne Hightech- und Dienstleistungswirtschaft etablieren. Doch die Dekarbonisierungsmaßnahmen sind nach wie vor unzureichend. In Störungen globaler Lieferketten sehen türkische Akteure Chancen für eine Verlagerung europäischer Produktionsketten in die Türkei (Nearshoring). Regierung, Privatsektor und Wirtschaftsverbände arbeiten am Ausbau nachhaltiger Energieversorgung. Die autoritäre Innenpolitik der Türkei mit Demokratieabbau, Rechtsstaatsdefiziten und Repression erschwert die Vertiefung bilateraler Kooperation erheblich. Trotz enger wirtschaftlicher Verflechtungen bestehen normative Differenzen zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei. Es gibt keine konsistente Strategie, um sie zu überwinden. Stattdessen setzt die türkische Regierung auf industriepolitische Kompensation. Im geopolitischen Spannungsfeld zwischen USA und China vollführt die Türkei einen Balanceakt: Sie wahrt ihre Westbindung, baut aber zugleich die Technologiepartnerschaft mit China und die Energiekooperation mit Russland aus. Ein strategisches Umdenken in der deutschen Türkeipolitik tut not. Sie sollte anstreben, wirtschaftliche Stabilität zu fördern, die sicherheitspolitische Einbindung der Türkei im europäischen Raum zu stärken und Ankaras strategischer Annäherung an Moskau oder Peking entgegenzuwirken. Künftige Kooperationen sollten dabei klar an Bedingungen wie Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechte geknüpft werden. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:320416 |
| By: | NEIFAR, MALIKA; Gharbi, Leila |
| Abstract: | Purpose The scope of this paper is to investigate if the information and communications technology (ICT) can improve the FinTech firm performance in the BRICS countries from monthly macro time series data during 2014M01-2022M12. Design/methodology/approach Through the Bayesian VAR-X approach and the time series DYNARDL simulation models, we investigate the impact of the ICT and its components on the firm performance for both the short-run (SR) and the long-run (LR) historical and predictive trend. Besides these regression models, this study applies the Granger Causality (GC) in quantile and the frequency domain (FD) GC tests to show more details about the causality linkage. Findings From the BVAR-X approach, historical IRFs conclude that the ICT has positive effect on PI for all countries in the SR and a positive effect in the LR only for China. From the DYNARDL simulation models, predictive IRFs results corroborate with the historical IRFs results except for the China and SA in the SR and for Brazil and India in the LR. We conclude in addition that the predictive positive relationships is driven by MCS for Brazil, IUI for China, FBS for SA, and all of the ICT components for the India case. GC type test results are in accordance with previous results. Originality The novelty of this research is based on the idea of studying the effect of the ICT on FinTech firm performance by using several time series data based dynamic technics so that we can estimate and predict the SR adjustments that arise from the impact of ICT to the LR relationship with the firm profitability. |
| Keywords: | FinTech Firm from BRICS area; Bayesian VAR-X model; DYNARDL simulation model; Historical and predictive IRFs for SR and LR effects; Granger Causality test in quantile (QGC); Frequency domain Granger causality (FDC) test |
| JEL: | C01 C11 C22 C53 D22 |
| Date: | 2025–02–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:123778 |
| By: | Assefa, Thomas; Berhane, Guush; Abate, Gashaw T.; Abay, Kibrom A. |
| Abstract: | We revisit the state of smallholder fertilizer demand and profitability in Ethiopia in the face of the recent global fuel–food–fertilizer price crisis triggered by the Russian–Ukraine war and compounded by other domestic supply shocks. We first examine farmers’ response to changes in both fertilizer and food prices by estimating price elasticity of demand. We then revisit the profitability of fertilizer by computing average value–cost ratios (AVCRs) associated with fertilizer application before and after these crises. We use three-round detailed longitudinal household survey data, covering both pre-crisis (2016 and 2019) and post-crisis (2023) production periods, focusing on three main staple crops in Ethiopia (maize, teff, and wheat). Our analysis shows that fertilizer adoption, use, and yield levels were increasing until the recent crises, but these trends seem halted by these crises. We also find relatively large fertilizer price elasticity of demand estimates, ranging between 0.4 and 1.1, which vary across crops and are substantially larger than previous estimates. We find suggestive evidence that households with smaller farm sizes are relatively more responsive to changes in fertilizer prices. We also document that farmers’ response to increases in staple crop prices is not as strong as perceived and hence appears to be statistically insignificant. Finally, we show important dynamics in the profitability of chemical fertilizer. While the AVCRs show profitable trends for most crops, the share of farmers with profitable AVCRs declined following the fertilizer price surge. Our findings offer important insights for policy focusing on mitigating the adverse effects of fertilizer price shocks. |
| Keywords: | fertilizer application; smallholders; household surveys; yield response factor; shock; Ethiopia; Africa; Eastern Africa |
| Date: | 2024–07–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gsspwp:148984 |
| By: | Gianluigi Conzo; Pierluigi Conzo |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the unintended effects of a sudden media shift from pandemic health-crisis coverage to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Using a dynamic Difference-in-Differences, we first examine how increased media focus on the war impacted contagion across Italian municipalities, with proximity to U.S. military bases serving as our treatment and proxy for heightened fear. Our findings reveal a temporary spike in infections, particularly in areas closer to bases, driven by increased mobility and a rise in "bunker" Google searches. Secondly, we show that politicians, especially from right-wing parties, gained electoral advantages in subsequent unexpected elections by leveraging war-related fears at the onset of the conflict. Voters in districts near bases responded more to the emotional tone of war-related messaging than its volume, underscoring fear’s influence on political outcomes. In contrast, left-wing parties benefited from the war’s media prominence, as their supporters responded more to issue salience than to emotional tone. |
| Keywords: | Media attention, Issue salience, Health outcomes, Electoral outcomes, Political communication, COVID-19, Russo-Ukrainian War, Fear of war. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:743 |