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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Alexander Knobel (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Maria Baeva (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | Since its accession to the WTO in August 2012, Russia has participated participates in 125 WTO trade disputes: 8 as a complainant, 11 as a respondent, 106 as a third party. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been in crisis for several years, primarily due to the suspension of the Appellate Body (AB) due to the U. S. bloking the appointment of new members. Despite this, countries continue to file complaints with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), recognizing the need for reforms to the dispute settlement system. Various ideas have been put forward. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, WTO, trade disputes |
| JEL: | F10 F13 F19 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1407 |
| By: | Natalia Shagaida (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Dmitry Ternovsky (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | Considering the main components of food security (availability and resilience of production; economic and physical access to food; food security), the situation in Russia on the eve of 2024 was not alarming. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, agricultural production, food security |
| JEL: | I18 I19 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1414 |
| By: | Igor Arlashkin (RANEPA); Barbashova Natalia (RANEPA); Ilya Sokolov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Tatiana Tischenko (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | According to the results of the enlarged government budget (EGB) in 2024 relative to 2023, there is an increase in revenues both in nominal (by Rb 11.9 trillion) and in shares of GDP —by 2.0 p. p. GDP and by 10.7% in 2023 prices (Table 5). As a share of GDP, aggregate revenues returned to the level of 2020–2021, which preceded the start of SMO. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, intergovernmental relations, fiscal policy, budget system, revenues, expenditures, Bank of Russia |
| JEL: | E62 H5 H61 H62 H68 H7 H72 H77 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1405 |
| By: | Vera Barinova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Margarita Gvozdeva (RANEPA); Stepan Zemtsov (RANEPA); Poilov N (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The sanctions and trade restrictions imposed on Russia limit access to sales markets and high technologies, lead to disruptions in value chains and complicate access to capital.2 The Russian business sector’s adaptive capacities play a significant role in overcoming various kinds of shocks and crises in the Russian economy.3 In particular, technological entrepreneurship makes it feasible to push back the boundaries of the economy’s production capacities through implementation of scientific and technological solutions in products which are in demand on the market. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, small businesses, medium-sized enterprises, sanctions |
| JEL: | C53 E37 I18 I19 L21 L52 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1412 |
| By: | Georgy Malginov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Alexander Radygin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Regular publication of the System of Indicators for Assessing the Efficiency of State Property Management approved by the RF Government Decree No. 72 dated 29.01.2015 has been performed since 2016. It contained data on the number of economic entities belonging to state property differentiated by main organizational and legal forms (business companies, unitary enterprises as well as institutions). Further, based on the RF Government Decree No. 1951 dated 22.11.2023, Rosstat stopped publishing relevant data from 2024.2 The federal privatization program remains their main source, which after the changes introduced in 2021 in the Rules for development of forecast plans (programs) of privatization is annually revised due to regular shifting of time limits. This program contains data on the number of federal state unitary enterprises (FGUPs) and business entities involving a capital ofthe Russian Federation, whereas previously the System of Indicators for Assessing the Efficiency of State Property Management also included data on the number of federal state unitary enterprises (FSUEs) and federal treasure agencies (FTAs), as well as JSCs where Russia used a special right to participate in management (“golden share†). |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, public sector, privatization |
| JEL: | H82 K11 L32 L33 L38 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1415 |
| By: | Pavel Trunin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Alexandra Bozheckkova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2024, monetary policy of the Bank of Russia was performed amid rapid increase in aggregate demand compared to the supply expansion opportunities, accompanied by a significant growth in consumer prices and inflation expectations. In such circumstances, the CBR pursued a tight monetary policy aimed at achieving price stability. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, monetary policy, money market, exchange rate, inflation, balance of payments, fiscal policy |
| JEL: | E31 E43 E44 E51 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1404 |
| By: | Irina Dezhina (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2024, active lawmaking activities were carried out in the science and technology (S&T) studies, a set of long-term documents was adopted, including the Strategy for Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation, and a list of priority areas and key knowledge-intensive technologies was approved. Changes were introduced in the system of S&T development governance, including the assignment of new functions to the Russian Academy of Sciences concerning expertise, information support of research and training of highly qualified personnel. In accordance with the new goals and objectives, the structure of budget financing of research and development was changed, and the emphasis on support for young scholars was strengthened. This took place against the background of issues caused by sanction restrictions and their consequences, such as “brain drain†and reduction of international cooperation with traditional academic partners. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, R&D, science, technology |
| JEL: | I2 I28 O3 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1411 |
| By: | Satoshi Mizobata (Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University; Ristumeikan University); Kazuho Yokogawa (Kanagawa University); Victor Gorshkov (University of Niigata Prefecture); Hiroaki Hayashi (Ristumeikan University); Vasiliy Anikin (HSE University) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the results of a survey on social capital in Russia, conducted from December 2023 to January 2024. It represents the second round of research, following an initial survey conducted in early 2022. The survey fs methodology for this round mirrors that of the first, with 1, 600 individuals from across Russia surveyed on their perceptions of social networks, levels of trust, civic engagement, and evaluations of government policies. Conducted nearly two years after the start of the military conflict with Ukraine and the imposition of economic sanctions by Western countries, this paper aims to assess how social capital has evolved during this turbulent period. The findings indicate that Russian social capital has remained relatively stable. Key characteristics include low generalized trust, high particularized trust, strong networks among family, relatives, and close friends, as well as mutual support within these networks. There is also notable trust in the President and the military. However, slight shifts are observable, such as efforts of some respondents to form new social ties and networks and emerging social division, particularly pronounced in generational differences in attitudes toward Russia fs government policies on Ukraine. |
| Keywords: | social capital, Russia, social network, social trust, civic engagement |
| JEL: | A13 A14 P52 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1118 |
| By: | Tatiana Klyachko (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The growing personnel shortages in the Russian economy, although not directly brought about by the activities of the vocational education system, are increasingly associated in the public opinion and some studies with the inefficient structure of training highly skilled workers and specialists at secondary vocational and higher education establishments. |
| Keywords: | Education system, general education, vocational education, distance learning, higher education |
| JEL: | I21 I22 I23 I24 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1420 |
| By: | Andrea Matranga; Timur Natkhov |
| Abstract: | This article examines the emergence of extractive institutions using the case of serfdom in early modern Russia. We argue that serfdom consolidated under the pressure of landhold ing military elites who gained political influence due to the prolonged struggle with steppe nomads. To contain nomadic raids, the Russian state erected defense lines on the southern frontier, and granted lands in the area to soldiers in charge of its defense. The soldiers could not farm while on defense duty, nor could they compete in the market for peasant labor, as the land had been selected for its defensive rather than agricultural value. The system was therefore only sustainable by restricting labor mobility. In response to the volume of landholders’ collective petitions, the Russian state gradually tied peasants to the land and institutionalized serfdom in the written law. Using newly digitized population data from the 17th century, we show a higher prevalence of serfs and military landholders in districts on the defense line. We also find a higher prevalence of small estates – up to 25 serf households sufficient to support a soldier and his family. Placebo tests show that these patterns do not hold for non-serf peasants, or for merchants and artisans. To ensure causality, we develop a novel algorithm that reconstructs the optimal invasion routes for nomads and pinpoints the optimal location of the defense line using topographic data. Our results highlight the primacy of political economy factors over purely economic ones, such as the land-labor ratio or the grain trade, in the development of serfdom. This sheds new light on the possible mechanisms of institutional divergence between Eastern and Western Europe in the early modern period. |
| Keywords: | serfdom, extractive institutions, factor markets, early modern Russia |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:735 |
| By: | Olga Izryadnova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The labor market in Russia in recent years evidences specific features of the demographic wave, changes in migration flows and growing demand for labor while business activity in the economy is recovering. The structure of labor supply and demand in the previous five years was significantly influenced, firstly, by the active development of providing goods and services in online formats, remote and platform employment, and secondly, by sanctions shocks resulting in the expansion and creation of new niches and jobs in industry, in transport and logistics and foreign trade facilities, and in the sphere of information and financial services. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, labor market, unemployment, employment |
| JEL: | J21 J23 J26 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1421 |
| By: | Nadezhda Volovik (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The last four years have been a major test for the global economy. Pandemic, geopolitical conflicts and extreme weather disrupted supply chains and triggered energy and food crises. However, in 2024, the global economy demonstrated stability, inflation was declining, and international trade was gradually recovering. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, terms of trade, regional pattern |
| JEL: | F10 F13 F19 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1408 |
| By: | Georgy Malginov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | 2024 marked the end of the active growth for the Russian real estate market and the transition to the phase of expected slowdown. The well-established mechanism of state support for mortgages, which stimulated demand, was subjected to a double squeeze: the government’s radical modification of preferential programs and the Bank of Russia’s continued increase in the key rate. However, the retention of the general favorable background in the economy (GDP growth of 4.1% and real disposable income of the population of 7.3%) led to the fact that the downward trend manifested itself rather moderately. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, residential property prices, housing market, housing construction |
| JEL: | H82 K11 L32 L33 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1416 |
| By: | Andrei Kaukin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Evgenia Miller (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2024, industrial production was growing, which was sustained primarily by the manufacturing sector (the reason, among other factors, could be import substitution, including don the back of the positive effect of production localization programs). The extractive sector demonstrated a downward trend for most of the year. The production and distribution of electricity, gas and water in 2024 also slightly decreased. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, production, external and internal demand, GDP structure |
| JEL: | G28 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1410 |
| By: | Alexander Ignatov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Marina Larionova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Irina Popova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Andrey Sakharov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Andrey Shelepov (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2024, the main trends in the system of international institutions are related to the consolidation of two multidirectional vectors of influence. On the one side, Russia and the leading developing countries — China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa—are playing an increasingly important role and stepping up cooperation to reform the system of international relations in the interests of the global majority states.On the other side, the United States and its partners are seeking to maintain supremacy and control over the processes and institutions of global and regional governance. The G7 countries are forming an ideological basis to change rules of international trade and climate governance and promote their norms and standards as the basis for the emerging international regulation of the digital economy and artificial intelligence (AI) governance. The participants’ conflicting interests make the transformation of the global governance architecture more painful and limit the effectiveness of institutions and their ability to cope with key challenges, such as growing inequality, debt vulnerability, climate change, energy poverty, food security and other. This section deals primarily with the outcomes of Russia’s work in the key informal multilateral institutions—the G20 and the BRICS—in terms of adaptation of the global economic governance system. Also, it analyzes the issues of reforming the IMF and multilateral development banks. Special attention is paid to cooperation within the UN system, the differences on the main provisions of the 2024 Pact for the Future and the decisions of the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Also discussed in this section are the main breakthroughs and challenges related with the harmonization of approaches of the members of the regional organizations: the SCO and the EAEU. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, international organizations, international institutional arrangements |
| JEL: | F5 F53 F55 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1419 |
| By: | Florencia Airaudo; Francois de Soyres; Keith Richards; Ana Maria Santacreu |
| Abstract: | Recent geopolitical tensions have revived interest in understanding the economic consequences of geopolitical fragmentation. Using bilateral trade flows, portfolio investment data, and detailed records of economic policy interventions, we revisit widely-used geopolitical distance metrics, specifically the Ideal Point Distance (IPD) derived from United Nations General Assembly voting. We document substantial variability in measured fragmentation, driven significantly by methodological choices related to sample periods and vote categories, especially in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Our results show robust evidence of increasing fragmentation in both trade flows and economic policy interventions among geopolitically distant country pairs, with particularly strong effects observed in strategically important sectors and policy motives. In contrast, financial portfolio allocations exhibit weaker, more heterogeneous, and context-sensitive responses. These findings highlight the critical importance of methodological transparency and careful specification when assessing geopolitical realignments and their implications for international economic relations. |
| Keywords: | Fragmentation; Geoeconomics; Trade; Financial Flows |
| JEL: | F14 F36 F50 F60 |
| Date: | 2025–05–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgif:1408 |
| By: | Alexander Abramov (RANEPA); Alexander Radygin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Maria Chernova (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | Between 2023 and 2024, global financial markets recovered from the 2022 downturn amid expectations of declining central bank interest rates, slowing inflation, and market actors’ confidence that major economies escaped recession. Completion oftheUS presidential election, removing uncertainties in expectations of the country’s future economic course, had an important stabilizing effect on financial markets in 2024. After the FRS top discount rate rose from 0.25% in March 2021to 5.0% in March 2023, causing a shock in the markets of almost all investment assets in the USA, it fell to 4.5% in December 2024. The ECB refinancing rate, after rising from 0% to 4.5% from June 2022 to October 2023, has fallen to 3.15% in December 2024 and 2.65% in March 2025. In 2024, China adopted a series of measures to ease monetary policy and support financial market, its economy maintained steady growth at 5%. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, stock market, bond market, corporate bond market, derivatives market, private investors |
| JEL: | G01 G12 G18 G21 G24 G28 G32 G33 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1406 |
| By: | Natalia Polezhaeva (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | Over the past three years the businesses bankruptcy regulation has not experienced any systemic changes. Russia’s bankruptcy legislation continues to retain its basically pro-creditor approach, which is not focused on saving business. However, interests of creditors are not sufficiently protected, as the level of satisfaction of creditors’ claims resulting from a company’s bankruptcy is 5–6% of the amount included in the register of claims. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, corporate governance, bankruptcy regulation |
| JEL: | I18 I19 M15 M16 O31 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1417 |
| By: | Olga Izryadnova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2023–2024, the Russian economy demonstrated a high potential of adaptation to restore growth in the domestic and external markets in the new formats of sanctions and infrastructure restrictions in the real and financial sectors. Positive GDP dynamics was recorded for seven quarters of the last two years. The acceleration of GDP growth in 2023 to 104.1% fully compensated for the previous year’s decline and was supported by a 9.8% increase in fixed capital investment, 3.8% in government spending and 7.5% in household final demand. Starting conditions in 2024 were characterized by a 5.7% growth in production in 2023 of basic economic activities, 4.3% in industrial production and 9.3% in construction relative to the corresponding period of the previous year. Under the pressure of political and economic restrictions, the initial state of the domestic market in 2024 was determined by the change in the contribution of net exports to GDP to 4.2% in 2023 vs. 12.6% of GDP in 2022 (according to the SNA methodology in current prices), with the volume of foreign trade in goods decreasing by 16.3% and against the growth by 9.2% a year earlier(according to the balance of payments methodology). The dynamics of the domestic economy growth in 2024 was influenced by the factors of active structural changes in the domestic and external markets. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, fixed investment, GDP, inflation |
| JEL: | E20 E21 E22 E60 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1409 |
| By: | Yuriy Ponomarev (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Ksenia Rostislav (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2024, despite the continuing pressure from the ongoing international sanction restrictions and new restrictive measures, the transportation industry demonstrated its ability to adapt, stabilize and build logistics supply chains, which is confirmed by the positive dynamics of cargo, freight and passenger traffic volumes. In the freight transportation industry, there is a trend towards the expansion of transportation and logistics services, which was facilitated by the development of transport and warehousing infrastructure. The growth of freight flows is facilitated by Russia’s inclusion in international trade and transport flows: according to preliminary estimates, in 2024, the volume of freight traffic along the Trans-Caspian international transport route (TCITR) increased significantly (by 63% to 4 mn tons). The development of passenger transport is facilitated by the growing demand for transportation services, in particular air services, as well as the growth of transportation efficiency due to an increase in flight hours and passenger seat occupancy. The sector managed to overcome the recession of the previous years and reduce the backlog of transportation workloads from pre-crisis levels. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, transportation industry, freight tariffs, passenger traffic, railways |
| JEL: | L91 L92 L93 L99 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1418 |
| By: | Olga Izryadnova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Starting conditions offinal consumption in 2024 were defined by favorable situation in the social sector due to the trend ofthe previous year, i. e. growth ofreal disposable households’ incomes by 6.1%, real wages by 8.2%, real size of awarded pensions by 3.3% and household expenditures by 7.5%. Higher government spending on final consumption played a key role in mitigating shocks ofthe inflationary wave, reducing tensions in the labor market and retaining social resilience of households. In 2024, growth in real disposable cash incomes accelerated to 7.3%, wages to 9.1% and had an incentive effect on increasing consumer and investment activity ofthe households. Household final consumption expenditures increased by 5.5% in 2024. Undoubtedly, the acceleration of dynamics of public consumption expenditures up to 104.5% vs. previous year had a positive impact on the social sector. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, households, income, poverty |
| JEL: | I30 I31 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2025-1413 |
| By: | Christophe Blot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Céline Antonin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Elliot Aurissergues (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Amel Falah (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Sabine Le Bayon (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Catherine Mathieu (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Ombeline Jullien de Pommerol (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christine Rifflart (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Benoît Williatte (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | La croissance mondiale en 2024 fut de nouveau marquée par le dynamisme de l'économie américaine. Inversement, malgré le recul des prix de l'énergie, la croissance est restée atone dans la zone euro, en particulier en Allemagne, même si d'autres pays comme l'Espagne ont maintenu une dynamique plus favorable. L'inflation a poursuivi sa baisse ce qui a conduit les banques centrales à mettre un terme au resserrement monétaire puis à baisser légèrement leurs taux directeurs. La perspective des hausses des droits de douane devrait freiner la désinflation et même accroître l'inflation aux États-Unis. Il en résulterait un ralentissement du commerce mondial tandis que les ménages verront leur pouvoir d'achat amputé par cette taxe supplémentaire sur les importations. La croissance mondiale sera donc freinée, d'autant plus que les pays sont dépendants du marché américain pour leurs exportations. Dans ces conditions, les banques centrales devront de nouveau arbitrer entre leur objectif de stabilité des prix et la croissance à court terme, la multiplication des annonces de hausses de droits de douane accroît fortement l'incertitude. La croissance mondiale sera plus faible en 2025 et 2026 mais résisterait grâce au soutien de la politique monétaire. Par ailleurs, le soutien budgétaire sera moindre qu'anticipé aux États-Unis du fait des coupes annoncées sur les dépenses publiques. En Europe, la poursuite de la guerre en Ukraine et des tensions avec la Russie conduiront à des hausses des dépenses militaires. L'orientation de la politique budgétaire sera moins restrictive et même expansionniste en Allemagne qui s'engage dans un plan de relance. |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05086984 |
| By: | Takeshima, Hiroyuki; Lambrecht, Isabel B.; Akramov, Kamiljon T.; Ergasheva, Tanzila |
| Abstract: | Climate change and increased frequency of abnormal weather are becoming growing threats to people’s livelihood, including in Central Asia. These threats are particularly challenging in Tajikistan, the poorest country in the Central Asia region. Despite the fact that migration is prevalent and remittances account for a significant share of GDP, evidence is scarce as to whether the decision to migrate is driven by weather shocks, whether migration is used as mitigating tool against adverse weather shocks, and how much of the loss in welfare is actually mitigated by such migration. This study aims to narrow this knowledge gap by providing evidence based on a unique panel dataset from one of the poorest and agriculturally dependent regions in Tajikistan (Khatlon province), combined with a detailed set of various climate data. In doing so, we apply a novel approach through the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) to identify key weather shock variables among a vast set of potential variables associated with outmigration decisions in different districts. Our results show that different types of weather shocks are associated with outmigration decisions in different districts within the province, ranging from rainfall, temperatures, drought, and windspeed in different subperiods throughout the year. Regardless, more abnormal weather is almost universally associated with more outmigration, and outmigration significantly mitigates the potentially adverse effects on household consumption and food/nutrition security in the origin households. However, more abnormal weather in the origin location is also associated with reduced remittances per month per migrant sent to the origin location. Thus, the capacity of migration to mitigate against weather shocks is still limited. Combined with migration policies that increase net earnings during migration, supplementary support to enhance climate resilience in home locations, such as climate-smart agriculture and development of the non-farm sector, remains critical. |
| Keywords: | climate change; shock; migration; extreme weather events; agriculture; food security; Tajikistan; Asia; Central Asia |
| Date: | 2025–06–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:175059 |
| By: | Aragie, Emerta A.; Khakimov, Parviz; Ashurov, Timur; Goibov, Manuchehr; Aliev, Jovidon; Diao, Xinshen; Fang, Peixun; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a model-based and data-driven analysis of alternative public investment options for Tajikistan’s agrifood system based on cost-effectiveness in achieving multiple development outcomes. The study indicates that there is no single intervention that is the most cost-effective across all economic and social outcomes, including agrifood GDP growth, job creation, poverty reduction, lowered undernourishment, and improvement in diet quality. Irrigation infrastructure development, R&D in husbandry, and food loss and waste reduction are the most cost-effective investments in the combined economic outcomes, including growth and jobs. In contrast, irrigation, food loss and waste reduction, and seed systems are more effective in the combined social outcomes, including poverty, undernourishment, and diet. Considering time horizons, extension services are more effective in the short run, while irrigation and R&D deliver greater impact over time. Sector variations in the magnitude of effects are also observed among investment interventions. Overall, comparisons across development outcomes, sectoral focus, and timeframes reveal important synergies and trade-offs, underscoring the need for evidence-based tools to guide effective policy and investment decisions. |
| Keywords: | public investment; agrifood systems; development; economic impact; Tajikistan; Asia; Central Asia |
| Date: | 2025–06–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:175060 |