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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Irto, Giuseppe; Kharitonov, Ivan; Nishikawa, Taro; Trebesch, Christoph |
| Abstract: | We study how Europe could replace US support for Ukraine both (i) financially, in terms of the fiscal effort required, and (ii) militarily, in terms of weapon production. Financial effort: The financial challenge of replacing US aid is limited. Currently, European governments are spending just 0.1% of their annual GDP on bilateral aid for Ukraine - a minor effort To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do. In short: Europe as a whole would need to follow Scandinavia's or Poland's example. In absolute terms (billions of Euro), the biggest European countries and the EU Institutions will be decisive. To replace US aid and get to 0.21% of GDP, Europe as a whole needs to increase its yearly aid flow from currently €44 bn per year to €82 bn per year. The biggest donors for that effort will be the EU institutions (Commission and EIB), who will need to increase their annual support from currently €16 bn to €36 bn per year. Next comes Germany (from currently €6 billion to at least €9 billion per year), then Great Britain (from €5 to € 6.5 bn per year), then France (from currently just €1.5 bn to €6 bn per year), Italy (from currently just €0.8 bn to €4.5 bn) and Spain (from just €0.5 bn to €3 bn per year). All remaining European donors would need to move from €14 bn to €16.5 bn per year. To avoid freeriding, we recommend offering financial incentives to those countries giving aid to Ukraine. Big Ukrainian donors (in % of GDP) could get priority access to any new EU-level defense financing scheme. Large Ukraine aid could also be exempt from EU fiscal rules, or deducted from each nations' contributions to the EU budget. (...) |
| Keywords: | Military aid, Foreign aid, War, Ukraine, Europe, Russia, Arms Trade, United States, US, Geoeconomics, Militärhilfe, Auslandshilfe, Krieg, Ukraine, Europa, Russland, Waffenhandel, Vereinigte Staaten, USA, Geo-Ökonomie |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:313634 |
| By: | Strelnyk, Olena Oleksandrivna; Yuzva, Liudmyla; Zlobina, Tamara |
| Abstract: | The research in this discussion paper explores the significant role of feminist perspectives and actions in fostering sustainable gender-transformative changes within Ukraine, particularly during the ongoing defence against Russian aggression. It highlights the ability of feminist movements to catalyse long-term shifts towards gender equality and social inclusion, with a focus on women's and LGBT+ rights. Despite the challenges of war, feminist activists continue to push for transformative policies that not only address immediate wartime needs, but also lay the foundation for gender-responsive defence, inclusive recovery and post-war reconstruction. This study examines the impact of feminist actions and perspectives on various sectors of Ukrainian society, the barriers they face and the opportunities that remain for strengthening feminist policies during and after the war. The research timeline spans 2014-2024, corresponding to the duration of Russia's war against Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on the period of the full-scale invasion from 2022 to 2024. |
| Keywords: | Gender, Ukraine, Feminism |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:diedps:313627 |
| By: | Marco Garofalo; Giovanni Rosso; Roger Vicquéry |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect of financial sanctions on the dominance of the US dollar in global credit markets. In the aftermath of the invasion of Crimea in 2014, sanctions imposed by both the US and the EU restricted the provision of financial services to Russian firms. We document how, between 2014 and 2021, the share of global cross-border credit to Russia denominated in US dollars declined from 65% to 25%, while the share denominated in euros rose from 20% to 45%. Relying on confidential bank-level data covering the universe of global banks located in the UK, we show that this shift was driven by banks previously lending to Russia in US dollars, and that banks shifted to euro lending to Russia regardless of whether their ultimate owner was based in a sanctioning jurisdiction or not. We argue that this euroisation relates to an increase in the relative “settlement risk” of US dollar claims, in the context of US extra-territorial sanctions targeting the dollar payment system. We rationalise our findings in a three-country model with financial intermediaries, where sanctions are introduced as both jurisdiction and currency-circuit specific frictions. |
| Date: | 2025–04–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:1079 |
| By: | Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde; Yiliang Li; Le Xu; Francesco Zanetti |
| Abstract: | We examine the rise of dark shipping – oil tankers disabling AIS transceivers to evade detection – amid Western sanctions on Iran, Syria, North Korea, Venezuela, and Russia. Using a machine learning-based ship clustering model, we track dark-shipped crude oil trade flows worldwide and detect unauthorized ship-to-ship transfers. From 2017 to 2023, dark ships transported an estimated 7.8 million metric tons of crude oil monthly – 43% of global seaborne crude exports – with China absorbing 15%. These sanctioned flows offset recorded declines in global oil exports but create distinct economic shifts. The U.S., a net oil exporter, faces lower oil prices but benefits from cheaper Chinese imports, driving deflationary growth. The EU, a net importer, contends with rising energy costs yet gains from Chinese demand, fueling inflationary expansion. China, leveraging discounted oil, boosts industrial output, propagating global economic shocks. Our findings expose dark shipping’s central role in reshaping oil markets and macroeconomic dynamics. |
| Keywords: | dark shipping, oil sanction, satellite data, clustering analysis, LP |
| JEL: | C32 C38 E32 Q43 R40 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2025-12 |
| By: | Florencia Airaudo; Francois de Soyres; Keith Richards; Ana Maria Santacreu |
| Abstract: | Recent geopolitical tensions have revived interest in understanding the economic consequences of geopolitical fragmentation. Using bilateral trade flows, portfolio investment data, and detailed records of economic policy interventions, we revisit widely-used geopolitical distance metrics, specifically the Ideal Point Distance (IPD) derived from United Nations General Assembly voting. We document substantial variability in measured fragmentation, driven significantly by methodological choices related to sample periods and vote categories, especially in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Our results show robust evidence of increasing fragmentation in both trade flows and economic policy interventions among geopolitically distant country pairs, with particularly strong effects observed in strategically important sectors and policy motives. In contrast, financial portfolio allocations exhibit weaker, more heterogeneous, and context-sensitive responses. These findings highlight the critical importance of methodological transparency and careful specification when assessing geopolitical realignments and their implications for international economic relations. |
| Keywords: | fragmentation; geoeconomics; trade; financial flows |
| JEL: | F14 F36 F50 F60 |
| Date: | 2025–03–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:99766 |
| By: | Süße, Marvin; Grigoriadis, Theocharis |
| Abstract: | Gerschenkron (1962) argued that public institutions such as the State Bank of the Russian Empire spurred the country's industrialization. We test this assertion by exploiting plant-level variation in access to State Bank branches using a unique geocoded factory data set. Employing an identification strategy based on geographical distances between banks and factories, our results show improved access to public banking encouraged faster growth in factory-level revenue, mechanization, and labor productivity. In line with theories of late industrialization, we also find evidence that public credit mattered more in regions where commercial banks were fewer and markets were smaller. |
| Keywords: | industrialization, economic geography, banking, industrial policy |
| JEL: | G28 L52 N23 O14 P41 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:315202 |
| By: | Marzian, Johannes; Trebesch, Christoph |
| Abstract: | Europa muss seine Militärausgaben deutlich erhöhen, aber wie? Diese Frage beantworten wir mit einem Blick in die Geschichte. Wie haben Regierungen in der Vergangenheit in ähnlichen Situationen reagiert? Wie wurden Aufrüstung und Kriege typischerweise finanziert - durch Schulden, Steuern oder Haushaltskürzungen? Hierzu sammeln und analysieren wir neue detaillierte Daten zu Staatsausgaben in 22 Ländern über einen Zeitraum von 150 Jahren. Unsere wichtigste Erkenntnis ist, dass Haushaltskürzungen, z.B. in Auswärtigen Angelegenheiten oder im sozialen Bereich, keine große Rolle spielten. Fast alle Aufrüstungen wurden kurzfristig über Defizite und höhere Steuereinnahmen finanziert. Je größer die Aufrüstung, desto stärker die Schuldenfinanzierung. Im Einklang mit ökonomischer Theorie sollten Deutschland und Europa die erhöhten Verteidigungsausgaben kurzfristig über Schulden finanzieren. Um die zusätzliche Schuldenlast zu bewältigen, könnten mittelfristig die Steuern erhöht, Subventionen und Steuervermeidung reduziert, und das Wachstum der Sozialausgaben begrenzt werden. Fiskalregeln dürfen der Verteidigung Europas nicht entgegenstehen. Ein warnendes Beispiel ist Großbritannien in den 1930ern, das auf Appeasement und eine "schwarze Null" setzte, statt die Militärausgaben zu erhöhen. Dies führte dazu, dass Großbritannien unzureichend vorbereitet war, als Nazi-Deutschland angriff. Wir sollten den schwerwiegenden Fehler Großbritanniens der 1930er vermeiden und heute ausreichend in Verteidigung investieren, um Russland abzuschrecken. Verteidigungsausgaben sollten daher von den Fiskalregeln ausgenommen werden, sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Europa. Eine weniger klare Alternative wären neue Schuldenfonds, etwa ein europäischer Finanzierungsmechanismus oder ein weiteres deutsches Sondervermögen. |
| Abstract: | Europe must rapidly increase its military spending, but how? We collect 150 years of data to study what governments in similar situations have done. How were past military buildups financed? What was the relative importance of debt financing, budget cuts, and taxes? Our main finding is that budget cuts, e.g. on social or foreign affairs, were rarely used to finance military buildups. Instead, governments typically relied on a mix of deficit financing and higher tax revenues. The larger the buildup, the more dominant debt financing has been. In line with history and theory, Germany and Europe should again rely on debt financing to quickly increase its defense spending and military capabilities. To deal with the added debt burden in the medium run, governments could increase taxes, reduce subsidies and tax avoidance, and freeze the growth of social spending. Fiscal rules must not stand in the way of the defence of Europe. A warning example is the case of the UK in the 1930s, which refrained from significantly ramping up military expenditure and instead pursued a policy of balanced budgets and appeasement. Consequently, the UK was ill-prepared when Nazi Germany launched its attack. Germany should not repeat the errors made by Britain in the 1930s and should invest heavily in defense so as to deter Russia. To achieve this, defense spending should be excluded from fiscal rules both in Germany and Europe. A less clear-cut alternative would be the creation of new debt funds, such as a European financing mechanism or another "Sondervermögen" in Germany. |
| Keywords: | Militärausgaben, Steuermultiplikatoren, Innovation, Wachstum, kurz- und langfristige Folgen der Aufrüstung, USA, Europa, Military expenditures, Fiscal multipliers, Innovation, Growth, Short- and long-run consequences of rearmament, USA, Europe |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:313630 |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth-Economic Growth Macroeconomics and Economic Growth-Inflation International Economics and Trade-Trade and Regional Integration |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:39933 |
| By: | Marzian, Johannes; Trebesch, Christoph |
| Abstract: | Europe must rapidly increase its military spending, but how? We collect 150 years of data to study what governments in similar situations have done. How were past military buildups financed? What was the relative importance of debt financing, budget cuts, and taxes? Our main finding is that budget cuts, e.g. on social or foreign affairs, were rarely used to finance military buildups. Instead, governments typically relied on a mix of deficit financing and higher tax revenues. The larger the buildup, the more dominant debt financing has been. In line with history and theory, Germany and Europe should again rely on debt financing to quickly increase its defense spending and military capabilities. To deal with the added debt burden in the medium run, governments could increase taxes, reduce subsidies and tax avoidance, and freeze the growth of social spending. Fiscal rules must not stand in the way of the defence of Europe. A warning example is the case of the UK in the 1930s, which refrained from significantly ramping up military expenditure and instead pursued a policy of balanced budgets and appeasement. Consequently, the UK was ill-prepared when Nazi Germany launched its attack. Germany should not repeat the errors made by Britain in the 1930s and should invest heavily in defense so as to deter Russia. To achieve this, defense spending should be excluded from fiscal rules both in Germany and Europe. A less clear-cut alternative would be the creation of new debt funds, such as a European financing mechanism or another "Sondervermögen" in Germany. |
| Abstract: | Europa muss seine Militärausgaben deutlich erhöhen, aber wie? Diese Frage beantworten wir mit einem Blick in die Geschichte. Wie haben Regierungen in der Vergangenheit in ähnlichen Situationen reagiert? Wie wurden Aufrüstung und Kriege typischerweise finanziert - durch Schulden, Steuern oder Haushaltskürzungen? Hierzu sammeln und analysieren wir neue detaillierte Daten zu Staatsausgaben in 22 Ländern über einen Zeitraum von 150 Jahren. Unsere wichtigste Erkenntnis ist, dass Haushaltskürzungen, z.B. in Auswärtigen Angelegenheiten oder im sozialen Bereich, keine große Rolle spielten. Fast alle Aufrüstungen wurden kurzfristig über Defizite und höhere Steuereinnahmen finanziert. Je größer die Aufrüstung, desto stärker die Schuldenfinanzierung. Im Einklang mit ökonomischer Theorie sollten Deutschland und Europa die erhöhten Verteidigungsausgaben kurzfristig über Schulden finanzieren. Um die zusätzliche Schuldenlast zu bewältigen, könnten mittelfristig die Steuern erhöht, Subventionen und Steuervermeidung reduziert, und das Wachstum der Sozialausgaben begrenzt werden. Fiskalregeln dürfen der Verteidigung Europas nicht entgegenstehen. Ein warnendes Beispiel ist Großbritannien in den 1930ern, das auf Appeasement und eine "schwarze Null" setzte, statt die Militärausgaben zu erhöhen. Dies führte dazu, dass Großbritannien unzureichend vorbereitet war, als Nazi-Deutschland angriff. Wir sollten den schwerwiegenden Fehler Großbritanniens der 1930er vermeiden und heute ausreichend in Verteidigung investieren, um Russland abzuschrecken. Verteidigungsausgaben sollten daher von den Fiskalregeln ausgenommen werden, sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Europa. Eine weniger klare Alternative wären neue Schuldenfonds, etwa ein europäischer Finanzierungsmechanismus oder ein weiteres deutsches Sondervermögen. |
| Keywords: | Military expenditures, Fiscal multipliers, Innovation, Growth, Short- and long-run consequences of rearmament, USA, Europe, Militärausgaben, Steuermultiplikatoren, Innovation, Wachstum, kurz- und langfristige Folgen der Aufrüstung, USA, Europa |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:313631 |
| By: | Fowler, Ben; Christopher Joseph Heitzig; Khan, Marrium; Renuka Pai; Sakshi Varma |
| Abstract: | The evidence so far is mixed as to whether educational entertainment (or “edutainment”) can create sustainable changes in financial attitudes and behaviors, and few studies have tested such hypotheses in Central Asia. This paper utilizes a genetic matching algorithm to estimate the impact of three edutainment interventions in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan: a television series, a TEDx-style in-person speaker event, and an interactive social media video. The study randomly selected 2, 187 respondents from 14 cities across the two countries to participate. A random subset of respondents was sent text messages encouraging them to view the three edutainment interventions, which were also disseminated nationally in the respective countries. Using a midline survey conducted a few weeks after concluding the campaign in both countries, and an endline survey three months later, the study measured the immediate effects of the campaign as well as those that lasted into the medium term. The findings show that campaign consumption broad impacts in the form of account ownership, savings habits, spending habits, and personal beliefs. Treated respondents were more likely to open accounts at formal financial institutions, especially e-wallets. Treated respondents also increased their savings balance using these formal accounts, and it was observed that these savings were sourced primarily from their informal savings balances. While some of these effects faded by endline, markers of account usage (for example, transactions and likelihood of saving) persisted even months after campaign consumption. Moreover, the study finds that campaign consumption led to increased awareness of the societal expectations responsible for women’s financial disenfranchisement and undesired financial behavior among youths. Generally speaking, however, the findings did not indicate a change in the degree of agreement with these norms as a result of the campaign. The study suggests that edutainment campaigns can be used to create lasting effects on measures of financial formalization and awareness of social norms. |
| Date: | 2025–03–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11088 |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth-Economic Growth Macroeconomics and Economic Growth-Economic Forecasting Private Sector Development-Business Environment |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40114 |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Gender-Gender and Economic Policy Governance-Governance and the Financial Sector Poverty Reduction-Equity and Development |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40259 |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Environment-Air Quality & Clean Air |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40244 |
| By: | Karymshakov , Kamalbek (Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University); Azhgaliyeva , Dina (Asian Development Bank) |
| Abstract: | Low-carbon energy transition, which includes the replacement of fossil fuels with low-carbon energy infrastructure, the removal of subsidies, and other measures, requires households to be able to pay for low-carbon energy services. Economic shocks such as the coronavirus disease pandemic and high inflation make paying for energy challenging for households. We use the Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey data (2019–2021) to study the impact of income decline on energy consumption. We provide the following key results. First, the empirical results show that the effects of income decline on household energy consumption vary (positive or negative) according to income group. Second, the low-income group with income decline reduced energy consumption, while the higher income group (second quartile) increased energy consumption. |
| Keywords: | household energy consumption; coal consumption; fossil fuel consumption; income decline; Central Asia; energy transition |
| JEL: | Q31 Q41 Q48 |
| Date: | 2025–04–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbewp:0773 |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Gender-Gender and Economics International Economics and Trade-Trade Facilitation International Economics and Trade-Trade and Regional Integration |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:39889 |