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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Beri, Parfait Bihkongnyuy; Mhonyera, Gabriel; Ho, Sin Yu |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian war on FDI in central and eastern European countries (CEECs) from 2020Q1 to 2022Q2. Using the panel quantile regression, it finds that COVID-19 and the conflict had a detrimental impact on the largest FDI recipient countries but not on those in the lower quantiles. Therefore, CEECs should encourage FDI inflows from several sources to reduce vulnerability to shocks and the consequences they bring, diversify investments, and conduct a thorough analysis to identify sectors most affected, and tailor policies to address the sustainable inflow of FDI from those sectors. |
| Keywords: | FDI, COVID-19, CEECs, Russia, Ukraine, quantile regression |
| JEL: | F1 F14 F2 F21 F23 |
| Date: | 2024–10–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122553 |
| By: | Wolff, Guntram B.; Burilkov, Alexandr; Bushnell, Katelyn; Kharitonov Ivan |
| Abstract: | War is back in Europe and as it becomes long-lasting, the question of armament gains central importance. This report finds that Russian military industrial capacities have been rising strongly in the last two years, well beyond the levels of Russian material losses in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the build-up of German capacities is progressing slowly. We document Germany's military procurement in a new Kiel Military Procurement Tracker and find that Germany did not meaningfully increase procurement in the one and a half years after February 2022, and only accelerated it in late 2023. Given Germany's massive disarmament in the last decades and the current procurement speed, we find that for some key weapon systems, Germany will not attain 2004 levels of armament for about 100 years. When taking into account arms commitments to Ukraine, some German capacities are even falling. The new Tracker provides detailed information on quantities, value of the orders, predicted delivery dates, as well as the companies from which Germany procures. The situation of slow and insufficient procurement can and needs to be remedied. Failing on deterrence would mean a higher likelihood of a costly war. Instead of Germany pursuing a "war economy", as some have argued, Germany's defence budget needs to durably and credibly increase. Higher and credible long-term demand will lead to increasing supply capacities. A long-term European armament strategy is needed. Germany and Europe need to focus on speed in procurement, on cost effectiveness through economies of scale in an integrated European market, on innovation, and on technological superiority. Tracking military rearmament is essential to the security of the continent. |
| Abstract: | Der Krieg ist zurück in Europa, und je länger er andauert, desto mehr gewinnt die Frage der Aufrüstung an zentraler Bedeutung. Dieser Bericht stellt fest, dass die Kapazitäten der russischen Rüstungsindustrie in den letzten zwei Jahren stark angestiegen sind, und zwar weit über das Niveau der russischen Materialverluste in der Ukraine hinaus. Derweil schreitet der Aufbau der deutschen Kapazitäten nur langsam voran. Wir dokumentieren Deutschlands militärische Aufrüstung in einem neuen Kiel Military Procurement Tracker und stellen fest, dass Deutschland seinen Bestand an militärischen Kapazitäten in den anderthalb Jahren nach Februar 2022 nicht nennenswert erhöht und erst Ende 2023 beschleunigt hat. Angesichts der massiven Abrüstung Deutschlands in den letzten Jahrzehnten und der aktuellen Beschaffungsgeschwindigkeit wird Deutschland bei einigen wichtigen Waffensystemen erst in etwa 100 Jahren das Rüstungsniveau von 2004 erreichen. Berücksichtigt man die Rüstungsverpflichtungen gegenüber der Ukraine, sinken einige deutsche Kapazitäten sogar. Der neue Tracker liefert detaillierte Informationen über Stückzahlen, Auftragswert, voraussichtliche Liefertermine sowie über die Unternehmen, von denen Deutschland beschafft. Die Situation der langsamen und unzureichenden Beschaffung kann und muss behoben werden. Ein Scheitern bei der Abschreckung würde die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines kostspieligen Krieges erhöhen. Anstatt dass Deutschland eine "Kriegswirtschaft" betreibt, wie einige argumentiert haben, muss der deutsche Verteidigungshaushalt dauerhaft und glaubwürdig erhöht werden. Eine höhere und glaubwürdige langfristige Nachfrage wird zu steigenden Lieferkapazitäten führen. Eine langfristige europäische Rüstungsstrategie ist notwendig. Deutschland und Europa müssen sich auf Schnelligkeit bei der Beschaffung, auf Kosteneffizienz durch Größenvorteile in einem integrierten europäischen Markt, auf Innovation und auf technologische Überlegenheit konzentrieren. Die Verfolgung der militärischen Aufrüstung ist für die Sicherheit des Kontinents unerlässlich. |
| Keywords: | Defence, Armament, Weapon industry, Budget, Germany, Europe, Russia |
| JEL: | H41 H56 H60 L64 N44 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkrp:306225 |
| By: | Wolff, Guntram B.; Burilkov, Alexandr; Bushnell, Katelyn; Kharitonov Ivan |
| Abstract: | Der Krieg ist zurück in Europa, und je länger er andauert, desto mehr gewinnt die Frage der Aufrüstung an zentraler Bedeutung. Dieser Bericht stellt fest, dass die Kapazitäten der russischen Rüstungsindustrie in den letzten zwei Jahren stark angestiegen sind, und zwar weit über das Niveau der russischen Materialverluste in der Ukraine hinaus. Derweil schreitet der Aufbau der deutschen Kapazitäten nur langsam voran. Wir dokumentieren Deutschlands militärische Aufrüstung in einem neuen Kiel Military Procurement Tracker und stellen fest, dass Deutschland seinen Bestand an militärischen Kapazitäten in den anderthalb Jahren nach Februar 2022 nicht nennenswert erhöht und erst Ende 2023 beschleunigt hat. Angesichts der massiven Abrüstung Deutschlands in den letzten Jahrzehnten und der aktuellen Beschaffungsgeschwindigkeit wird Deutschland bei einigen wichtigen Waffensystemen erst in etwa 100 Jahren das Rüstungsniveau von 2004 erreichen. Berücksichtigt man die Rüstungsverpflichtungen gegenüber der Ukraine, sinken einige deutsche Kapazitäten sogar. Der neue Tracker liefert detaillierte Informationen über Stückzahlen, Auftragswert, voraussichtliche Liefertermine sowie über die Unternehmen, von denen Deutschland beschafft. Die Situation der langsamen und unzureichenden Beschaffung kann und muss behoben werden. Ein Scheitern bei der Abschreckung würde die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines kostspieligen Krieges erhöhen. Anstatt dass Deutschland eine "Kriegswirtschaft" betreibt, wie einige argumentiert haben, muss der deutsche Verteidigungshaushalt dauerhaft und glaubwürdig erhöht werden. Eine höhere und glaubwürdige langfristige Nachfrage wird zu steigenden Lieferkapazitäten führen. Eine langfristige europäische Rüstungsstrategie ist notwendig. Deutschland und Europa müssen sich auf Schnelligkeit bei der Beschaffung, auf Kosteneffizienz durch Größenvorteile in einem integrierten europäischen Markt, auf Innovation und auf technologische Überlegenheit konzentrieren. Die Verfolgung der militärischen Aufrüstung ist für die Sicherheit des Kontinents unerlässlich. |
| Abstract: | War is back in Europe and as it becomes long-lasting, the question of armament gains central importance. This report finds that Russian military industrial capacities have been rising strongly in the last two years, well beyond the levels of Russian material losses in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the build-up of German capacities is progressing slowly. We document Germany's military procurement in a new Kiel Military Procurement Tracker and find that Germany did not meaningfully increase procurement in the one and a half years after February 2022, and only accelerated it in late 2023. Given Germany's massive disarmament in the last decades and the current procurement speed, we find that for some key weapon systems, Germany will not attain 2004 levels of armament for about 100 years. When taking into account arms commitments to Ukraine, some German capacities are even falling. The new Tracker provides detailed information on quantities, value of the orders, predicted delivery dates, as well as the companies from which Germany procures. The situation of slow and insufficient procurement can and needs to be remedied. Failing on deterrence would mean a higher likelihood of a costly war. Instead of Germany pursuing a "war economy", as some have argued, Germany's defence budget needs to durably and credibly increase. Higher and credible long-term demand will lead to increasing supply capacities. A long-term European armament strategy is needed. Germany and Europe need to focus on speed in procurement, on cost effectiveness through economies of scale in an integrated European market, on innovation, and on technological superiority. Tracking military rearmament is essential to the security of the continent. |
| Keywords: | Verteidigung, Rüstung, Rüstungsindustrie, Haushalt, Deutschland, Europa, Russland |
| JEL: | H41 H56 H60 L64 N44 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkrp:306226 |
| By: | Kirton-Darling, Judith; Denis, Benjamin |
| Abstract: | The EU and its workforce are experiencing a polycrisis, encompassing many geopolitical, economic, social and climate challenges. Resilience and open strategic autonomy are being increasingly emphasised by EU political leaders and there has been wave of support in favour of greater European solidarity and a ‘whatever it takes’ mentality since the pandemic and the start of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, European workers are reeling from years of austerity, deregulation, employment insecurity and deteriorating working conditions. This CEPS Explainer takes a deep dive into the development and current state of the EU’s internal market. It argues that returning to the laissez-faire solutions of the past are now no longer viable or desirable, and that another way is possible. The EU should instead strengthen its internal market by implementing a real European industrial investment plan for clean technology value chains and a ‘good jobs plan’ for every EU region. This is how the internal market can contribute to solving, rather than prolonging, the polycrisis. |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:cepswp:42220 |
| By: | Urban, Patricia; Rizos, Vasileios; Ounnas, Alexandre; Kassab, Amin; Kalantaryan, Hayk |
| Abstract: | In recent years, the concept of green jobs has been the focus of increasing attention from both policy and research circles. At the EU policy level, the green transition is seen as an opportunity to create jobs in existing and emerging economic sectors. The need for re- and upskilling workers to ensure a socially just green and digital transition is also increasingly being highlighted in the policy debate. Despite this renewed surge in interest, partly propelled by the necessity to mitigate the impacts of the climate crisis as well as external shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the notion of green jobs is not a recent one. A large number of different approaches to how green jobs can be defined and classified have been put forward in the past few decades. While these definitions and taxonomies display certain overlaps, often in terms of a focus on jobs in the Environmental Goods and Services Sector, key analytical differences compromise the comparability of assessments. These differences along with gaps identified in existing definitions and frameworks have exposed the need to create a novel taxonomy for green jobs. Combining various elements of these approaches in a quantifiable, and thus practically applicable, manner, this report develops an integrated taxonomy based on four pillars: inputs, outputs, processes, and job quality. The use of different indicators to operationalise these pillars aims to enable more accurate assessments and comparison of case studies, to support policymaking in this area. A number of different strategies and policies that incorporate green jobs elements have been launched, at the EU level as well as by Member States and internationally, in the past couple of years. In line with other recent policy developments, most of these initiatives focus on developing skills for the green transition. In addition, many strategies incorporate a social dimension to green jobs, aiming to ensure that vulnerable groups are protected in the green transition. Tackling the creation and retention of green jobs while phasing out brown jobs may profit from a more integrated approach that goes beyond skills, while also taking into account the greenness of work processes, outputs and supply chain inputs, as put forward by this report. |
| Date: | 2023–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:cepswp:40726 |
| By: | Natalya Naumenko (George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | Using recently discovered archival data, this article studies the changes in the Soviet population and the urbanization patterns after the 1933 famine. It documents that, although most of the direct victims lived in the rural areas, the famine is associated with a persistent negative change in the urban population. In fact, the rural population gradually recovered while urban settlements in more affected areas became permanently smaller. The paper shows that these changes were not planned in the First Five-Year Plan (1928--1933), but that subsequent plans may have incorporated and exacerbated the differences in urbanization that occurred during the years of rural crisis. The paper argues that the shortage of labor during the crucial years of the rapid industrialization hindered the development of cities in areas stricken by the famine. Thus, the timing of the shock to population appears to be important. While established urban networks tend to recover from large temporary negative shocks, the lack of people during construction and rapid growth might have a permanent negative impact. |
| Keywords: | Russia, Famine consequences, Multiple equilibria |
| JEL: | N34 O18 P25 R12 R13 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0270 |
| By: | Timothé Beaufils; Joschka Wanner; Leonie Wenz |
| Abstract: | The European Union (EU) is implementing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) at its borders, which will require exporters of basic materials to surrender emission permits when exporting to the EU market. Since it makes foreign producers compete under a carbon price, the EU CBAM may motivate some trade partners to implement their own carbon pricing mechanisms, thereby encouraging the creation of a coalition of countries with ambitious carbon pricing policies protected by a joint CBAM. Such geostrategic potential of the EU CBAM has been identified in previous literature, but the conditions under which it could be realised remain largely unknown. Here, we present a modelling framework to simulate the potential of CBAMs to motivate the creation of climate coalitions. We use a fully interlinked New Quantitative Trade model to evaluate the pay-offs of a dynamic club negotiation model. Compared to previous research, our approach allows for a more granular definition of climate policies and requires relatively little input data and numerical power. This allows us to explore the formation and stability of climate coalitions under a broader range of CBAM implementation options. Our results highlight that the potential of a CBAM-based climate coalition strongly depends on the exact CBAM design. In its current version, the EU CBAM would only trigger the formation of a modest coalition. Future extensions of the EU CBAM could motivate the adoption of carbon pricing in all countries except China, India and Russia. Meanwhile, export rebates shrink its coalition-building potential. |
| Keywords: | Carbon Border Adjustment, climate policy, international trade, climate cooperation, climate clubs |
| JEL: | C68 F18 Q56 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11429 |
| By: | Mirjana Miletic, Danilo Cerovic and Aleksandar Tomin; Mirjana Miletic (National Bank of Serbia); Danilo Cerovic (National Bank of Serbia); Aleksandar Tomin (National Bank of Serbia) |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which global factors – supply chain disruptions and rising oil prices – affect inflation in Serbia and other European countries, this being particularly important in the context of the ongoing episode of global inflation growth, which is largely a consequence of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, but also of the energy crisis and the conflict in Ukraine. The analysis was carried out using the panel method, whereby an estimation was made for 31 European countries considered together and separately for European advanced and emerging economies. The analysis was carried out for the period from Q1 2006 to Q2 2023 using the panel ARDL model and estimates were obtained using the PMG and DFE methods, as well as the asymmetric ARDL model, where the inflationary impact of the rise and fall in global energy prices and of the tightening and easing of supply bottlenecks was tested separately. The obtained results suggest that global supply chain disruptions have a statistically significant effect on consumer and producer prices in the long term, and global oil prices in both the short and long term (controlled for the influence of domestic factors). The link between inflation and supply bottlenecks has been confirmed for both advanced and emerging economies, as well as by various disruption indicators (the European Commission’s Business Climate Indicator, measuring the level of disruption specific to a country, and the Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, gauging the intensity of global pressures), which indicates the robustness of the obtained estimates. When the asymmetric ARDL model is applied, a higher coefficient is obtained for the indicator of global supply chain disruptions (measured by GSCPI) when a negative shock occurs (their loosening) than in the case of a positive shock (tightening), which is a consequence of the significant drop in this indicator in the last three quarters of the period analysed. This suggests that the obtained result is not robust in relation to the period analysed, which is why, before drawing final conclusions regarding this part of the analysis, the model should be re-evaluated once data for a few more quarters become available. |
| Keywords: | inflation, global supply chain disruptions, energy, panel |
| JEL: | C32 C33 E43 |
| Date: | 2023–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nsb:bilten:19 |
| By: | Hisham Aidi |
| Abstract: | The global wave of democratic retrenchment has not spared North Africa as seen in the cases of Tunisia and Sudan, where democratic transitions have stalled or regressed into autocracy. How do to explain Tunisia and Sudan’s troubled transitions from authoritarian rule? Both states are attempting to transition from single-party authoritarianism. In both cases, economic crises exacerbated by COVID, the Russian-Ukraine war, and involvement by external actors stymied the fragile transition process. But there are also clear differences in the role of European powers, the strength of political parties and civil society actors, and discourses of national identity. |
| Date: | 2022–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:rpaeco:pb_69-22 |
| By: | Kim, Hyun-Seok (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) |
| Abstract: | In recent years, global financial markets have experienced unprecedented volatility due to a confluence of factors, including the COVID-19 crisis, the Russian-Ukraine war, the US-China rivalry and strategic economic decoupling, conflict in the Middle East, and severe supply chain disruptions. Central banks responded to the inflationary pressures caused by these and other factors with aggressive monetary policy, which has in effect meant a sharp increase in interest rates across the globe. Lingering uncertainties in financial markets have also contributed to high lending rates, as greater risks drive financial institutions and investors in corporate financing markets to demand higher returns on their investments. And rates seem unlikely to fall in the long term, as ongoing changes to the structure of the global economy — the evolving dynamics of globalization, falling birth rates, and an aging population — exert upward pressure on inflation, anchoring interest rates at current levels. As a consequence, many firms have struggled to access funding through direct finance channels (equity sales and bond issuance) and instead rely mostly on indirect finance (loans). This owes partially to the fact that, as rates grew in 2022 and stayed high in 2023, corporate debt burdens ballooned, raising the risk of widespread bankruptcies. In this study, I examine how greater uncertainties in financial markets affect corporate borrowing costs. In Korea, the two key capital markets with an influence on corporate finance are the loan market, where banks play a central role, and the corporate bond market, where firms issue bonds to raise funds. |
| Keywords: | corporate debt; corporate financing; capital financing; corporate lending; corporate bond market; capital markets; Korea; KIET |
| JEL: | G30 G31 G32 G34 G38 O16 |
| Date: | 2024–09–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieter:2024_025 |
| By: | Schöneberg, Katharina; Riede, Hannah |
| Abstract: | Die Rahmenbedingungen für Laborunternehmen in Deutschland haben sich durch die Corona-Pandemie und den Ukraine-Krieg verändert. Nachfrageveränderungen, Materialengpässe, erhöhte Kosten und wachsender Preisdruck stellen die Unternehmen vor Herausforderungen. Übernahmen und strukturelle Veränderungen, Fachkräftemangel und Digitalisierung sowie erhöhte Arbeitsbelastung samt wachsender mentaler Beanspruchung und erhöhtem Krankenstand machen die Sicherung guter und fairer Arbeitsbedingungen zu einer wichtigen Aufgabe für die Mitbestimmung. Die vorliegende Studie liefert aktuelle Daten zu den relevanten Entwicklungen der Branche und ihrer Handlungsfelder. |
| Keywords: | Gute Laborpraxis, MTA-Reform-Gesetz, Laborbranche, Fachkräftemangel |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hbsfof:305284 |