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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Igor Arlashkin (RANEPA); Konstantin Vekerle (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Alexander Deryugin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Elisey Leonov (RANEPA); Evgeniy Matveev (RANEPA); Ilya Sokolov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Tatiana Tischenko (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | Revenues of the Extended Government Budget (hereinafter referred to as the EGB) in 2023 relative to the previous year decreased by 0.1 pp. GDP to 34.5% of GDP. In recent years, total revenues as a share of GDP have shown high stability, fluctuating slightly around the level of 35% of GDP. Deviations of the parameters of the actual fulfillment of the EGB revenues in 2023 from those forecast by the Ministry of Finance of Russia are insignificant, which allows us to draw conclusions about a fairly good accuracy of budget forecasting, as well as about the high quality of administration of state revenues. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, intergovernmental relations, fiscal policy, budget system, revenues, expenditures, Bank of Russia |
| JEL: | E62 H5 H61 H62 H68 H7 H72 H77 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2024-1323 |
| By: | Alexander Ignatov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Marina Larionova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Irina Popova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Andrey Sakharov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Andrey Shelepov (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2023, the main trends in the system of international institutions were related with the US and its allies’ continued efforts to form new rights and institutes, as well as the mounting pressure on other countries to condemn and isolate Russia in the existing multilateral mechanisms. Overall, it can be stated that isolation of Russia has failed, though in the Bank for International Settlements’ committees which are entirely controlled by western countries they succeeded in suspending Russia’s participation.2 Developing and emerging market countries demonstrated greater resistance to pressure, their independence and weight. However, global institutions turned out to be unable to function fully as a result of adversarial positions between their member-countries. At the same time, the importance of non-western institutions, such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization increased. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, international organizations, international institutional arrangements |
| JEL: | F5 F53 F55 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2024-1338 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The euro area economy has been resilient in the face of multiple, large shocks, including the pandemic, Russia’s gas shut-off, and fallout from the war in Ukraine. Nonetheless, the adverse shocks have had persistent effects which shape economic prospects. Energy-intensive industries, in particular, have struggled to adjust to higher input costs and continue to underperform. Despite subdued overall activity, employment growth remains robust. Inflation has declined significantly from its late-2022 peak in response to the ECB’s policy tightening and the decline in commodity prices. |
| Date: | 2024–07–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/248 |
| By: | Tatiana Klyachko (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2023, the main trends which emerged during the coronavirus pandemic and largely consolidated with the start of the special military operation in 2022 continued in the Russian education system. In the higher education, the Russian Federation announced its withdrawal from the Bologna system, and that has already led to the shrinkage of partner relations with European universities and termination of academic mobility of teachers and students, while in school education Russia found itself cut off from international comparative studies of the quality of general education conducted by the OECD – PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS. A shift is observed towards Asian, Arab and Latin American education systems through which, nevertheless, access is also provided to European/American developments in the field of education. At the same time, a new national system is being designed in the higher education system which architecture has been tested since the spring of 2023 in an experimental mode by six universities: the I. Kant Baltic Federal University, the Moscow Aviation Institute (National Research University), the National Research Technological University “MISiS†, The Moscow Pedagogical State University, The St. Petersburg Mining University (NRU) and the Tomsk National Research State University. The experiment on the new higher education system will last for three years, but some higher education establishments will be able to use its outputs in their activities even earlier, i.e. before the end of the pilot project. In 2023, as part of the experiment, about 180 new educational programs were developed and they are expected to form the basis for new federal state educational standards (FSES) and create the framework of a new higher education system in Russia |
| Keywords: | Education system, general education, vocational education, distance learning, higher education |
| JEL: | I21 I22 I23 I24 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2024-1337 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | L'Union européenne (UE) se trouve confrontée à un besoin critique de terres rares, en particulier de produits raffinés essentiels à la production de voitures électriques, de turbines et d'autres applications technologiques. Cependant, le processus de raffinage est non seulement énergivore, mais pose également des risques environnementaux importants. Par conséquent, les communautés locales, comme en témoignent les exemples en Espagne et au Portugal, s'opposent avec véhémence à de telles opérations dans leur voisinage, préconisant une politique du « chacun pour soi ». L’UE dépend actuellement fortement de la Chine, qui contrôle la majorité de la transformation mondiale, avec 90 % de toutes les terres rares et 60 % du lithium. En réponse à ces défis, l’UE a franchi une étape cruciale en novembre 2023 en concluant un accord préliminaire sur la loi européenne sur les matières premières critiques (CRMA). Cette initiative législative vise à améliorer et à diversifier l'approvisionnement de l'UE en matières premières critiques (CRM), à favoriser l'économie circulaire, à renforcer l'autonomie stratégique de l'Europe et à explorer des alternatives pour atténuer la dépendance. Les récentes crises transnationales, notamment les perturbations des chaînes d'approvisionnement lors de la pandémie de COVID-19 et l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie, soulignent l'impératif de garantir des chaînes d'approvisionnement sécurisées dans tous les secteurs économiques. Ces crises soulignent également l’influence considérable exercée par les principales économies émergentes, notamment les pays BRICS (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine et Afrique du Sud), qui dominent les principales chaînes d’approvisionnement mondiales, notamment celles des matières premières critiques (CRM). La Russie joue un rôle central en tant que l'un des plus grands fournisseurs mondiaux de palladium (40 % de l'offre mondiale), le deuxième fournisseur de platine (13 %) et de nickel (12 %) et un contributeur substantiel d'aluminium et de cuivre. En outre, la Russie possède le potentiel de devenir un acteur majeur sur le marché des terres rares grâce à ses vastes réserves. Le pays représente également une part considérable des acquisitions de l'UE, notamment le palladium (41 %), le platine (16 %), le cobalt (5 %) et le lithium (4 %). La Russie est notamment la principale source de l'UE pour la transformation des métaux du groupe du platine (iridium, platine, rhodium, ruthénium ; 40 %), l'extraction de la roche phosphatée (20 %), la transformation du lithium (4 %) et la transformation du scandium (1 %). Pour parvenir à une plus grande indépendance en matière de fourniture externe de CRM, l’UE doit réaliser des investissements importants dans ses installations d’extraction et de transformation. Cependant, l’exploitation minière ne représente que la phase initiale ; les étapes suivantes impliquent la séparation des éléments de terres rares (REE) des oxydes, le raffinage et le forgeage d'alliages, un processus complexe, hautement spécialisé et en plusieurs étapes. À cet égard, les nouveaux arrivants comme l’Europe sont à la traîne, la Chine ayant consolidé sa position dominante à chaque étape grâce à une stratégie industrielle concertée à long terme soutenue par des subventions publiques. |
| Abstract: | The European Union (EU) finds itself in a critical need for rare earths, particularly the refined products essential for the production of electric cars, turbines, and other technological applications. However, the refining process is not only energy-intensive but also poses significant environmental risks. Consequently, local communities, as evidenced by instances in Spain and Portugal, vehemently oppose having such operations in their vicinity, advocating a "beggar thy neighbour" policy. The EU currently relies heavily on China, which controls the majority of global processing, commanding 90% of all rare earths and 60% of lithium. In response to these challenges, the EU took a crucial step in November 2023 by reaching a preliminary agreement on the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA). This legislative initiative aims to enhance and diversify the EU's supply of critical raw materials (CRM), foster the circular economy, fortify Europe's strategic autonomy, and explore alternatives to mitigate dependence. Recent transnational crises, including disruptions to supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, underscore the imperative of secure supply chains across all economic sectors. These crises also underscore the significant influence wielded by major emerging economies, notably the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which dominate key global supply chains, including those for critical raw materials (CRMs). Russia plays a pivotal role as one of the world's largest suppliers of palladium (40% of global supply), the second-largest supplier of platinum (13%) and nickel (12%), and a substantial contributor of aluminium and copper. Furthermore, Russia possesses the potential to emerge as a major player in the rare earths market due to its extensive reserves. The country also accounts for a considerable share of the EU's acquisitions, including palladium (41%), platinum (16%), cobalt (5%), and lithium (4%). Notably, Russia serves as the primary EU source for platinum group metals processing (iridium, platinum, rhodium, ruthenium; 40%), phosphate rock extraction (20%), lithium processing (4%), and scandium processing (1%). To attain greater independence in external CRM provision, the EU must make significant investments in its mining and processing facilities. However, mining represents merely the initial phase; subsequent steps involve the separation of rare earth elements (REE) from oxides, refining, and alloy forging a complex, highly specialized, multi-stage process. In this regard, relative newcomers like Europe lag behind, as China has solidified its dominant position in each phase through a concerted, long-term industrial strategy supported by state subsidies |
| Keywords: | terres rares, transition énergétique, changement climatique, pollution |
| JEL: | D24 D43 D52 E23 F18 Q53 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300883 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Lithuania has experienced fast income convergence over the past two decades and the economy is projected to return to growth this year after a shallow recession. However, higher inflation differentials following the shock triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have had an impact on competitiveness, even though Lithuania entered this crisis with an undervalued real effective exchange rate. At the same time, global fragmentation, long-term spending pressures, eroded corporate profitability, and pre-existing structural challenges in education, healthcare and the labor market continue weighing on productivity and growth. Thus, Lithuania needs prudent policies and decisive structural reforms to support sustained productivity growth and ensure higher living standards and continued convergence. |
| Date: | 2024–07–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/242 |
| By: | Ignacio Presno; Andrea Prestipino |
| Abstract: | The 2022 inflation surge has renewed interest in the drivers of inflation, with special attention on the role of oil and other commodity prices given the large increase in these prices post-pandemic. In this note, we use a DSGE model of the global economy to quantify the impact on U.S. inflation and output of the oil shocks that drove oil prices up by about $45 per barrel in the first half of 2022, around Russia's invasion of Ukraine. |
| Date: | 2024–08–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfn:2024-08-02-3 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | After decades of rapid growth and improvements in living standards, a series of shocks led to severe economic pressures, and the public investment-led growth model has reached its limits. Domestic conflict, the pandemic, droughts, and spillovers from Russia’s war in Ukraine, as well as significant exchange rate overvaluation and insufficient macroeconomic policy adjustment, compounded building vulnerabilities resulting in high inflation, falling exports, foreign exchange shortages, erosion of international reserves, and unsustainable external debt. Reflecting their ambition to transform the economic model towards private sector-led development, and recognizing the urgent need for reform, the authorities developed the Home-Grown Economic Reform Agenda. This ambitious plan aims at tackling the drivers of economic imbalances including through moving to a market-determined exchange rate, modernizing the monetary policy framework, tackling fiscal revenues, and reforming state-owned enterprises. |
| Date: | 2024–07–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/253 |
| By: | Mungase, Sachin; Nikam, Supriya; Kothe, Satyanarayan |
| Abstract: | The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have seen varying GDP growth rates, averaging around 5 percent in the 1990s, rising to 8 percent in the 2000s, and about 5.5 percent from 2011 to 2020. Structural change and labour productivity are key for sustained economic growth, achieved by reallocating resources to more productive activities. This study analyses employment changes and labour productivity from 1990 to 2018, focusing on labour shifts from less productive to more productive sectors, inter-sectoral changes in output and employment patterns, and the impact of structural changes on labour productivity. Using the Economic Transformation Database (ETD) and methodologies from various researchers, the study highlights significant structural changes in China and India, while Russia, Brazil, and South Africa show minimal change. It underscores the need for policies promoting education, vocational training, and reducing trade barriers to enhance productivity and economic growth. |
| Keywords: | BRICS Countries, GDP Growth Rates, Structural Change, Labour Productivity, Economic Growth, Resource Reallocation, Employment Patterns, Sectoral Shifts, Economic Transformation Database (ETD), Inter-Sectoral Changes, China Economic Growth, India Economic Growth, Russia Economic Growth, Brazil Economic Growth, South Africa Economic Growth, Education and Vocational Training, Trade Barriers, Policy Recommendations, Productivity Enhancement, 1990-2018 Economic Analysis |
| JEL: | E00 E24 F62 J01 O11 O14 O4 O47 O57 |
| Date: | 2024–07–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121607 |
| By: | Alistair Milne |
| Abstract: | Supply disruptions, in particular the reduced supply of gas following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has triggered the major energy crisis across all of Europe. This threatens a severe economic downturn with substantially reduced real incomes, widespread business closures and – especially in the UK with its heavy reliance on natural gas for domestic heating – many households pushed into 'fuel poverty', choosing between adequate nutrition and heating for their homes. This note discusses the economic mechanisms driving this crisis and the policy tools available to address it. The principal message is that in a crisis such as this quantities matter. The new UK government is introducing a near complete suspension of price mechanism in domestic energy markets, freezing both household and wholesale prices. Government across Europe will take similar measures. These seem necessary to protect households and businesses. But they are only sticky plasters. There is a near-binding constraint on the overall supply of gas in Europe. Without prices allocating supply, further measures are needed to decide who gets how much gas. So, the policy response must address quantities, turning to administrative management of the physical flows of gas, to secure supply and reduce demand (through public appeal, voluntary proposed consumption reductions and where unavoidable rationing). In practical terms this means, going beyond the price caps (i) negotiating, bilaterally, with Norway as the principal supplier of gas to Europe to ensure energy security, obtaining allocations of gas at below elevated wholesale market prices; and (ii) within the resulting envelope of supply, implement standing plans e.g. in the UK those of BEIS and the National Grid, for allocating limited energy resources in a supply crisis. From the policies announced and discussed so far it appears that the UK government, and its counterparts across Europe, believe that the physical deficit of energy in Europe can be closed by spending unlimited amounts of money. But the underlying problem is a shortage of physical supply. Spending more money, without controlling quantity, drives prices ever higher. This policy stance is reminiscent of the Major government in Black Wednesday 1992. Like that policy it is not sustainable. Turning to administrative management of the quantities of gas deals directly with the supply deficit and will bring the cost of energy closer to normal levels. This is not without economic costs. Low priority consumers will consume less gas than they would like to purchase. Imports of liquid natural gas LNG must still be paid for at a premium price. But much less money than currently announced is needed for protecting households and businesses. No need to burden the taxpayer. |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nsr:niesrp:35 |
| By: | Glas, Alexander; Schölkopf, Julius |
| Abstract: | On 6 June 2024, the European Central Bank (ECB) lowered the main refinancing operations (MRO) rate from 4.5% to 4.25%. This decision followed a period of elevated interest rates intended to combat high inflation in the euro area, which peaked at 10.6% in October 2022 in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although inflation levels are now closer to the ECB's medium-term target of 2%, some doubt remains on whether the inflationary pressure has truly abated, since the last mile of the inflation cycle is often perceived as challenging. Indeed, inflation increased again in May 2024 to 2.6%, from 2.4% in April, and the ECB has not committed itself to a certain interest rate path. Instead, it follows a data-dependent meeting-by-meeting approach for further interest rate decisions. In this policy brief, we analyse whether and how much professional forecasters and market analysts disagree on the nature and speed of future interest rate decisions by the ECB. We also consider the role of uncertain dynamics of future inflation and the economic recovery in the euro area to explain the dispersion of interest rate expectations. For this purpose, we asked the participants in the June 2024 wave of the ZEW's Financial Market Survey for their expectations regarding interest rate decisions at upcoming Governing Council meetings. We condition the individual responses on the respondents' short- and medium-term inflation and GDP growth expectations and supplement our findings with similar evidence for the US. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewpbs:300832 |
| By: | Alexander Abramov (RANEPA); Alexander Radygin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Maria Chernova (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In contrast to 2022, a rare phenomenon of negative returns on almost most categories of financial assets happened due to a sharp increase in interest rates by central banks of developed countries, the year 2023 was a relatively favorable year of recovery growth in returns on these assets. The economies of the United States and the European Union avoided recession, and the decline in inflation offered financial markets hope for lower interest rates in 2024. To assess the investment attractiveness of different financial instruments in 2023, it is essential to analyze data on returns and risks of 147 investment strategies popular in the world, represented by stock indices and large investment funds over different time horizons in 2014–2023. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, stock market, bond market, corporate bond market, derivatives market, private investors |
| JEL: | G01 G12 G18 G21 G24 G28 G32 G33 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2024-1324 |
| By: | Martin, Will; Minot, Nicholas |
| Abstract: | This paper begins with a survey of recent commodity price developments that highlights the magnitude of this price surge and identifies the rapid rise in wheat prices as a key element. The analysis in this paper focuses on the extent to which domestic markets are insulated from these changes and on the resulting impacts on world prices. An econometric analysis using Error Correction Models finds stable long-term relationships between world wheat prices and most domestic prices of wheat and wheat products, but with considerable variation across countries in the rate of price transmission. A case study of the price shocks during the Covid pandemic and the Ukraine food price crisis finds that price insulation roughly doubled the overall increase in world wheat prices and raised their volatility both during periods of price increase and price decline. |
| Date: | 2024–07–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:dyqek |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Moldova’s economic recovery from the multiple shocks is proceeding, albeit at a slower pace than expected. Progress towards EU accession continues. Presidential elections are scheduled in October, to be combined with a referendum on EU accession. |
| Date: | 2024–07–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/208 |
| By: | Dhaka, Surjeet Singh; Kyire, Samuel Kwabena Chaa; Asare, Jeffery Kofi |
| Abstract: | Climate change has become a global burden. In part, technological innovations (TIs), foreign direct investments (FDIs), and agricultural growth are potential factors contributing to overall emissions. However, empirical evidence on the interplay of these variables on CO2 emissions is rare in literature, particularly for BRICS countries, which is essential to investigate. In this quest, we sourced panel data obtained from World Development Indicators and FAO repositories. We found cross-sectional dependency in the panel data. Hence, the Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag model (Pooled Mean Group regression) was used to analyse the short-run and long-run relationship. We found a long-run negative effect of TI on CO2 emissions, but no short-run effect was observed. Likewise, agricultural growth had positive significant effect on CO2 emissions only in the long-run. The Granger Causality test confirmed a causal relationship between agricultural growth, TI, and CO2 emissions in the BRICS countries. We recommend that BRICS countries should invest in innovative technologies, especially those that facilitate green production and renewable technologies to minimize greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, there is a need to embrace sustainable agricultural practices like tree-crop plantations, sustainable production technologies, and less-carbon-emitting inputs used to minimize the emissions from agriculture. |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness |
| Date: | 2024–08–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cfcp15:344316 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), created in September 2023 by the three military governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso as a counterweight to ECOWAS and the postcolonial influence of France and other Western countries, announced the creation of a confederation of its three countries in July 2024. The AES have more in common than the other countries of the Sahel. First, they are the centre of the Sahel and most vulnerable to jihadism. They figure among the least developed countries, with 40% to 50% of the population living in poverty. They are also landlocked countries with vast desert areas, making them more vulnerable to climate change. Finally, they are the countries with the highest population growth in the Sahel, with an average of six children per woman. The creation of the AES came amid a decade of escalating unrest in the Sahel, fuelled by the aftermath of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. The resulting instability caused rampant arms trafficking and the rise of armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The Sahel region accounts for a staggering 43% of global terrorist deaths, more than South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa combined. AES counterinsurgency operations will focus on the Liptako-Gourma region, the vast and porous border area where the three states meet, a borderland notorious for its instability. Previous leaders have often put French interests ahead of those of their own people, allowing the continued exploitation of the region's natural resources, including uranium, gold and manganese, without much benefit to the local population. In the face of critical comments from the AU about the AES countries' exit from ECOWAS, the former rejected any interference in their internal affairs. The AES confederation will expand the operational space of the junta alliance and consolidate its military and economic partnership with Russia and China, as well as Turkey and Iran. However, the AES secession undermines the legitimacy of ECOWAS by hindering regional economic and security integration and further complicating the return to democratization. The confederation will seek to absorb new members such as Chad, Guinea and Sudan to further strengthen its power and legitimacy as an alternative regional bloc. However, a divided Sahel will make tackling regional challenges even more difficult. If the AES were to replace the CFA franc with its own currency, as announced, and other Francophone countries in the UEMOA were to follow suit, this would require a fundamental restructuring of both the UEMOA and ECOWAS and finally also call into question the introduction of the ECO, the common West African currency, envisaged for 2027. |
| Abstract: | Die Allianz der Sahelstaaten (AES), die im September 2023 von den drei Militärregierungen Malis, Nigers und Burkina Fasos als Gegengewicht zur ECOWAS und dem postkolonialen Einfluss Frankreichs und anderer westlicher Länder gegründet wurde, kündigte im Juli 2024 die Gründung einer Konföderation ihrer drei Länder an. Die AES haben mehr gemeinsam als die anderen Länder der Sahelzone. Erstens sind sie das Zentrum des Sahel und am anfälligsten für Dschihadismus. Sie gehören zu den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern, wobei 40% bis 50 % der Bevölkerung in Armut leben. Außerdem sind sie Binnenländer mit riesigen Wüstengebieten, was sie anfälliger für den Klimawandel macht. Schließlich sind sie die Länder mit dem höchsten Bevölkerungswachstum in der Sahelzone, mit durchschnittlich sechs Kindern pro Frau. Die Gründung der AES erfolgte inmitten eines Jahrzehnts eskalierender Unruhen im Sahel, die durch die Nachwirkungen der NATO-geführten Intervention in Libyen im Jahr 2011 angeheizt wurden. Die daraus resultierende Instabilität hat zu einem grassierenden Waffenhandel und dem Aufstieg bewaffneter Gruppen geführt, die mit al-Qaida und dem Islamischen Staat in Verbindung stehen. Die Sahelzone ist für erschreckende 43 % der weltweiten Todesfälle durch Terroristen verantwortlich, mehr als in Südasien, der Nahe Osten und Nordafrika zusammen. Die Aufstandsbekämpfungsoperationen der AES werden sich auf die Liptako-Gourma Region konzentrieren, das riesige und durchlässige Grenzgebiet, in dem die drei Staaten aufeinandertreffen, ein Grenzland, das für seine Instabilität berüchtigt ist. Frühere Staatschefs haben die französischen Interessen oft denen ihres eigenen Volkes vorgezogen und die fortgesetzte Ausbeutung der natürlichen Ressourcen der Region, darunter Uran, Gold und Mangan, ermöglicht, ohne dass die lokale Bevölkerung davon viel profitiert hätte. Angesichts kritischer Äußerungen der AU über den Austritt der AES-Länder aus der ECOWAS verbaten sich erstere jede Einmischung in ihre inneren Angelegenheiten. Die Konföderation der AES wird den operativen Spielraum des Bündnisses der Juntas erweitern und ihre militärische und wirtschaftliche Partnerschaft mit Russland und China sowie der Türkei und dem Iran festigen. Die Abspaltung der AES untergräbt allerdings die Legitimität der ECOWAS, indem sie die regionale Wirtschafts- und Sicherheitsintegration behindert und die Rückkehr zur Demokratisierung weiter erschwert. Die AES wird versuchen, neue Mitglieder wie den Tschad, Guinea und den Sudan aufzunehmen, um ihre Macht und Legitimität als alternativer regionaler Block weiter zu stärken. Eine geteilte Sahelzone wird die Bewältigung regionaler Herausforderungen jedoch noch schwieriger machen. Wenn die AES wie angekündigt, den Franc CFA durch eine eigene Währung ersetzt, und dem andere frankophone Länder der UEMOA folgen würden, würde das eine grundlegende Umstrukturierung sowohl der UEMOA als auch der ECOWAS erfordern und schließlich auch die für 2027 geplante Einführung des ECO, der neuen gemeinsamen westafrikanischen Währung, wieder in Frage stellen. |
| Keywords: | Alliance of Sahel States, Sahel, ECOWAS, UEMOA |
| JEL: | F15 F35 F52 F53 F54 H77 N17 O17 O55 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300869 |
| By: | Ivan Boldyrev |
| Abstract: | What are the effects of authoritarian regimes on scholarly research in economics? And how might economic theory survive ideological pressures? The article addresses these questions by focusing on the mathematization of economics over the past century and drawing on the history of Soviet science. Mathematics in the USSR remained internationally competitive and generated many ideas that were taken up and played important roles in economic theory. These same ideas, however, were disregarded or adopted only in piecemeal fashion by Soviet economists, despite the efforts of influential scholars to change the economic research agenda. The article draws this contrast into sharper focus by exploring the work of Soviet mathematicians in optimization, game theory, and probability theory that was used in Western economics. While the intellectual exchange across the Iron Curtain did help advance the formal modeling apparatus, economics could only thrive in an intellectually open environment absent under the Soviet rule. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.14315 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Uzbekistan’s growth momentum continues on the back of far-reaching structural reforms to liberalize its economy, favorable commodity prices, and notable increases in financial and income flows. Leveraging the remarkable progress that has been achieved in the last seven years, the authorities remain steadfast in their commitment to continue their policy and reform agenda—as shown by the recent energy price reform—and to address the remaining challenges of reducing the role of the state, accelerating productivity growth, bringing down inflation, and stepping up some key structural reforms that have proceeded at a slower pace than desired. |
| Date: | 2024–07–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/210 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Selected Issues |
| Date: | 2024–07–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/211 |
| By: | Kaoutar Saboni (ENCGK - ENCG University Ibn Tofail of Kenitra, Morocco); Laila Bennis (ENCGK - ENCG University Ibn Tofail of Kenitra, Morocco); Nour-Eddine Anguer (ENCGK - ENCG University Ibn Tofail of Kenitra, Morocco) |
| Keywords: | Moroccan economy Covid19 crisis Ukraine-Russia crisis Rainfall shocks sectoral strategies, Moroccan economy, Covid19 crisis, Ukraine-Russia crisis, Rainfall shocks, sectoral strategies |
| Date: | 2024–05–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04648945 |