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on Confederation of Independent States |
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Issue of 2024‒07‒22
24 papers chosen by |
| By: | Huterer, Manfred; Sahm, Astrid |
| Abstract: | Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 also called the sovereignty of Belarus into question. The country served as a launching pad for the attack, thus becoming a co-aggressor. However, relations between Minsk and Moscow changed the longer the war has lasted. Belarusian leader Lukashenka has increasingly acted like a self-confident war service provider toward Kremlin boss Putin. At the same time, he has been able to avoid any direct military involvement and has sought to preserve his chance at serving as a mediator. Nevertheless, Belarus' structural dependence on Russia has continued to increase in many areas. Right now, this gradual loss of sovereignty can still be reversed. In order for this to remain the situation, the EU and Germany must not write the country off. |
| Keywords: | Belarus, Russia, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Alexander Lukashenka, Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Union State of Russia and Belarus |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:299528&r= |
| By: | Klein, Margarete |
| Abstract: | In its war of attrition against Ukraine, the Kremlin is counting on outnumbering the enemy over a long period in terms of both hardware and personnel. Following the unpopular partial mobilisation in autumn 2022, the recruitment of contract soldiers and volunteer fighters was stepped up significantly in order to conceal the human costs of war. At the same time, the 'Wagner mutiny' showed that the diffusion of the structures of violence as part of the covert mobilisation poses risks for the regime. For this reason, control over the volunteer formations has been tightened, while the Kremlin is laying the groundwork for a new round of compulsory mobilisation. However, Russia is not only recruiting for the war against Ukraine; the plan to increase the number of soldiers to 1.5 million clearly shows that the Kremlin is preparing for a prolonged confrontation with the West.. |
| Keywords: | Vladimir Putin, Yevgenii Prigozhin, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Russia, war against Ukraine, militarisation of Russian foreign policy, "compulsory mobilisation", National Guard, soldiers, Cossacks, reservists, conscripts, volunteers, mobiki, kontraktniki, private military companies (PMCs), partial mobilisation, confrontation with the West, number of casualties, Georgia, Crimea, Donbas, NATO, EU |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:299536&r= |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | The dynamics of Austria’s economic relations with the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – and with Russia have deviated from those of the EU in several important ways. During the decade preceding the war in Ukraine, Austrian trade with the region generally developed less dynamically than EU trade, as trade with countries that did not sign Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) with the EU – unsurprisingly –underperformed. However, Austrian investments in Russia have shown greater resilience than EU investments, especially since the start of the war in Ukraine. Austria ranks third from bottom among EU member states for the share of companies that have completely withdrawn from Russia or are in the process of doing so, probably explaining in part why its exports to Russia have suffered much less than EU exports. In addition, chemicals, including pharmaceuticals, which have been little affected by sanctions, account for a large share of Austrian exports. Also, unlike the EU, Austria’s dependence on Russian natural gas remains high, partly for geographical reasons and also because of contractual obligations between Austria’s ÖMV and Russia’s Gazprom. Austria would be well advised to build on its record of economic involvement in the EaP region and capitalise on the new opportunities offered by the improved EU accession prospects of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. |
| Keywords: | EU Eastern Partnership countries, Austria, EU, trade, investment, gas dependence |
| JEL: | F14 F21 Q40 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:81&r= |
| By: | Bayerlein, Michael; Böttcher, Miranda; Rudloff, Bettina; Villarreal, Pedro A. |
| Abstract: | In the European summer of 2027, the world faces a threat, not only to human health but also to biological diversity and food security. An alarming scenario is emerging: The rapidly thawing permafrost in the Russian tundra has released an unknown form of anthrax that is primarily transmitted by birds. European efforts to collaborate with Russia in combating the spread of this pathogen are being met with resistance. |
| Keywords: | pathogens, permafrost, climate change, anthrax, Russia, global health, health threats, global health governance architecture |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:299529&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to have a devastating economic and social impact. Skillful policymaking supported by external financing has helped maintain macroeconomic and financial stability despite challenging circumstances, and the authorities continue to advance important structural reforms. Better-than-expected growth outturns in 2023 and in 2024Q1 demonstrate the resilience of the economy. Approval by the United States of the US$61 billion financial and military support package, and by the European Council of the €50 billion Ukraine Facility and its underlying Ukraine Plan are positive developments following a challenging period of liquidity strains in early 2024. However, headwinds include the rising risks of a prolonged war and the economic impact of the attacks on energy infrastructure and mobilization. |
| Date: | 2024–06–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/199&r= |
| By: | Gaetan de Rassenfosse (Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne); Tetiana Murovana (Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne); Wolf-Hendrik Uhlbach (Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | The ongoing war in Ukraine has unsettled the Ukrainian scientific community in ways that have not been quantified. Some scientists have left the country or changed jobs. For those who remain in research, the destruction of civil infrastructure and psychological stress may dramatically slow down research progress. Based on a survey of over 2, 500 Ukrainian scientists, we estimate that by the Fall of 2022, around 18.5 percent of the population of Ukrainian scientists fled the country, and around 17.6 percent left academia or stopped conducting research. Considering reductions in research time, we estimate that Ukraine has lost a fifth of its research capacity and, should the war stop today, about seven percent of its scientists. We further utilize the survey to shed more light on scientists who left the country and those who remained in Ukraine and conclude by discussing potential policy measures. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine; Science; Mobility; War; Research; Migration |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iip:wpaper:25&r= |
| By: | Vlasiuk, Volodymyr; Cooper, Luke; Milakovsky, Brian |
| Abstract: | How the state is interacting with markets is a key consideration in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. A critical question concerns whether the state can develop the capacity to correct market failures in order to support the security and wellbeing of the population and answer the challenges of the on-going war. This research report seeks to address this question by investigating the relationship between market and state in the contemporary Ukrainian economy. The report is published as part of a collaborative partnership between Ukraine Industry Expertise and PeaceRep’s Ukraine programme. It builds upon previous work that demonstrated how Ukraine had a range of in-country assets that could be mobilised to ‘insource the recovery’ through the adoption of policies designed to support and maximise domestic output. |
| JEL: | E6 N0 |
| Date: | 2024–06–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:123813&r= |
| By: | Hebb, Barrie; Cooper, Luke |
| Abstract: | The research report presents a wide range of macroeconomic data to assess the strength of the Ukrainian economy and, by extension, the state’s capacity to meet its external liabilities. If debt sustainability is measured against the size and productive capacity of the working population, this unfortunately underlines the scale of the challenge that Ukraine faces. Even prior to the full-scale invasion, demographic trends such as the age dependency ratio were moving in the wrong direction. Furthermore, the incomes of the working population are chronically low and have worsened dramatically since February 2022. The number of Ukrainians with incomes at or below subsistence in Ukraine is often underestimated in data collected in workplaces with 10 or more formally employed workers. Taking a more holistic view of the data that captures in particular levels of rural poverty unfortunately shows that the income situation is worse than is often reported. This report makes a number of warnings on the Ukrainian state’s fiscal position, specific recommendations to Ukraine’s donors, and recommendations for the Government of Ukraine’s economic strategy. The aim is to realise Ukraine’s significant economic potential through a strategy for sustainable improvements in incomes, productivity and productive capacity. |
| JEL: | E6 N0 |
| Date: | 2024–06–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:123811&r= |
| By: | Shushan Movsisyan (ASUE - Armenian State University of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The more developed the country's economy, the larger the share of services in the structure of GDP, which speaks of the importance of this sector from the point of view of economic development. To foster the development of the service sector, it is important to understand the directions in which the country has potential. The paper explores the competitiveness of services exports among EAEU member states, based on the evaluation of comparative advantages. The dynamics of comparative advantages before and after the formation of EAEU were observed. The analysis revealed that EAEU member states possess comparative advantages in traditional services, such as transport services, construction, and travel. The comparative advantages changed slightly during the five years of the Union's existence, but underwent more significant changes against the backdrop of the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war. In particular, Russia's comparative advantages have decreased in transport services. At the same time, Russia's comparative disadvantages in contemporary services decreased. Belarus and Armenia have gained significant comparative advantages in the field of telecommunications, computer and information services, with the latter also excelling in travel services. |
| Abstract: | Чем развита экономика страны, тем больше доля услуг в структуре ВВП, что подчеркивает важность этого сектора с точки зрения экономического развития. Для содействия развитию сферы услуг важно понимать направления, в которых страна имеет потенциал.В статье исследуется конкурентоспособность экспорта услуг среди государств-членов ЕАЭС на основе оценки сравнительных преимуществ. Проведен анализ динамики сравнительных преимуществ до и после формирования ЕАЭС. Анализ показал, что государства-члены ЕАЭС обладают сравнительными преимуществами в экспорте традиционных услуг, таких как транспорт, строительство и туризм. За пять лет существования Союза они изменились незначительно, но более существенные изменения претерпели на фоне российско-украинской войны 2022 года. В частности, сравнительные преимущества России снизились в сфере транспортных услуг. В то же время уменьшились сравнительные недостатки России в сфере современных услуг. Беларусь и Армения получили значительные сравнительные преимущества в сфере телекоммуникаций, компьютерных и информационных услуг, причем последняя также получила преимущество в сфере туристических услуг. |
| Keywords: | comparative advantages, NRCA index, services, exports, EAEU |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04601730&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Growth decelerated to 1.7 percent in 2023 from 4.2 percent in 2022 but has proven resilient despite ongoing headwinds, such as spillovers from the war in Ukraine and from the economic slowdown in Europe. Inflation has moderated from 17.4 percent in October 2022 to 6 percent, on average, in 2023, but wage pressures linger due to minimum wage increases and emigration. The fiscal balance deteriorated from a surplus of 0.9 percent in 2022 to a deficit of 1.7 percent in 2023, reflecting the accumulated impact of several permanent increases in public wages and social benefits. Progress on structural reforms remains limited, although EU accession talks appear to have sparked some reform ambition. |
| Date: | 2024–06–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/175&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | For two years in 2021–23, a political stalemate hampered policymaking as Bulgaria needed to stir the exit from the pandemic, cope with the global inflation shock and the fallout of Russia’s war in Ukraine, secure its energy supply, implement reforms to unlock EU Funds, and prepare for euro adoption. The government formed in June 2023 prioritized euro and Schengen areas accession, NGEU funds delivery, and judicial reforms. It fell in March 2024, increasing the risk of delays in key policy decisions. Despite the succession of international and domestic shocks, the economy showed resilience and can achieve a soft landing if inflation decelerates towards 2 percent as expected under the baseline. Moreover, longstanding intertwined challenges remain: convergence toward EU average income is lagging peers, investment is low, perception of corruption is large, inequality is high, poverty is widespread, the population is shrinking, and the growth model still relies largely on brown energy. |
| Date: | 2024–06–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/163&r= |
| By: | Jang, Youngook (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Cheolwon (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Na, Suyeob (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Hyun-Jean (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lim, You-Jin (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 본 보고서에서는 최근 EU 및 유럽 주요국에서 제시하고 있는 경제안보 분야 대중국 전략을 문헌조사, 통계분석, 현지조사, 전문가간담회를 통해 다각도로 분석하였다. EU 및 유럽 주요국이 제시하고 있는 다양한 산업 및 통상 정책에는 중국의 경제적, 정치적 위상 제고에 대응하여 자국의 산업경쟁력을 보호하기 위한 노력이 반영되고 있다. 유럽 주요국의 대중국 전략 변화가 우리 기업에 미치는 영향을 파악하여 대응하는 한편, 우리나라의 대중국 전략을 수립하는 참고자료로 활용할 필요가 있다. This report analyzes the recent strategies of the EU and major European countries regarding economic relations with China, through literature review, statistical analysis, field research, and expert interviews. Chapter 2 of this report examines the background to the recent changes in the public attitudes towards China and ‘China Strategy' of Europe. China’s rising economic and diplomatic profile has led to an intensification of the U.S.-China trade dispute since the mid-2010s. The COVID-19 pandemic has turned the U.S.-China conflict into a competition over values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. The West has intensified its criticism of the Chinese Communist Party regime, including human rights issues and media control. After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, China’s pro-Russian behavior further aggravated European perceptions of China, and countries responded by establishing official ‘China Strategy’. Chapter 2 further examines the trends and determinants of public attitudes towards China in major European countries. The trend of rising anti-China sentiment over the past decade was evident in the data from Eurobarometer, Pew Research Center, and YouGov. Regression analyses showed that the trade deficit is the most significant factor in worsening public perceptions of China, while trade with China itself is effective in improving public perceptions. Institutional factors, such as the rule of law, were not significant in the full sample, but were found to be significant in explaining changes in public attitudes after 2017, when the regime competition with China began to intensify. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | EU; economic security; China; China Strategy |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_027&r= |
| By: | Sylvain Bellefontaine; Benoît Jonveaux; Maxime TERRIEUX; Alix Vigato; Morgane Salomé; Gaëlle BALINEAU; Vincent Joguet; Laura Marie; Thibault Vasse |
| Abstract: | 2024 was supposed to be a year of rate cuts, ending with a question mark over the US elections which would reopen the scenarios for 2025… Yet, firstly, inflation is struggling to leave the stage and give way to widespread and significcant rate cuts.Secondly, political factors already seem to be gaining the upper hand by bringing about fresh uncertainty over the path of the global economy in the short and medium term.While oil prices display good resistance (with an upward trend) to the tensions in the Middle East, and grain prices seem to be returning to the levels that prevailed before the war in Ukraine, the continuation and/or extension of the conflicts could permanently change certain supply chains and certain commodity markets. The first consequence would be volatile and structurally higher inflation, potentially driven by an acceleration and intensification of climatic disasters. Finally, the reconstitution of rival blocs could adversely affect trade, financial, and migration flows, which had reduced inequalities and increased productivity across the globe.For this reason, in this latest edition in the MacroDev Semestrial Panorama series, we have decided to put the spotlight on the path of foreign direct investment (FDI), which stands as both a weak signal of the geoeconomic reconfiguration and a fundamental element of the sustainability of external accounts, development, and the economic convergence of emerging and developing countries. |
| Keywords: | Égypte, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibie, Sénégal, Argentine, Costa Rica, Arménie, Turquie |
| JEL: | E |
| Date: | 2024–07–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:avg:wpaper:en16927&r= |
| By: | Brüggemann, Anke; Rode, Johannes |
| Abstract: | A recent analysis of the KfW Climate Barometer revealed that in the year 2022, 4.3% or approx. 160, 000 private-sector firms in Germany invested in the generation and storage of electricity or heat from renewable energy sources. That was significantly more than in the previous year. The increase in fossil fuel prices caused by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has made investment in renewables more attractive. More than half of firms (54%) in Germany were already using electricity from renewables. But only one in ten businesses was using heat from renewable energy. Both electricity and heat from renewables are more common in larger enterprises than in smaller firms. The provision of heat in industry and commerce is still largely based on burning fossil fuels. That is why it is now necessary to place a stronger focus on the decarbonisation of industrial process heat supply. |
| Date: | 2024–04–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:145732&r= |
| By: | Brüggemann, Anke; Rode, Johannes |
| Abstract: | Aktuelle Auswertungen des KfW-Klimabarometers zeigen, dass im Jahr 2022 4, 3 % oder rund 160.000 der privaten Unternehmen in Deutschland in die Erzeugung und Speicherung von Strom oder Wärme aus erneuerbaren Energien investiert haben. Das ist deutlich mehr als im Vorjahr. In Folge der durch den Angriffskrieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine gestiegenen Preise für fossile Energieträger wurden Investitionen in erneuerbare Energien attraktiver. Über die Hälfte der deutschen Unternehmen (54 %) nutzten bereits Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien. Nur jedes zehnte Unternehmen setzte dagegen Wärme aus erneuerbaren Energien ein. In größeren Unternehmen sind sowohl Strom als auch Wärme aus erneuerbaren Energien weiter verbreitet als in kleineren. Die Wärmebereitstellung in Industrie und Gewerbe basiert nach wie vor zum Großteil auf fossilen Energieträgern. Deshalb gilt es jetzt auch die Dekarbonisierung der industriellen Prozesswärmeversorgung stärker in den Fokus zu rücken. |
| Date: | 2024–04–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:145734&r= |
| By: | Kim, Yoonjung (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Cheolwon (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Oh, Taehyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Chorong (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kang, Yooduk (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) |
| Abstract: | 본 연구에서는 러시아의 우크라이나 침공 이후 EU의 추가 확대 가능성에 대한 고찰을 통해 향후 한-EU 경제협력 관련 정책 시사점을 제시한다. 기존의 EU 확대 관련 연구가 글로벌 금융위기 이전에 주로 수행된 반면, 본 연구는 금융위기 및 유로존 위기와 팬데믹 등을 거치며 나타난 변화를 반영한다는 점에서 차별성을 갖는다. 특히 중동부유럽 국가들의 EU 가입 이후 성과에 대한 평가와 함께 다양한 경제지표 및 거버넌스 지수 분석을 통해 신규 가입 후보국들의 현 상황을 세부적으로 진단하고, 기업 및 산업 구조에 대한 조망을 통해 우리나라의 대EU 진출 전략을 도출하였다. This study assesses the previous enlargement of the EU and investigates the potential enlargement EU in the future. The European Union has established itself as a politically and economically integrated community in the European region, and it continues to evolve. The biggest change in the EU in the last two decades was the massive enlargement of the EU to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 2004, when eight Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU together at the same time. The discussion of EU enlargement, which has been stagnant since the last enlargement when Croatia joined the EU, seems to have been revitalized by the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine. As further changes in the EU are becoming increasingly visible, the purpose of this study is to draw implications for Korea’s future strategy to cooperate with the EU candidate countries. To this end, Chapter 2 provides an understanding of the EU’s enlargement process, and Chapter 3 lays the groundwork for future conjectures through an economic and political assessment of existing Central and Eastern European countries since their accession to the EU. In addition, Chapter 4 examines the prospects for the accession of the candidate countries through a diagnosis of their current economies and governance, and Chapter 5 examines Korea’s cooperation with the existing Central and Eastern European countries and the current status of cooperation with the candidate countries. We conclude with the prospects for further enlargement of the EU and policy implications for Korea’s future cooperation in Chapter 6. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | enlargement; EU; Central and Eastern Europe; GDP; trade share; foreign direct investment |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_035&r= |
| By: | Sylvain Bellefontaine; Benoît Jonveaux; Maxime TERRIEUX; Alix Vigato; Morgane Salomé; Gaëlle BALINEAU; Vincent Joguet; Laura Marie; Thibault Vasse |
| Abstract: | 2024 devait être l’année de la baisse des taux, s’achevant par le point d’interrogation des élections américaines qui rouvrirait les scénarios pour 2025… Or, d’une part, l’inflation peine à quitter la scène pour laisser la place à des baisses de taux généralisées et significatives. D’autre part, les facteurs politiques semblent déjà prendre le dessus en faisant peser de nouvelles incertitudes sur la trajectoire de l’économie mondiale à court et moyen terme. Même si les cours du pétrole semblent bien résister (à la hausse) aux tensions au Moyen-Orient et ceux des céréales retrouver les niveaux qui prévalaient avant la guerre en Ukraine, la prolongation et/ou l’extension des conflits pourraient durablement altérer certaines chaines d’approvisionnement et certains marchés de matières premières. La première conséquence serait une inflation volatile et structurellement plus élevée, possiblement catalysée par une accélération et une intensification des catastrophes climatiques. Enfin, la reconstitution de blocs rivaux pourrait nuire aux flux commerciaux, financiers et migratoires, qui permettaient une réduction des inégalités et un accroissement de la productivité à l’échelle mondiale.C’est la raison pour laquelle nous avons choisi, pour ce nouveau panorama semestriel de la série Macrodev, de mettre les projecteurs sur la trajectoire des investissements directs étrangers (IDE), à la fois signaux faibles de la reconfiguration géoéconomique et éléments fondamentaux de la soutenabilité des comptes externes, du développement et de la convergence économique des pays émergents et en développement. |
| Keywords: | Égypte, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibie, Sénégal, Argentine, Costa Rica, Arménie, Turquie |
| JEL: | E |
| Date: | 2024–06–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:avg:wpaper:fr16927&r= |
| By: | Zilla, Claudia (Ed.) |
| Abstract: | Feminist foreign policy (FFP) provides a policy framework for government action and for processes and structures within ministries. The introduction of such a framework is linked to a change in policy that is intended to help reduce discriminatory asymmetric relations of power. FFP is a new political concept that has emerged in the context of increasing gender awareness in international politics. The Swedish government was the first to officially describe its foreign policy as feminist in 2014. Other countries from various regions have gradually followed suit. Germany joined the trend in March 2023, when the Federal Foreign Office published its guidelines for feminist foreign policy and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development published its strategy for a feminist development policy. Both ministries see their documents as unfinished concepts that - with the help of research - will be adapted and further developed. This study, with its 11 application-oriented analyses, can contribute towards this effort. In addition to the core elements of national FFP concepts, German and European policy towards selected countries (states in Eastern Europe as well as Turkey, the Palestinian territories and Iran) as well as individual policy areas and international instruments (trade policy, digital policy, migration, flight and displacement, stabilisation and sanctions) are examined with regard to the limits and potentials of implementing FFP. |
| Keywords: | feminist foreign and development policy, feminist foreign policy (FFP), discriminatory asymmetric relations of power, gender awareness, Federal Foreign Office, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Russia, Turkey, Palestinian territories, Iran, trade policy, digital policy, migration, flight and displacement, stabilisation, sanctions, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), "Women, Peace and Security" (WPS) |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:299226&r= |
| By: | Kang, Munsu (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Son, SungHyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Ryou, Kwangho (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Jieun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Han, Saerom (Sookmyung Women's University) |
| Abstract: | 중동·북아프리카 지역의 에너지 보조금 정책 개혁에 관한 논의는 정부 재정 건전화, 사회보장 서비스 확대를 위한 재원 확보, 기후변화 대응 및 탈탄소화를 근거로 지속적으로 이루어지고 있다. 그러나 2010년대 이후 이루어진 보조금 정책 개혁에 따라 물가가 급등하면서 사회적 불안정이 발생하는 계기가 되기도 하였다. 이에 본 연구에서는 2010~21년 사이 에너지 보조금 정책이 중동·북아프리카 지역 경제 활동과 환경에 미친 영향, 그리고 에너지 보조금에 관한 사회적 인식도 조사를 바탕으로 보조금 정책 개혁을 위한 정책 과제를 제시하였다. 에너지 보조금 개혁에 관한 논의는 역내 경제 성장, 사회적 영향, 그리고 환경적인 영향까지 종합적으로 고려해서 이루어져야 하는바, 이에 본 연구에서는 취약계층을 위한 사회 서비스 개선, 대중교통 시스템 및 에너지 효율성 개선, 재생에너지 지원 확대, 캠페인을 통한 인식 개선을 정책 과제로 제시하였다. In recent years, international efforts have been made to reduce fossil fuel-based energy subsidies as the energy transition has accelerated in response to climate change. As part of a social contract, energy subsidies have been used to stabilize domestic prices and stimulate the economy, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. As a result, per capita energy subsidies in the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter referred to as MENA) have reached the highest levels in the world, and excessive government spending has also been identified as a factor preventing the expansion of social services for the most vulnerable. In light of the decarbonization trends and research showing that energy subsidies contribute to air pollution, subsidy policies are at a critical crossroads between reduction and maintenance. However, the Arab Spring in 2011 occurred in countries that attempted to reduce energy subsidies and resulted in consumer prices rises contributing to political instability. More recently, the overall increase in energy subsidies since 2020 was also an attempt to stabilize the domestic situation by overcoming the economic downturn through the successive outbreaks of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian-Ukrainian war. Despite its importance, there is little research on the impact and social perceptions of energy subsidy policies in the MENA region with coverage since the late 2010s. To fill this gap, this study focuses on the impact of energy subsidy policies on the economy and environment, and social perceptionsof energy subsidies in the MENA region. Using satellite data such as nighttime lights and air pollution concentrations, this study examines trends in energy subsidy policies and levels in the MENA region in the 2010-2021 period. Lastly, we conducted an online survey to examine awareness of energy subsidy policy and policy reform in the MENA. Based on these findings, this study proposed recommendations for energy subsidy policy reform, taking into account the MENA context. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | Middle East and North Africa(MENA); climate change; energy subsidy reform; energy transition |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_018&r= |
| By: | Kinninmont, Jane; Werenfels, Isabelle |
| Abstract: | NATO's 2023 summit in Vilnius was dominated by Russia's war against Ukraine. The summit in Washington, D.C., in July 2024 will be influenced by an additional major conflict in NATO's neighbourhood: the war in Gaza and the related heightened tensions in the Middle East. These have also negatively impacted attitudes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region towards many of the Alliance's members. The Vilnius summit decision to reflect deeply on NATO's southern neighbourhood turned out to be timely. An independent expert group appointed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg contributed towards this reflection process. The group, which included the two authors of this paper, found there are shared security interests between NATO and countries in the south, including on counterterrorism and maritime security. Yet, security perceptions are far from identical, especially when it comes to the role of strategic competition. NATO needs to adapt its mindset to take advantage of opportunities for problem-solving cooperation with partners who may not share its views about international order, and who have concerns about the risk of importing a new Cold War. |
| Keywords: | NATO's 2023 summit in Vilnius, "360-degree approach" (NATO), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, counterterrorism, maritime security, African Union, Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:299539&r= |
| By: | Kim, Jeong-Gon (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Kyunghoon (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Pek, Jong-Hun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Nam, Yoojin (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Cho, Won-Deuk (Korea National Diplomatic Academy) |
| Abstract: | 본 연구에서는 외교·경제 측면에서 인도의 전략적 중요성이 높아지는 배경과, 주요국의 대인도 전략 변화 및 인도의 대응, 그리고 인도와 주요국 간 경제협력 어젠다를 분석했다. 또한 설문조사 및 인터뷰를 통해 한·인도 협력에 대한 양국 전문가의 시각을 조사했다. 본 연구에서는 인도태평양 시대 한·인도 경제협력의 중장기 방향으로 ‘지속성 있고 호혜적인 경제협력을 통한 신뢰관계 구축’을 강조하고, 양국간 경제협력의 핵심 과제로 제조업을 중심으로 한 호혜적 협력 다각화를 제안했다. With the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the Indo-Pacific region in the spotlight, India’s strategic value has come to the fore, and its eventual positioning in the G3 is more likely than ever. The United States and other like-minded countries are committed to building diplomatic, military, and economic ties with India. In response, India is more actively pursuing strategic autonomy. While increasingly estranged from China and relatively close to the United States, India is clearly seeking to minimize its dependence on any one country and maximize its autonomy to consider its own interests and make alliances on a case-by-case basis. This is true in the economic sphere as well as in foreign and security affairs. Therefore, it is important to understand the nature of the issue and India’s unique position and needs on it. For example, while India has some cooperation with China in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it opposes the Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, it continues to engage in military and economic exchanges with Russia, despite the cold shoulder from the US and other Western countries. Major players in the international community, such as the United States and Japan, have significantly strengthened their strategic economic cooperation with India in recent years, especially as they have begun to reshape their global supply chains. While complete decoupling from China is unlikely at least in the short term, it is clear that India is emerging as an alternative partner in the new Asia (Altasia). With a growing network of strategic, economic, and technological partnerships already centred on India, there is every likelihood that India will become a major player in global supply chains in the medium to long term. South Korea seems to have started to ride this wave. By adopting Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy to strengthen its role as a ‘global pivot’, the South Korean government has created an opportunity to share its strategic vision with India. It should develop the bilateral relationship into one of close strategic solidarity and cooperation, and adjust its approach to India. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | India; Indo-Pacific region; Korea-India economic cooperation |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_002&r= |
| By: | Vîntu, Denis |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to describe the economy of the Republic of Moldova from a neo-classical perspective, with an emphasis on the opening of the economy in a neo-Keynesian context. It was concluded that from the point of view of different indicators, the optimal model of accumulations to the state budget based on the Laffer curve is different: GDP-25 %, Inflation 30 %, Interest rate 20 %, unemployment rate 35 %, budget deficit 40 %, public debt 15% and exchange rate 44 % (maximum, which corresponds to the Nordic model of economic development). The research methods used by the author include identifying the trend of economic development, diagnostic analysis, scientifically based economic forecasting, ARIMA technique, extrapolation as regression analysis of time series The scientific and methodological approaches described in this work will serve as scientific support in the process of developing the scenarios of economic evolution. |
| Keywords: | Laffer curve, GDP, inflation, interest rate, unemployment rate, budget deficit, public debt, exchange rate, extrapolation, ARIMA technique, Student test, Fisher. |
| JEL: | H3 H30 H6 |
| Date: | 2024–03–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121133&r= |
| By: | Klingebiel, Stephan; Baumann, Max-Otto |
| Abstract: | Eine erneute Präsidentschaft von Donald Trump dürfte auf alle Themen der internationalen Beziehungen enorme Auswirkungen haben; relevant sind sie aufgrund der Weltmachtstellung der USA per se für alle Akteure. Trumps politische Inhalte unterscheiden sich gravierend von früheren republikanischen Präsidenten in den USA. Sein Populismus hat den konservativen Internationalismus gezwungen, zum Isolationismus zurückzukehren. In fünf Kurzanalysen beleuchten wir Handlungsfelder, die für globale nachhaltige Entwicklung und für den Globalen Süden von großer Bedeutung sind: (i) Grundzüge des internationalen Systems und multilaterale Ordnung, (ii) die Vereinten Nationen (VN), (iii) internationale Klimapolitik, (iv) Entwicklungspolitik und (v) Afrikapolitik. Diese Handlungsfelder haben jeweils ihre eigene Dynamik. Zugleich sollten sie als Teil einer internationalen Ordnung gesehen werden, die gegenwärtig im Umbruch ist. In allen Feldern dürfte sich ein ähnliches Muster zeigen: Rückzug aus multilateralen Arrangements; teils auch deren gezielte Unterminierung; Kürzung oder Streichung finanzieller Beiträge, wo amerikanische Interessen nicht unmittelbar tangiert erscheinen. Zudem dürfte Trump in den multilateralen Foren vereinzelt (wieder) die Konfrontation mit China und anderen als unliebsam erachteten Staaten suchen. Dies alles berührt europäische Interessen. Zum einen dürfte es sich auf die internationale Problemlösungsfähigkeit auswirken, etwa dabei, die globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele zu erreichen und den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen. Falls sich die USA an vielen Stellen zurückziehen, dürften sie so zum anderen letztlich China, Russland und deren verbündeten Staaten Einflussmöglichkeiten eröffnen. Unter Trump 2.0 wären die USA vermutlich erneut ein 'wichtiger Störenfried' der liberalen Weltordnung. Da sich ein globaler Umbruch vollzieht (wachsende Bedeutung Chinas und anderer Akteure des Globalen Südens etc.), dürfte eine von den USA ausgelöste Verkettung von Disruptionen empfindliche direkte und indirekte Folgen haben (Funktionsfähigkeit internationaler Organisationen; Druck, die Verteidigungshaushalte europäischer Länder zu erhöhen etc.). Während Trump ein Brandbeschleuniger struktureller Veränderungen in der internationalen Politik ist, dürfte eine fortgesetzte Biden-Regierung noch eine Zeitlang als Brandmauer wirken. Aber im Management von Weltordnungsumbrüchen könnte auch Biden sich als schwacher Partner erweisen. Unabhängig vom Ausgang der amerikanischen Präsidentschaftswahlen gilt es für europäische Akteure, ihre Politik für ein neues geopolitisches Zeitalter fit zu machen. Für Akteure, die an einem funktionierenden Multilateralismus interessiert sind, ist es ein Ansatzpunkt, in Foren Allianzen zu schaffen oder zu nutzen, die sich gegenüber dem US-Regierungsverhalten behaupten können. Grundsätzlich dürfte es vorteilhaft sein, viel stärker auf 'gemischte Allianzen' von Ländern mit unterschiedlichen Identitäten zu setzen ('Westen', 'Globaler Süden', regionale Zuschreibungen etc.). Wie die letzten Jahre gezeigt haben, birgt ein erneutes Blockdenken und -handeln Gefahren für gemeinsame Ansätze, etwa wenn es darum geht, Fortschritte im Bereich der internationalen Klimapolitik zu identifizieren. Beispielhaft könnten etwa transnationale urbane Klimaallianzen und die Bridgetown-Initiative zum Umbau der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen sein. |
| Keywords: | USA, Donald Trump, Populismus, Vereinte Nationen, Entwicklungspolitik, Afrika, Internationale Beziehungen, global governance, Multilateralismus, China |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:idospb:299531&r= |
| By: | Khamitkhanova, Aiganym; Paul, Anju Mary (New York University Abu Dhabi) |
| Abstract: | Kazakhstan scored 5.13 out of 10 in the GCPI, placing it in the “Maturing” band of the Index. Its score of 5.40 in Sub-Index A indicates that despite existing financial and employment protections during pregnancy and maternity leave, there are areas that require improvement, such as paternity and dependent care leave policies, and mother-friendly workplace policies. With a score of 4.87 in Sub-Index B, Kazakhstan shows some level of support for domestic workers. However, there are substantial gaps in ensuring fair employment, decent working and living conditions, labor rights, and protections for forced domestic workers. |
| Date: | 2024–06–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:cmqke&r= |