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on Confederation of Independent States |
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Issue of 2024‒06‒24
seventeen papers chosen by |
| By: | Aluykov, Maxim (King's College London); Gilev, Aleksei; Vyrskaia, Marina; Rumiantseva, Aleksandra; Zavadskaya, Margarita (University of Helsinki) |
| Abstract: | The first wave of the Panel Study of Russian Public Opinion and Attitudes (PROPA), conducted between March 13 and March 21, 2024, offers a comprehensive insight into the political and economic sentiment among Russian citizens. Run via an online survey involving 4, 757 participants, the study presents nuanced perspectives on the economic conditions, electoral integrity, and political landscape of Russia. The participants, all Russian residents 18 years old and older, completed the survey in 22 minutes on average, with incentives such as gift certificates. The demographic is slightly skewed towards younger women. Respondents with higher education were over-represented in the sample due to the nature of the online survey method. Responses indicate generally positive perceptions of the state of the economy. Al- though responses suggest a somewhat critical view of personal economic situations in the context of the war, with a significant number of respondents unable to afford expensive goods like cars, they manage day-to-day expenses successfully. This sentiment is crucial, as it underscores the prevailing economic discontent that is strongly correlated with voting strategies. Political support remains strong for President Vladimir Putin, with 71% expressing approval. However, this support does not indicate a unanimous support for the ongoing war in Ukraine, with only 43% of respondents claiming to support the war in response to a direct question. Our findings do not suggest noticeable presence of any preference falsification among the respondents recruited through online marketing panels when it comes questions about the war. The tension reveals a complex interplay of support and dissent, which is particularly pronounced between gender lines. The perceived legitimacy of election presents a dichotomy: while a significant majority consider the electoral processes fair, there is also a noticeable skepticism towards electoral malpractice, suggesting a reluctant acceptance of the status quo by many. Despite the high official records for Putin in the elections, the survey results suggest a disparity, with only 54.8% of the respondents supporting Putin. This difference points to the potential dissatisfaction not reflected in the official figures. Moreover, the acceptance of workplace mobilization and other electoral malpractice suggests a decline in citizens’ standards of free and fair elections. At the same time, respondents express balanced view on media where they get the news. Finally, most of the respondents answering the questions regarding Russia’s future expect their country to be strong and prosperous, while economic prosperity tend to be relatively more demanded than any kind of geopolitical greatness. Pessimists as well tend to focus more on future economic hardships. |
| Date: | 2024–05–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:ek8wy&r= |
| By: | Kluge, Janis |
| Abstract: | Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the terms of Russia-China economic relations. Economic cooperation with China has become vital for the Russian economy. Trade turnover between Russia and China has increased significantly since February 2022. However, Chinese companies remain hesitant about investing in Russia. Energy cooperation remains the backbone of Sino-Russian cooperation, but the expansion of Russian exports is hindered by infrastructure limitations. Russian arms exports have declined in recent years. Meanwhile, China exports large quantities of dual-use goods to Russia, which are urgently needed by the Russian military industry. Sino-Russian cooperation in the digital economy has been hit hard by Western sanctions. China's digital giants cancelled several projects in Russia due to fears of secondary U.S. sanctions. Russia's trade with China is mainly conducted in Chinese yuan. However, Russia continues to rely on the U.S. dollar for trade with the rest of the world. |
| Keywords: | Russia-China economic rlations, invasion of Ukraine, energy cooperation, arms exports, dual-use goods, Russian military industry, digital economy, yuan, U.S. dollar |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:296472&r= |
| By: | Haishi Li; Zhi Li; Ziho Park; Yulin Wang; Jing Wu |
| Abstract: | How do firms in neutral developing countries adjust their supply chains in response to geopolitical and economic fragmentation? Do they comply with or circumvent Western sanctions on Russia? Using comprehensive transaction-level bill of lading data from major developing countries, we study these questions in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War. We find that firms in non-sanctioning countries significantly reduced exports of sanctioned products to Russia (and Belarus) if their headquarters are located in sanctioning countries (i.e., sanctioning MNEs), highlighting MNEs’ role in propagating sanctions globally. Domestic firms in developing countries observed a relative increase in such exports, weakening the effect of Western sanctions. Sanctioning MNEs expanded exports of sanctioned products to both sanctioning and Russia-friendly countries, indicating a blend of compliance and non-compliance. Sanctioning MNEs significantly reduced imports from Russia (and Belarus) in financially risky sectors, consistent with the effect of financial sanctions. To strengthen the effectiveness of sanctions, sanctioning countries should use their MNE networks, induce domestic firms in neutral countries to comply, and prevent sanction avoidance of MNEs through indirect exports. |
| Keywords: | global supply chains, geopolitical risk, international conflict |
| JEL: | F14 F63 O19 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11110&r= |
| By: | Vuving, Alexander |
| Abstract: | This article examines how Vietnam has responded to the Russia-Ukraine war, how the war has impacted Vietnam’s foreign policy, and why Hanoi has behaved the way it has. It is organized into three major sections. The first discusses the impact of the Ukraine war on Vietnam’s strategic environment and grand strategy. It also outlines the broad contour of Vietnam’s grand strategy and identifies major possible directions along which Hanoi may steer its course in the future. The second section examines Russia’s unique role in Vietnam’s strategic calculus and Russian soft power in Vietnam. It also discusses the pre-war developments that strengthened Russia’s role and soft power, thus providing a larger context without which Vietnam’s responses to the war cannot be fully understood. The third section documents Vietnam’s domestic and foreign policy responses to the war. The article argues that although the Russia-Ukraine war has triggered diverse, even opposing, responses from Vietnam’s ruling elite, it has not changed the general direction of Vietnam’s foreign policy because it has not directly and fundamentally affected Vietnam’s quest for security, resources, and identity. However, the war posed moral and strategic dilemmas for Hanoi, tore the web of geopolitical partnerships upon which Vietnam relied to secure its place in the world, and threatened to shake Russia’s unique and critical role in Vietnam’s foreign relations. Hanoi responded by reinforcing the current paradigm of its foreign policy, performing a delicate balancing act between the great powers, and deepening ties with the major powerhouses in its surrounding region. In the long term, however, the costs of this “bamboo diplomacy” may outweigh its benefits. |
| Date: | 2024–05–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:e3rf4&r= |
| By: | Rudloff, Bettina; Mensah, Kristina; Wieck, Christine; Kareem, Olayinka; Montesclaros, Jose Ma Luis; Orden, David; Sonddergaard, Neils; Yu, Wusheng |
| Abstract: | This study contributes to the recent literature on geostrategic aspects of economic policy and the objective of economic security by addressing food security as a subcategory within economic security. Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this study analyses whether and how the relevance of food security as a national policy goal has changed. It focuses on the questions of whether countries’ policy choices towards this objective have initiated longer-term strategic shifts, rather than just acute reactions, and analyses the extent to which these adjustments are influenced by underlying geopolitical considerations. To answer these questions, developments in food security policies are identified, focusing primarily on the perspective of security of supply. This perspective fits with the recent political focus and current initiatives by many countries aiming at national economic and supply security in general. |
| Keywords: | Crop Production/Industries, Food Security and Poverty, International Relations/Trade |
| Date: | 2024–04–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iatrcp:343001&r= |
| By: | Marcel Caesmann; Janis Goldzycher; Matteo Grigoletto; Lorenz Gschwent |
| Abstract: | The spread of propaganda, misinformation, and biased narratives from autocratic regimes, especially on social media, is a growing concern in many democracies. Can censorship be an effective tool to curb the spread of such slanted narratives? In this paper, we study the European Union’s ban on Russian state-led news outlets after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. We analyze 775, 616 tweets from 133, 276 users on Twitter/X, employing a difference-in-differences strategy. We show that the ban reduced pro-Russian slant among users who had previously directly interacted with banned outlets. The impact is most pronounced among users with the highest pre-ban slant levels. However, this effect was short-lived, with slant returning to its pre-ban levels within two weeks post-enforcement. Additionally, we find a detectable albeit less pronounced indirect effect on users who had not directly interacted with the outlets before the ban. We provide evidence that other suppliers of propaganda may have actively sought to mitigate the ban’s influence by intensifying their activity, effectively counteracting the persistence and reach of the ban. |
| Keywords: | Censorship, policy effectiveness, text-as-data, media slant |
| JEL: | D72 D78 L82 P16 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:446&r= |
| By: | International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) |
| Abstract: | IFPRI’s 2023 Annual Report offers highlights from our research around the world and of our analysis and communications on addressing global challenges that contribute to hunger and malnutrition. In 2023, IFPRI continued the critical work on crisis and resilience-building that began with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and rising food prices. Our research also continued to inform policymakers and stakeholders on climate resilience and sustainability, healthy diets and nutrition, inclusive and efficient food systems, institutions and governance, and rural transformation, all with attention to gender and the world’s most vulnerable people, with the goals of reducing poverty and ending hunger and malnutrition. |
| Keywords: | WORLD; resilience; nutrition; food systems; climate change |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:annrep:2023&r= |
| By: | Postepska, Agnieszka (University of Groningen); Voloshyna, Anastasiia (University of Groningen) |
| Abstract: | Following the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022, over a quarter of the Ukrainian population became displaced, with many seeking refuge across Europe. Czechia emerged as a key destination, granting Temporary Protection to approximately 433 thousand Ukrainians by the end of 2022, thus sheltering the highest per capita number of Ukrainian refugees worldwide. The swift enactment of the Lex Ukraine Act granted the refugees benefits typically reserved for permanent residents, such as unrestricted access to the labour market. This led to a notable increase in the number of Ukrainians officially employed and expanding Czechia's workforce. Using individual micro-level data from sixteen waves of the Labour Force Sample Survey (LFSS), collected between the 1st quarter of 2019 and the 4th quarter of 2022, we examine the short-term impact of the influx of the Ukrainian refugees on the labour market outcomes of locals in Czechia. Using several empirical strategies, including a two-way fixed effects model (TWFE), extensions to the canonical difference in differences (DiD) estimator, and matching on selective characteristics of individuals/districts and pre-treatment trends, we find consistent evidence that the influx of refugees had no economically meaningful impact on employment, unemployment, or inactivity rates within the local population, regardless of gender, educational level, or industry, noting that we find small negative effects on employment and positive effects on unemployment in sectors that experienced the largest influx of workers. However, we treat these results with caution due to the small sample sizes. Most importantly, we find consistent evidence of an increase in weekly working hours among local females in treated districts. This increase is primarily driven by workers with secondary education employed in the most affected sectors. |
| Keywords: | Ukrainian refugees, immigrants, local labour market, labour supply |
| JEL: | F22 J15 J21 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16965&r= |
| By: | Nebojša Vukadinović (IRM - Institut de Recherche Montesquieu - UB - Université de Bordeaux, Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | Alors que la guerre se poursuit, la reconstruction de l'Ukraine a débuté. Pour mieux appréhender et préparer les étapes à venir en Ukraine, les leçons de la reconstruction d'après-guerre des Balkans peuvent être utiles, d'autant que les donateurs et les organisations internationales en jeu sont les mêmes, tout comme les logiques et les phases de la reconstruction. L'article analyse donc les leçons de la reconstruction des Balkans. |
| Keywords: | Reconstruction, Western Balkans, Balkans, Ukraine, War, Post-war |
| Date: | 2024–05–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04567011&r= |
| By: | Kaim, Markus; Kempin, Ronja |
| Abstract: | Seit Beginn des russischen Angriffskrieges durchläuft die europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik eine Zeitenwende: Verteidigungsausgaben werden erhöht, kritische Fähigkeitslücken geschlossen. Die Nato stellt ihre Vitalität unter Beweis, im Rahmen der EU handeln die Mitgliedstaaten mutig und geschlossen. Gleichwohl werden nach den amerikanischen Präsidentschaftswahlen weitere Anpassungsleistungen erbracht werden müssen: Wenngleich unterschiedlich hergeleitet, sehen die außenpolitischen Programmatiken der Kontrahenten Biden und Trump vor, dass die Schutzmacht USA ihre Beteiligung an der europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik reduziert. Deutschlands wichtigste sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitische Aufgabe wird es künftig sein, gemeinsam mit seinen Verbündeten und Partnern die politische Souveränität und territoriale Integrität aller EU- und Nato-Mitglieder umfassend gegen Russland zu schützen. Daher wird Berlin vom internationalen Krisenmanagement Abstand nehmen müssen. Die politische Dimension der transatlantischen Lastenteilung sollte sich in einem europäischen Pfeiler der Nato manifestieren. Den Finanzbedarf der Bundeswehr muss Berlin ernsthaft abdecken, wohl wissend, dass das vereinbarte Zwei-Prozent-Ziel nur noch die unterste Grenze des Notwendigen darstellt. In der EU sollte Deutschland darauf hinwirken, dass die Mitgliedstaaten den von der EU-Kommission geforderten finanziellen Rücklagen für Verteidigungsausgaben ihre Zustimmung erteilen. Berlin sollte die EU‑Kommission dabei unterstützen, einen Rüstungsbinnenmarkt zu schaffen. Da die USA eine Nato-Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine langfristig ablehnen dürften, sollte die EU in Betracht ziehen, den Geltungsbereich ihrer Beistandsklausel auszudehnen. |
| Keywords: | USA, Europa, Sicherheitsbeziehungen, Nato, russische Angriffskrieg, Ukraine, Zeitenwende, EU, Beistandsklausel |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:296471&r= |
| By: | Kosyakova, Yuliya (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; Univ. Bamberg); Brücker, Herbert (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, BIM) |
| Abstract: | "Since the onset of Russia's war against Ukraine, the number of Ukrainian nationals in Germany has risen from 156, 000 to 1, 240, 000. Although many plan to return to Ukraine after the war, the duration of the conflict is leading an increasing number of them to consider staying in Germany for an extended period or permanently. Against this backdrop, this research report simulates various scenarios of labor market integration for Ukrainian refugees, based on the employment trajectories of previous refugees and migrants from the former Soviet Union. The scenarios aim to establish realistic expectations about the progress of labor market integration for Ukrainian refugees and to quantitatively assess the impact of specific factors. However, these conditional scenarios should not be misunderstood as forecasts, as they are based on strong assumptions and do not fully control for many relevant factors. In the baseline scenario, which is based on what we believe are the most realistic assumptions regarding demographic factors, family configurations, education, language skills, and institutional and economic conditions, the average employment rate for Ukrainian refugees is projected to be 45 percent after five years and 55 percent after ten years. Gender composition and family configuration have a dampening effect on employment rates, while education level and expected language skills development have a positive impact. The comparatively poor health of Ukrainian refugees also dampens employment rates. Conversely, institutional conditions, particularly the absence of asylum procedures, have a positive impact. Economic conditions, measured by labor market tightness, also have a strong influence. The current economic downturn has a negative effect, but the picture could quickly improve with an economic recovery due to increasing labor market tension amid demographic changes, which would likely increase employment rates compared to the baseline scenario. A key finding for integration policy is that language courses not only enhance language development but also significantly boost employment rates." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) |
| Keywords: | IAB-Open-Access-Publikation |
| Date: | 2024–05–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabfob:202409&r= |
| By: | Cantoni, Davide; Kao, Andrew; Yang, David Y.; Yuchtman, Noam |
| Abstract: | Citizens have long taken to the streets to demand change, expressing political views that may otherwise be suppressed. Protests have produced change at local, national, and international scales, including spectacular moments of political and social transformation. We document five new empirical patterns describing 1.2 million protest events across 218 countries between 1980 and 2020. First, autocracies and weak democracies experienced a trend break in protests during the Arab Spring. Second, protest movements also rose in importance following the Arab Spring. Third, protest movements geographically diffuse over time, spiking to their peak, before falling off. Fourth, a country’s year-to-year economic performance is not strongly correlated with protests; individual values are predictive of protest participation. Fifth, the US, China, and Russia are the most over-represented countries by their share of academic studies. We discuss each pattern’s connections to the existing literature and anticipate paths for future work. |
| Keywords: | protests; information technology; movements; political participation |
| JEL: | D72 P00 |
| Date: | 2024–02–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:123527&r= |
| By: | Patrick Honohan (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | For most of the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic, undershooting rather than overshooting had been the main inflation problem of the European Central Bank (ECB). During 2020, consumer prices in the euro area were falling; by the end of that year, average inflation since the introduction of the euro two decades earlier stood at only 1.6 percent per year. Things began to snowball in 2021. The 12-month inflation rate steadily accelerated. It reached double digits in the final quarter of 2022--more than twice the level it had ever reached since the euro's introduction in 1999. Four striking features emerge from a review of the unexpected surge in European inflation since 2021: (1) The ECB's monetary policy response lagged behind that of the US Federal Reserve, reflecting the more gradual evolution of inflation in the euro area and its distinct pattern of causes; (2) the range of inflation rates across different euro area countries has been unprecedented. This largely reflects the differential impact of war-related energy shocks (especially for natural gas piped from Russia) as well as the differential fiscal response by national governments partially insulating consumers from these shocks; (3) not all households were net losers from the inflation, with some benefiting from the fact that inflation reduced the real value of their indebtedness; and (4) the speed with which inflation was returning toward target during 2023 prompted concerns that the ECB's monetary tightening might have been pushed too far, prolonging the output slowdown. |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb24-2&r= |
| By: | Tamilina, Larysa; Hryniv, Dzvenyslava; Hulko, Pavlo |
| Abstract: | This research focuses on examining why young social media users might become trapped in a "social bubble" defined as seeking information that supports only one’s existing beliefs. We use a method called Qualitative Comparative Analysis to identify various combinations of factors that either contribute to or prevent the formation of these bubbles. Our findings reveal three combinations that tend to create social bubbles. All three involve young people's tendency to conform to dominant opinions and how often they expose themselves to diverse viewpoints. We have also identified one combination that leads to the opposite outcome, where young individuals reject the idea of being in a social bubble. Specifically, such persons are characterized by rarely conforming to dominant opinions, engaging in frequent debates, and regularly exposing themselves to diverse perspectives, even if they use only a few social media platforms. These results suggest that universities can play an important role in shaping social media behavior by teaching students to seek out diverse viewpoints and critically evaluate them to form their own independent opinions. |
| Keywords: | Social media, Social bubbles, QCQ, Young users, Ukraine |
| JEL: | C1 C5 C80 |
| Date: | 2024–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121084&r= |
| By: | Gerards Iglesias, Simon |
| Abstract: | China dominiert den Handel mit den wichtigsten Ländern des Globalen Südens. Zwischen 2019 und 2023 stieg der Handel Chinas mit dem Globalen Süden stark um 47 Prozent auf über 1, 9 Billionen US-Dollar an, sodass die EU und die USA als wichtigste Handelspartner abgelöst wurden. Deutschlands Warentausch stagnierte in den vergangenen Jahren mit den strategisch bedeutsamen Ländern, zudem wird Deutschland von Russland als Handelspartner eingeholt. Überkapazitäten und Sanktionen verändern die globalen Warenströme, auch zum Nachteil Deutschlands. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:295748&r= |
| By: | Jens-Christian Høj; Viktoriia Klimchuk |
| Abstract: | Before the war, the Ukrainian Pay-As-You-Go pension system required large government transfers. Since then, large scale emigration and an increasing number of people eligible for pensions have further increased the need for government transfers and exacerbated the challenges of population ageing. At the same time, the system provides relatively low pension benefits, despite fairly high contribution rates and short time in retirement. This reflects to a large degree a relatively narrow contribution base due to a large informal economy and underreporting of labour income. Reform of the system must encourage participation, secure liveable pensions, and safeguard the system’s fiscal sustainability. |
| Keywords: | informal labour markets, old-age poverty, pension systems, Public finances |
| JEL: | E6 H55 I32 J46 |
| Date: | 2024–06–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1805-en&r= |
| By: | Köppl-Turyna, Monika |
| Abstract: | Die Policy Note analysiert und vergleicht Elektrizitätspreise für gewerbliche und industrielle Kunden in Europa seit 2007. Historisch betrachtet zählten die Nettopreise für gewerbliche und industrielle Kunden in Österreich zu den niedrigeren in Europa. Jedoch änderte sich diese Situation abrupt mit dem russischen Angriffskrieg, was zu einem rapiden Anstieg der Erdgaspreise führte. Da Erdgas insbesondere in den Wintermonaten eine bedeutende Rolle für die Stromproduktion in Österreich spielt, hatten diese Preissteigerungen direkte Auswirkungen auf die Elektrizitätspreise. Es besteht die Gefahr, dass die Preise aufgrund der höheren Gaspreise weiterhin hoch bleiben werden. Obwohl die Nettostrompreise vor dem Krieg moderat waren, sind die Bruttopreise in Österreich über dem europäischen Schnitt gelegen, hauptsächlich aufgrund der hohen Nebenkosten (Abgaben und Netzentgelte), insbesondere für Großkunden. Der Anteil der Nebenkosten am Bruttopreis ist nur in wenigen europäischen Ländern höher als in Österreich. Dies beeinträchtigt trotz vergleichsweise niedriger Nettostrompreise die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit österreichischer Industrieunternehmen. Ein weiteres wichtiges Ergebnis der Analyse ist die starke (negative) Korrelation zwischen den Nettopreisen und dem Anteil erneuerbarer Energien in der Stromproduktion im internationalen Vergleich. Insbesondere Windenergie zeigt einen deutlichen Einfluss auf die Preise, wobei ein stärkerer Einsatz zu signifikanten Preisreduktionen führt. Ähnliche Effekte sind auch bei der Wasserkraft zu beobachten, wenn auch in geringerem Ausmaß. Prognosen deuten darauf hin, dass Österreich im Vergleich zu anderen europäischen Ländern einen langsameren Rückgang der Elektrizitätspreise für gewerbliche und industrielle Kunden verzeichnen wird. Dies ist vor allem auf den Einsatz von Erdgas in der Stromproduktion zurückzuführen, was zu höheren Terminpreisen für Strom führt. (...) |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ecoapn:296485&r= |