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on Confederation of Independent States |
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Issue of 2024‒06‒10
sixteen papers chosen by |
| By: | Ozili, Peterson K |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the global economic consequence of the Russia-Ukraine war over a four-month period from December 2021 to March 2022. Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. The study used the Pearson correlation and two-stage least square regression methods to assess the impact of Russian invasion of Ukraine on the global economy. It was observed that stock prices plunged on the day of the invasion. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic jointly led to a significant increase in the world price of food and crude oil. The rise in the world food price index after the invasion was driven by a significant increase in the price of dairy and oils. The rise in inflation in Russia and Ukraine after the invasion was followed by a rise in inflation in countries that imposed severe sanctions on Russia, and in countries that were not involved in the conflict in any way. |
| Keywords: | Russia, Ukraine, War, Inflation, Crisis |
| JEL: | E65 E66 O5 O52 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120781&r= |
| By: | Balma, Lacina; Heidland, Tobias; Jävervall, Sebastian; Mahlkow, Hendrik; Mukasa, Adamon N.; Woldemichael, Andinet |
| Abstract: | Russia's invasion of Ukraine has threatened global grain supplies as it reduces production and exports while increasing trade costs. While the overall share of Africa's trade with Ukraine and Russia is small, the concentration of imports in products such as wheat, other grains, and fertilizer is critical to food security. This paper investigates the long‐term impacts of the conflict on grain imports and prices in Africa. We use a long‐run general equilibrium trade model to study three scenarios that may evolve as a consequence of the conflict: (1) a heavily reduced Ukrainian production of wheat and other grains; (2) rising trade costs with Ukraine and Russia due to disrupted trade routes in the Black Sea and the sanctions against trading with Russia; and (3) an outright ban on Russian grain export. The model simulations show that the conflict severely affects grain imports, raising local prices for wheat and other grains, with especially strong effects in high import‐dependent countries. That creates risks for food security in some African countries. |
| Keywords: | agriculture, food insecurity, food prices, grain, trade, trade disruptions, war, wheat |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:294185&r= |
| By: | Röhl, André; Starz, Philipp |
| Abstract: | Die zunehmenden geopolitischen Spannungen, vor allem durch den Konflikt zwischen Russland und der Ukraine, stellen Deutschland und seine Unternehmen vor eine komplexe Bedrohungslage, die mit erhöhten Risiken aufgrund von Sabotageaktivitäten und Wirtschaftsspionage einhergeht. Vor diesem Hintergrund stehen deutsche Unternehmen vor erheblichen Herausforderungen, die eine proaktive und wachsame Herangehensweise erfordern, um die damit verbundenen Risiken zu mindern. Trotz der vielfältigen Herausforderungen bietet die heutige vernetzte digitale Landschaft Unternehmen auch technologische Möglichkeiten, ihre Abwehrmechanismen zu stärken und sich proaktiv vor potenziellen Bedrohungen zu schützen. Durch die Nutzung von Methoden und Technologien zur Datenerfassung aus mobilen Anwendungen (ADINT) können Unternehmen effektive Maßnahmen ergreifen, um ihre Sicherheit zu verbessern und sensible Daten zu schützen. |
| Abstract: | Increasing geopolitical tensions, particularly due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, present Germany and its companies with a complex threat situation that is accompanied by increased risks from sabotage activities and industrial espionage. Against this backdrop, German companies face significant challenges requiring a proactive and vigilant approach to minimize the associated risks. Despite the many challenges, today's interconnected digital landscape also offers companies technological opportunities to strengthen their defenses and proactively protect themselves from potential threats. By utilizing methods and technologies to collect data from mobile applications (ADINT), companies can take effective measures to improve their security and protect sensitive data. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:nbswps:294879&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The Montenegrin economy has rebounded strongly from the COVID-19 shock as private consumption grew, tourism recovered, and an influx of relatively affluent Russian and Ukrainian nationals due to Russia’s war in Ukraine has also contributed to growth. While debt-to-GDP ratios have improved largely due to nominal effects, fiscal weaknesses remain. After prolonged political uncertainty, a new coalition government formed in October 2023. Thereafter, a new Central Bank (CBCG) Governor was appointed in December 2023. |
| Date: | 2024–05–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/101&r= |
| By: | Michele Di Maio; Patricia Justino; Valerio Leone Sciabolazza; Cecilia Nardi |
| Abstract: | We show that the Russia-Ukraine-war-induced changes in the international price of wheat affected political violence in Asia. Using data from 13 countries and more than four million cell-level observations, we show that a higher wheat price increases political violence in areas that are more suitable to produce that crop. We interpret this evidence as consistent with a rapacity effect being at play: the higher value of agricultural output increases the incentive to violently appropriate it. Our result is robust to a number of falsification and robustness tests. |
| Keywords: | War, Commodity shocks, Trade, Political violence, Agricultural market performance, Asia |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2024-30&r= |
| By: | Ekeruche, Mma Amara |
| Abstract: | This paper examines in great detail the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Nigerian economy for the purpose of informing experts and non-experts alongside providing recommendations to the government1. Specifically, it evaluates the trade, monetary, fiscal and macroeconomic conditions of the economy since the war began, as well as debt vulnerabilities, whilst discussing the official response so far, and seeking to forge a path for the government and its international partners. |
| Keywords: | Russia-Ukraine War, Macroeconomy, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, Governance |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpm:notfdl:2302&r= |
| By: | Josina Solomons; Pamela Mjandana; Jean-Francois Mercier |
| Abstract: | In the past few decades, political factors have had a short-lived impact on the world economy and policy. The rise in geopolitical tensions in recent years, however, suggest that this trend could be changing. In the years following the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), investors seemed less concerned with political dynamics and more focussed on economic performance, such that global policy mostly reflected economic conditions rather than political risk at the time. Recently, geopolitics has become a complex mix of events, exogenous factors, and thematic risks. This complexity poses a heightened risk to the global economy, potentially leading to more frequent geopolitical surprises in the coming decade. Geopolitical tensions, including the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and the impact of climate change on food prices, are likely to remain on the radar for South Africa over the medium term, while general elections later this year also pose a threat to political stability. |
| Date: | 2024–04–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rbz:oboens:11054&r= |
| By: | Michael Reiterer (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | While Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine is shaking the liberal international order, the Global South is using the occasion to demand overdue reforms and complaining about the neglect of its acute structural problems. Alternative organisations, such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and various new development banks, are stepping out of the shadows. At the same time, efforts to achieve more economic security by making supply, production and value chains more resilient are also offering a chance for change – if well steered – to prevent industrial policy at home from turning into protectionism abroad. |
| Keywords: | BRICS, Global South, Economic Security, Indo-Pacific, managing change |
| JEL: | F13 F53 F55 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:75&r= |
| By: | Puzikova, Valentyna |
| Abstract: | The new EU Financial Facility for Ukraine presents both opportunities and controversial issues in the context of international assistance. This paper examines the multifaceted dynamics surrounding the Facility and highlights its potential benefits and challenges. Opportunities include substantial financial assistance that can stabilize Ukraine's economy, promote reforms, and foster development in various sectors. The Facility also provides incentives for reform efforts, particularly in the areas of governance, rule of law, and economic policy. Infrastructure development, support to civil society and the political signal of EU solidarity further enhance its potential benefits. To achieve these benefits and before using the received funds, it is important for Ukraine to make a conscious commitment to prioritize the areas of the economy for which these funds are intended, to calculate the growth rate of the external debt, the ability to meet its obligations, and to examine the assumed requirements. To minimize the risks of ineffective distribution of financial assistance and corruption schemes, bureaucratic simplicity of these processes is very important, especially when it comes to Ukraine, its reconstruction, and urgent needs. The implementation mechanism should be as simple as possible and easily verifiable and controllable, while ensuring the necessary transparency. |
| Keywords: | EU Financial Facility for Ukraine; financial support; prioritization the areas of the economy; loans; non-repayable assistance; grants; provisioning of guarantees |
| JEL: | F21 F50 F60 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-720&r= |
| By: | Michał Gradzewicz (Narodowy Bank Polski); Janusz Jabłonowski (Narodowy Bank Polski); Michał Sasiela (Narodowy Bank Polski); Zbigniew Żółkiewski (Narodowy Bank Polski) |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to assess the impact on the Polish economy of energy price shocks arising after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We computed both the impact of the energy shocks (separately for gas, oil and coal prices) on the real side of the economy, and the pass-through of energy prices to the overall price level. The former part of the analysis was simulated using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Polish economy while the price effects of the shocks were simulated using a dual Leontief price model. Additionally, the price model was augmented with the mechanism of nominal wage adjustment suggested by the theory. This methodological novelty is our original contribution to empirical economics. Our simulations indicate that the price shock for all energy goods of the magnitude observed in 2022 resulted in a decrease in GDP of about 2.9% relative to the baseline solution. Moreover, we document a strong pro-inflationary effect of rising energy prices. After a combined shock to energy prices the consumption deflator increases by 10.3% (when we include the spreading the price increases across the industries), but the effect is simulated at 15.4%, when we account for an additional nominal wage adjustments (ensuring no real wage changes). We show that due to the differences in forward and backward propagation of shocks, the oil price shock had the strongest impact on real aggregates, whereas prices were hit the strongest by the gas price shock. |
| Keywords: | CGE, dual Leontief model, energy shocks, price pass-through |
| JEL: | C67 C68 D58 E16 E17 E31 Q43 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:369&r= |
| By: | d'Artis Kancs |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the recently experienced systemic shocks (the COVID-19 pandemic and the full-fledged Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine) - that have created new forms of uncertainties to our supplies - this paper explores the supply chain robustness under risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. We aim to understand the potential consequences of deeply uncertain systemic events on the supply chain resilience and how does the information precision affect individual agents' choices and the chain-level preparedness to aggregate shocks. Augmenting a parsimonious supply chain model with uncertainty, we analyse the relationship between the upstream sourcing decisions and the supply chain survival probability. Both risk-averse and ambiguity-averse individually-optimising agents' upstream sourcing paths are efficient but can become vulnerable to aggregate shocks. In contrast, a chain-level coordination of downstream firm sourcing decisions can qualitatively improve the robustness of the entire supply chain compared to the individual decision-making baseline. Such a robust decision making ensures that in the presence of an aggregate shock - independently of its realisation - part of upstream suppliers will survive and the final goods' supply will be ensured even under the most demanding circumstances. Our results also indicate that an input source diversification extracts a cost in foregone efficiency. |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2405.03451&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | After successive external shocks—first, the pandemic and later higher commodity prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—the region’s output has surpassed its pre-pandemic level boosted by a strong tourism rebound and investment. Inflation is moderating from its peak. Fiscal and external balances have improved, but public debt and current account deficits remain high. The financial system has been stable and liquid, although it continues to be confronted with asset quality weaknesses and rising risks in the non-bank financial sector. Longstanding structural challenges affecting private investment and employment create a drag on growth going forward. The region’s outlook is heavily dependent on uncertain Citizenshipby- Investment (CBI) inflows, and susceptible to volatility in commodity prices, a slowdown in major tourism source countries, and the recurrent threat of natural disasters. |
| Date: | 2024–04–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/093&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Kazakhstan saw a significant increase in crypto mining in 2021 following a ban on mining in China. Volatility in crypto markets and energy shortages, coupled with a prohibition on the circulation of crypto assets in Kazakhstan, reduced the size of the market by the following year. While retail and institutional crypto holdings are limited, growing public sector experiments with distributed ledger technology, a pilot project to allow the circulation of crypto in the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), and mandates for crypto miners to store a proportion of their mining rewards in AIFC registered exchanges has the potential to increase the size of the sector. If incentives grow for users and firms to circulate crypto, the existing prohibition – which has dampened market growth, could become untenable. Although not a regulatory priority, the broad prohibition on crypto assets should be replaced by a robust regulatory framework, contingent on market growth, upskilling supervisors, and a globally coordinated move to implementing conduct and prudential regulation. |
| Date: | 2024–04–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/095&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Kazakhstan is vulnerable to transition risk due to the importance of its energy- and emissions-intensive sectors. Domestic and global climate policies would negatively affect Kazakhstan’s economy, its firms, industries, and banks, with heterogenous impacts across industries and banks. Using both micro and macro modeling approaches, the climate risk analysis suggests Kazakhstani banks are exposed to significant transition risk from domestic and, more importantly, global climate policies. The risk is especially higher for carbon intensive sectors, such as fossil fuel extraction, refining, and electricity generation. Banks with large exposure to emissions-intensive sectors experience up to 30 percent additional losses under a disorderly 1.5°C scenario over a 5-to-7-year horizon, compared to the baseline. Banks with a small share of portfolio with emissions-intensives sectors may still experience losses, as climate change mitigation actions affect the economy at large and the financial health of individual consumers, businesses, and industries. |
| Date: | 2024–04–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/096&r= |
| By: | Christine Rifflart (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Amel Falah (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | En 2023, la croissance des économies émergentes s'est maintenue à 4 %, affichant une résilience certaine face à un environnement dégradé. Elle a notamment été soutenue par le dynamisme asiatique (hausse de la croissance en Chine et maintien sur un rythme de 5, 2 % dans les autres pays de l'Asie émergente) et la reprise de l'activité en Russie et ses pays satellites. Les autres zones émergentes ont affiché un net ralentissement. En Amérique latine, la croissance est passée sous la barre des 2 % en 2023 après 4, 2 % en 2022. |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04566409&r= |
| By: | Christophe Blot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Céline Antonin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Amel Falah (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Sabine Le Bayon (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Catherine Mathieu (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Hervé Péléraux (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christine Rifflart (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Benoît Williatte (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Mathieu Plane (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Elliot Aurissergues (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Bruno Coquet (DARES - Direction de l'animation de la recherche, des études et des statistiques - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Magali Dauvin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Ombeline Julien de Pommerol (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Pierre Madec (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Raul Sampognaro (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | Les dynamiques de croissance mondiale en fin d'année 2023 sont restées contrastées. Alors que l'Europe dans son ensemble apparaît engluée dans la stagnation, les États-Unis résistent avec une croissance en hausse malgré le resserrement monétaire. Il en résulte une divergence accrue qui pourrait aller au-delà des différences de croissance potentielle. De fait, même si le retour de l'inflation a été un phénomène global, l'invasion de l'Ukraine et la crise énergétique qui a suivi ont plus profondément bousculé les économies européennes en raison d'une plus grande dépendance que les États-Unis au gaz russe dont le prix est soudainement devenu bien plus élevé qu'il ne l'avait jamais été. La politique budgétaire est certes venue en soutien, en partie atténué par la volonté des banques centrales de ramener l'inflation vers un niveau proche de 2 % comme l'exige leur mandat. De plus, l'orientation du policy mix américain a été assez similaire en 2023 à celui des pays européens puisque la politique budgétaire a été également expansionniste. À court terme, les signaux conjoncturels n'indiquent pas de rebond immédiat de l'activité en Europe. Inversement, les indicateurs restent bien orientés outre-Atlantique, suggérant que la divergence pourrait encore s'accroître au premier semestre 2024. À moyen terme, la politique monétaire devrait s'assouplir mais le débat sur le niveau des déficits publics et de la dette va s'intensifier, surtout dans l'Union européenne. Pourtant, malgré l'hétérogénéité des situations des pays qui la composent, la zone euro aurait un déficit public de 3, 4 % du PIB en 2023 selon le FMI, soit près de 5 points de moins qu'aux États-Unis. Nous anticipons une faible croissance dans les pays industrialisés en 2024 (1, 1 %) et des perspectives légèrement plus favorables en 2025 surtout dans les pays européens, où l'activité progresserait de 1, 7 % contre 0, 8 % en 2024. Du côté des pays émergents, la Chine a retrouvé un sentier de croissance plus dynamique en 2023 mais ne parviendrait plus à afficher des taux de croissance aussi élevés que pendant les années pré-Covid. L'activité ralentirait légèrement en Inde après une année 2023 très favorable. Il en résulterait une croissance mondiale en repli à 2, 5 % en 2024. Malgré le rebond anticipé pour 2025 (2, 8 %), la croissance mondiale semblerait marquer le pas relativement à la période 2015- 2019, où elle dépassait 3 % en moyenne annuelle. |
| Keywords: | inflation, croissance |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04566485&r= |