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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Korhonen, Iikka; Simola, Heli |
| Abstract: | We examine Russian imports since a coalition of countries imposed sanctions on exports to Russia. As Russia no longer publishes detailed statistics on foreign trade, we rely on export data from its largest trading partners (mirror statistics). We are particularly interested in trade diversion, i.e. the extent to which Russian imports have shifted from sanctioning countries to other countries. Our analysis is based on monthly export data and focuses on technology goods (HS codes 84 and 85) utilizing a difference-in-difference approach. Our dataset covers exports to Russia at the HS6-level of disaggregation from 26 sanctioning and 14 non-sanctioning countries during 2018-2023. We find that the exports of sanctioning countries to Russia fell drastically overall, with exports of sanctioned goods declining more than average exports. On the other hand, the export of sanctioned goods to Russia by non-sanctioning countries have risen more than their overall exports, indicating that Russia has managed to replace some goods no longer available from sanctioning countries, but not all of them. |
| Keywords: | Russia, sanctions, foreign trade |
| JEL: | F12 F14 F51 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitp:283904&r=cis |
| By: | Magulsha George (Research Scholar (Corresponding Author), Madras School of Economics, Gandhi Mandapam Road, Chennai-600 025 (India)); K. R. Shanmugam (Director and Professor, Madras School of Economics, Gandhi Mandapam Road, Chennai) |
| Abstract: | This study analyses an important policy issue pertaining to the public debt and external debt of BRICS nations from 1993 to 2020 using the Bohn framework and a penalized spline estimation method. The results indicate that, as the primary surplus reacts positively and significantly to public debt in China and South Africa, the debt is sustainable in these nations. In Brazil, India and Russia, the debt is not sustainable. The external debt policy is sustainable only in China and not in other BRICS nations. These results suggest immediate policy interventions in Brazil, India and Russia to achieve sustainable levels of public debt and external debt. We hope that these results will be useful to policy makers and other stake holders to take appropriate strategies to improve the public debt and external debt position of BRICS nations and make them sustainable. |
| Keywords: | Sustainable Debt, BRICS, Bohn Model, Penalized Spline. |
| JEL: | H63 C23 D72 E62 H72 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mad:wpaper:2023-253&r=cis |
| By: | Grömling, Michael |
| Abstract: | Die großen Krisen der vergangenen vier Jahre - zunächst die Pandemie und dann die russische Invasion in der Ukraine mit ihren geopolitischen Verwerfungen - haben ihren Preis. Eine aktualisierte Bilanzierung dieser Krisenlasten kommt zu einem Ausfall an gesamtwirtschaftlicher Bruttowertschöpfung in Deutschland in einer Größenordnung von insgesamt 545 Milliarden Euro in diesem Zeitraum. Bei dieser Schätzung der preisbereinigten Wertschöpfungsverluste in Deutschland wird der tatsächlichen Wirtschaftsentwicklung ein kontrafaktischer Konjunkturverlauf gegenübergestellt, bei dem ein ökonomisches Umfeld unterstellt wird, in dem es die Pandemie, den Krieg in der Ukraine, den Konflikt im Nahen Osten und die insgesamt damit verbundenen geoökonomischen Anpassungslasten nicht gibt. Werden die bisherigen Wertschöpfungsausfälle in Deutschland infolge der Pandemie und der Geopolitikkrise mit den Einbußen während der Strukturkrise 2001/2004 und der globalen Finanzmarktkrise von 2008/2009 verglichen, dann zeigt sich, dass das in den jeweils ersten 16 Krisenquartalen aufgelaufene Schadensausmaß in absoluten Größen mit jeder Krise höher ausgefallen war. In der Strukturkrise waren es rund 255 Milliarden Euro und im Verlauf der globalen Finanzmarktkrise 445 Milliarden. In relativer Betrachtung waren die höchsten Ausfälle (mit insgesamt knapp 4 Prozent der tatsächlichen gesamtwirtschaftlichen Bruttowertschöpfung in den vier Jahren) während der Finanzmarktkrise zu verzeichnen. Im Gefolge der Strukturkrise beliefen sie sich auf gut 3 Prozent. Bislang waren in den 16 Quartalen seit Ausbruch der Corona-Pandemie Einbußen in Höhe von knapp 4 Prozent der tatsächlichen Wirtschaftsleistung dieser vier Jahre zu verzeichnen. Mit dem aktuellen Wertschöpfungsverlust auf der Entstehungsseite der Volkswirtschaft gehen Konsumausfälle in Höhe von gut 400 Milliarden Euro bezogen auf die Jahre 2020 bis 2023 einher. Das entspricht zum einen gut 5 Prozent des Konsums in dieser Zeit und zum anderen einer Konsumeinbuße je Einwohner von insgesamt rund 4.800 Euro. Während zunächst die eingeschränkten Einkaufs- und Freizeitmöglichkeiten und die krisenbedingten Verhaltensänderungen den Konsum einschränkten, sorgten die Kaufkraftverluste durch den kriegsbedingten Energieschock für Einbußen in den vergangenen beiden Jahren. Die Ausfälle bei den Investitionen in Ausrüstungen, Bauten und immaterielle Kapitalgüter belaufen sich bezogen auf die vergangenen 16 Quartale auf insgesamt 155 Milliarden Euro. Das entspricht gut 5 Prozent der gesamten Bruttoanlageinvestitionen dieser vier Jahre. Diese Investitionsverluste haben langfristig bremsende Auswirkungen auf das Produktionspotenzial in Deutschland und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. |
| Keywords: | Konjunktur, Geopolitik, Corona-Pandemie, Wohlstand |
| JEL: | E6 E32 I15 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:283626&r=cis |
| By: | Тұрабай Бердібек // Turabai Berdibek (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Алмагамбетова Меруерт // Almagambetova Meruyert (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Ускенбаев Азат // Uskenbayev Azat (National Bank of Kazakhstan) |
| Keywords: | реальный обменный курс, эффект Баласса-Самуэльсона, производительность труда, торгуемый и неторгуемый сектора экономики, экспорт, инфляция, конкурентоспособность, голландская болезнь, фискальная политика, real exchange rate, Balassa-Samuelson effect, labor productivity, tradable sectors, non-tradable sectors, export, inflation, competitiveness, Dutch disease, fiscal policy |
| JEL: | E24 E31 E58 E62 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aob:wpaper:51&r=cis |
| By: | Martin, Will; Vos, Rob |
| Abstract: | Progress toward reducing global hunger has stalled since the mid-2010s. In fact, hunger is on the rise again, driven by slowing economic growth and protracted conflict, intensified by the impacts of climate change and economic shocks in many low- and middle-income countries. In addition, food systems worldwide have suffered disruptions in recent years, caused by the COVID-19-related global recession and associated supply chain disruptions, and exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. These factors have also jeopardized efforts at addressing the challenges to food system sustainability. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the related sustainable development goals (SDGs), defined in 2015, recognize these challenges and set ambitious targets to end hunger and all forms of malnutrition and to make agriculture and food systems sustainable by 2030. Many other fora have restated and reiterated these ambitions, including the 2021 United Nations Food System Summit (UNFSS). While governments around the world have subscribed to these ambitions, collectively they have not been very specific as to how to achieve the SDGs and related goals and targets, except for three means of implementation (MOI) involving (i) increases in research and development, (ii) reductions in trade distortions, and (iii) improved functioning and reduced volatility in food markets. This paper is part of a wider effort at assessing the international community’s follow-through on the above ambitions and the related (implicit or explicit) commitments made toward action for achieving them. While not presenting new research findings, we bring together available evidence and scenario analyses to assess the progress made toward the ambitions for transforming food systems, the actions taken in regard of the internationally concerted agenda, and the potential for accelerating progress. The number of hungry people in the world has risen from 564 million in 2015, when the SDGs were agreed, to 735 million in 2022. While declines to between 570 and 590 million by 2030 are projected, this is far above the 470 million projected in the absence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war. The share of the world’s people unable to afford healthy diets is projected to decline from 42 percent in 2021 to a still far too high 36 percent by 2030. On the means of implementation, levels of spending on agricultural research and development have increased, particularly in key developing countries such as Brazil, China and India. However, rates of investment remain too low for comfort, particularly in low-income countries. Also, little progress has been made in reducing agricultural trade distortions and many countries continue to use trade policy measures, such as export restrictions, which have proven to increase the volatility of both world and domestic food prices. We conclude that progress toward the SDG-2 targets has been dismal, and that the food system challenges have only become bigger. But we also find that it is not too late to accelerate progress and that the desired food system transformation can still be achieved over a reasonable timespan and at manageable incremental cost. Doing so will require unprecedented concerted and coherent action on multiple fronts, which may prove the biggest obstacle of all. |
| Keywords: | food security; food systems; hunger; nutrition; diet; sustainable development goals |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:2237&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | At the end of 2019 the financial sector supervisory responsibilities of the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) were transferred to the newly established authorized body Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Regulation and Development of the Financial Market (ARDFM). ARDFM has made progress in delivering on its supervisory mandate by conducting stress test and internal desk-based assets quality review (AQR), which became two annual exercises that complement the supervisory review examination process (SREP). However, the most recent transfer of the supervisory function has represented a setback in terms of mandate and budget. |
| Date: | 2024–02–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/054&r=cis |
| By: | Rotte, Ralph (RWTH Aachen University) |
| Abstract: | Given the variously stated „renaissance of nuclear power“, including a number of potential newcomers to the civilian use of nuclear energy, this paper addresses implications of a propagation of nuclear facilities and new reactor technologies for the nuclear nonproliferation and verification regimes. A special focus is on small modular reactors (SMRs) which, despite technological and economic doubts, are currently under development in various countries. Quantitative and qualitative problems in international verification of SMRs are enhanced by the political framework of international great power competition, especially among the U.S., China and Russia with their respective allies, the subsequent global technological and economic conflicts, and the structural, mainly financial weaknesses of the IAEA. This leads to the nuclear technological and energy economic dynamics resulting in potentially serious risks for the stability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. |
| Date: | 2024–02–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:45wh7&r=cis |
| By: | Devasmita Jena (Corresponding Author, Madras School of Economics (MSE), Chennai); C. Akash (MSE); Prachi Gupta (Temple University, Tokyo, Japan) |
| Abstract: | Success of economic sanctions hinges on their impact on sanctioned countries’ trade. This, in turn, depends on the sanctioned country’s opportunity to divert trade to a third-party (country, not involved in sanctions). History is witness to third-parties facilitating trade diversion, thus busting sanction. Nonetheless, literature does not present conclusive evidence on trade diversion or on motivation for busting sanctions. Therefore, in this paper, we address the following. What bearing sanctions have on bilateral trade flows and trade diversion? Is diversion dependent on the political and trade alliance the third-party shares with the sanctioned and/or the sanctioning countries? We estimate a structural gravity model for globally representative country-dyads, during 1990-2019, using, inter-alia the Global Sanctions Database. We find that sanctions depress bilateral trade between sanctioned and sanctioning nations and cause trade diversion via third-party. The existence of trade alliance between third-party and country involved in sanction has additional impact on trade diversion. Furthermore, a political alliance between third-party and sanctioned country heightens trade between them. However, political alliance between third-party and sanctioning country doesn’t explain trade between them. Our results have insight for India’s evolving trade relations with Russia, since 2022, as Russia reels under Western sanctions. |
| Keywords: | Sanction, GSDB, Trade Agreement, Political Alliance, Structural Gravity Model |
| JEL: | F1 F14 F51 N4 |
| Date: | 2023–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mad:wpaper:2023-248&r=cis |
| By: | Fabio Ghironi; Daisoon Kim; G. Kemal Ozhan |
| Abstract: | We study international trade and macroeconomic dynamics triggered by the imposition of sanctions. We begin with a tractable two-country model where Home and Foreign countries have comparative advantages in production of differentiated consumption goods and a commodity (e.g., gas), respectively. Home imposes sanctions on Foreign. Financial sanctions exclude a fraction of Foreign agents from the international bond market. Gas sanctions take the form of a ban on gas trade, equivalent to an appropriate price cap in our model. Differentiated goods trade sanctions exclude a fraction of Foreign and Home exporters from international trade. All sanctions lead to resource reallocation in both economies. Exchange rate movements reflect the direction of reallocation and the type of sanctions imposed rather than the success of the sanctions. Welfare analysis shows that gas sanctions are more costly for Home, while differentiated consumption goods trade sanctions are more costly for Foreign. A third country that refrains from joining the sanctions mitigates welfare losses in Foreign, but refraining from joining the sanctions is beneficial for the third country. These findings highlight the importance and the difficulty of international coordination when imposing sanctions. |
| JEL: | F31 F41 F42 F51 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32188&r=cis |