|
on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Shykhutsina, Veranika |
| Abstract: | With the help of the concept of linkage and leverage, this paper aims at exploring how the relative influence of international actors (namely the European Union (EU) and Russia) can explain the persistence of the authoritarian regime in Belarus. The findings suggest that in the background of the great power competition that has played out in Belarus, EU's efforts to expand different types of linkages have not resulted in their sufficient levels to create leverage capable of neutralizing a significant Russian influence. Apart from the absence of substantial linkages between Belarus and the EU, such factors as Russia being a "countervailing power" providing the Belarusian regime with all sorts of support needed to sustain the autocratic rule; the absence of EU membership perspective; and diverging geopolitical interests of the EU member states leading to the absence of a coherent policy in relation to Belarus also negatively affect the strength and effectiveness of EU's leverage. |
| Keywords: | Authoritarian persistence, Belarus, Democratization, Linkage and Leverage, Social contract |
| JEL: | F51 F59 P27 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ipewps:2182023&r=cis |
| By: | Häberli, Christian; Kostetsky, Bogdan |
| Abstract: | The latest report on "Repairing Broken Food Trade Routes Ukraine – Africa” covers: Kakhovska HPP and the war Western border and EU grains production Grain Initiative This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme “Making Agricultural Trade Sustainable” (MATS) programme (https://sustainable-agri-trade.eu/). The role of MATS/WTI in this programme is to identify and explore “broken” Ukrainian - African food trade routes due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Starting with a food trade flow chart pre- and post-24 February 2022, it will assess, first, whether Ukrainian (or African) traders can again supply these products (Output 1). Failing that, whether the new EU-financed “Crisis Management” (or another) programme can possibly make up for lost Ukrainian agrifood exports (Output 2). It will also identify alternative exporters (if any) which might already have filled in agrifood demand in Africa (Output 3). Importantly, the Project also looks at the potential effect of these developments on competing farm production in Africa (Output 4). For further information and/or offer to assist in project implementation, please write to Christian Häberli (Christian.Haeberli@wti.org) or to Bogdan Kostetsky (bogdan.kostetsky@gmail.com). |
| Date: | 2023–08–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wti:papers:1403&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to have a devastating economic and humanitarian impact. In addition to the continuing combat in Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, air raids on Kyiv and other population centers have been escalating since early May; the recent destruction of the Kakhovka dam has added to the challenges. The war is having a severe impact on human and physical capital, with loss of life, drop in living standards and rise in poverty, as well as infrastructure damages. Despite the resilience of the Ukrainian people and the authorities’ skillful policymaking in maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability, continuous external support is critical to help restore medium-term external viability, prepare the country for post-war recovery and reconstruction, and facilitate Ukraine’s path to EU accession. |
| Date: | 2023–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/248&r=cis |
| By: | Iryna Kosse |
| Abstract: | Ukraine is a big country with a developed multimodal transport infrastructure that includes a network of roads, railways, airports and seaports, as well as pipelines. In addition, the country has significant infrastructure for electricity generation and distribution, and for gas transportation. Ukraine is an urbanised country, with 46% of its population living in an apartment. The ongoing armed aggression by the Russian Federation has had a significant impact on Ukrainian infrastructure, leading to the destruction of roads, rail tracks, power stations and housing units. Over the next few years, the infrastructure sector will require significant financing, prioritisation and coordination between the Ukrainian government and international actors, based on the principles of multimodality, flexibility, connectivity and sustainable urban mobility. Energy and housing infrastructure should rely on renewable energy sources, distributed generation and energy-efficient housing. In addition, domestic infrastructure policies should be combined with EU infrastructure initiatives. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine, multimodal transport infrastructure, electricity generation, electricity distribution, gas transportation, Russian Federation, infrastructure destruction, EU infrastructure initiatives |
| JEL: | R4 Q4 O1 O4 R1 H7 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:72&r=cis |
| By: | Ina Ganguli; Fabian Waldinger |
| Abstract: | We discuss the impacts of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian science. Using newly collected data, we show that the war has already had significant effects on science in Ukraine: research papers produced by Ukrainian scientists declined by about 10%, approximately 5% of the most prolific scientists are publishing with a foreign affiliation, 22% of top universities have faced destruction of physical capital, and international collaborations with Russian scientists have declined by more than 40%. Drawing upon the economics of science and innovation literature, we highlight three primary channels through which wars impact science: (1) the loss of human capital, (2) the destruction of physical capital, and (3) reductions in international scientific cooperation. The evidence from the literature on the long-run effects of losing human or physical capital indicates that shocks to physical capital can be remedied more easily than shocks to human capital. Our new data also suggests that human capital shocks are the main drivers of the reduction in Ukrainian research output that has occurred since the beginning of the war. Hence, reconstruction efforts that focus on supporting scientists to continue in the research sector, and return to Ukraine after the war has ended, are likely to have the greatest impact on long-run scientific productivity in Ukraine. |
| JEL: | F51 I23 O3 P20 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31449&r=cis |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Fang, Peixun; Pauw, Karl; Randriamamonjy, Josee; Thurlow, James; Akramov, Kamiljon T.; Ellis, Mia |
| Abstract: | Tajikistan experienced strong annual economic growth of 6.8 percent during the 2011 to 2020 period (TAJSTAT 2020). This has translated into improved living standards, with the national poverty rate falling from 53.1 percent in 2007 to 26.3 percent in 2019 (World Bank 2023a). The global COVID-19 pandemic caused a significant slowdown in economic growth in 2020, but the economy rebounded in 2021. However, as a country heavily reliant on wheat and fuel imports, Tajikistan was severely affected by the Russia-Ukraine war that started in 2022, and more recently by the global recession in 2023 (Arndt et al. 2023; Diao and Thurlow 2023). Private remittances are the largest source of foreign exchange, accounting for nearly one-third of Tajikistan’s GDP and more than 40 percent of total foreign inflows. Russia is the most important destination for Tajikistan’s emigrants working abroad, and the ongoing war will continue to affect movement of people and inflows of remittances. Tajikistan’s GDP growth is projected to be 6.5 percent in 2023 and 5.0 percent in 2024 (World Bank 2023b), below its pre-pandemic growth trajectory. |
| Keywords: | agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, livestock, freuits, cereals, poultry, oilseeds, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:18&r=cis |
| By: | Fabrizio Ferriani (Bank of Italy); Andrea Gazzani (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of the widening energy price differentials caused by the war in Ukraine on the returns of European and US firms. Using several measures of firms' exposure to energy consumption, we show that return differentials between EU and US firms widened significantly after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Our results indicate a persistent comparative disadvantage between the two regions, driven by heterogeneous energy costs, which has continued even after the partial subsiding of the energy shock by the end of 2022. These findings suggest that the impact of the war on energy prices may have lasting economic implications for Europe, potentially exacerbating its competitiveness disadvantages compared with other geographic regions that have access to more affordable energy inputs. |
| Keywords: | war in Ukraine, energy impacts, energy comparative advantage, financial performance |
| JEL: | G12 G14 G32 G33 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_789_23&r=cis |
| By: | Mikhail Mamonov; Anna Pestova |
| Abstract: | How much do sanctions harm the sanctioned economy? We examine the case of Russia, which has faced three major waves of international sanctions over the last decade (in 2014, 2017, and 2022). In a VAR model of the Russian economy, we first apply sign restrictions to isolate shocks to international credit supply to proxy for the financial sanctions shocks. We provide a microeconomic foundation for the sign restriction approach by exploiting the syndicated loan deals in Russia. We then explore the effects of the overall sanctions shocks (financial, trade, technological, etc.) by employing a high-frequency identification (HFI) approach. Our HFI is based on each OFAC/EU sanction announcement and the associated daily changes in the yield-to-maturity of Russia’s US dollar-denominated sovereign bonds. Our macroeconomic estimates indicate that Russia’s GDP may have lost no more than 0.8% due to the financial sanctions shock, and up to 3.2% due to the overall sanctions shock cumulatively over the 2014–2015 period. In 2017, the respective effects are 0 and 0.5%, and in 2022, they are 8 and 12%. Our cross-sectional estimates show that the real income of richer households declines by 1.5–2.0% during the first year after the sanctions shock, whereas the real income of poorer households rises by 1.2% over the same period. Finally, we find that the real total revenue of large firms with high (low) TFPs declines by 2.2 (4.0)% during the first year after the sanctions shock, whereas the effects on small firms are close to zero. Overall, our results indicate heterogeneous effects of sanctions with richer households residing in big cities and larger firms with high TFPs being affected the most. |
| Keywords: | Sanctions news shock, Monetary policy, Commodity terms-of-trade, High-frequency identification (HFI), Household income, TFP |
| JEL: | F51 E20 E30 |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp756&r=cis |
| By: | Osavolyuk A. (RANEPA); Tsatsura Elena (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | Against this background, early in 2022 expert assessments in respect of economic forecasts showed positive trends. Late in 2021, the RF Central Bank presented several scenarios of Russia’s macroeconomic development in 2022– 2024.2 According to the estimates of the baseline scenario, GDP was expected to grow by 2%—3% by the end of 2022. Apart from that, the regulator presented other three scenarios proceeding from potential risks to Russia: +2.4%–3, 4% (the “Financial Crisis” scenario and the “Global Inflation” scenario); (-0.8%)–(-0.2)% (a decrease in GDP in case of the “Growing Pandemic” scenario). |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, households, income, poverty |
| JEL: | I30 I31 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1287&r=cis |
| By: | Balandina Galina (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The year 2022 saw the approval of numerous statutory and other regulatory legal acts aimed at mitigating administrative barriers on the way of movement of goods via the customs border. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, customs regulation |
| JEL: | F10 F13 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1291&r=cis |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Alexandra Bykova (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Rumen Dobrinsky (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Selena Duraković (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Richard Grieveson (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Doris Hanzl-Weiss (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Gabor Hunya (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Branimir Jovanović (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Niko Korpar (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Sebastian Leitner (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Isilda Mara (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Olga Pindyuk (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Sandor Richter (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Bernd Christoph Ströhm (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Maryna Tverdostup (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Nina Vujanović (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Zuzana Zavarská (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Adam Żurawski |
| Abstract: | Winter Forecast Update Resilience Put to the Test by War Fallout Economic Forecasts for Eastern Europe for 2023-25 Despite the war in Ukraine and the highest inflation for 15 years or more in many countries, the economies of Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE) are demonstrating their resilience. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy of using energy as a weapon has failed, as most countries have already significantly reduced gas consumption. Although economic activity has slowed significantly, a full-year recession will be largely avoided in CESEE this year, except in Hungary – and Russia, whose economy will continue to decline (-3%), following the 2.5% contraction in 2022. After a 30% slump in GDP last year, Ukraine should recover somewhat this year (3%), although this forecast is subject to great uncertainty and depends, above all, on the future course of the war. Overview by Richard Grieveson Growth has slowed due to high inflation, but most economies are adapting, and the recovery will strengthen from the second half of 2023. Country updates Albania Weaker though resilient growth expected by Isilda Mara Belarus Decoupling from Europe leads to lasting economic weakness by Rumen Dobrinsky Bosnia and Herzegovina One step closer to EU membership by Selena Duraković Bulgaria Imbalances likely to stay as snap elections result in another split parliament by Rumen Dobrinsky Croatia A new euro area member by Bernd Christoph Ströhm Czechia Growth constrained by struggling domestic demand by Zuzana Zavarská Estonia Combating the effects of the energy crisis by Maryna Tverdostup Hungary Bleak short-term growth prospects by Sándor Richter Kazakhstan Hopes for investment-driven growth by Alexandra Bykova Kosovo Another difficult year ahead to meet energy needs by Isilda Mara Latvia Rising confidence in the recession to be short-lived by Sebastian Leitner Lithuania Resisting a war-induced recession by Sebastian Leitner Moldova Emerging from the energy crisis? by Gábor Hunya Montenegro Growing, despite instability by Nina Vujanović North Macedonia FDI lifting the economy? by Branimir Jovanović Poland A slowdown in the making by Adam Żurawski Romania Deceleration despite an engine change by Gábor Hunya Russia Energy exports crippled by sanctions by Vasily Astrov Serbia The price of close relations with Russia by Branimir Jovanović Slovakia Outlook threatened by political turmoil by Doris Hanzl-Weiss Slovenia Despite subdued prospects, still ahead of the EU average by Niko Korpar Turkey Foot to the floor as election approaches by Richard Grieveson Ukraine Defying Russia’s bombs by Olga Pindyuk |
| Keywords: | Keywords: CESEE, economic forecast, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, EU, euro area, CIS, war in Ukraine, Ukrainian refugees, energy dependence, EU accession, COVID-19, EU Recovery and Resilience Facility, economic growth, labour markets, inflation, stagflation, monetary policy, fiscal policy |
| JEL: | E20 E21 E22 E23 E24 E31 E32 E5 E62 F21 F31 H60 I18 J20 J30 O47 O52 O57 P24 P27 P33 P52 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:mpaper:mr:2023-01&r=cis |
| By: | Anton Grui (National Bank of Ukraine); Nicolas Aragon; Oleksandr Faryna (National Bank of Ukraine; National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy); Dmytro Krukovets (National Bank of Ukraine); Kateryna Savolchuk (National Bank of Ukraine); Oleksii Sulimenko; Artem Vdovychenko (National Bank of Ukraine); Oleksandr Zholud (National Bank of Ukraine) |
| Abstract: | This report evaluates the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Ukraine during the early years of inflation targeting. It assesses both the overall strength of the policy interest rate transmission, and its channels. Furthermore, it addresses the stabilizing role of forward guidance, foreign exchange interventions, and monetary policy credibility. The National Bank of Ukraine abandoned its fixed exchange rate regime in 2014 in response to an economic crisis ignited by the initial invasion by russia. Under inflation targeting, the short-term interest rate became the main monetary policy instrument, while the exchange rate remained floating. The full-scale russian invasion in 2022 forced the National Bank of Ukraine to temporarily shelve its policy interest rate, fix the exchange rate and impose administrative restrictions. However, it remains committed to returning to conventional inflation targeting when economic conditions normalize. This report could become a point of reference for future policy decisions by the Ukrainian central bank. |
| Keywords: | monetary policy transmission mechanism, inflation targeting, interest rate channel, exchange rate channel, expectations channel |
| JEL: | E37 E43 E52 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukb:wpaper:02/2023&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | A cascade of external and domestic shocks –including the COVID-19 pandemic, rising global commodity prices and global economic slowdown linked to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ecowas sanctions against Mali, the US dollar appreciation, domestic spending pressures, and tightened global and regional financing conditions–have dampened economic activity in 2022, widened external and fiscal deficits, increased debt levels, and eroded regional international reserves. The challenging external environment, together with likely delays in the start of hydrocarbon production, will continue to weigh on economic activity in 2023. In the medium term, economic prospects remain favorable, with the temporary boost of oil and gas production, but ambitious reforms are needed to reduce macroeconomic imbalances, put debt on a downward trajectory, and make growth more inclusive. The impact of climate change in Senegal is projected to be severe and reforms to adapt to climate change while contributing to lower greenhouse emission rank high on the Senegalese authorities’ agenda. |
| Date: | 2023–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/250&r=cis |
| By: | Zubov Sergey (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | At the end of 2022, there were 361 credit institutions in the Russian banking system. A year earlier their number amounted to 370 units (a decrease by 9 units during the year, in 2021 — by 37 units). There were 3 revocations of licenses (in 2021 — 26), the number of voluntary revocation of licenses came to 9 (in 2021 — 11). There were 225 banks with universal license as of the end of the year (232 banks as of the beginning of the year) and 101 banks with the basic license (103 banks as of the beginning of the year). The number of non-bank credit institutions was 35, the same as in the previous year. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, banking sector, profit, capital, corporate loans, retail lending |
| JEL: | E41 E51 G21 G24 G28 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1276&r=cis |
| By: | Magda Catalina Jiménez Jiménez (Faculty of Finances, Government, and International Relations, Universidad Externado de Colombia); Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón (African Centre of Excellence for Inequality Research (ACEIR) & Southern African Labour Development Research Unit (SALDRU), University of Cape Town) |
| Abstract: | The last years have observed a series of mounting challenges that have deepened tensions in the region, as illustrated by the increase in the number of protests in the region. The increase in tensions relate to the intersection of worsening of living conditions for millions of citizens- a consequence of the pandemic, the ripple effects of Russian aggression towards Ukraine, and the concerns about a coming global recession. These tensions will bring challenges to political systems across the region, manifested in the occurrence of different types of protests, and the risk of declining support for democracy in Latin America, should governments fail to respond to the demands of their citizens. |
| Keywords: | Inequalities, protest, Latin America, democracy, collective action |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:299&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The euro area economy has shown resilience in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the largest terms of trade loss in several decades, reflecting strong policy efforts to secure gas supplies and cushion disposable incomes. Nonetheless, activity has weakened, with the economy slipping into a mild technical recession in early 2023, and inflation is far above target. While headline inflation has started to decline with the easing of supply bottlenecks and energy prices, core inflation is proving more persistent. Euro area banks are well capitalized and liquid overall, but the rapid tightening of monetary policy after a prolonged period of accommodation can expose pockets of weakness in the financial system, including in the nonbank sector. |
| Date: | 2023–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/264&r=cis |
| By: | Heo, Jaichul (KOREA INSaTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 미중 전략경쟁 심화와 4차 산업혁명에 따른 반도체 수요의 증가, 그리고 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 등을 배경으로대만 문제가 부각되고 있다. 본 연구는 공급망 안정과 산업경쟁력, 경제적 통치술을 중심으로 한 경제안보의관점에서 대만해협 유사시 우리의 경제안보가 받게 될 영향과 시사점에 대해 고찰하였다. During the Cold War, the United States and China began visible efforts to normalize relations in 1972, with the strategic intent of jointly responding to the common threat posed by the Soviet Union, and finally established diplomatic relations in 1979. In this process, the Taiwan issue was one of the biggest obstacles to normalizing bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the two countries succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations by agreeing on the “One China” principle (policy) andrecognition of non-governmental exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan, and have managed the Taiwan issue based on three joint statements made by the two countries. However, the Taiwan issue has been brought to the forefront again, mainly due to great transformation in the international order and strategic competition between the U.S. and China, created by the rise of China and the response of the U.S. to contain it. Of course, even after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, friction between the U.S. and China over the Taiwan issue and confrontation between both sides of the Taiwan Straits (i.e. Chinese mainland and Taiwan) have continued. However, the recent U.S.-China strategic competition has further increased the risk and uncertainty of the Taiwan issue. In addition, with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, the international community's concern about the Taiwan Strait has grown, and the strategic value of Taiwan is rising even more in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, as an important actor in the global semiconductor supply chain. Against this background, this study analyzes the impact of U.S.-China strategic competition on the Taiwan issue and considers the implications for Korea in terms of supply chain stability, industrial competitiveness, and economic statecraft, which are important elements of economic security.First, the supply chain instability that can result from an emergency in the Taiwan Strait will mainly occur along the maritime transportation route, which accounts for an overwhelming portion of Korea's import and export volume.(the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | 경제안보; 중국정치; Economic security; Chinese politics |
| Date: | 2023–03–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepre:2022_012&r=cis |
| By: | КУМО, Кадзухиро; KUMO, Kazuhiro |
| Abstract: | В данной статье используются данные микроуровня Российского Мониторинга экономического положения и здоровья населения (РМЭЗ – НИУ ВШЭ) для рассмотрения влияния таких экономических факторов, как доход домохозяйства, зарплата женщин, факторов субъективного благополучия, таких как удовлетворенность жизнью и состояние здоровья, на вероятность рождения детей в России, которое сопровождалось длительным снижением на протяжении 1990-ых годов, в 2000-ых начавшее стабильно увеличиваться, выросшее затем до исходных значений. Были получены следующие результаты: более высокие доходы домохозяйства способствуют деторождению, в то время как заработная оплата труда женщин сокращает рождаемость; и, когда, удовлетворенность жизнью и состояние здоровья на высоком уровне, вероятность рождения детей значительно увеличивается. Большинство предыдущих исследований детерминантов рождаемости в России выявили, что доход не имеет никакого эффекта на рождаемость, но результаты, полученные в этой статье, предполагают, что это могло быть связано с особыми обстоятельствами начала экономической трансформации в 1990-ых годах. |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:rrcwps:100&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Cabo Verde’s medium-term outlook is positive, supported by the authorities’ policy package to respond to the evolving impacts of the war in Ukraine and their commitments to the recovery process and the ECF in a challenging environment. The economy rebounded strongly in 2022 with GDP growth of 17.7 percent, although average inflation increased to 7.9 percent at end-December 2022 driven by higher food, electricity, gas, and transportation costs. The new Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development 2022-2026 (PEDS II) sets the reform agenda to overcome challenges to sustainable development. The economy remains vulnerable to internal and external risks. In this context, the ECF will support the authorities’ plans towards economic and social progress, as well as the environmental challenges facing the country in its development process, while seeking to reduce debt levels and mitigate risks. |
| Date: | 2023–07–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/262&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Pakistan’s economy was buffeted by significant shocks over the past year. The severe impact of the floods, the commodity shock from the war in Ukraine, and the tightening of external and domestic financing conditions together with policy backsliding aggravated economic conditions and halted the post-pandemic recovery. Growth stalled, inflation surged, international reserves dropped to very low levels, and fiscal and external pressures have become acute. Despite some efforts in FY23H2, the difficult economic, social, and political environment as well as insufficient external financing, have prevented sufficient progress in completing the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) which expired on June 30. To address the challenges and sustain macroeconomic stability, the authorities have renewed their policy efforts, and are seeking support under a new Stand-By Arrangement. |
| Date: | 2023–07–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/260&r=cis |
| By: | Mikhail Mamonov |
| Abstract: | This paper suggests a novel approach to measuring fraud in banking and to evaluating its crosssectional and aggregate implications. I explore unique evidence of declining regulatory forbearance from the Russian banking system in the 2010s, when the central bank forcibly closed roughly twothirds of all operating banks for fraudulent activities. I first introduce an empirical model of the regulatory decision rule that determines whether a regulator is likely to run an unscheduled onsite inspection of a suspicious bank in the near future. I estimate the model using unique data on asset losses hidden by commercial banks and discovered by the Central Bank of Russia during unscheduled on-site inspections in the last two decades. I find that the average size of hidden asset losses detected by the rule equals 38% of the total assets of not-yet-closed fraudulent banks, and that the likelihood of fraud detection soared by a factor of 5 after 2013. With quarter-by-quarter predictions from the estimated rule, I form a “treatment” group of likely-to-be-inspected banks and then run a “fuzzy” difference-in-differences (FDID) regression to estimate the effects of the tightened regulation. FDID estimates show that likely-to-be-inspected banks substantially reduced credit to households and firms after the policy started in 2013, compared to similar untreated banks. Interpreting the FDID estimates of credit contraction as a credit supply shock and evaluating the macroeconomic implications of this shock using a VAR model of the Russian economy, I find that Russia’s GDP could have been larger by 7.3% cumulatively by the end of 2016 in the absence of the policy. This is the price the economy pays for reducing fraud in the banking system. |
| Keywords: | Bank misreporting, Regulatory forbearance, Bank closure, Credit Supply Shocks, Heckman selection model, Fuzzy difference-in-differences, VAR |
| JEL: | D22 G21 G28 G33 H11 |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp755&r=cis |
| By: | Huw Dixon; Aftab Chowdhury |
| Abstract: | This study finds a downward bias in the official CPI inflation figure from the second quarter to the end of 2022 due to the sudden changes in household energy expenditure. The energy price (specifically, oil price) started increasing from the last quarter of 2021 due to the rebound of economic activity and the supply-side issues after the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the declining investment in oil and gas production after 2014. However, the sudden increase in the energy price in the second quarter of 2022 is simply derived from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that began on 24 February 2022. The sudden rise in the energy price and its inelastic nature has generated significant changes in household expenditure for energy (specifically in COICOP 04 Housing, water, electricity, gas, and other fuels and the COICOP 07 transport). These produce a significant downward bias in the official CPI inflation rate in COICOP 04 and 07, hence in the official CPI inflation rate for all items. Moreover, the input-output matrix of the national accounts helps us find the intermediate use of energy and its impact in other COICOP divisions which are not directly related to energy, such as COIOP 02 Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, COICOP 05 manufacture of Furniture, and COICOP 06 Health. All those together have caused the downward bias in the official CPI inflation rate in 2022. |
| Keywords: | CPI, inflation, energy economics |
| JEL: | C43 C67 D10 E01 E31 Q41 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nsr:niesrd:550&r=cis |
| By: | Andam, Kwaw S.; Diao, Xinshen; Ecker, Olivier; Pauw, Karl; Thurlow, James; Ellis, Mia |
| Abstract: | Nigeria experienced a rise and fall in economic growth over the past two decades. The economy experienced strong growth, averaging 7 percent per year, from 2000 to 2014. Then falling world oil prices caused an abrupt decline in Nigeria’s GDP in 2015 and 2016 and the country entered its first recession in nearly 20 years. Since then, the economic growth rate has remained below the population growth rate, complicating efforts to reduce poverty in a country with the world’s second-largest number of poor people (80 million) (World Bank 2022a). Various other factors contributed to sluggish economic growth, including the spread of insecurity and conflict across almost all areas of the country; policies related to COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021 (Andam et al. 2020); the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war (Diao and Thurlow 2023); and general macroeconomic instability (World Bank 2022b). Nigeria’s GDP growth is projected to remain low at 2.9 percent in 2023 and 2024, barely exceeding the population growth rate (World Bank 2022c). First quarter growth in 2023 was only 2.3 percent, reflecting the impact of cash restrictions imposed by monetary authorities during the election campaign period (NBS 2023). |
| Keywords: | NIGERIA, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, rice, maize, fish, soybeans, cowpeas, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:14&r=cis |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Ellis, Mia; Rosenbach, Gracie; Mugabo, Serge; Pauw, Karl; Spielman, Â David J.; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Rwanda has made remarkable economic progress during the past two decades, and its annual GDP growth rate reached more than 7 percent during the 2009 to 2019 period (NISR 2021). The rapid economic growth has been pro-poor, and the poverty rate fell from 58.9 percent in 2000/01 to 38.2 percent in 2016/17 (NISR 2018). The country has also emerged as a leader among sub-Saharan African countries in promoting innovation, gender equality, and an enabling business environment for development. The government remains strongly committed to a set of ambitious development goals, as set forth in the 2017–2024 National Strategy for Transformation (NST 1) and the corresponding sector-level strategic plans. While the global COVID-19 pandemic had a severe adverse effect on the economy, causing negative GDP growth in 2020, the country rebounded quickly and registered more than 10 percent growth in 2021 (NISR 2022). The country was only minimally affected by global commodity market disruptions resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war that started in 2022 and the global recession in 2023 (Arndt et al. 2023; Diao and Thurlow 2023). Looking forward, Rwanda’s GDP growth is projected to reach 6.7 percent in 2023 and 7.0 percent in 2024 (World Bank 2023), suggesting the economy is returning to its pre-pandemic high-growth trajectory. |
| Keywords: | RWANDA, CENTRAL AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, soybeans, groundnuts, cereal crops, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:15&r=cis |
| By: | Xinshen Diao; Ellis, Mia; Fang, Peixun; Pauw, Karl; Pradesha, Angga; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Nepal experienced annual economic growth of 5.0 percent between 2009 and 2019 (World Bank 2023b). Thanks to a relatively slow population growth rate of 1.4 percent, the living standards of most Nepalis improved during this period; this allowed Nepal to graduate in 2019 from a low-income country to a lower-middle-income country. Nepal’s economy, however, was severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, with GDP declining by 2.4 percent in 2020 and growing only modestly in 2021. Fortunately, the country was largely spared the adverse effects of global commodity market disruptions arising from the Russia-Ukraine war that started in 2022 and from the 2023 global recession (Arndt et al. 2023; Diao and Thurlow 2023). Nepal’s GDP growth is now projected to reach 5.1 percent in 2023 and 4.9 percent in 2024 (World Bank 2023a); this suggests that the economy is resuming its pre-pandemic growth trajectory. Agriculture remains an important sector, accounting for 25 percent of Nepal’s GDP and 30 percent of its jobs. In this brief, we further unpack Nepal’s historical and projected economic growth trajectory in order to better understand the role of agriculture, and of the broader agrifood system (AFS), in the performance and transformation of its economy. |
| Keywords: | NEPAL, SOUTH ASIA, ASIA, agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:12&r=cis |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Ellis, Mia; Pauw, Karl; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Uganda experienced annual economic growth of 5.8 percent between 2009 and 2019 (UBOS 2020). While restrictive COVID-19 policy measures in 2020 and 2021 caused a slowdown in the economy, the country has largely been spared the adverse effects of the global commodity market disruptions arising from the Russia-Ukraine war that started in 2022 and from the 2023 global recession (Arndt et al. 2023; Diao and Thurlow 2023). Uganda’s GDP growth is projected to reach 5.5 percent in 2023 and 6.1 percent in 2024 (World Bank 2023), suggesting that the economy is resuming its pre-pandemic growth trajectory. Agriculture remains an important sector, accounting for one-quarter of GDP and two-thirds of Uganda’s jobs. The agriculture sector also performed well in the 2009 to 2019 period, growing at 5.0 percent annually (UBOS 2020). Thanks to a positive terms of trade shock and an established trade surplus in agrifood products, this sector played an important role in weathering the 2022 and 2023 global commodity market shocks (Diao and Thurlow 2023). In this brief, we examine Uganda’s economic growth and transformation trajectory, both historically and going forward. Rather than focusing on the role of primary agriculture, we examine how the country’s broader agrifood system (AFS) is contributing to that transformation process. |
| Keywords: | UGANDA, EAST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, oilseeds, cattle, fruits, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:20&r=cis |
| By: | Pauw, Karl; Randriamamonjy, Josee; Thurlow, James; Diao, Xinshen; Ellis, Mia |
| Abstract: | Senegal experienced annual economic growth of 4.8 percent during the 2009 to 2019 period (World Bank 2023a). With an annual population growth rate of 2.7 percent over the same period, the living standards of Senegalese improved modestly. In 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic caused a significant slowdown in economic growth, but growth rebounded in 2021. While the country was adversely affected by the global commodity market disruptions related to the Russia-Ukraine war that started in 2022 (Arndt et al. 2023; Diao and Thurlow 2023), its growth is projected to reach 8.0 percent in 2023 and 10.5 percent in 2024 (World Bank 2023b). This suggests a much-improved short-term outlook and a future growth trajectory well above its pre-pandemic growth trajectory. Agriculture is a relatively small sector in Senegal, accounting for less than one-fifth of GDP. However, the broader agrifood system (AFS), which includes processing, trade and transport of agrifood products, and food services, makes up about one-third of GDP. In this brief, we examine the performance of Senegal’s broader AFS and its contribution to growth and transformation. |
| Keywords: | SENEGAL, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, cotton, cattle, rice, fish, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:16&r=cis |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Ellis, Mia; Pauw, Karl; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Zambia experienced modest economic growth of 4.8 percent per year between 2010 and 2019 (ZamStats 2020). Most growth occurred in the earlier part of the decade. After world commodity prices fell in 2014, the GDP growth rate slowed to an annual rate of 3.1 percent (for 2014–2019), which is below the country’s population growth rate. The global COVID-19 pandemic further damaged the economy and GDP declined by 2.8 percent in 2020. The global commodity market disruptions related to the Russia Ukraine war that started in 2022 and the global recession in 2023 are expected to further harm Zambia’s economy (Arndt et al. 2023; Diao and Thurlow 2023). Zambia’s projected GDP growth rate is 3.9 percent for 2023 and 4.1 percent for 2024 (World Bank 2023). Its economy relies heavily on exports of copper and other minerals. While mining is a large sector in total GDP, it creates few jobs in the country. Agriculture remains important in employment, accounting for near 40 percent of jobs. In this brief, we unpack the historical and projected economic growth trajectory further to better understand the role of agriculture as well as the broader agrifood system (AFS) in the performance and transformation of the economy of Zambia. |
| Keywords: | ZAMBIA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, maize, cattle, sugarcane, cereals, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:21&r=cis |
| By: | Maryna Tverdostup (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Even before the war started, Ukrainian demographic prospects were almost uniquely negative, even in the context of CESEE. Ukrainian population declined steadily over last decade and the war has significantly worsened Ukraine’s already negative demographic outlook, to the extent that a shortage of labour, particularly in certain parts of the country, is highly likely to be one of the main challenges of post-war reconstruction. Our findings show that, regardless of our assumptions regarding the duration of the war and further military escalation, Ukraine’s population will not return to its pre-war level even in 2040, and the decline will be most pronounced in the working-age population. Although the population will rise somewhat in the years following the war, as soon as return migration flows run low, the population dynamic will turn negative again. Simulated population size ranges between 34.6m and 35m in 2040, which is around 20% below the 2021 level, with an improved fertility rate and declining mortality having very limited capacity to offset the rapid population decline. Our results suggest that over 20% of refugees will not return after the war, with many of those being working-age Ukrainians and their children, resulting in a long-lasting negative impact on Ukraine’s population and reconstruction prospects. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine, demographic trends, outward and return migration, post-war reconstruction |
| JEL: | J11 J13 O15 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:71&r=cis |
| By: | Beznoska, Martin; Hentze, Tobias; Niehues, Judith; Stockhausen, Maximilian |
| Abstract: | Auf die Energiepreiskrise, die bereits Ende des Jahres 2021 begann und durch den russischen Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine verschärft wurde, hat die Bundesregierung mit 28 Maßnahmen in drei Entlastungspaketen reagiert, die insgesamt für den Zeitraum von 2022 bis 2024 einen Umfang von knapp 240 Milliarden Euro aufweisen. Zu den fiskalisch bedeutsamen Instrumenten zählen die Preisbremsen für Strom und Gas, der Ausgleich der kalten Progression, der Wegfall der EEG-Umlage sowie die Energiepreispauschale. Hinzu kommt die von den Arbeitgebern finanzierte Inflationsausgleichsprämie, bei der der Staat auf Steuern und Sozialabgaben verzichtet. [...] |
| JEL: | H20 H24 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkpps:62023&r=cis |
| By: | Terstriep, Judith; David, Alexandra |
| Abstract: | Mit der seit 2015 steigenden Fluchtmigration nach Deutschland, die mit dem Krieg in der Ukraine ihren bisherigen Höhepunkt erreicht hat, rückt die unternehmerische Tätigkeit von Flüchtlingen wieder in den Fokus der öffentlichen Debatte. Während die strukturellen Vor- und Nachteile von Flüchtlingsunternehmen breit diskutiert werden, finden der sozioökonomische und räumliche Kontext kaum Beachtung. Das regionale unternehmerische Ökosystem ist jedoch ein wichtiger Einflussfaktor für die Gründungstätigkeit und das Wachstum von Flüchtlingsunternehmen. Unsere vergleichende Studie von vier Ländern in Europa zeigt, dass es neben "harten" insbesondere "weiche" Faktoren sind, die Geflüchteten den Zugang zum unternehmerischen Ökosystem erst ermöglichen. |
| Keywords: | Unternehmerische Ökosysteme, Flüchtlingsunternehmen, Unternehmertum, Kontextfaktoren, regionale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, Innovationssysteme, sozialer Fortschritt, Integration |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iatfor:062023&r=cis |
| By: | Mr. Ali J Al-Sadiq; Diego Alejandro Gutiérrez |
| Abstract: | The heightened volatility of commodity prices in recent years, reflecting the effects of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, begs the longstanding question of the optimal fiscal policy response to commodity price shocks. Fiscal performance in most commodity-exporting countries is typically shaped by shifts in commodity prices and economic activity, often resulting in procyclical fiscal policy. One way to minimize the procyclicality of fiscal policy is to set up a stabilization Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). While such funds can help smooth government consumption in good and bad times, the empirical evidence of their value so far has been inconclusive. However, using an unbalanced panel dataset for 182 countries during 1980-2019, with two econometric methods that address the selection-bias problem, we provide robust evidence that stabilization SWFs do indeed help smooth government consumption by reducing fiscal policy volatility associated with commodity price fluctuations. |
| Keywords: | Sovereign Wealth Funds; Fiscal Policy Procyclicality; Matching Analysis; Commodity-exporting Countries |
| Date: | 2023–06–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2023/133&r=cis |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Pauw, Karl; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James; Ellis, Mia |
| Abstract: | Kenya experienced significant economic development in the 2009 to 2019 period. Gross domestic product (GDP)—an indicator of the economy’s size—expanded by an annual average of 5 percent (KNBS 2022). This exceeded population growth and helped raise household incomes, leading to a decline in poverty rates; more importantly, for the first time in at least three decades, the country experienced a decline in the absolute number of poor people (World Bank 2022). While the global COVID-19 pandemic caused negative economic growth in 2020, the economy recovered quickly in 2021. Kenya was also largely spared the adverse effects of the global commodity market disruptions arising from the Russia-Ukraine war that started in 2022 and from the global recession in 2023 (Arndt et al. 2023; Diao and Thurlow 2023). Kenya’s GDP growth is projected to reach 5.0 percent in 2023 and 5.3 percent in 2024 (World Bank 2023), suggesting that the economy is resuming its pre-pandemic growth trajectory. Agriculture remains an important sector, accounting for about one-quarter of GDP and nearly half of Kenya’s employment. It has thus played an important role in economic development. The sector has grown alongside the rest of the economy despite many challenges including climate variability (Ochieng et al. 2020), weak rural infrastructure (Benin and Odjo 2018), declines in farm size (Jayne et al. 2016), and limited access to farm inputs combined with poor agronomic management (Worku et al. 2020). In this brief, we look beyond primary agriculture to understand how Kenya’s broader agrifood system (AFS) is contributing to growth and transformation in the country. |
| Keywords: | KENYA, EAST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, grain legumes, cattle, fruits, coffee beans, tea, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:6&r=cis |
| By: | Pauw, Karl; Randriamamonjy, Josee; Thurlow, James; Diao, Xinshen; Ellis, Mia |
| Abstract: | Ghana experienced rapid economic growth with an annual GDP growth rate of 6.6 percent between 2009 and 2019 (GSS 2023). Restrictive COVID-19 policy measures in 2020 caused a slowdown in growth (Amewu et al. 2020), with the rate falling to just 0.5 percent in that year (World Bank 2023a). Economic growth rebounded to 5.4 percent in 2021, but this growth was fueled by excessive government borrowing to finance an ambitious public infrastructure campaign and ushered in a severe financial crisis in Ghana. By 2022, the fiscal deficit had reached almost 10 percent of GDP and the total debt-to-GDP ratio had skyrocketed to 90 percent, resulting in rampant inflation (32 percent year-on year), a doubling of interest rates (from 14 to 28 percent), and a sharp currency depreciation (40 percent) (World Bank 2023b; Naadi 2023). Economic growth slowed to 3.2 percent in 2022 and is projected to decline further to 1.6 percent in 2023 (World Bank 2023a). Although President Akuffo-Addo blamed “malevolent forces†(Financial Times 2023)—including the global commodity market shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which by some accounts had only a minimal effect on Ghana’s economy (Arndt et al. 2023; Diao and Thurlow 2023)—the economic situation eventually forced the government to agree to an IMF bailout of US$3 billion in 2023. This will be in force for three years. |
| Keywords: | GHANA, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, agrifood systems, value chains, markets, agriculture, labour productivity, off-farm employment, poverty, diet quality, jobs, development, gross national product, horticulture, maize, rice, gross domestic product (GDP), |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:afsdcs:5&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The German economy has demonstrated resilience following the shut-off of Russian gas supply last year, with highly adverse scenarios of widespread energy scarcity being avoided. This success reflects impressive efforts to conserve energy and secure future energy supplies, as well as the lack of severe winter weather. Nonetheless, adverse effects from the energy shock and tighter financial conditions have been sufficient to tilt the economy into recession in recent months. Inflation also spiked as the energy price shock added to existing pandemic-related supply bottlenecks, though inflation is now falling as these effects start to ease. Germany’s financial system remains well capitalized and liquid overall, but banking turmoil in other advanced economies earlier this year has nonetheless heightened the focus on potential financial stability risks associated with rising interest rates. |
| Date: | 2023–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/258&r=cis |
| By: | Beisheim, Marianne (Ed.) |
| Abstract: | The SDG Summit will take place on 18-19 September 2023 in New York. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has called it the 'centrepiece' of the UN's work this year. Numerous reports for this year's mid-term review of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs will lament the 'lack of political will' to implement the SDGs. This research paper addresses the lack of analysis of country-level politics around the SDGs by assessing the political priorities of local elites in eleven countries. Alongside the specific findings for these countries, we present overarching conclusions on the significance of country-level politics for SDG implementation. Analysing political will and considering country-level constraints should be part of the mid-term review and inform the outcome of the summit. |
| Keywords: | 2023 SDG Summit, 2030 Agenda, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR), Belarus, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, State of Palestine, Sudan |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:72023&r=cis |
| By: | Sonali Chowdhry; Julian Hinz; Katrin Kamin; Joschka Wanner |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition setups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanctions senders and target; (ii) compare prospective coalition partners; (iii) investigate “optimal” coalitions that maximise payoff from sanctions; (iv) provide bounds for sanctions potential, i.e. the maximum welfare change attainable when sanctions are scaled vertically up to an embargo, and horizontally up to a global regime. Relative to unilateral action, we find that coalitions magnify welfare losses imposed while their impact on domestic welfare loss incurred depends on the design and sectoral dimension of sanctions. Hypothetical cooperation of large developing economies such as China additionally raises the deterrent force of coalitions. Additionally, we quantify transfers that equalise welfare losses across coalition members to further demonstrate asymmetries in the relative economic burden of sanctions. In all scenarios, we implement a novel Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands for simulation outcomes. |
| Keywords: | sanctions, embargoes, alliances, sectoral linkages |
| JEL: | F13 F14 F17 F51 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10561&r=cis |
| By: | Chadha, J. S. |
| Abstract: | Major central banks have been caught in a low interest rate trap for over a decade. The temporary response to the financial crisis of 2008-9 has become something of a regime. The Federal Reserve, for example, attempted to ease quantitative easing in 2013 but this stalled following the “taper tantrum†and commenced a normalisation in the Federal Funds rate from 2015 but during Covid major central banks around the world rapidly returned policy rates to around zero. Low policy rates have been the response to tighter credit conditions, excessive global savings, low levels of investment and fiscal consolidation. But they have also played a role in propelling asset price growth and increasing levels of indebtedness. The accommodative stance in monetary policy, as well as the impetus from previous monetary and fiscal interventions seem like to have stoked inflation to a higher level that might otherwise have been the case following the shock of a war on the European continent. But may also have finally secured a normalisation in policy rates. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy, Ukraine War, Normalisation, Liquidity Trap |
| JEL: | E43 E58 E61 |
| Date: | 2023–07–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2354&r=cis |
| By: | Jagjit S. Chadha |
| Abstract: | Major central banks have been caught in a low interest rate trap for over a decade. The temporary response to the financial crisis of 2008-9 has become something of a regime. The Federal Reserve, for example, attempted to ease quantitative easing in 2013 but this stalled following the "taper tantrum" and commenced a normalisation in the Federal Funds rate from 2015 but during Covid major central banks around the world rapidly returned policy rates to around zero. Low policy rates have been the response to tighter credit conditions, excessive global savings, low levels of investment and fiscal consolidation. But they have also played a role in propelling asset price growth and increasing levels of indebtedness. The accommodative stance in monetary policy, as well as the impetus from previous monetary and fiscal interventions seem like to have stoked inflation to a higher level that might otherwise have been the case following the shock of a war on the European continent. But may also have finally secured a normalisation in policy rates. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy, Ukraine War, Normalisation, Liquidity Trap |
| JEL: | E43 E58 E61 |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nsr:niesrd:551&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Market stress following the September 2022 'mini-budget' has dissipated, in the context of a successful financial stability intervention by the Bank of England (BoE) and two prudent budgets. Post-Brexit uncertainty has declined somewhat due to the Windsor Framework agreement to resolve disputes around the Northern Ireland Protocol. Still, the economy faces several challenges. The post-pandemic recovery was disrupted by the sharp energy price shock due to Russia’s war in Ukraine; labor force participation has declined, mainly on account of rising long-term illness; and large policy rate increases—needed to arrest high and sticky inflation—have tightened financial conditions. Accordingly, and despite recent upgrades, GDP growth is forecast at a modest 0.4 percent for 2023, followed by 1 percent growth in 2024. Lower energy prices and emerging economic slack is projected to help reduce headline inflation to around 5¼ percent by end-2023 and to the 2 percent target by mid-2025. Risks are tilted to the downside for growth and to the upside for inflation. Tighter-than-expected global financial conditions present the key downside risk to growth, while robust wage growth and greater inflation persistence pose upside risks to inflation. |
| Date: | 2023–07–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/252&r=cis |
| By: | Hüther, Michael; Küper, Malte; Schaefer, Thilo |
| Abstract: | Erdgas ist für Deutschland in den letzten drei Dekaden immer wichtiger geworden, sei es für das Heizen von Gebäuden, die Bereitstellung von Prozesswärme in der Industrie oder die Stromerzeugung. Dabei ist die Importabhängigkeit bei Erdgas in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten auf fast 100 Prozent angestiegen, wobei der größte Teil der Importe aus Russland kam. Dementsprechend schwer wurde die deutsche Energieversorgung im vergangenen Jahr durch den Ausfall seines größten Gaslieferanten getroffen. Ein Teil davon kann inzwischen durch den vermehrten Import von Flüssiggas kompensiert werden. Vor allem die USA schickten LNG-Tanker in Richtung Europa. Die geringere LNG-Nachfrage aus China, dem größten LNG-Käufer, kam aus EU-Sicht zur richtigen Zeit und schaffte auf dem Weltmarkt die freien Kapazitäten, die in Europa dringend benötigt wurden. Damit trug LNG ebenso wie die Gaseinsparungen von Haushalten und Industrie sowie zusätzliche Pipelineimporte aus Norwegen ganz entscheidend zur Sicherung der Versorgungslage bei. Deutschland, das erst seit Ende letzten Jahres ein eigenes LNG-Terminal betreibt, profitierte 2022 von LNG-Terminals in Belgien und den Niederlanden. Bis Sommer 2024 werden an der deutschen Nord- und Ostseeküste weitere schwimmende LNG-Terminals entstehen und schrittweise die Gasversorgung in Deutschland sicherstellen. |
| JEL: | F15 O13 Q41 Q43 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkpps:52023&r=cis |
| By: | Roman Goncharenko; Mikhail Mamonov; Steven Ongena; Svetlana Popova; Natalia Turdyeva |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyze how firms search for new lenders after a financial regulator forcibly closes their prior banks, and what happens to the firms’ performance during this transition period. In 2013, the Central Bank of Russia launched a large-scale bank closure policy and started detecting fraudulent (sin) banks and revoking their licenses. By 2020, two-thirds of all operating banks had been shuttered. We analyze this unique period in history using credit register data. First, we establish that before sin bank closures, there was no informational leakage and the borrowing firms remain unaffected. After the closures, there is a clear sorting pattern: poorly-performing firms rush to other (not-yetdetected) sin banks, while profitable firms transfer to financially solid banks. We find that the coupling of poorly-performing firms and not-yet-detected sin banks occurs more frequently when the two sin banks (the prior and the next lender) are commonly owned or when the local banking market is unconcentrated. Finally, we show that during the transition period (i.e., after the sin bank closures and before matching to new banks), poorly-performing firms shrink in size and experience a sharp decline in borrowings and market sales, whereas profitable firms strengthen in terms of employment, investment, and market sales. A potential mechanism involves credit risk underpricing by sin banks: we find that poorly-performing firms (especially commonly owned) received loans at lower interest rates than profitable firms prior to sin bank closures. |
| Keywords: | Credit register, Bank clean-up, Regulatory forbearance, Credit risk underpricing, Common ownership |
| JEL: | G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp754&r=cis |
| By: | Pavel Valedinsky (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Valeriya Ivanyushina (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Daniel Alexandrov (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Daria Khodorenko (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Alcohol use is a common form of risky consumption among adolescents. Little research has been carried out on the influence of such factors as parental control, relationships with parents, and teenage feelings of depression on the frequency of alcohol consumption among adolescents in Russia. In this paper, structural models were developed to describe the influence of these factors on adolescent alcohol consumption and the relationship between the factors. Alcohol consumption in adolescents is represented in the work in two ways: casual alcohol use and binge drinking (the consumption of four or more servings of alcohol at a time). The respondents were students at vocational schools who participated in a longitudinal project to study the risky behavior of adolescents in St. Petersburg. Four waves of the survey were used: 1, 5, 6 & 7. According to the results, the strongest direct negative effect on alcohol consumption is caused by parental monitoring. However, the direct influence of monitoring on adolescent alcohol consumption was significant in Wave 1. But in Wave 6, this influence was insignificant, which can partially be explained by the age of the respondents, most of whom were already adults at the moment of completing the questionnaire in Wave 6. Regarding the relationship with parents, no direct influence on alcohol consumption was detected—only an indirect effect mediated by parental monitoring. The positive correlation between the relationship with parents and the level of monitoring was significant in Waves 1 and 7. The level of depression in adolescents was a significant predictor of drinking behavior only in the model describing alcohol consumption as the frequency of casual drinking. In the models describing binge drinking, this relationship was insignificant. In all models, there was a stable negative relationship between the relationship with parents and depression in adolescents |
| Keywords: | alcohol consumption, adolescents, vocational school, parental control, parental monitoring, depression, structural equation modeling (SEM), longitudinal study |
| JEL: | Z |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:101/soc/2023&r=cis |
| By: | M. ADAM (Insee); O. BONNET (Insee); E. FIZE (Conseil d’Analyse Économique); T. LOISEL (Insee, Crest); M. RAULT (onseil d’Analyse Économique.); L. WILNER (Insee, Crest) |
| Abstract: | This article exploits quasi-natural experiments provided by both the 2022 crude oil price surge consecutive to the Russo-Ukrainian war and fuel excise tax cuts in France to infer the price sensitivity of fuel demand. The granularity of bank account data available at the transaction level permits to shed new insights on how to properly disentangle anticipation effects from price effects. After controlling for anticipatory behavior, we obtain a price-elasticity comprised between -0.4 and -0.21. The average elasticity exhibits sizeable dispersion with respect to fuel spending, but varies little with income and location. Counterfactual simulations enable us to assess both financial and distributive impacts of the tax policy at stake as well as its effect on CO2 emissions. |
| Keywords: | Fuel demand; price elasticity; excise tax changes; anticipatory behavior; transaction-level data. |
| JEL: | C18 C51 D12 H23 H31 L71 Q31 Q35 Q41 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nse:doctra:2023-17&r=cis |
| By: | Mikhail Mamonov; Anna Pestova; Steven Ongena |
| Abstract: | We study the impacts of global financial sanctions on banks and their corporate borrowers in Russia. Financial sanctions were imposed consecutively between 2014 and 2019, allowing targeted (but not-yetsanctioned) banks to adapt their international and domestic exposures in advance. Using a staggered difference-in-differences approach with in-advance adaptation to anticipated treatment, we establish that targeted banks immediately reduced their foreign assets and actually increased their international borrowings after the first sanction announcement compared to other similar banks. We reveal that the added value of the next sanction announcements was rather limited. Despite considerable outflow of domestic private deposits, the government support prevented disorderly bank failures and resulted in credit reshuffling: the banks contracted corporate lending by 4% of GDP and increased household lending by almost the same magnitude, which mostly offset the total economic loss. Further, we introduce a two-stage treatment diffusion approach that flexibly addresses potential spillovers of the sanctions to private banks with political connections. Employing unique hand-collected board membership and bank location data, our approach shows that throughout this period, politically-connected banks were not all equally recognized as potential sanction targets. Finally, using syndicated loan data, we establish that the real negative effects of sanctions materialized only when sanctioned firms were borrowing from sanctioned banks. When borrowing from unsanctioned banks, sanctioned firms even gained in terms of employment and investment but still lost in terms of market sales pointing to a misallocation of government support. |
| Keywords: | Staggered policy implementation, Anticipation effects, Treatment diffusion, Banks, International positions, Politically-connected firms, Capital misallocation |
| JEL: | F51 G41 H81 L25 |
| Date: | 2023–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp753&r=cis |
| By: | Mikhail Mamonov (Charles University in Prague-CERGE-EI); Anna Pestova (Charles University in Prague-CERGE-EI); Steven Ongena (University of Zurich; KU Leuven; NTNU Business School; Swiss Finance Institute; and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We study the impacts of global financial sanctions on banks and their corporate borrowers in Russia. Financial sanctions were imposed consecutively between 2014 and 2019, allowing targeted (but not-yet-sanctioned) banks to adapt their international and domestic exposures in advance. Using a staggered difference-in-differences approach with in-advance adaptation to anticipated treatment, we establish that targeted banks immediately reduced their foreign assets and actually increased their international borrowings after the first sanction announcement compared to other similar banks. We reveal that the added value of the next sanction announcements was rather limited. Despite considerable outflow of domestic private deposits, the government support prevented disorderly bank failures and resulted in credit reshuffling: the banks contracted corporate lending by 4% of GDP and increased household lending by almost the same magnitude, which mostly offset the total economic loss. Further, we introduce a two-stage treatment diffusion approach that flexibly addresses potential spillovers of the sanctions to private banks with political connections. Employing unique hand-collected board membership and bank location data, our approach shows that throughout this period, politically-connected banks were not all equally recognized as potential sanction targets. Finally, using syndicated loan data, we establish that the real negative effects of sanctions materialized only when sanctioned firms were borrowing from sanctioned banks. When borrowing from unsanctioned banks, sanctioned firms even gained in terms of employment and investment but still lost in terms of market sales pointing to a misallocation of government support. |
| Keywords: | Staggered policy implementation, Anticipation effects, Treatment diffusion, Banks, International positions, Politically-connected firms, Capital misallocation. |
| JEL: | F51 G41 H81 L25 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2359&r=cis |
| By: | Alden, Christopher; le Pere, Garth |
| Abstract: | The shifting nature of contemporary global politics highlights the growing contestation about power and how it is distributed, with multipolarity as its hallmark and distinguishing feature. Amid the shift to multipolarity, new forms of multilateralism are emerging from the South, which are grounded in ‘institutional arrangements led by countries of the Global South’ in terms of the origin of initiatives, the drivers of such arrangements and the resources to sustain them. In this context, Southern Multilateralism offers a differ approach to classical Realist thinking where power is ‘the final arbiter of things political’. Southern Multilateralism has also given rise to new international institutional arrangements, such as the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB) and its predecessor, the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Forum and the IBSA Fund Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation. This article compares the IBSA and their Fund with the NDB and argues that there are continuities and linkages between the NDB and the IBSA Fund, which have yet to be examined by scholars; and to be more precise, the NDB has absorbed and reflects, key attributes of the IBSA and their Fund. Moreover, this study concludes by suggesting regional collaboration options for the NDB, led by South Africa, India and Brazil and their respective regions, whereby the NDB can expand its global role and relevance in future via its regional offices, particularly by supporting the regional trade integration plans in Africa, South Asia and South America. |
| Keywords: | Wiley deal |
| JEL: | J1 F3 G3 |
| Date: | 2023–07–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:119700&r=cis |
| By: | Patrinos, Harry Anthony; Rivera-Olvera, Angelica |
| Abstract: | Countries across Eastern Europe and Central Asia are in their third decade of independence. What impact does this have on the skills premium and does accession to the European Union have an impact on the returns to education? The returns to education in 28 transition and 20 non-transition countries in Europe and Central Asia are analyzed using panel data analysis and difference-in-difference methods to estimate the impact of transition and EU accession. It is found that the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy increases the returns to schooling in post-socialist countries positively and significantly, especially through the EU accession channel. |
| Keywords: | returns to education, transition, technological change |
| JEL: | I26 J31 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1312&r=cis |
| By: | Berbée, Paul; Stuhler, Jan |
| Abstract: | Germany has become the second-most important destination for migrants worldwide. Using all waves from the microcensus, we study their labor market integration over the last 50 years, and document key differences to the US case. While the employment gaps between immigrant and native men decline in the first years after arrival, they remain large for most cohorts; the average gap one decade after arrival is around 10 percentage points. Income gaps are instead widening with time spent in Germany. Differences in educational and demographic characteristics explain how those gaps vary across groups, and why they widened over time: accounting for composition, integration outcomes show no systematic trend. However, economic conditions do matter, and the employment rate of some earlier cohorts collapsed when structural shocks hit the German labor market in the 1990s. Finally, we study the likely integration path of recent arrivals during the European refugee 'crisis' and the Russo-Ukrainian war. |
| Keywords: | Immigration, labor market integration, long-run trends |
| JEL: | J11 J61 J68 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:23020&r=cis |
| By: | Carnevali, Emilio; Sommacal, Matteo |
| Abstract: | In the three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the notion of socialism has been swept into almost total disrepute. The more recent economic literature, however, has shown a resurgence of interest in the concept of socialism, albeit on very different theoretical grounds than in the past. This article investigates the reasons for the socialist movement's historical distrust of the development of "well-defined" economic projects. This attitude seems to have disappeared in contemporary "socialist projects". The article also discusses the Shareholder Socialism proposal developed by economist Giacomo Corneo and proposes a different mathematical formulation of the mechanism through which the takeover of private industries by the public sector should be conducted. |
| Keywords: | Market Socialism; Nationalization; Economic Systems |
| JEL: | B14 B24 H1 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:117919&r=cis |
| By: | Berbée, Paul; Stuhler, Jan |
| Abstract: | Seit der Anwerbung sogenannter Gastarbeiter/innen in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren wurde Deutschland nach den USA zum weltweit wichtigsten Zielland für Migranten/-innen. Trotzdem tut sich Deutschland bis heute schwer damit, seine Rolle als Einwanderungsland zu akzeptieren und eine vorausschauende Einwanderungs-, Sozial- und Bildungspolitik zu betreiben, die den jeweiligen Zuwanderungsgruppen Rechnung trägt. Mithilfe neuer Daten zeigt dieser ZEW policy brief, wo bei der Arbeitsmarktintegration konkrete politische Herausforderungen liegen: Während EU-Bürger häufig Arbeit finden und zum Teil besser verdienen als Einheimische, tun sich Migranten/-innen aus außereuropäischen Ländern mit hohem Flüchtlingsanteil besonders schwer. Selbst Kinder von Zugewanderten, die das deutsche Bildungssystem durchlaufen haben, sind weiterhin benachteiligt. Insgesamt hat sich die Arbeitsmarktintegration im Laufe der Jahrzehnte verschlechtert. Dies lässt sich mit der veränderten Zusammensetzung der Neuankommenden und wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen erklären. Die Ergebnisse helfen aber auch, die Integrationsverläufe von Geflüchteten vorherzusagen, die seit 201 nach Deutschland gekommen sind und dokumentieren das hohe Arbeitsmarktpotenzial gut ausgebildeter ukrainischer Geflüchteter. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewpbs:072023&r=cis |