|
on Confederation of Independent States |
|
Issue of 2023‒07‒31
thirty-one papers chosen by |
| By: | Jens Klose (THM Business School Giessen) |
| Abstract: | What are the effects of sanctions and economic support on stock prices and exchange rates in the Russia-Ukraine war? We address this question using a panel-VAR model that incorporates data from 23 countries, besides Russia and Ukraine, spanning the period from 02/01/2022 to 02/24/2023. Our analysis relies on a detailed database to capture the nuances of sanctions and economic support. The results are presented from three distinct perspectives: firstly, in relation to the global economies; secondly, with regard to Russia; and thirdly, concerning Ukraine. The findings reveal that the overall impact of economic support provided to Ukraine is generally limited. In contrast, sanctions imposed by countries have minimal effects on the sanctioning country itself, but they can have significant consequences for the targeted nation. This is particularly evident when financial sanctions are implemented. However, it is important to note that such sanctions also exert effects on the opposing party in the war, Ukraine. Furthermore, if the sanctions originate from G7 or developed countries, the effects on Russia tend to be more pronounced. |
| Keywords: | Sanctions, Support Measures, Stock Prices, Exchange Rates, Panel-VAR |
| JEL: | F31 F51 G15 C33 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202317&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Haiti faces a challenging macroeconomic outlook amid a humanitarian crisis. The country has been hit hard by economic spillovers from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with food price inflation triggering a hunger crisis. This global shock has been compounded by a dire security situation, which has heightened the economy’s fragility, hampered activity, and generated supply-side bottlenecks which have further fueled inflation. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. |
| Date: | 2023–06–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/230&r=cis |
| By: | Barinova Vera (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Zemtsov Stepan (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Demidova Ksenia (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Levakov P. (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | 2022 demonstrated intensification of sanction pressure on the Russian Federation. Consumer demand contracted against the backdrop of inflation coupled with the rising cost of borrowing, many entrepreneurs faced the risk of bankruptcy. Under pressure from unfriendly countries, many large foreign companies left Russia, and established supply chains were severed. The release of jobs, caused by the closure of a number of industries, created the preconditions for the development of forced entrepreneurship, mainly for people who lost their jobs. Small and medium-sized enterprises suffered both from the imposed restrictions and the ensuing decline in consumer demand, and therefore became one of the objects of the anti-crisis state policy. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, small businesses, medium-sized enterprises, sanctions |
| JEL: | C53 E37 I18 I19 L21 L52 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1285&r=cis |
| By: | Avxentyev Nikolai (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Nazarov Vladimir (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sisigina Natalia (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The main challenge of the year for domestic health care was the need to maintain the achieved level of quality and accessibility of medical care in unfavorable macroeconomic atmosphere. Despite medical products were not formally the core of Western sanctions, provision of the industry was dramatically complicated due to restrictions on transportation, uncertainty of the exchange rate and departure of a number of suppliers from the Russian market. For most of the year, health care system also continued to struggle with the pandemic of a new coronavirus infection. While the severity of the disease declined sharply, the spread of COVID-19 remained widescale enough to place a high burden on health care organizations. External and internal constraints were bound to have a negative impact on the implementation of the national project “Health Care” and sectoral projects of smaller scale. Overall consequences of the crisis for the sector development can be assessed only after the restructuring of previously approved programs and projects is completed. Nevertheless, implementation of the majority of planned activities continues, while cancellations or significant temporary shifts of projects are isolated. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, health care system |
| JEL: | I1 I15 I18 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1290&r=cis |
| By: | Arkashkin Igor (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Barbashova Natalia (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Matveev Evgeniy (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Vekerle Konstantin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sokolov Ilya (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Tishchenko Tatiana (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2022, the nominal growth of all the main parameters of the enlarged government budget (hereinafter — EGB) led to their dynamics in shares of GDP in relation to the previous year to have a multidirectional nature: revenues decreased by 0.6 p.p. of GDP to its lowest level in recent years of 35.0% of GDP, while expenditures rose by 1.6 p.p. of GDP to 36.4% of GDP |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, intergovernmental relations, fiscal policy, budget system, revenues, expenditures, Bank of Russia |
| JEL: | E62 H5 H61 H62 H68 H7 H72 H77 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1274&r=cis |
| By: | Makarentseva M. (RANEPA); Mkrtchyan Nikita (RANEPA); Florinskaya Yulia (RANEPA); Khasanova Ramilya (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2022, natural population decline was equal to nearly 600, 000 persons (599, 600) or 4.1‰ (per mille) which is much below the level of a natural decline in the population in 2021 (1, 042, 700, 7.2‰) (Fig. 13). Such a decrease was feasible owing to the return of the mortality rate to the normal (non-pandemic) level. Experts approached the beginning of 2022 with negative expectations regarding the birth rate dynamics and the demographic situation as a whole. First, Russia is approaching the “bottom” as regards the number of women of the most active reproductive age (Fig. 14). With each year, a large generation of the late 1980s makes a smaller and smaller contribution to the current birth rate. All subsequent cohorts of women are substantially smaller in number. Second, as of the beginning of 2022 an upcoming decrease in the intensity of childbirth was mainly driven by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021 and the accompanying economic stagnation. Now we can say that the effect of the coronavirus pandemic on the birth rate has become inseparable in Russia from the effects of subsequent developments (the beginning of the special military operation, the sanctions regime and the economic crisis) since Autumn 2022. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, population decline, demographic trends, childbirth, migration, internal migration, temporary migration, long-term migration |
| JEL: | J11 J13 J61 J62 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1295&r=cis |
| By: | Malginov Georgy (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sternik Sergey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Last year, the Russian real estate market was fully affected by the shocks that hit the domestic economy, passing through several phases. The first months were marked by the continued growth of real estate prices with a shortage of supply. The mechanism of government mortgage support worked out in the previous years stimulated the demand ensuring the prevalence of mortgage transactions in the total volume of deals in Russian cities. The changes in socio-economic situation that took place at the turn of winter and spring amid the aggravation of geopolitical tensions caused panic among buyers and sellers on the real estate market and a significant drop in the volume of transactions. A sharp increase of the key rate by the central bank to 20% led to a collapse of mortgage lending by the banks. The rapid buying up of “cheap” supply was carried out by means of withdrawal of cash from bank accounts by the population. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, residential property prices, housing market, housing construction |
| JEL: | H82 K11 L32 L33 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1288&r=cis |
| By: | Izryadnova Olga (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The 2022 economic dynamic was characterized by extreme volatility. The situation was shaped by the continuing trends, on the one hand, of economic recovery after the coronavirus pandemic and, on the other hand, the creation of new mechanisms to support, adapt and reduce the impact of sanctions restrictions in relation to the real and financial sectors of the domestic economy throughout the year. The profiles of the economic development in early 2022 were defined by continuation of the imbalance of the growing demand and limited changes in the supply at high differentiation of the growth rates by types of economic activities and segments of the internal and external markets; intensification of the inflationary pressure on incomes and consumer behavior of the population; structural transformation of prices and production costs.3 The starting position for 2022 was driven by the output growth by the basic types of economic activities by 5.9% according to the results of 2021, the final demand of the households increasing by 10.0% and the investment demand — by 7.6%. Domestic demand was propped up by raising the scale of foreign trade turnover: the increase in the contribution of net exports in 2021 came to 9.3% of GDP, including exports - 30.2% and imports — 20.9% (by the SNA methodology in current prices). |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, fixed investment, GDP, inflation |
| JEL: | E20 E21 E22 E60 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1282&r=cis |
| By: | Dorokhina K. (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Ignatov Alexander (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Larionova Marina (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Popova Irina (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sakharov Andrey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Shelepov Andrey (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2022, the process of gradual destruction of multilateralization gave way to an acute crisis. Multiple challenges, including a continued spread of new strains of coronavirus, disruptions in supply chains, appreciation of prices for food and energy, rising inflation, slowdown of economic growth rates, increased inequality and lagging behind in achieving sustainable development goals and targets of the Paris climate agreement required collective actions. However, after the recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic and the beginning of the special military operation (SMO) the USA and its allies took unprecedented efforts to isolate Russia in the system of multilateral institutes. The pressure put by G7 and their partners has led to an increased mistrust and tensions in the relations between the westerns countries and developing countries, as well as the risk of key international institutes’ loss of functionality. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, international organizations, international institutional arrangements |
| JEL: | F5 F53 F55 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1293&r=cis |
| By: | Shagaida Natalya (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Ternovsky Dmitry (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2022, index of physical volume of agricultural output in agricultural organizations, peasant (private) farms and household farms grew by 10.2% as compared to the previous year. In monetary terms growth was 14.8% due to rising prices on agricultural products (+4.2%, i.e. much lower as compared to general inflation). Such high growth in physical volume is determined among other things by a lower comparison base — in 2021 index was 99.6% against 2020. In 2022, output of livestock went up, however here an impact on overall dynamics of agricultural production is much less significant than in crop production (+1.1 p.p., vs. 9.6 p.p.). Largest increase was observed in pork (+5.0%) which led to a 0.5 p.p. increase in the index. Beef is the only livestock product with negative dynamic (drop in the production of cattle meat in slaughter weight came to 3.6%). Increase in grain production in 2022 was mainly on the back of a sharp increase in yields (126.9% vs. 2021), which resulted in a record-high gross harvest in country’s history. Crop area expansion was negligible at 101.1% relative to 2021 which is within five-year range of crop area fluctuations. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, agricultural production, food security |
| JEL: | I18 I19 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1280&r=cis |
| By: | Malginov Georgy (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Radygin Alexander (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Publication of data according to the System of indicators to assess the effectiveness of state property management began in 2016 in compliance with the RF Government Decree of 29.01.2015 No. 72. This system has replaced monitoring of indicators of the public sector of the economy, conducted by Rosstat since the early 2000s based on the RF Government Decree of 4.01.1999 No. 1 (subsequently revised on 30.12.2002). It contains information about the number of federal state unitary enterprises (FSUE) and joint-stock companies (JSCs) with the RF participation in the capital, which are also published in the privatization programs for the next term. The new edition of the “Forecast plan (program) of federal property privatization and focal points of federal property privatization” with shifting of its time limits from 2022—2024 to 2023—2025 allows to describe the processes that took place in the previous year. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, public sector, privatization |
| JEL: | H82 K11 L32 L33 L38 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1286&r=cis |
| By: | Klyachko Tatiana (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Tokareva Galina (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2022, all pandemic restrictions were lifted from the Russian education system as it switched to full-time mode. At the same time, the outcomes that emerged during the periods of prolonged lockdowns remained, especially distance learning. In the new environment, they are used partially but allow to work remotely, for example, university lecturers (to give lectures remotely, being on business trip, etc.) or researchers can remotely participate in scientific conferences and seminars. As a result, the audiences outreach for various seminars and webinars has increased dramatically. Simultaneously, in 2022, the Russian education system faced new challenges associated with the special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine and the sanctions pressure on Russia caused by the SMO. This led to substantive, structural, organizational and economic changes in the functioning of different levels of the education system. |
| Keywords: | Education system, general education, vocational education, distance learning, higher education |
| JEL: | I21 I22 I23 I24 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1294&r=cis |
| By: | Bozhechkova Alexandra (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Trunin Pavel (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Knobel Alexander (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2022, the Russian economy experienced a profound negative shock associated with the imposition of sanctions against Russia by a number of developed countries, including the freeze of the Bank of Russia’s international reserve assets, Russian banks being cut out of international payment systems, restrictions on imports of Russian goods and services and exports of technologies to Russia, and some other measures. The shock gave rise to pronounced instability in Russia’s financial market and forced the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to sharply tighten its monetary policy in order to prevent the outflow of funds from the banking system. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, monetary policy, money market, exchange rate, inflation, balance of payments, fiscal policy |
| JEL: | E31 E43 E44 E51 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1273&r=cis |
| By: | Nilsson, Lars (DG Trade); Antimiani, Alessandro (DG Trade); Jan, Schmitz (DG Trade) |
| Abstract: | We use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model analysis to show estimates of the medium-term economic impact of the sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and related Russian countermeasures. Sanctions covered are those legally in place and announced against Russia and Belarus by Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, the UK, the US, and countersanctions by Russia until 25 March 2022. The results simulating the impact of those measures point to a reduction in Russian GDP of 3.7%, amounting to a strong recession, at a level rarely seen in such modelling exercises. EU GDP would fall more modestly by 0.08%. |
| Keywords: | Russian invasion of Ukraine; sanctions; economic modelling |
| JEL: | F51 |
| Date: | 2023–04–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:dgtcen:2022_004&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The outlook remains challenging. While the economy is recovering from shocks induced by the war in Ukraine and the Ebola outbreak, the recent global market turmoil, and potential spillovers from the conflict in Sudan pose new policy challenges. The authorities have reacted to the shocks with support to vulnerable households, an appropriate monetary policy stance to contain inflation, and fiscal consolidation to contain vulnerabilities. |
| Date: | 2023–06–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/229&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The multiple external shocks that hit the Gambian economy obstructed a rapid recovery in 2022. The implications of the war in Ukraine continue to exert pressures on inflation. These pressures are threatening socio-economic stability in the context of local elections, despite the absence of severe social tensions in recent months. This sixth program review is the last review under the current ECF arrangement. The authorities have requested a successor program with the Fund, which will draw on the authorities’ national development plan as well as on lessons learnt and outstanding challenges from this expiring program. |
| Date: | 2023–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/216&r=cis |
| By: | Abramov Alexander (RANEPA); Radygin Alexander (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Chernova Maria (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The year 2022 was one of the most difficult periods for the global financial market in many years. Due to a unique combination of adverse economic and geopolitical factors, investments in almost all assets, with few exceptions, had negative returns in 2022. Even investment assets such as government securities, precious metals, real estate and cryptocurrency failed to perform their functions of hedging investor returns against losses. In January-February 2023, many financial assets began to show positive returns again, however, this trend gradually slowed down under the influence of the same factors that negatively affected the financial market in 2022. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, stock market, bond market, corporate bond market, derivatives market, private investors |
| JEL: | G01 G12 G18 G21 G24 G28 G32 G33 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2023-1275&r=cis |
| By: | I. Savchuk I. Savchuk (GC (UMR_8504) - Géographie-cités - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UPCité - Université Paris Cité, EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales) |
| Abstract: | Avant la guerre, l'économie ukrainienne était portée par ses exportations céréalières, minéraux de fer et sidérurgiques. Ces trois activités ont été brutalement réduites par un conflit durant lequel le secteur informatique s'est imposé comme nouvelle branche de développement. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine, National economy, War, Agriculture |
| Date: | 2023–02–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04129611&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Comoros is a small, fragile island state facing significant development challenges, balance of payments needs, a high risk of debt distress, vulnerabilities in the banking system, and governance weaknesses. In recent years, the country was hit by successive shocks including Cyclone Kenneth in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020- 21, and fallout from the war in Ukraine in 2022. Two rounds of emergency support under the RCF/RFI of SDR 8.9 million each were approved in July 2019 and April 2020. A Staff Monitored Program (SMP), approved in September 2021, ended with broadly satisfactory performance, helping to establish a track record of policy implementation towards an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement. Policies under the SMP aimed to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, reduce economic risks, and begin reforms to tackle sources of fragility. |
| Date: | 2023–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/215&r=cis |
| By: | World Bank; Coll-Black, Sarah; Von Lenthe, Cornelius Claus; Koettl-Brodmann, Stefanie |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the social protection response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to learn lessons on how to build the resilience of their social protectionsystem. These countries made substantial efforts to address the most serious consequences of the pandemic, pragmaticallyharnessing existing programs to reach vulnerable groups, while also introducing innovations to fill gaps in theexisting social protection system. Rigidities in administrative systems, complex eligibility criteria, aswell as weaknesses in information systems, limited governments’ ability to quickly identify and reach thosehouseholds that were most vulnerable to the impact of the pandemic with adequate support. These challenges strengthenthe case for investment in crisis preparedness – most immediately by improving the functioning of socialprotection systems and setting out the design features and delivery systems to support a response to future covariate shocks. |
| Date: | 2023–06–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:hdnspu:183521&r=cis |
| By: | Motyakina, Yana |
| Abstract: | The paper examines the impact of priority development areas (PDA) on the economic diversification of Russia's cities. The research question of the work is this: did the creation of priority development areas contribute to a decrease in the share of employees in the city-forming enterprise and an increase in the number of operating firms? The main data sources are EMISS and SPARK-Interfax. The collected data of operating firms in a single-industry town, the number of employees in a city-forming enterprise, and other variables were converted into a panel for 2015–2021 for 279 cities. Since cities received status of PDA in different years, the method of difference in differences with multiple periods was applied along with the panel matching. The work tests the main hypothesis:“Assigning the status of PDA to a single-industry town ensures a significant increase in the number of new enterprises.” As a result of the analysis, it was revealed that, according to the panel matching, the assignment of the priority development area status increases the number of new firms after 2 and 3 years after assigning, but, according to the staggered adoption difference-in-differences, the results are not significant. |
| Keywords: | single-industry town; priority development areas |
| JEL: | J21 R15 |
| Date: | 2023–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:117635&r=cis |
| By: | Alexandra Bykova (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Rumen Dobrinsky (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Richard Grieveson (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Maciej J. Grodzicki; Doris Hanzl-Weiss (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Gabor Hunya (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Niko Korpar (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Sebastian Leitner (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Bernhard Moshammer (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Ondřej Sankot; Bernd Christoph Ströhm (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Maryna Tverdostup (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Zuzana Zavarská (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | The EU member states of Central Eastern Europe (EU-CEE) have experienced rapid convergence in the decades following their EU accession, and have built up strong export-oriented manufacturing sectors boosted by foreign direct investment inflows. While this growth model has brought many positives, there are indications that it is hitting its limits. Endogenous limits to EU-CEE’s growth model are exacerbated by exogenous challenges of the ‘twin’ (green and digital) transitions, and the fallout of the pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine. This reinforces the imperative for EU-CEE to transition to a more innovation-driven, new growth model, enabled by a comprehensive industrial policy. However, the EU-CEE countries have not only lacked a stable and strategic approach to industrial policy in their development paths, but also find themselves in a unique position due to EU membership. As a result, innovation and industrial policies are underdeveloped in the region. Based on an in-depth analysis of the industrial landscape and the industrial policy environment of the region, we propose eight pillars for creating a EU-CEE version of the entrepreneurial state. |
| Keywords: | industrial policy, EU-CEE, convergence, transition, green, digital |
| JEL: | L52 O25 F63 L60 P27 O40 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rpaper:rr:469&r=cis |
| By: | Jakub Mućk (Narodowy Bank Polski and SGH Warsaw School of Economics); Łukasz Postek (Narodowy Bank Polski and University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences) |
| Abstract: | This article quantifies the effects of supply chains disruptions on inflation in European economies. We apply the local projection method in a panel framework and estimate responses of nine measures of consumer and producer inflation to shortages in materials and equipment reported by enterprises in the business surveys conducted by the European Commission. We find that supply chains disruptions are proinflationary for all considered measures of inflation, and a larger effect can be observed for inflation of prices of goods rather than services. The peak of impulse responses can be observed 4-6 quarters after shock, while the effect usually dies out after 8-12 quarters. The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) suggests that supply chain disruptions are much more important in explaining inflation changes at medium- rather than short-run forecast horizon. Moreover, supply chain shocks seem to matter relatively more for the variance of inflation of consumer prices of goods than for other measures of inflation. Interestingly, the positive estimates of the impact of supply chains disruptions on inflation can be related mainly to the period corresponding with the COVID-19 pandemics as well as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and may exhibit asymmetric or regime-switching nature. |
| Keywords: | supply chains shock, inflation, local projection, panel data. |
| JEL: | E31 E32 F41 C33 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:360&r=cis |
| By: | Бекишева Зайра // Bekisheva Zaira (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Аймухамедова Акмарал // Aimukhamedova Akmaral (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Ускенбаев Азат // Uskenbayev Azat (National Bank of Kazakhstan) |
| Keywords: | FDI |
| JEL: | F21 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aob:anotes:11&r=cis |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Serbia has made impressive economic gains over much of the past decade: living standards improved, inflation fell, public finances were strengthened, and reserves increased, helped by ample foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. But spillovers from the war in Ukraine—especially the sharp increase in international energy prices—and deep-rooted problems in Serbia’s energy sector that came to a head last year, led to large external and fiscal financing needs, prompting the authorities to request a Fund-supported Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). Fiscal and external outturns for 2022 were both better than expected, and unemployment remains low. Record FDI inflows continue to drive reserves higher. But inflation remains a pressing challenge. Led by high food and energy prices, headline inflation is now well above the National Bank of Serbia’s (NBS’s) target band and core inflation has also increased sharply. Fiscal policy is expected to remain relatively tight in 2023, despite additional mid-year spending measures. Deep structural problems persist in the energy sector and are a key focus of the SBA. Long-standing geopolitical challenges remain. |
| Date: | 2023–06–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2023/243&r=cis |
| By: | Dmytro Boyarchuk; Marek Dabrowski |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses Ukraine’s war economy management and performance, according to information available in June 2023. |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:wpaper:node_9241&r=cis |
| By: | Roberto Roson; Emanuela Ghignoni |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a data set, associating education levels to occupations, and a methodology, which allow estimating how the distribution of the two variables could change, after some exogenous shock affecting the labor market. We assess some implications of the empirical finding that, in response to a weaker demand for labor, sufficiently educated workers would reallocate themselves into lower-ranked occupations, rather than getting unemployed. The exercise is conducted with Italian data, where 37 occupations and 10 education levels are considered. A counterfactual distribution is estimated, using a computable general equilibrium model to simulate the impact on the labor market of a trade disruption crisis with Russia. |
| Keywords: | Skill Mismatch; Education; Overeducation; Unemployment; Labor Market; Computable General Equilibrium Models |
| JEL: | A20 C23 C68 C82 D58 E24 F16 I20 J21 J24 J62 J82 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp241&r=cis |
| By: | Brainerd, Elizabeth (Brandeis University); Malkova, Olga (University of Kentucky) |
| Abstract: | Can a policy intervention in the stressful first year after a birth affect marital stability? We examine this question using a large expansion in maternity benefits in 1982 in the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The program provided partially paid leave until the child's first birthday and included a small cash payment at birth. We use individual-level panel data and compare the Baltics with similar East European countries using a difference-indifferences framework. Maternity benefits decrease divorce within the first year after birth. This decrease persists for at least a decade, indicating that couples avoided divorce altogether rather than simply delaying it. While mothers extended their leave by several months, they returned to full-time work afterwards, consistent with egalitarian gender norms in the labor market. |
| Keywords: | marriage, divorce, marital stability, maternity benefits, Baltics, Eastern Europe |
| JEL: | J12 J16 J18 P2 P3 |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16238&r=cis |
| By: | Lee, Sora (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) |
| Abstract: | The Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade publishes major projections for Korean economic performance in Industrial Economic Review. For more detailed data, visit us at www.kiet.re.kr/en. In the first half (H1) of 2023, the domestic real economy in Korea demonstrated a solid growth trajectory, despite global uncertainties and sluggish export performance since the end of 2022. But various factors are set to hamstring the growth of the global economy this year, including the Ukraine conflict, problems in the finance sector, and slack domestic demand triggered by interest rate hikes. International oil prices are projected to remain lower in H2 compared to H1, with demand growth stifled and oil output steady. Furthermore, the USD/KRW exchange rate in H2 should remain lower than the highs set in the first half of the year. The US Federal Reserve (Fed) decision to keep interest rates unchanged and the alleviation of financial market risks have contributed to the weakening of the dollar. Looking ahead to H2 2023, the domestic economy is expected to face challenges stemming from a global economic slowdown and a sustained decline in trade volume. These factors may hinder export growth. In addition, a contraction in domestic demand resulting from the impact of interest rate hikes is likely to cap economic growth at a modest rate of around 1.4 percent. In H2 2023, exports of Korea’s 13 flagship industries are expected to decline by 4.3 percent year over year (YoY), reflecting an accelerated decline from last year, when exports fell 3.2 percent. This decline can be attributed to weak demand from key export partners suffering from continued economic hardship. And while the shipbuilding, ICT devices, and rechargeable batteries sectors are showing some resilience, domestic demand in the other flagship sectors is projected to experience slower growth or decline. Production in every major industry save only for the shipbuilding, steel, and rechargeable batteries sectors is expected to either stagnate or decline. This owes to sluggish domestic and export demand, excess inventory, and the continued relocation of production facilities to locations overseas. Imports are also set to fall in Korea’s 13 flagship industries for H2 2023, by 4.9 percent, due to by falling prices and a slowdown in domestic economic activity. |
| Keywords: | economic projection; economic outlook; 2023 economic outlook; 2023 macroeconomic outlook; industrial production; production estimates; production outlook; export projection; export outlook; export growth; export performance; Korea |
| JEL: | E00 E01 E66 F00 F01 F17 F20 F21 F31 F44 F52 |
| Date: | 2023–07–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieter:2023_015&r=cis |
| By: | Mekvabishvili, Rati |
| Abstract: | The vast majority of experimental studies on the effectiveness of punishments in promoting cooperation in social dilemma situation examine decentralized incentive systems where all group members can punish each other. Cross-societal experimental studies suggest that while decentralized incentives can successfully promote cooperation in one society, they fail to do so in another. So, how is social order, as a large-scale cooperation problem among strangers, maintained in such societies? Many modern societies overcome this problem through well-functioning top-down formal enforcement institutions. In the experimental setting of the public goods game, we compare a strong and weak exogenous centralized incentive system with a decentralized incentive system in the case of Georgia. Our experimental evidence suggests that in Georgia, self-governed groups are doomed to suffer from high inefficiencies under a decentralized peer-to-peer punishment incentive system. They are better off when punishment power is given to an external centralized authority that is not exposed to power abuse risks. |
| Keywords: | Centralized punishment, Decentralized punishment, Cooperation, Public goods, Welfare |
| JEL: | C71 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2023–06–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:117811&r=cis |
| By: | Puls, Thomas; Wendt, Jan |
| Abstract: | Am 22. Juni beginnen in Nordrhein-Westfalen die Sommerferien. Wie jedes Jahr werden dann Viele mit dem Pkw in den Urlaub fahren und aus diesem Grund werden die Preise für Benzin und Diesel regelmäßig ein heißes Sommerthema. Die gute Nachricht ist, dass Diesel deutschlandweit Mitte Juni 2023 etwa 22 Prozent billiger ist als im Vorjahr. Bei Super E5 ist der Unterschied kleiner, aber auch hier kostet der Liter knapp 7, 5 Prozent weniger als 2022. Bei einer Bestandsaufnahme der Kraftstoffpreise in Deutschland zeigt sich, dass es sich für den anstehen Urlaub in Deutschland empfiehlt, im Westen zu tanken. Die Preise für Diesel und Benzin waren in den ersten beiden Juniwochen im westlichen Versorgungsgebiet durchschnittlich am günstigsten. Den geringsten Zapfsäulenpreis für Super bezahlt man mit 1, 825 Euro pro Liter in Nordrhein-Westfalen, während man in Rheinland-Pfalz mit 1, 552 Euro am wenigsten für den Liter Diesel zahlt. Der höchste Preis für Superbenzin wird in Bayern und Thüringen mit gut 1, 86 Euro pro Liter aufgerufen. Beim Diesel zeigt sich ein klares Ost-West-Gefälle. In Brandenburg und Berlin zahlte man mit etwas über 1, 60 Euro pro Liter etwa fünf Cent mehr als im Westen der Republik. Aber hier scheint der Ferienbeginn in Nordrhein-Westfalen seinen Schatten vorauszuwerfen, denn im Mai war der Preisvorteil im Westen gegenüber dem Rest der Republik noch deutlich höher als am aktuellen Rand. Die unterschiedlichen Kraftstoffpreise in den Bundesländern korrelieren dabei stark mit den Versorgungsgebieten der deutschen Raffinerien. Die über Pipeline aus Rotterdam mit Öl versorgten Raffinerien in Nordrhein-Westfalen und Niedersachsen geben derzeit den günstigsten Kraftstoff ab. Der teuerste Diesel stammt hingegen aus der Raffinerie in Schwedt, die sich erst gegen Ende des Vorjahres vom russischen Öl abwandte. Schaut man über die deutschen Grenzen so ergibt sich ein uneinheitliches Bild. In Skandinavien wird das tanken insbesondere für Dieselfahrer teurer als zu Hause. Aber auch in Frankreich wird derzeit für beide Kraftstoffarten mehr bezahlt als in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Im nahe gelegen Belgien ist Diesel teurer als in Nordrhein-Westfalen. In den meisten Mitgliedsstaaten der EU liegen die Preise an den Zapfsäulen aber deutlich unter dem heimischen Niveau. |
| JEL: | Q41 D49 R49 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:352023&r=cis |