nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2023‒07‒10
25 papers chosen by

  1. A note on export redirection: Evidence following the onset of the war in Ukraine By Hutter, Christian; Stepanok, Ignat; Weber, Enzo
  2. Rebuilding Ukraine: What the international community now needs to consider By Grävingholt, Jörn; Faust, Jörg; Libman, Alexander; Richter, Solveig; Sasse, Gwendolyn; Stewart, Susan
  3. 대러시아 제재가 중동부유럽 경제에 미치는 영향과 시사점(The Impact of Anti-Russian Sanctions and Implications for the Economy of Central and Eastern Europe) By Lee, Cheolwon; Kim, Cho Rong
  4. Enhancing Public Support for International Sanctions By Kantorowicz, Jaroslaw; Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Elena
  5. Brief Considerations regarding the Main Union Legislative and Transposition Instruments, adopted with the View to Supporting Ukraine in the Context of the Russian Invasion By Elise-Nicoleta Valcu
  6. Monthly Report No. 12/2022 By Hubert Gabrisch; Doris Hanzl-Weiss; Esther Linton-Kubelka; Leon Podkaminer; Roman Stöllinger
  7. Insourcing the war-economy: building a resilient Ukraine means maximising its domestic output By Cooper, Luke
  8. Russia’s Relations with China Amidst US-China-Russia Strategic Competition By Park, Joungho; Kang, Boogyun; Hyun, Seungsoo; Jeh, Sunghoon
  9. Die deutsche Russlandpolitik festigen: Bestehende Ansätze schärfen und Zielkonflikte verdeutlichen By Stewart, Susan
  10. 2022 annual report By International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
  11. Bulgaria and Russia: A Diplomatic Deficit By Avgustina Asenova Peycheva
  12. Regionale Verteilung russischer Communities in Deutschland By Gallegos Torres, Katia; Sommerfeld, Katrin
  13. Wiederaufbau in der Ukraine: Was die internationale Gemeinschaft jetzt beachten muss By Grävingholt, Jörn; Faust, Jörg; Libman, Alexander; Richter, Solveig; Sasse, Gwendolyn; Stewart, Susan
  14. Who Is to Suffer? Quantifying the Impact of Sanctions on German Firms By Görg, Holger; Jacobs, Anna; Meuchelböck, Saskia
  15. Von 'Global Britain' zur Realpolitik - die aktualisierte "Integrated Review": Wie sich das Vereinigte Königreich als verlässlicher Partner im globalen Systemwettbewerb positionieren will By von Ondarza, Nicolai; Rehbaum, Dominik
  16. 한-호주 공급망 협력 방향: 핵심광물과 수소를 중심으로(Korea-Australia Supply Chain Cooperation: Focus on Critical Minerals and Hydrogen) By Cho, Seung Jin; Shin, Minlee
  17. Wie Lateinamerika wirtschaftlich wieder den Vorwärtsgang findet: Just Transition als Zielmarke By Maihold, Günther
  18. Brückenstrompreis: Fehler aus der Vergangenheit fortführen? By von Graevenitz, Kathrine; Rottner, Elisa; Gerster, Andreas
  19. 기후변화에 따른 아프리카ㆍ중동의 식량안보 위기와 한국의 협력방안(Impacts of Climate Change and Policy Implications on Food Security in Africa and the Middle East) By Kang, Munsu; Han, Seoni; Son, Sung Hyun; Kim, Yejin; Jeong, Minji; Park, Kyu Tae
  20. Die arktische Sicherheitspolitik der USA: Amerikanische Arktisstrategien, russische Hybris und chinesische Ambitionen By Paul, Michael
  21. Solidarische Sanktionsmehrheit By Diermeier, Matthias; Fremerey, Melinda
  22. Insourcing the recovery: maximizing engagement of Ukrainian manufacturers in reconstruction efforts By Vlasiuk, Volodymyr; Milakovsky, Brian
  23. La situation des grands groupes bancaires français à fin 2022 By Pierre Berthonnaud; Mylène Carreira; Numa Bosc; Grégoire Desbrosses; Laurent Faivre; Sandrine Lecarpentier; Emmanuel Point; Jerry Simpson
  24. Impact de la guerre russo-ukrainienne sur le cours des produits de base exportés par les pays de la CEMAC By Ngah Ntiga, Louis Henri; Badjeck Mvondo, Laureine
  25. Monetary policy transmission in Georgia: empirical evidence By Sergo Gadelia; Tamar Mdivnishvili; Shalva Mkhatrishvili

  1. By: Hutter, Christian (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Stepanok, Ignat (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Weber, Enzo (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; Univ. Regensburg)
    Abstract: "The war in Ukraine triggered a global trade shock, with German exports to Russia also collapsing abruptly. Using this break, we analyse whether the exports were redirected to other destinations. We divide the world market into three regions: domestic, eurozone, and the rest of the world (ROW). In a panel model of German industries, we find that higher export exposure to Russia meant lower sales to the ROW after the war began. This was offset by higher sales in the eurozone and domestic markets. The effects occurred quickly but later receded. We find no production decline due to the trade shock." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
    Keywords: IAB-Open-Access-Publikation
    JEL: E23 F14
    Date: 2023–06–12
  2. By: Grävingholt, Jörn; Faust, Jörg; Libman, Alexander; Richter, Solveig; Sasse, Gwendolyn; Stewart, Susan
    Abstract: Rebuilding Ukraine starts now - even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country's recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq. Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted. Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people's daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time. Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war's trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect. Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them. Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included. Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war. Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees. Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society.
    Keywords: Ukraine, reconstruction, war in Ukraine, European Union (EU), Wiederaufbauhilfe, international help, fighting corruption, transformation, sustainability
    Date: 2023
    Abstract: 본 연구는 러시아와 우크라이나 간 전쟁 발발 이후 EU의 대러시아 제재가 중동부유럽 국가에 미치는 영향을 다각도로 분석하고, 우리의 대중동부유럽 경제관계에 대한 시사점을 도출하는 데 그 목적이 있다. 본 연구는 크게 다음과 같은 세 가지 이슈로 구성되어 있다. 첫째, 중동부유럽 국가가 러시아와 얼마나 밀접한 경제관계를 맺고 있는지, 둘째, 그에 따라 러시아발 지정학적 위기가 중동부유럽 경제에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지, 마지막 셋째, 한국 기업과 정부는 중동부유럽과의 경제관계에 어떻게 대응해야 하는지이다. 현지 진출기업 면담 결과, 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 발발 이후 중동부유럽 진출 우리 기업의 비즈니스 환경 변화는 공급망 문제, 에너지 가격 급등, 고용난 등의 부문에서 가장 두드러지게 나타난 것으로 드러났다. The Russia-Ukraine war and EU sanctions against Russia are having a negative impact not only on Russia but also on the overall EU economy, and these negative effects are expected to continue into 2023 as the war prolongs. Central and Eastern European countries, which enjoy relatively strong trade, business and energy-related links with Russia, have been hit particularly hard. Central and Eastern European countries bordering Russia and Ukraine are relatively dependent on Russia for energy, and are expected to suffer the greatest economic damage in terms of trade relations. Policies toward Russia in Central and Eastern Europe have maintained various stances depending on country, ranging from Poland, which consistently maintains an anti-Russian stance, to Hungary, a typical pro-Russian country, or have recently undergone a change in stance. Central and Eastern European countries located on the EU border or those close to Russia and have some legacy of past socialist alliances, regardless of their pro-Russian or anti-Russian ties, generally have close economic ties with Russia. Therefore, after the invasion of Ukraine, the EU’s sanctions on Russia will inevitably have a serious impact on the Central and Eastern European countries in various sectors such as trade, investment, and finance as well as the energy sector, which is expected to suffer a direct short-term impact. In 2004 and 2007, Korean companies entered Central and Eastern Europe in large numbers including the four Visegrad countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), set production bases in Europe, and then made further investments. The Visegrad V4 countries represent the largest export market for Korea in the EU, accounting for 28.3% of its exports to the EU in 2020. As such, Central and Eastern Europe, where Korea has the most active economic cooperation in Europe, is expected to suffer the most serious and diverse negative impacts from geopolitical crises, including the recent Russia-Ukraine war.(the rest omitted)
    Keywords: 경제협력; 해외직접투자; 대러시아 제재; 중동부유럽 경제; Economic cooperation; foreign direct investment; sanctions against Russia; Central and Eastern European economy
    Date: 2022–12–30
  4. By: Kantorowicz, Jaroslaw; Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Elena (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
    Abstract: International sanctions are commonly used when military intervention is particularly undesirable. The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the saliency of sanctions, as well as their high domestic costs for the sender states. Democratic states require public support to sustain long and costly sanctions. Yet empirical research on public perception and support for sanctions is scarce. We conduct two experimental studies on quota-representative samples in Poland and Germany using the context of the sanctions on Russia. The first study uses a novel conjoint experiment with the goal to examine how features of a sanctioning regime shape public support for sanctions. As expected, support increases with a decrease in domestic costs and increases in costs imposed on the target state. In addition, aid programs, which can mitigate domestic costs, and beneficial policy alternatives (e.g., developing sustainable energy to replace Russian oil) can enhance support. Furthermore, public support for sanctions requires larger sanctioning countries’ coalitions. In the second—information experiment—study, we find that people overestimate the sanctions’ costs for their country and that correcting this perception through the provision of estimated costs increases reported support. Yet, contrasting sanctions costs with other costs has no additional effect.
    Date: 2023–06–02
  5. By: Elise-Nicoleta Valcu (University of Pitesti, Romania)
    Abstract: On February 24, 2022, the European Council condemned, in the strongest terms, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, considering it “a serious violation of the territorial integrity, of the sovereignty†of an independent state, also representing a serious violation of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. In the same context, the European Council reaffirmed the need to adopt protective measures for refugees from Ukraine and to support the Ukrainian economy. Therefore, the member states of the European Union have determined that it is necessary for the Union legislator to adopt an appropriate regulatory framework, to which this material refers and which is to be presented, prioritizing two fundamental directions: (a) providing support both to Ukrainian citizens as well as to other refugees from Ukraine, located in the territory of any state of the European Union; (b) granting concessions to the Ukrainian authorities by adopting trade liberalization measures for all products, adopting policies on accelerating the elimination of customs duties for trade between the Union and Ukraine.
    Keywords: preferential treatment, trade liberalization, temporary protection, refugee, rights
    Date: 2022–10
  6. By: Hubert Gabrisch (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Doris Hanzl-Weiss (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Esther Linton-Kubelka; Leon Podkaminer (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Roman Stöllinger (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw)
    Abstract: Chart of the Month EU-CEE at the forefront of electric vehicle production and export by Doris Hanzl-Weiss Opinion Corner Into the Maelstrom - The EU in the Zeitenwende by Hubert Gabrisch Multiple crises have hit the European Union since 2008, and a new global order is evolving. The EU needs to adjust its 1990s-era treaties in the direction of more democracy and sovereignty. There is a European momentum to reform; yet the political leadership that would enable the opportunity to be seized is lacking. Russian energy dependence and European inflation by Esther Linton-Kubelka and Roman Stöllinger Despite a common monetary policy and closely synchronised business cycles in the euro area, the increase in inflation since the outbreak of war in Ukraine has varied considerably across member states. As the increase in inflation across the EU is positively associated with energy dependence on Russia, the overreliance on Russian gas and oil supplies may turn out to be rather costly both economically and politically. More evidence-based policy advice is warranted (rather than following groups with a vested interest). Rising public debt does not drive up short-term interest rates by Leon Podkaminer Econometric models for the European countries, the US and Japan suggest that increasing public debt may have been of only minor importance in determining short-term real interest rates. Moreover, the effect appears to be negative almost everywhere rising public debt has tended to reduce short-term interest rates, if only fairly marginally in most cases. The lingering opinion that fiscal deficits can drive up interest rates is not confirmed by the data. Monthly and quarterly statistics for Central, East and Southeast Europe
    Keywords: automotive industry, electric vehicles, EU institutions, Conference on the future of Europe, energy dependence, inflation, energy supply diversification, public debt, interest rates, crowding-out, theory of loanable funds
    Date: 2022–12
  7. By: Cooper, Luke
    Abstract: PeaceRep’s Ukraine programme are extensively involved in providing analysis, evidence and data to prepare discussions at the London Ukraine Recovery Conference, 21st – 22nd June 2023. As part of this work, I recently undertook a study trip to Kyiv. With support and assistance from the Kyiv Office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Kyiv School of Economics, US Aid Economic Resilience Activity and Ukraine Industry Expertise, I met government officials, civil society activists, trade unions, and academics, and made a number of visits to industrial sites in the Kyiv Oblast region to see their challenges up close. In this policy brief, I argue that the Government of Ukraine should pursue policies that prioritise Ukraine’s economic resilience and mitigate against the risk of balance of payments crisis in the event that there is a significant reduction in donor support. The starting point for this analysis is that markets cannot function in wartime. The Ukrainian state therefore needs to embrace its inevitably central role as the coordinator of an integrated war-economy.
    JEL: N0
    Date: 2023–06–13
  8. By: Park, Joungho (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kang, Boogyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Hyun, Seungsoo (Korea Institute for National Unification); Jeh, Sunghoon (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
    Abstract: This study comprehensively examines the development of Russia's strategic relationship with China amidst intensifying strategic competition among the United States, China, and Russia. Specifically, we analyze the fundamental meaning and direction of Russia's strategy toward China in the process of shaping a new global order, and the key features and characteristics of cooperation between the two countries in a wide range of fields spanning politics, diplomacy, security, military, economy, society, and culture. Accordingly, this research aims to draw valuable policy insights for Korea based on evaluation of the direction and level of Russia-China cooperation from the Russian perspective. In this respect, this study is composed of the following four parts. Part II examines Russia's perception of China and its policy direction, as well as evaluates the prospects of Russia-China relations. Part III conducts an in-depth analysis of the opportunities and constraints associated with Russia-China cooperation in the fields of advanced technology, energy, and finance, which are key strategic areas for strengthening Russia's economic security amidst intense Western sanctions against its economy. In Part IV, we explore the current status and characteristics of cooperation in the fields of education and research, culture and arts, mass media, tourism, etc. Part V presents policy implications for Korea, particularly suggesting promising directions and tasks for the Northern Policy given the major turning point in the changing external environment.
    Keywords: Russia-China Relations; US-China-Russia Strategic Competition
    Date: 2023–06–01
  9. By: Stewart, Susan
    Abstract: Mit der "Zeitenwende" in der internationalen Politik geht die Notwendigkeit einher, strategisches Denken zu stärken und sich für künftige Herausforderungen besser zu wappnen. Deutschland tut dies bereits, indem es strategische Dokumente zur nationalen Sicherheit und zu den Beziehungen mit China vorbereitet. In Bezug auf Russland drängt sich eine ähnliche Vorgehensweise auf: Erstens weil Russlands Aggression gegen die Ukraine die Situation in Europa und darüber hinaus für längere Zeit wesentlich verschlechtert hat. Zweitens weil die Konzeption einer Russlandpolitik, die auf den seit 2022 deklarierten Leitlinien basiert, eine Möglichkeit bietet, frühere Fehler zu korrigieren und Maßnahmen, die aus einer Krisensituation hervorgegangen sind, in eine langfristige Politik zu verwandeln.
    Date: 2023
  10. By: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
    Abstract: IFPRI’s 2022 Annual Report presents highlights from our research work in low- and middle-income countries and on global challenges. In 2022, IFPRI provided critical analysis on the food systems impact of the Russia-Ukraine war and related food, fertilizer, and fuel price crisis, as well as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Work in our strategic research areas—climate resilience and sustainability, healthy diets and nutrition, inclusive and efficient food systems, institutions and governance, and rural transformation, as well as cross-cutting work on gender—continued to inform policies and programs to end hunger and malnutrition sustainably at both national and global levels.
    Keywords: WORLD; agricultural research; agricultural policies; food security; gender; poverty; developing countries; resilience; food systems; Coronavirus; coronavirus disease; Coronavirinae; COVID-19; climate change; sustainability; trade; diet; governance
    Date: 2023
  11. By: Avgustina Asenova Peycheva (Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria)
    Abstract: The article examines the contemporary Bulgarian - Russian relations and the definition of NATO information operations through a descriptive political analysis. The scientific relevance of the research topic is found in the insufficient study of it in political science due to its novelty. The purpose of this case study is to analyze the peculiarities of NATO information operations of Bulgarian - Russian relations and assess the possibility to re-apply them for the improvement of the current worldwide state of matters. The policy analysis makes use of the interdisciplinary approach to reassessing and redefining NATO information operations through historical, political, psychological analysis with the perspective of influencing the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries in order to dissolve disagreements and adopt conflict resolution through communication and inclusivity. The authors H. D. Lasswell and B. McNair, who discuss tactics of manipulation and propaganda are used as a base to explain the theory of information operations. Complimentary authors, who explain for media communication’s influence are ones such as C.E. Merriam, T.V. Adorno, H. Marcuse. The duality of information operations is assessed too. The author concludes that the diplomatic deficit stems from a lack of understanding of information operations worldwide, the lack of clear laws approving, assessing, limiting and punishing for abuses of information operations. As a result, due to the need for peace, stability and development, conditions are created to enhance international efforts to take action against different types of contemporary terrorism and force diplomacy to prevail.
    Keywords: Bulgaria, Russia, information operations, diplomacy, NATO
    Date: 2022–10
  12. By: Gallegos Torres, Katia; Sommerfeld, Katrin
    Abstract: Russische Communities in Deutschland könnten vor dem Hintergrund des Ukraine-Krieges in der mittleren bis langen Frist als Destination von russischen Zuwanderern/-innen an Bedeutung gewinnen. Russische Staatsangehörige leben vor allem in Berlin, München und Hamburg. Ihr Anteil an der lokalen Bevölkerung ist in Baden-Baden mit 1, 7% am größten. Spätaussiedler/innen aus der ehemaligen Sowjetunion sind in Nordrhein-Westfahlen und Baden-Württemberg konzentriert, wobei ihr Bevölkerungsanteil in verschiedenen Kreisen in Rheinland-Pfalz am höchsten ist und dort bis zu 8.6% beträgt (Rhein-Hunsrück-Kreis).
    Date: 2022
  13. By: Grävingholt, Jörn; Faust, Jörg; Libman, Alexander; Richter, Solveig; Sasse, Gwendolyn; Stewart, Susan
    Abstract: Der Wiederaufbau der Ukraine beginnt jetzt - auch wenn das Umfeld, in dem er stattfindet, von Krieg, Gewalt und Zerstörung geprägt ist und Russland seinen Angriffskrieg fortsetzt. Mit der Aufnahme der Ukraine als Beitrittskandidat hat die Europäische Union (EU) den Wiederaufbau auch zu ihrer Aufgabe gemacht. Damit er gelingen kann, sind spezifische Rahmenbedingungen zu beachten, aber auch Erfahrungen aus anderen Wiederaufbauprozessen, etwa auf dem Westbalkan oder im Irak: Funktionale Staatlichkeit: Im Vergleich zu vielen anderen Fällen liegen in der Ukraine bessere interne Voraussetzungen vor, insbesondere eine funktionale und breit akzeptierte Staatlichkeit in weiten Teilen des Landes. Wiederaufbauhilfe kann eine zukunftsorientierte, ökologisch nachhaltige Transformation von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft anstoßen. Zugleich besteht die Gefahr, dass massive externe Mittelzuflüsse alte Korruptions- und Patronagenetzwerke alimentieren und neue entstehen lassen. Um dem entgegenzuwirken, sind klare Rechenschaftslegung und Sanktionen im Falle von Missbrauch erforderlich. Agile Planung statt linearem Phasenmodell: Wiederaufbau findet in einem Kontext großer Ungewissheit statt. Die Planungen müssen daher für unterschiedliche Kriegsverläufe anpassungsfähig sein. Eine lineare Abfolge von Wiederaufbauphasen wird dem nicht gerecht. Dies zeigt sich bereits jetzt bei der Sicherung der kritischen Infrastruktur. Ihr Funktionieren ist essenziell für das tägliche Leben der Bevölkerung und für jede Art des Wiederaufbaus; zugleich kann sie jederzeit wieder Ziel von Angriffen werden. Ukraine als selbstbewusster Partner: Die ukrainische Regierung tritt in Folge des Kriegsverlaufs selbstbewusst gegenüber internationalen Gebern auf. Dies ist grundsätzlich positiv, kann aber auch zu Reformresistenz führen. Die Aussicht auf einen EU-Beitritt schafft hier einen gemeinsamen Zielhorizont und kann kohärente Kriterien auch für den Wiederaufbauprozess begründen - jedoch nur so lange, wie die Beitrittsperspektive tatsächlich glaubwürdig bleibt. Steuerung der Wiederaufbauhilfe: Als Koordinationsinstrument haben sich Wiederaufbaufonds bewährt. Ob es einen oder mehrere komplementäre Fonds geben wird, ist eine offene Frage. Ein zentraler Ukrainefonds sollte geberseitig von der Europäischen Kommission (ko-)geleitet werden, da sie mit dem EU-Beitritt über den stärksten Reformanreiz verfügt. Dazu müsste die EU indes sicherstellen, dass Kommission und Mitgliedsstaaten gemeinsam auch den größten Anteil der Mittel einbringen. Vielfalt und Inklusivität: Die Governance-Strukturen des Wiederaufbaus sollten darüber hinaus so ausgestaltet werden, dass sie pluralistischen politischen Institutionen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Stimmen in der Ukraine Teilhabe und Mitsprache eröffnen sowie Geschlechtergerechtigkeit stärken. Um einem "Braindrain" entgegenzuwirken, müssen sich zudem jüngere und mobile Bevölkerungsschichten (inklusive Geflüchteter im Ausland) beteiligt fühlen können. Sozialer Ausgleich: Wesentlich wird auch die Berücksichtigung sozialer Aspekte im Wiederaufbau sein. Angesichts der alarmierenden Verarmung der Bevölkerung infolge des Krieges werden vulnerable Gruppen besondere Unterstützung benötigen. Investitionsanreize: Wesentliche Wiederaufbauleistungen müssen von der Privatwirtschaft erbracht werden. Dafür müssen klare Anreize geschaffen werden, u. a. durch Investitionsgarantien. Sensibilität für Traumatisierung: Der Wiederaufbau findet in einem Kontext von Gewalt und Traumatisierung statt. Das erfordert eine besondere Sensibilisierung aller Beteiligten für den Umgang mit Opfern von Gewalt und einer traumatisierten Gesellschaft.
    Keywords: Ukraine, Wiederaufbau, Ukrainekrieg, Europäische Union (EU), Wiederaufbauhilfe, Internationale Hilfe, Staatlichkeit, Korruptionsbekämpfung, Transformation, Nachhaltigkeit
    Date: 2023
  14. By: Görg, Holger (Kiel Institute for the World Economy); Jacobs, Anna (University of Bielefeld); Meuchelböck, Saskia (Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
    Abstract: In this paper, we use a novel firm level dataset for Germany to investigate the effect of sanctions on export behaviour and performance of German firms. More specifically, we study the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea and Russia's countermeasures. We find a substantial negative effect on both the extensive and intensive margin of German exports. While the negative effects are strongest for firms exporting products subject to trade restrictions, we provide further evidence on the indirect effects of sanctions. Analysing the impact on broader measures of firm performance, we document that the cost of sanctions is heterogeneous across firms but overall modest. Our results reveal that the negative impact of the shock was concentrated primarily among a small number of firms that were highly dependent on Russia as an export market and those directly affected by the sanctions.
    Keywords: sanctions, foreign policy, trade, firm behaviour, Germany
    JEL: F1 F14 F51 L25
    Date: 2023–05
  15. By: von Ondarza, Nicolai; Rehbaum, Dominik
    Abstract: Knapp zwei Jahre nach der Veröffentlichung der "Integrated Review" hat die britische Regierung ihre Sicherheitsstrategie aktualisiert. Diese 'Auffrischung' soll vor allem der schnell voranschreitenden Entwicklung zu einer umkämpften und zersplitterten Weltordnung Rechnung tragen. Ohne ein radikales Umdenken erkennen zu lassen, präzisiert die Strategie die britische Antwort auf China und Russland und legt einen besonderen Fokus auf die Rolle von Partnern sowie auf nationale Resilienz. Nach dem Wechsel in der britischen Regierung hin zu Rishi Sunak steckt das Papier zudem einen deutlich pragmatischen Rahmen für die zukünftige Zusammenarbeit mit der Europäischen Union (EU) ab. Um konkrete Initiativen zur Umsetzung der "Integrated Review" voranzubringen und die euroatlantischen Beziehungen zu stärken, sollten Deutschland und die EU das Momentum nutzen und ihre Kooperation mit London vertiefen.
    Keywords: KW, Großbritannien, Vereinigtes Königreich, UK, VK, Deutschland, EU, USA, Indo-Pazifik, Russland, China, Beziehungen VK-EU, Beziehungen VK-Europa, Weltordnung, Systemwettbewerb, Resilienz, Außenpolitik, Sicherheitspolitik, Verteidigungspolitik, IR21, Global Britain, IR23, Rishi Sunak, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, Ukraine-Krieg, britischer Verteidigungshaushalt, britisch-französische Beziehungen
    Date: 2023
    Abstract: 한국과 호주는 핵심광물과 수소 분야의 상호보완적 경쟁력을 바탕으로 양국간 협력 필요성이 증대되고 있다. 본 보고서에서는 호주의 핵심광물 및 수소 분야 정책과 대외협력 현황을 분석하였다. 이를 바탕으로 한국과 호주의 핵심광물 및 수소 분야의 공급망 협력 방안을 도출하였다. The U.S.-China rivalry and COVID-19 have increased the supply chain's vulnerability and reshaped the global value chain. The weaponization of resources, such as Russia's natural gas export restrictions in response to the war in Ukraine, demonstrates that the government must take urgent measures to stabilize the supply chain. Korea relies entirely on critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths from other countries because these minerals are essential for the electric vehicle and secondary battery industry. Moreover, Korea will increasingly rely on hydrogen imports to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Korea and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding on December 2021 for cooperation in the area of critical mineral supply chains, carbon-neutral technology and a clean hydrogen economy. Australia is the world's largest producer of lithium and contains large deposits of other critical minerals such as nickel, of which it has the largest reserves in the world. Australia has a favorable geographical environment for producing hydrogen. Australia also has the advantage of being relatively close to Korea, and is one of the countries expected to become a major hydrogen-exporting country. From Australia’s point of view, Korea offers a stable demand for critical minerals and hydrogen. Therefore, bilateral cooperation to stabilize the supply chain is expected to increase. Accordingly, this study analyzes Australia’s policy on critical minerals and hydrogen, and the current status of international cooperation. Based on this, effective measures to strengthen the supply chain cooperation between Korea and Australia are derived. The Australian government announced its critical minerals strategy in 2019 and 2022. This critical minerals strategy and modern manufacturing initiative were launched to boost the weak indigenous manufacturing sector. The Australian government is also aiming to boost the capacity of downstream industries by leveraging its strengths in the mining sector of critical minerals. This policy is also found in Western Australia’s Future Battery Industry Strategy and Critical Minerals and High-tech Metal Strategy announced by the state government. In addition, the Australian Government has announced the National Hydrogen Strategy in 2019 under the vision of becoming a leading country in the global hydrogen industry by 2030.(the rest omitted)
    Keywords: 경제협력; 경제안보; 한국; 호주; 공급망; 핵심광물; 탄소중립; Economic Cooperation; Economic Security; Korea; Australia; Supply Chain; Core Minerals; Carbon Neutrality
    Date: 2022–12–30
  17. By: Maihold, Günther
    Abstract: Das traditionelle Bild Lateinamerikas als Krisenregion scheint sich auch nach der Corona-Krise fortzuschreiben, nunmehr im Zeichen der Folgen des Ukraine-Krieges und der Sanktionsmaßnahmen des Westens. Inflationsdruck, Budgetdefizite und die Gefahr eines Abrutschens breiter Kreise der Bevölkerung in die Armut beflügeln Negativszenarien. Es gibt erste Hinweise, dass bereits einige Länder in Zahlungsschwierigkeiten geraten. Auf die Tagesordnung gesetzt werden Forderungen lateinamerikanischer Regierungen nach Schuldenerlass oder Neuverhandlung der Auslandsschulden im Zuge einer Neuausrichtung des Entwicklungsmodells an Nachhaltigkeitskriterien und Klimaschutz. Dies erfordert einen tiefgreifenden Strukturwandel, weg von der traditionellen Rohstoffprägung der Ökonomien und hin zu einem umwelt- bzw. sozialverträglichen Entwicklungspfad. Auf diesem Weg müssen auch Deutschland und Europa einen Schwenk vollziehen, indem sie einen Beitrag zum Erhalt der natürlichen Ressourcen leisten und nicht nur zu deren Ausbeutung.
    Keywords: Lateinamerika, Wirtschaft, Just Transition, Inflationsdruck, Verschuldung, Energietransition, Klimawandel, Armutsbekämpfung
    Date: 2023
  18. By: von Graevenitz, Kathrine; Rottner, Elisa; Gerster, Andreas
    Abstract: Bedingt durch den Angriffskrieg Russlands auf die Ukraine und der damit einhergehenden Verknappung in der Erdgasversorgung sind deutsche Energie- und Strompreise in den vergangenen Monaten stark gestiegen. Zum Schutz des Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland hat das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium eine Begrenzung der Strompreise für energieintensive Unternehmen vorgeschlagen. Aus Sicht von Wissenschaftler/innen des ZEW Mannheim und der Universität Mannheim gibt es allerdings keine Hinweise auf einen negativen Einfluss der Strompreise auf die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit deutscher Industrieunternehmen. Empirische Studien zur Befreiung der vollständigen Zahlung der Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz(EEG)-Umlage sowie zu steigenden Netzentgelten zeigen, dass Industrieunternehmen mit ihrem Stromverbrauch auf Strompreise reagieren, nicht aber mit ihrer Beschäftigung oder ihrem Umsatz. Dies liegt auch daran, dass für die meisten Industrieunternehmen der Energiekostenanteil am Umsatz deutlich unter 5 Prozent liegt und andere Standortfaktoren für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit relevanter sind. Eine Begrenzung industrieller Strompreise schwächt Anreize zur Innovation und zum Stromsparen ab. Diese Anreize aber sind dringend notwendig, um die Klimaziele zu erreichen. Während Versorgungssicherheit in der kritischen Infrastruktur sichergestellt werden muss, ist eine breite Subventionierung industrieller Strompreise für die Transformation zu einer klimaneutralen Wirtschaft eher kontraproduktiv.
    Date: 2023
    Abstract: 본 연구는 기후변화가 아프리카·중동의 식량안보에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구를 통해 우리나라의 대아프리카 및 대중동 농업·식량 분야 정책시사점을 제공하는 데 목적이 있다. 가뭄, 홍수와 같은 기상이변이 아프리카와 중동지역에서 점차 빈번해지고 있으며, 특히 농산물 가격 상승과 영양 부족 인구 증가에 영향을 주고 있다. 이에 따라 아프리카·중동 주곡에 대한 품종 개발, 관개수로 시설 확대를 통한 수자원 확보, 기상재해 경보 시스템 도입과 같은 생산 측면에서의 협력과 더불어 소비 측면에서는 취약계층 지원을 위한 식량원조 역시 확대할 필요가 있다. As a result of the recent outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the global agri-food supply chain has collapsed, thereby raising concerns about food security in Africa and the Middle East. The international community is paying greater attention to the issue of food security caused by climate change, which is actually affecting food supply and demand in Africa and the Middle East as a result of frequent weather conditions, such as droughts, flooding, and heat waves. As a result of an intensifying drought, North Africa increased its imports of external grain in January 2022, and East Africa has experienced droughts that have adversely affected its crops in recent years. It is therefore increasingly important for the international community to cooperate to respond to the food security crisis resulting from climate change, and Korea should expand its cooperation to address climate change, food security, and agriculture in Africa and the Middle East. Climate change has both a global and a national impact, and African and Middle Eastern developing countries, especially those with insufficient climate resilience, are particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change on agriculture and food production. It is therefore necessary to develop policies that can help lead the discussion of climate change in the international community while also increasing support for the agri-food sector through official development assistance (ODA) funded by Korea. Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to analyze the food security crisis in Africa and the Middle East caused by climate change from the perspective of supply and demand, and to identify potential areas of cooperation. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines food security as “a situation in which everyone is always physically, socially and economically accessible to a sufficient amount of safe and nutritious food, while meeting individual dietary needs and preferences for a healthy and active life.” Therefore, food security should be considered throughout the entire food production and consumption process, toward which this study also examined the current state of the African and Middle Eastern food security crisis, causes of food insecurity, and policies to address it.(the rest omitted)
    Keywords: 농업정책; ODA; Agricultural Policy
    Date: 2022–12–30
  20. By: Paul, Michael
    Abstract: Im Unterschied zu seinen Vorgängern hat US-Präsident Joe Biden schon früh in seiner Amtszeit wichtige Entscheidungen getroffen, um eine bessere Koordination der amerikanischen Arktispolitik zu ermöglichen. Dazu zählt auch die nationale Arktisstrategie. Sie kam infolge des russischen Angriffskriegs später als geplant: Russland hat damit die wenigen, noch verbliebenen Hoffnungen auf Zusammenarbeit zerstört und die Arktis zu einem Thema der Sicherheitspolitik gemacht. Alaska steht als der nördlichste Bundesstaat naturgemäß im Mittelpunkt der US-Arktispolitik, die zunehmend auch chinesische Aktivitäten berücksichtigen muss. Zuletzt entdeckte die US-Küstenwache im September 2022 chinesische und russische Kriegsschiffe vor Alaska. Derzeit steht nur ein einziger US-Eisbrecher kontinuierlich für die Arktis zur Verfügung, der die Souveränität im Eismeer schützen und Seeräume mit Eisbedeckung überwachen kann. Der US-Bundesstaat lag auch auf der Route des chinesischen Spionageballons, der im Februar 2023 abgeschossen wurde. Gibt es nun nach Jahrzehnten mangelnder Aufmerksamkeit eine engagiertere Sicherheitspolitik der USA in der Arktis?
    Keywords: KW, Arktis, Arktisstrategie, Arktispolitik, Nordpolarregion, Arktischer Rat, Alaska, Nordostpassage, Arctic Caucus, Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Coast Guard, USCG, Arctic Executive Steering Committee, AESC, U.S. Arctic Research Commission, USARC, Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate, MOSAiC, North American Aerospace Defense, NORAD, Ice Exercise, ICEX
    Date: 2023
  21. By: Diermeier, Matthias; Fremerey, Melinda
    Abstract: Noch immer stehen 71 Prozent der Deutschen hinter den Sanktionen gegen Russland - und das obwohl knapp zwei Drittel dieser Sanktionsbefürworter denken, die Sanktionen schadeten primär Deutschland. Selbst in Ostdeutschland, wo 83 Prozent der Menschen die Sanktionsschäden vorrangig in Deutschland verorten, stützt noch immer eine Mehrheit die Sanktionen (55, 8 Prozent). Innerhalb der Parteianhängerschaften sind die Ost-West Unterschiede zudem lediglich bei den Parteien DIE LINKE und AfD präsent.
    Date: 2023
  22. By: Vlasiuk, Volodymyr; Milakovsky, Brian
    JEL: N0
    Date: 2023–05–30
  23. By: Pierre Berthonnaud; Mylène Carreira; Numa Bosc; Grégoire Desbrosses; Laurent Faivre; Sandrine Lecarpentier; Emmanuel Point; Jerry Simpson
    Abstract: L’année 2022 a été marquée par des modifications significatives de l’environnement économique et financier, impacté notamment par les conséquences de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie : forte augmentation des cours de l’énergie, alimentant une montée rapide de l’inflation, laquelle a conduit les banques centrales à relever sensiblement les taux d’intérêt. Ces différents éléments ont altéré les perspectives de croissance économique.
    Keywords: rentabilité, coût du risque, solvabilité, liquidité
    JEL: G21
    Date: 2023
  24. By: Ngah Ntiga, Louis Henri; Badjeck Mvondo, Laureine
    Abstract: Cet article évalue l’impact de la guerre russo-ukrainienne sur les cours des produits de base exportés par les pays de la CEMAC. Ce travail s’inscrit dans un contexte où les pays de la CEMAC, dont les recettes à l’exportation proviennent principalement des matières premières et énergétiques, voient les cours de ces dernières augmenter. De ce fait, la connaissance de l’impact réel de cette guerre sur les cours de ces produits s’avère importante dans l’optique de l’élaboration des politiques pertinentes pouvant permettre à ces pays de tirer profit. En ayant recours à un modèle DSGE, des simulations ont été faites sur les cours de ces produits de base « sans guerre » et « avec guerre ». Les résultats obtenus suggèrent que l’impact est plus prononcé sur les cours du gaz, du pétrole et de l’huile de palme de sorte qu’il faille au moins 40 mois pour qu’il soit restauré.
    Keywords: guerre russo-ukrainienne; produits de base; modèle DSGE
    JEL: C13 C5 C82 E31 E31 Q
    Date: 2023–06
  25. By: Sergo Gadelia (Junior Researcher, Private Sector Development Research Center (PCDRC), ISET Policy Institute (ISET PI)); Tamar Mdivnishvili (Macroeconomic Research Division, National Bank of Georgia); Shalva Mkhatrishvili (Head of Macroeconomics and Statistics Department, National Bank of Georgia)
    Abstract: The strength of monetary policy transmission mechanism is what defines central banks’ ability to influence a real economy and overall prices. This is what we analyse empirically within this paper. Namely, using structural vector autoregressions and based on data since 2009 when the NBG switched to an inflation targeting regime, we estimate the strength of interest rate and exchange rate channels in Georgia. The results suggest that both are relatively strong. Namely, an increase in interest rates seems to generate all three: smaller output gap, exchange rate appreciation and, consequently, lower inflation, underlining the improved transmission mechanism since the estimates from a decade ago. The reaction of inflation to an interest rate change peaks after 4 quarters, in line with other studies as well as the NBG’s communication. Moreover, a variance decomposition analysis shows that inflation is mostly driven by supply shocks with demand shocks having only a negligible effect. In principle, this may be in line with the presumption that it is the central bank’s systematic reaction function that neutralizes the effects of demand shocks on inflation, leaving the supply side as the major driver of inflation data.
    Keywords: Monetary policy; Transmission mechanism; Structural vector autoregressions; Inflation targeting.
    JEL: C13 E43 E52 F31
    Date: 2021–11

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NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.