nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2023‒05‒29
twenty papers chosen by

  1. The 2014 Russia Shock and Its Effects on Italian Firms and Banks By Stefano Federico; Giuseppe Marinelli; Francesco Palazzo
  2. Modeling the impact of sanctions on inflation expectations By Matevosova Anastasia
  3. Household Earnings in Putin’s Russia: Distributional Changes across Socioeconomic Groups, 2000–2016 By Vladimir Hlasny
  4. Shift contagion and minimum causal intensity portfolio during the COVID-19 and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict By Mondher Bouattour; Amine Ben Amar; Stéphane Goutte; Makram Bellalah
  5. How would the war and the pandemic affect the stock and cryptocurrency cross-market linkages? By Bampinas, Georgios; Panagiotidis, Theodore
  6. Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy By Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin
  7. Kein Aufschwung in Sicht: IW-Konjunkturprognose Frühjahr 2023 By Bardt, Hubertus; Demary, Markus; Grömling, Michael; Henger, Ralph; Hentze, Tobias; Hüther, Michael; Obst, Thomas; Pimpertz, Jochen; Puls, Thomas; Schaefer, Thilo; Schäfer, Holger
  8. Contracting Matters: Hedging Producers and Consumers with a Renewable Energy Pool By Karsten Neuhoff; Fernanda Ballesteros; Mats Kröger; Jörn C. Richstein
  9. The Recovery from the Covid-19 Pandemic as an Opportunity for a Sustainable and Resilient World By Phoebe Koundouri; Anthony Cox; Arunima Malik; Ben Groom; Brian O'Callaghan; Cameron Hepburn; Catherine Kilelu; Christine Lins; Dale Squires; E. Somanathan; Heba Handoussa; Ian Bateman; Ismail Serageldin; Josep M. Anto; Ketan Patel; Kirsten Brosbol; Lamia Kamal-Chaoui; Luiz Augusto Galvao; Manfred Lenzen; Min Zhu; Rabia Ferroukhi; Richard Carson; Stefan Brunnhuber; Theodoros Zachariadis; Thomas Sterner; Gertrude (Trudi) Makhaya; Angelos Alamanos; Mark C. Freeman; Christian Hansmeyer; Conrad Landis; Tamara Paremoer; Angelos Plataniotis
  10. Construction and Analysis of Uncertainty Indices based on Multilingual Text Representations By Viktoriia Naboka-Krell
  11. Стандартная модель международной торговли и теорема Столпера-Самуэльсона: почему коррупция никак не влияет на экономическое развитие, а от снижения торговых барьеров больше всего страдают олигархи. By Spirin, Victor
  12. Geoeconomics, Structural Change and Energy Use in Iran: A SAM-Based CGE Analysis with Some Geoeconomic and Geopolitical Considerations By Khan, Haider
  13. Implications of Climate Change Impacts on Food Security Threats in Africa and the Middle East By Kang, Munsu
  14. Food systems in the Anthropocene: Resilent, sustainable and open to learnings By Sophie Michel; Séverine Saleilles; Bertrand Valiorgue
  15. The economic impact of conflict-related and policy uncertainty shocks: the case of Russia By Marina Diakonova; Corinna Ghirelli; Javier J. Pérez; Luis Molina
  16. La Turquie soutient-elle le développement en Afrique de l'Ouest ? L'exemple du Nigeria, du Ghana et de la Côte d'Ivoire By Kohnert, Dirk
  17. Foreign-owned firms and occupational gender pay inequality By Dinara Alpysbayeva; Galiya Sagyndykova; Aigerim Yergabulova
  18. Catching up on lost learning opportunities: Research and policy evidence on key learning recovery strategies By Andreea Minea-Pic
  19. Le prix de l'inflation : Perspectives 2023-2024 pour l’économie française By Mathieu Plane; Elliot Aurissergues; Bruno Coquet; Ombeline Julien de Pommerol; Pierre Madec; Raul Sampognaro
  20. The rapid rise of Russia's wheat exports: Price formation, spot-futures relations and volatility effects By Heigermoser, Maximilian

  1. By: Stefano Federico; Giuseppe Marinelli; Francesco Palazzo
    Abstract: We study how a demand shock in an export market propagates to the exporting country’s banking system. Using the dual shocks of sanctions and falling oil prices suffered by Russia in 2014, we investigate the effects on Italian firms and banks more exposed to the Russian market. This event implied a sharp decline in sales for firms with a significant share of sales to Russia, but it did not affect the overall amount of credit available to them. Banks relatively more exposed to Italian exporters to Russia cut their overall credit supply, especially vis-à-vis ex ante risky borrowers, but continued to provide credit towards firms moderately hit by the trade shock, in an attempt to let them cope with the liquidity shortfall. Our results suggest that banks mitigate trade shocks for certain hit firms, while at the same time propagate them to other firms not directly affected by the shock.
    JEL: F10 G21
    Date: 2023–04
  2. By: Matevosova Anastasia (Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University)
    Abstract: In 2022, Russian economy faced unprecedented sanctions pressure from the collective West. Against this background, the government and the Central Bank need to constantly monitor the economic situation in the Russian Federation in order to take timely and effective measures. A high-frequency indicator of inflation expectations based on big data can help in the solution of this problem. In the article the author presents significant shortcomings leading to the inapplicability of existing common approaches to assessing inflation expectations under sanctions. Based on the constructed high-frequency indicators of inflation expectations, contribution of sanctions to the formation of inflation expectations and sanctions concerns, the impact of sanctions on the inflation expectations of Russian population is analyzed.
    Keywords: sanctions, inflation expectations, high-frequency indicator, inflation
    JEL: F51 E31 D84 C55 C82
    Date: 2023–05
  3. By: Vladimir Hlasny
    Abstract: Following Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions by countries worldwide, Russian population faces a crisis with deep but differentiated consequences across socioeconomic groups. We examine the evolution of earnings and societal earnings gaps throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidency, including the 2014 oil bust and trade war spurred by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Unconditional quantile regressions are applied to 2000–2016 surveys to estimate the distributional changes across urban/rural, farming/non-farming and gender divides at all earnings quantiles, and growth incidence curves for the respective groups are derived using consistent survey waves around the crisis years of 2014–2015. Urban-rural gaps are found to be pervasive, particularly at lower earnings quantiles, while gender gaps declined over time. Rural and female-headed households receive lower returns on their endowments because they lack employment opportunities. The 2014 shocks affected all groups, particularly the rural poor, export-oriented farmers, and urban rich, not only immediately but over several years.
    JEL: F16 J31 D31 D63 N34 C21
    Date: 2022–09
  4. By: Mondher Bouattour (Excelia Group | La Rochelle Business School); Amine Ben Amar (Faculté des sciences [Rabat] - UM5 - Université Mohammed V de Rabat [Agdal]); Stéphane Goutte (UMI SOURCEE - Université Paris-Saclay); Makram Bellalah (LEFMI - Laboratoire d’Économie, Finance, Management et Innovation - UR UPJV 4286 - UPJV - Université de Picardie Jules Verne)
    Abstract: Using the TYDL causality test, this paper attempts (i) to investigate the existence of shift contagion among a large spectrum of financial markets during recent stress and stress-free periods and (ii) to propose a new approach of portfolio management based on the minimization of the causal intensity. During the COVID-19 crisis period, the shift contagion analysis not only reveal a tripling of the causal links between the markets studied, but also a change in the causal structure. Beyond the initial impact of the COVID-19 crisis on financial markets, policy interventions seem to have helped in reassuring market participants that the further spread of financial stress would be mitigated. However, the Russian-Ukrainian, and the high degree of uncertainty it entailed, has again exacerbated the interdependencies between financial markets. In terms of portfolio analysis, our minimum-causalintensity approach records a lower (respectively higher) reward-to-volatility ratio than the Markowitz (1952 & 1959) minimum-variance traditional approach during the pre-COVID-19 (respectively prewar) period. On the other hand, both approaches, the one we propose in this paper and the minimum-variance approach, record negative reward-to-volatility ratios during crisis periods.
    Keywords: Shift contagion, diversification, minimum-causal intensity portfolio, clean energy, financial market, cryptocurrencies, socially responsible investment
    Date: 2023–04–10
  5. By: Bampinas, Georgios; Panagiotidis, Theodore
    Abstract: This paper studies the cross-market linkages between six international stock markets and the two major cryptocurrency markets during the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. By employing the local (partial) Gaussian correlation approach, we find that during the Covid-19 pandemic period both cryptocurrency markets possess limited diversification and safe haven properties, which further diminish during the war. Bootstrap tests for contagion suggest that during the Covid-19 pandemic the East Asian markets lead the transmission of contagion towards the two cryptocurrency markets. During the Russian invasion, the US stock market emerges as the principal transmitter of contagion. Uncovering the role of pandemic (Infectious Disease EMV Index) and geopolitical risk (GPR index) induced uncertainties, we find that under conditions of high uncertainty and financial distress the dependency between the US and UK stock markets with both cryptocurrency markets increases considerably. The latter is more profound during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
    Keywords: Bitcoin, Ethereum, cryptocurrency, stock market, tail dependence, local Gaussian partial correlation, pandemic uncertainty, geopolitical risk uncertainty
    JEL: C51 C58 G1
    Date: 2023–01
  6. By: Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin
    Abstract: Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito’s government launching a war against the United States, or Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao’s Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot’s collectivization drive, they typically involve both a monumental miscalculation and an institutional environment in which better-informed subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being implemented. We offer a dynamic model of non-democratic politics, in which repression and bad decision-making are self-reinforcing. Repressions reduce the threat, yet raise the stakes for the incumbent; with higher stakes, the incumbent puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence. Our theory sheds light on the mechanism of disastrous individual decisions in highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes.
    JEL: C73 D72 D83 P16
    Date: 2023–04
  7. By: Bardt, Hubertus; Demary, Markus; Grömling, Michael; Henger, Ralph; Hentze, Tobias; Hüther, Michael; Obst, Thomas; Pimpertz, Jochen; Puls, Thomas; Schaefer, Thilo; Schäfer, Holger
    Abstract: Ein namhafter Aufschwung der deutschen Wirtschaft findet im Jahr 2023 nicht statt. Das reale Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird zwar nach der Winterpause im Jahresverlauf wieder zulegen. Das Konjunkturtempo wird zum Jahresende jedoch wieder nachlassen, wenngleich eine erneute Winterrezession derzeit nicht gesehen wird. Neuerliche Knappheiten an den Energiemärkten können für wiederkehrende Preisausschläge sorgen. Insgesamt bleibt die Dynamik hierzulande verhalten und dies spiegelt keine breit angelegte und zugkräftige Erholung nach den dreijährigen Beeinträchtigungen durch die Pandemie und die russische Invasion in der Ukraine wider. Folglich wird in diesem Jahr die Wirtschaftsleistung in Deutschland das Vorjahresergebnis nur um gut ¼ Prozent übertreffen.
    Keywords: Konjunktur, Weltwirtschaft, Arbeitsmarkt, Staatshaushalt, Finanzmärkte
    JEL: E2 E3 E5 E6
    Date: 2023
  8. By: Karsten Neuhoff; Fernanda Ballesteros; Mats Kröger; Jörn C. Richstein
    Abstract: Renewable energy installations are rapidly gaining market share due to falling technology costs and supportive policies. Meanwhile, the energy price crisis resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian war has shifted the energy policy debate toward the question of how consumers can benefit more from the low and stable generation costs of renewable electricity. Here we suggest a Renewable Pool (“RE-Pool”) under which the government passes the conditions of Contracts-for-Difference on to consumers who thereby benefit from reliably low-cost electricity supply. We assess the effect on financing costs, scale, and system friendliness of wind investments, as well risk hedging for consumers’ volume risks and hedging incentives.
    Keywords: Contracts-for-Difference, renewable policy, electricity markets, financing, PPA
    JEL: D44 D47 G32 L94
    Date: 2023
  9. By: Phoebe Koundouri; Anthony Cox; Arunima Malik; Ben Groom; Brian O'Callaghan; Cameron Hepburn; Catherine Kilelu; Christine Lins; Dale Squires; E. Somanathan; Heba Handoussa; Ian Bateman; Ismail Serageldin; Josep M. Anto; Ketan Patel; Kirsten Brosbol; Lamia Kamal-Chaoui; Luiz Augusto Galvao; Manfred Lenzen; Min Zhu; Rabia Ferroukhi; Richard Carson; Stefan Brunnhuber; Theodoros Zachariadis; Thomas Sterner; Gertrude (Trudi) Makhaya; Angelos Alamanos; Mark C. Freeman; Christian Hansmeyer; Conrad Landis; Tamara Paremoer; Angelos Plataniotis
    Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic caused a global health crisis with severe social and economic effects, formulating a converging situation with the climate change, the biodiversity collapse, the subsequent war in Ukraine and the macroeconomic recession. This combination of challenges forms an unprecedented opportunity for addressing them systemically, achieving multiple co-benefits under the broader sustainability context: Alleviating poverty and hunger, inequality, and building resilient societies, based on inclusiveness and strong finance, is the topic of this paper. We explain the concept of this ''green'' recovery, the pathways to achieve it, the key areas-sectors for transformation, and outline the funding opportunities and necessary changes for its globally sustainable implementation. This paper reflects the work of global experts on the field, joined after the Lancet Commissioned Report on the Recovery from COVID-19, with a strong focus on science-based policy, global cooperation, and international finance.
    Keywords: Sustainability, Resilience, Green Recovery, Finance, Global Cooperation, COVID-19
    Date: 2023–05–10
  10. By: Viktoriia Naboka-Krell (University Giessen)
    Abstract: The work by Baker et al. (2016), who propose a dictionary based method and estimate the level of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) based on the occurrence of specific terms in ten leading newspapers in the USA, is among the first ones to detect the potential of text data in economic research. Following this line of research, this paper proposes automated approaches to construction of EPU indices for different countries based on newspapers’ texts. First, multilingual fastText word embeddings and BERT text embeddings are used in order to define relevant EPU key words and EPU related articles, respectively. Further, multilingual conceptualized topic modeling introduced by Bianchi et al. (2021) is performed and EPU related topics are detected. It is shown that the constructed EPU indices based on fastText embeddings Granger cause the economic activity in all of the considered countries, namely Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. Also, some of the topics uncovered by multilingual conceptualized topic modeling have proved to Granger cause the economic activity in all of the considered countries.
    Keywords: text-as-data, fastText emeddings, BERT, economic policy uncertainty, natural language processing
    Date: 2023
  11. By: Spirin, Victor
    Abstract: The standard model of international trade demonstrates the inevitability of deindustrialization of a developing country in the face of premature liberalization of foreign trade with the developed world. This result is a consequence of elementary mathematical optimization and does not depend on the retreat from democratization and glasnost, the rule of law, or the corruption of the economic or political system. In this article, we will especially emphasize the fact that the reasons for the deindustrialization of the Russian economy should not be sought in any inefficiency of the economic system, but corruption, on the contrary, may have been the engine of economic development in historical examples. In addition, from the consideration of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, it follows that in a developing country with the liberalization of foreign trade, the oligarchs are the most affected class. The reason for this is the huge amount of capital that is completely incommensurable with the stolen, which is given to foreigners: instead of developing our own machine-building, electronic and other high-tech industries, and growing our oligarchs in these industries, all the money was given without a fight to foreign oligarchs.
    Keywords: Vanek-Reinert effect, free trade, standard model, macroeconomic effect of globalization
    JEL: F6 F62 F63
    Date: 2023–05–07
  12. By: Khan, Haider
    Abstract: In this paper we present a structural CGE model for analyzing the energy situation in Iran and to draw some tentative economic policy and geopolitical conclusions. An important feature of the Iranian economy is its constant intensification of energy use per unit of labor. At the same time, Iran shows only slow improvement in energy intensity i.e. the use of energy per unit of output. Our structural computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Iran is based on 3- aggregate productive activities input-output structure- agriculture, energy and industry ---within a social accounting matrix for Iran. Four simulation exercises are conducted using this model--- industrial investment demand increase, industrial wage increase, exchange rate depreciation, and government spending increase in industry. Our results show that structural change associated with raising industrial labor productivity and employment share are likely to result in simultaneous intensification of per worker energy-use and slight reduction of energy productivity in Iran. Industrial wage increase can create cost-push inflation and output contraction through a decrease in input use and increase in imports. Exchange rate devaluation is expansionary. Furthermore, when industrial output is insulated from foreign-domestic relative price effects, devaluation too becomes contractionary and wage increase results in a slight contraction in real GDP due to the "forced saving" effect. The model illustrates some of policy challenges Iran faces in its attempt to achieve "green growth" objective with high level of employment. To implement socially beneficial, capabilities- enhancing wage-led growth, Iran has to first successfully rebalance from its export-oriented growth path, which might require the government providing better social safety net for its citizens and increase their purchasing power across the board and generate further productive capacity in the Agricultural sector rather than generate inflation by increasing just the industrial sector wage. This would require a careful crafting of guaranteed income esp. for the Agricultural sector and government programs and incentives for increasing supply and productivity by enhancing both physical infrastructure, technical change and human capabilities. Geopolitically, Iran’s current competition with Saudi Arabia and Turkey diverts valuable economic resources from development to political purposes. Satisfying legitimate security concerns rationally while reorienting the geopolitical concerns to a peaceful commercial relation to North and East of Iran including Japan will lead to much more stable and prosperous economic conditions than Iran experiences at present. However, provocations such as the June 2017 Qatar crisis provoked by Saudi Arabia and its “Islamic NATO” alliance makes geopolitical complexities more acute for Iran. Still Iran needs to avoid sanguinary conflicts and try to isolate Saudi Arabia politically. Geopolitical, 2023 moves for reconciliation via China and Russia seem to indicate a northward and eastward direction of energy and other related policies of both Iran and Saudi Arabia.
    Keywords: Energy , Geoeconomics, geopolitics, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, CGE modeling
    JEL: F4 F51 Q4
    Date: 2023–04–15
    Abstract: The food security crisis in the Middle East has been exacerbated by several events, including COVID-19 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but the greater crisis is the decline in agricultural productivity caused by climate change and the rise of protectionist trade policies. This study examined the impact of drought on regional grain prices, specifically drought, which has the greatest impact on the Middle East region of Africa among weather changes. It was predicted by the IPCC (2019) that weather changes would affect agricultural production systems and that these changes would affect international grain markets and government trade policies. This study found that prices in the African Middle East maize and rice market increased as the drought intensified and the period lengthened, as predicted. Sorghum and millet, however, are relatively inelastic to climate change, so it can be assumed that they will receive attention as climate change intensifies. This study proposes areas for cooperation such as agricultural production, supporting the vulnerable, and crop reserve with the Middle East and Africa.
    Keywords: Climate change; Food security; Africa; Middle East
    Date: 2023–03–29
  14. By: Sophie Michel; Séverine Saleilles; Bertrand Valiorgue (CleRMa - Clermont Recherche Management - ESC Clermont-Ferrand - École Supérieure de Commerce (ESC) - Clermont-Ferrand - UCA [2017-2020] - Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020])
    Abstract: La période 2020-2022 a été marquée par le surgissement de multiples crises qui ont mis les systèmes alimentaires à rude épreuve. Nous pouvons en premier lieu évoquer le surgissement de la COVID 19, dont la rapidité de déploiement à l'échelle planétaire est la résultante d'une interconnexion des sociétés humaines à travers des niveaux de flux de population et de biens qui n'ont jamais été aussi importants. Ces flux et ces interconnexions sont notamment générés par un mode de développement urbain qui nécessite d'aller chercher et de transporter des ressources alimentaires bien au-delà des frontières nationales (Rastoin et Ghersi, 2010). Plus les sociétés humaines s'urbanisent, plus les systèmes alimentaires s'allongent et sont connectés les uns aux autres (Rastoin, 2022). La crise Covid 19 souligne aussi les empiètements sur le domaine du sauvage qui facilitent la circulation des virus entre les espèces sur une échelle géographique désormais globalisée (Rastoin, 2020). La guerre en Ukraine est également un évènement qui concerne et impacte directement les systèmes alimentaires. L'Ukraine est en effet une puissance agricole de premier plan dont les productions en blé et oléagineux sont indispensables pour nourrir des populations situées en Afrique ou au Moyen-Orient. La mainmise de la Russie sur les terres agricoles ainsi que sur toutes les infrastructures portuaires perturbe les équilibres alimentaires mondiaux. À travers la guerre en Ukraine, la Russie cherche à sécuriser ses approvisionnements mais également à peser politiquement et économiquement sur les équilibres alimentaires mondiaux car ses dirigeants anticipent une raréfaction des denrées alimentaires du fait de la nouvelle donne climatique qui s'installe (Valiorgue, 2023). La sécheresse historique de l'été 2022 constitue enfin une troisième crise qui a fortement mis à l'épreuve les systèmes alimentaires à l'échelle du globe. En dépit de ces crises historiques qui se cumulent et s'amplifient, force est de constater que nos systèmes alimentaires ont tenu bon car il n'y a pas eu de ruptures alimentaires majeures. Les systèmes alimentaires ont encaissé les chocs et sont parvenus à maintenir des états de fonctionnement et des niveaux de performance proches des conditions initiales. Ils ont fait preuve de résilience. Ces trois crises historiques ne viennent pas de nulle part et elles peuvent être plus généralement repositionnées dans le contexte général d'une grande transformation des équilibres géologiques du système Terre. Cette transformation, dont les humains sont directement à l'origine, est si importante que certains considèrent que nous sommes en train de passer d'une époque géologique à une autre. Nous sortons de l'Holocène pour entrer dans l'Anthropocène (Bonneuil et Fressoz, 2016) et ce passage a des impacts considérables sur les systèmes alimentaires (Valiorgue, 2020). En effet, ce grand basculement dans l'Anthropocène et les événements politiques qu'il engendre percutent directement et frontalement les systèmes alimentaires qui sont confrontés à des environnements - à la fois naturels et institutionnels - qui deviennent structurellement volatils, incertains, complexes et ambigus. C'est dans ce contexte inédit que le terme de résilience s'est imposé pour décrire un état supposé des systèmes alimentaires capables d'encaisser les multiples chocs et crises désormais inscrits dans le présent et le futur des sociétés humaines. Si l'emploi de ce terme semble aujourd'hui se généraliser, nous souhaitons revenir dans l'introduction de ce numéro spécial sur les ambiguïtés et certaines fragilités que la notion de résilience charrie. À la suite de Rastoin (2020) qui plaidait dans l'éditorial de Systèmes Alimentaires / Food Systems pour une « résilience pro-active », à l'encontre du sens étymologique de « sauter en arrière », nous souhaitons revenir sur la dimension construite, organisationnelle et partagée de la résilience. Par ailleurs, la qualité de résilient ne peut suffire à décrire ce qui semble devoir être les caractéristiques et les trajectoires des systèmes alimentaires de l'Anthropocène. Ces derniers devront également être durables, c'est-à-dire capables d'avoir des impacts positifs sur le système Terre afin de limiter les dégradations environnementales et de ne pas dépasser certaines limites planétaires dont le respect conditionne le maintien de l'espèce Homo Sapiens (Rockström et al., 2019). Les systèmes alimentaires devront enfin être apprenants, afin de renouveler les institutions et les stocks de connaissance face à des environnements (naturels et institutionnels) qui vont se transformer dans des proportions, des rythmes et des directions qui ne peuvent être connus à l'avance. Nous terminons l'introduction par une présentation des articles qui composent ce numéro spécial et qui enrichissent notre compréhension des dynamiques collectives en lien avec la résilience et les transitions des systèmes alimentaires dans le contexte Anthropocène.
    Date: 2023–03–16
  15. By: Marina Diakonova (Banco de España); Corinna Ghirelli (Banco de España); Javier J. Pérez (Banco de España); Luis Molina (Banco de España)
    Abstract: We show how policy uncertainty and conflict-related shocks impact the dynamics of economic activity (GDP) in Russia. We use alternative indicators of “conflict”, relating to specific aspects of this general concept: geopolitical risk, social unrest, outbreaks of political violence and escalations into internal armed conflict. For policy uncertainty we employ the workhorse economic policy uncertainty (EPU) indicator. We use two distinct but complementary empirical approaches. The first is based on a time series mixed-frequency forecasting model. We show that the indicators provide useful information for forecasting GDP in the short run, even when controlling for a comprehensive set of standard high-frequency macro-financial variables. The second approach, is a SVAR model. We show that negative shocks to the selected indicators lead to economic slowdown, with a persistent drop in GDP growth and a short-lived but large increase in country risk.
    Keywords: GDP forecasting, natural language processing, social unrest, social conflict, policy uncertainty, geopolitical risk
    JEL: E37 D74 N16
    Date: 2022–11
  16. By: Kohnert, Dirk
    Abstract: In the 19th and 20th centuries, Turkey considered only North Africa a substantial part of the Ottoman Empire and neglected sub-Saharan Africa unless vital interests were at stake. However, the apathy of successive Turkish governments changed with the 1998 "Africa Action Plan". Since then, the Turkish state has intensified its diplomatic, political, economic and cultural interactions with sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish-African relations received a further boost when Ankara declared 2005 the "Year of Africa". Although the predominantly Muslim region of North Africa is the focus of Turkish foreign policy due to their shared history, the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa has also increased due to the growing demand for military and medical supplies. Since 2005, Ankara promoted state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, although it does not follow Western democratization policies. Turkey's growing economic, political and security involvement in Africa aims to open new markets for its manufactured goods, particularly its defence and security industries. Presenting itself as a relevant regional power without colonial ballast, Turkey sets itself apart from traditional Western players on the continent. Turkey's engagement in sub-Saharan Africa differed markedly from that of other emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. While Ankara shared the disregard for Western sanctions due to BRICS members' democratic deficits, it went beyond traditional state-to-state relations and increasingly relied on cooperation with non-state actors. African partners value Turkish products and expertise. In addition, Ankara has taken a coordinated approach to working with African states and leaders, avoiding entanglements with international organizations or other alliances, as in Somalia and Kenya, but more recently in much of East, South and West Africa. This has been demonstrated using the example of the three West African countries Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast.
    Keywords: Turquie; Afrique subsaharienne; Afrique de l'Ouest; Nigeria; Ghana; Côte d'Ivoire; commerce international; migration; développement durable; démocratisation; postcolonialisme; nationalisme; BRICS; Chine; France; Grande-Bretagne; aide au développement; ONG; Études africaines;
    JEL: E26 F22 F24 F35 F52 F54 F63 I31 J46 J61 L31 N14 N17 N37 N47 O17 O35 O55 Z13
    Date: 2023–05–03
  17. By: Dinara Alpysbayeva (Norwegian University of Life Sciences, School of Economics and Business); Galiya Sagyndykova (Nazarbayev University, School of Sciences and Humanities); Aigerim Yergabulova (Nazarbayev University, Graduate School of Business)
    Abstract: Despite significant progress in gender equality over the past decades, women's access to equal pay is still a persistent and complex issue. Recent research on the gender pay gap in foreign-owned companies has illuminated the possible effects of foreign ownership on the gender wage gap, emphasizing the significance of addressing this problem for advancing gender equality in the context of global trade and economic growth. This paper examines the gender pay gap in Kazakhstan, with a focus on the impact of foreign ownership and the gender-occupational composition of firms. The study aims to identify the underlying sources of the gender pay gap and whether it can be attributed to either wage discrimination or productivity differences, and how the institutional background of Kazakhstan may influence this issue. Our primary estimation technique throughout the analysis is the reduced-form linear probability model. We show that the gender pay gap is higher in foreign-owned firms, especially for managerial positions. Interestingly, our findings align with distinct sources of the disparity in foreign-owned firms and domestic firms. For foreign-owned firms, we find a gender wage gap only in management positions, consistent with a wage gap driven by work requirements that disproportionately impact women in career advancement. For domestic-owned firms, we find a rural versus urban difference in the gender wage gap which indicates discrimination based on traditional gender stereotypes. We do not find any evidence to suggest that the wage disparity is due to productivity differences. Based on our findings, policy measures should include flexible work arrangements that enhance temporal flexibility to reduce the gender pay gap and improve outcomes for female employees.
    Keywords: gender pay inequality, occupations, foreign ownership, Kazakhstan
    Date: 2023–08
  18. By: Andreea Minea-Pic
    Abstract: Climate change and natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic, and geopolitical shocks have increasingly disrupted school education around the world in recent years. Whether leading to school closures, school destructions or repeated interruptions in students’ learning experiences, these external shocks have translated into lost learning opportunities for students. In this context, education systems face heightened pressure to become ever more resilient, enhance the efficiency of public spending and address emerging learning gaps. This working paper highlights key education strategies for helping students catch up on lost learning opportunities and bridge learning gaps, based on a review of research and policy evidence from OECD and non-OECD countries. It examines a range of academic strategies to address learning gaps, including i) adapting instructional strategies and pedagogies to individual needs, ii) extending and adapting the time of instruction, and iii) providing curricular flexibility and enabling fluid learning pathways within the school system. It provides research evidence on the effectiveness of such strategies, together with examples of their large-scale implementation and cost-effectiveness considerations. While this paper presents programmes of general interest for all countries, a separate policy brief targets learning recovery strategies for students in Ukraine.
    Date: 2023–05–11
  19. By: Mathieu Plane (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Elliot Aurissergues (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Bruno Coquet; Ombeline Julien de Pommerol; Pierre Madec (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Raul Sampognaro (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)
    Abstract: La reprise de l'activité post-Covid a été violemment freinée par de multiples événements, en premier lieu les conséquences de l'invasion de l‘Ukraine par la Russie. La crise énergétique, le retour du spectre de l'inflation, les tensions internationales et les difficultés d'approvisionnement, la remontée brutale des taux… l'ensemble de ces chocs amputeraient la croissance du PIB de 3 points sur trois ans malgré les mesures budgétaires déployées. Si le reflux des prix de l'énergie depuis le pic de l'été 2022 devrait permettre d'éviter officiellement une récession, l'économie française ne devrait cependant croître que de 0, 8 % en 2023, marquée encore par la diffusion des chocs monétaire et énergétique. En 2024, sous l'hypothèse d'une relative stabilité des prix de l'énergie et sans crise financière majeure, la croissance du PIB serait de 1, 2 %. La croissance de l'activité serait principalement impactée par la diffusion de la hausse des taux et une politique budgétaire plus restrictive. Tirée par les prix de l'alimentaire, l'inflation resterait élevée jusqu'à la fin de l'année 2023 oscillant entre 5, 5 % et 6, 5 %. Elle commencerait à se dégonfler seulement à partir de 2024 pour converger vers 3 % à la fin de l'année prochaine. Au total, l'inflation mesurée par l'IPC, augmenterait en moyenne de 5, 8 % en 2023 et de 3, 8 % en 2024. Le pouvoir d'achat par unité de consommation baisserait de 1, 2 % sur la période 2022-24. Il reviendrait en 2024 à un niveau proche de 2019 malgré les mesures fiscales déployées. Le taux d'épargne des ménages, encore près de 3 points au-dessus de son niveau de 2019 à la fin 2022, convergerait vers son niveau d'avant-crise à l'horizon de la prévision, soutenant ainsi la consommation. La « sur-épargne » accumulée depuis le début de la crise Covid représenterait 12, 6 % du revenu annuel des ménages, hors taxe inflationniste sur le patrimoine, à la fin de l'année 2024. La résilience des entreprises, visible dans la bonne tenue du climat des affaires contraste avec les déficits extérieurs. Cependant, le moindre restockage et la stabilité attendue du taux d'investissement, couplés à un rattrapage partiel des parts de marché avec notamment l'amélioration de la situation dans l'aéronautique, permettrait au commerce extérieur de contribuer positivement à la croissance au cours des trimestres à venir. L'année 2023 devrait être l'année du retournement du marché du travail, le taux de chômage augmentant à partir du second semestre, avec la baisse de l'apprentissage et la hausse de la durée du travail. Nous attendons 100 000 pertes d'emplois entre la fin de l'année 2022 et 2024 et un taux de chômage à 7, 9 % à la fin de l'année prochaine (contre 7, 2 % actuellement). Cependant la productivité du travail ne retrouverait pas sa tendance d'avant-crise d'ici la fin 2024, révélant un cycle de productivité encore largement creusé. Le déficit public à 4, 7 % du PIB en 2022, diminuerait légèrement, sous l'effet de l'extinction progressive des mesures sanitaires et énergétiques pour atteindre 4 % du PIB en 2024. Le ratio entre dette publique et PIB baisserait, passant de 111, 6 % en 2022 à 107, 8 % en 2024, ce dernier bénéficiant d'une croissance du PIB nominal vigoureuse avec la hausse marquée des prix du PIB. L'inflation élevée relève comptablement le niveau de déficit qui stabilise la dette en points de PIB, allégeant ainsi le poids de la dette.
    Date: 2023–04–13
  20. By: Heigermoser, Maximilian
    Keywords: Crop Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Security and Poverty, International Relations/Trade
    Date: 2023

General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.