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on Confederation of Independent States |
|
Issue of 2023‒02‒13
twenty-one papers chosen by |
| By: | Mohammad Farhadi (Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan) |
| Abstract: | The present study seeks to make a comparative study of the opportunities & threats of Turkish & Russian economic projects in Central Asia for Iran. Therefore, using the content analysis method & the theme matrix type by performing indirect observation (analysis of texts), research data are collected as a purposeful sampling method from existing texts & through thematic coding, themes, opportunities & project threats. The economic relations of Russia & Turkey in Central Asia were identified for Iran & finally compared & analyzed in terms of commonalities & differences. Findings showed that the common denominator of Turkish & Russian economic plans in Central Asia for Iran in terms of opportunity is to increase Iran's geopolitical importance & expand Iran's relations with countries involved in these economic plans. In addition, the difference between Russian & Turkish economic plans in Central Asia for Iran in terms of threat, having negative political & economic consequences due to the implementation of Russian economic plans, inconsistency of Iran & Turkey development policies in Central Asia & weakening Iran's position due to Turkey is pursuing Occidentalism policies in the region. In order to validate the qualitative findings, the audit method & the formation of a focal group have been used for its reliability & the reproducibility as well as the transferability or generalizability. |
| Keywords: | Economic Projects, Central Asia, China, India, Iran |
| Date: | 2022–12–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03912864&r=cis |
| By: | Michael Rochlitz; Olga Masyutina; Koen Schoors; Yulia Khalikova (-) |
| Abstract: | How does the prospect of an autocrat remaining in office affect individual expectations and behavior? To answer this question, we implemented a survey experiment in May 2021 in Russia by treating respondents with three hypothetical outcomes of the 2024 Russian presidential elections – Vladimir Putin remaining in office, his close associate Sergei Shoigu winning the elections, or a young reformer becoming president. Respondents then had to answer a range of questions on individual expectations and intended behavior. We find that respondents agree on economic stagnation being a concern under Putin, but not under the two political alternatives. For most other questions, we find a strong division along political lines, as well as – less systematically – with respect to income, age and education. Most importantly, we find that pro-regime respondents were more likely to invest and be economically active under Putin, despite concerns about economic stagnation. Our results show the importance of regime legitimacy for individual incentives, and provide an explanation why unpopular authoritarian regimes might be less economically successful. |
| Keywords: | authoritarian durability, individual attitudes, economic incentives, survey experiment, Russia |
| JEL: | D84 P16 P52 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:23/1061&r=cis |
| By: | Sim, Soonhyung (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) |
| Abstract: | On February 24, Russia launched an all-out invasion of Ukraine. Contrary to initial expectations that the war would end early, strong resistance by the Ukrainian army and the incompetence of the Russian army overlapped, and the war is showing signs of prolongation. A long war seems inevitable as Ukraine’s resistance, backed by Western military support, intensifies and the armistice agreement faces difficulties. This paper explores the threats faced the Korean defense industry as well as opportunities for export growth amid a rapidly evolving global security order. A review of relevant defense data finds that, in order for Korean defense exports to take a leap forward, it is necessary to take full advantage of security gaps in Europe that the war in Ukraine has exposed. Especially, it is crucial to establish an export strategy that takes advantage of Europe’s common security and defense policy. |
| Keywords: | defense; defense industry; defense exports; Russia-Ukraine war; weapons exports; weapons manufacturing; arms exports; arms manufacturing; EU; Russia; Ukraine; United States; Korea |
| JEL: | F13 L64 |
| Date: | 2023–01–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieter:2022_018&r=cis |
| By: | Teodora Boneva; Armin Falk; Mark Fallak; Lasse Stötzer |
| Abstract: | Knapp 70 Prozent der 2.000 Befragten gaben an, einen Importstopp für Gas, Öl und Kohle aus Russland zu unterstützen. Drei von vier Deutschen sind dafür, Vermögenswerte von Personen aus dem Umfeld Putins zu beschlagnahmen und damit die wirtschaftlichen Folgen der Sanktionen für Deutschland abzufedern. Um die Abhängigkeit von Energieimporten nachhaltig zu reduzieren, sprechen sich 90 Prozent für einen beschleunigten Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien aus. Für den Übergang würden drei Viertel der Deutschen eine Laufzeitverlängerung der verbliebenen Atomkraftwerke akzeptieren, 63 Prozent eine vorübergehende Intensivierung des Braunkohleabbaus. Darüber hinaus würde eine Mehrheit der Deutschen verschiedene Maßnahmen zur Senkung des Kraft- stoffverbrauchs im Straßenverkehr unterstützen: 61 Prozent der Befragten halten ein zunächst für sechs Mo- nate geltendes Tempolimit von 100 km/h auf deutschen Autobahnen für vertretbar. Knapp mehrheitsfähig mit 53 Prozent Zustimmung wäre auch die Wiedereinführung autofreier Sonntage. Vier von fünf Deutschen könnten sich zudem eine teilweise Verlängerung der Homeoffice-Pflicht vorstellen. Zusätzliche Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine sehen allerdings viele Deutsche skeptisch, nur die Hälfte der Befragten wäre damit einverstanden. Politische Unterstützung für einen EU-Beitritt der Ukraine halten 56 Prozent für geboten. Eine breite Rückendeckung von 70 Prozent der Deutschen findet der Vorschlag, die Integration von Geflüchteten aus der Ukraine durch eine unbefristete Aufenthalts- und Arbeitserlaubnis zu erleichtern. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:031&r=cis |
| By: | Rüdiger Bachmann; David Baqaee; Christian Bayer; Moritz Kuhn; Andreas Löschel; Ben McWilliams; Benjamin Moll; Andreas Peichl; Karen Pittel; Moritz Schularick; Georg Zachmann |
| Abstract: | An end to gas supplies from Russia has recently become much more likely. Russian supply volumes have already been substantially reduced, and uncertainty about future supplies and the winter supply situation is high. In this study, we ask what the economic consequences would be of a complete halt to Russian gas imports at present (August 2022). Almost five months have passed since our first study, "What if" (Bachmann et al., 2022), on the economic effects of a March 2022 Russian energy import freeze. The debate sparked by the study has sharpened the focus on the issues and assumptions that are critical to estimating the economic costs of a Russian energy import freeze. In this study, we update the results based on the situation in August 2022. (i) We estimate the necessary demand reduction that would result if Russian gas imports were halted from August 2022 and discuss economic policy strategies to achieve this adjustment. (ii) We update our estimated expected economic costs and discuss practical examples of substitution options in the industrial sector. (iii) We evaluate the federal government's economic policy, in particular its decision to increase storage levels with continued gas imports from Russia since March 2022, but to largely forego measures to reduce gas demand in power generation, industry, and residential and commercial sectors. The key findings of the study can be summarized as follows: In the event of a complete loss of Russian gas supplies in the next few weeks, Germany will have to reduce its gas demand by around 25% (equivalent to 210 TWh) by the end of the coming heating period (April 2023), even if the planned liquefied natural gas terminals come on stream as planned in the winter. When factoring in the savings in gas demand that can be achieved through alternative energy sources in power generation, this leaves an adjustment of about 20% of gas consumption that must be borne by industry, households, businesses, and the public sector. Such a reduction is feasible in a collective effort if measures are taken quickly to save gas. The good news from our study is that Germany can get through the winter without Russian gas. Panic mongering is out of place. Nevertheless, it should be clear to everyone that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made Germany permanently poorer. The days of cheap energy are over and collective efforts are needed to make the economy crisis-proof. Reducing gas consumption is feasible, but it comes at an economic cost. In particular, there is much less time now to substitute gas in the industrial sector and power generation than in the spring. It is difficult to estimate how many companies have made the sometimes costly investments in alternatives even without the appropriate political framework. However, it has become clear that the view that gas substitution was not possible at all within six months was wrong. There are now numerous examples of substantial substitution possibilities, including in the chemical and glass production industries. The bottom line is that the economic costs of adjusting to an import freeze are likely to remain similar to those of committing to an import freeze already in the spring. This is because the gas gap is smaller than in the spring, but the remaining adjustment period is shorter. In this respect, the costs remain substantial, but manageable with appropriate economic policy measures. There is no threat of mass poverty or popular uprisings in the event of a halt to Russian gas imports. The economy will face production losses of a magnitude that Germany has already managed in the past when it had to face economic shocks. It is also important to interpret the effects of a gas import stop relative to a scenario without an import stop. For example, Germany could fall into recession even without an import freeze. The assessment of the German government's strategy of not enforcing an early demand adjustment and continuing gas imports from Russia despite the war of aggression on Ukraine is ambivalent. Although a good 100 TWh of gas was stored from April to July, without Russian supplies the need for adjustment on the demand side remains substantial at 25% until the end of the next heating period. In a counterfactual scenario, in which Germany would have had to manage without Russian gas imports as early as from April onwards, demand would have had to be reduced by 31%, a good 6 percentage points more. Yet in return, there would have been more time to prepare the appropriate adjustments for the winter heating period. Even if the storage facilities were filled to 100% in the fall, Germany would remain dependent on Russian imports for normal winter consumption and would thus remain vulnerable to blackmail from Moscow. This is because the storage facilities only have a total capacity of below 250 TWh, which is roughly equivalent to the consumption of two winter months. In this respect, the focus on storage levels and the neglect of adaptation measures was not suitable to end Germany's dependence on Russia and its political blackmail ability completely and quickly. While closer cooperation with European partners could have mitigated the necessary reduction in gas demand in Germany, there is still a risk that national go-it-alone efforts will undermine essential European energy solidarity. In any case, the BMWK's efforts to build LNG terminals and diversify gas supplies through imports from third countries are positive. However, this could have been done even with an import freeze or tariff solutions in March. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:034_en&r=cis |
| By: | Rüdiger Bachmann (University of Notre Dame); David Baqaee (University of California, Los Angeles); Christian Bayer (University of Bonn); Moritz Kuhn (University of Bonn); Andreas Löschel (Ruhr University Bochum); Benjamin Moll (London School of Economics); Andreas Peichl (Ifo Institute for Economic Research, University of Munich); Karen Pittel (Ifo Institute for Economic Research, University of Munich); Moritz Schularick (Sciences Po Paris, University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | This article discusses the economic effects of a potential cut-off of the German economy from Russian energy imports. We show that the effects are likely to be substantial but manageable. In the short run, a stop of Russian energy imports would lead to a GDP decline in range between 0.5% and 3% (cf. the GDP decline in 2020 during the pandemic was 4.5%). |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:028&r=cis |
| By: | Teodora Boneva; Armin Falk; Mark Fallak; Lasse Stötzer |
| Abstract: | According to a representative briq survey, more than two-thirds of the German population would support a halt to energy imports from Russia in order to increase pressure on the Russian government. A broad ma- jority would also welcome additional measures to reduce energy dependence, including alternative energy sources and energy-saving. When it comes to helping the Ukrainian people, many of the respondents would support both aid and integration policies, including permanent residence and work permits for refugees. Germans are divided, however, on the question of further arms deliveries to Ukraine. |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:031_en&r=cis |
| By: | Feng, Fan; Jia, Ningyuan; Lin, Faqin |
| Abstract: | Purpose: Considering the importance of Russia and Ukraine in agriculture, the authors quantify the potential impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on food output, trade, prices and food security for the world. Design/methodology/approach: The authors mainly use the quantitative and structural multi-country and multi-sector general equilibrium trade model to analyze the potential impacts of the conflict on the global food trade pattern and security. Findings: First, the authors found that the conflict would lead to soaring agricultural prices, decreasing trade volume and severe food insecurity especially for countries that rely heavily on grain imports from Ukraine and Russia, such as Egypt and Turkey. Second, major production countries such as the United States and Canada may even benefit from the conflict. Third, restrictions on upstream energy and fertilizer will amplify the negative effects of food insecurity. Originality/value: This study analyzed the effect of Russia–Ukraine conflict on global food security based on sector linkages and the quantitative general equilibrium trade framework. With a clearer demonstration of the influence about the inherent mechanism based on fewer parameters compared with traditional Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) models, the authors showed integrated impacts of the conflict on food output, trade, prices and welfare across sectors and countries. |
| Keywords: | agriculture commodity price; agriculture trade; food security; Russia–Ukraine conflict; welfare; 72261147471; 72073128 and 72061147002 |
| JEL: | J1 L81 |
| Date: | 2023–01–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:117881&r=cis |
| By: | Geis-Thöne, Wido |
| Abstract: | Fehlten im Frühjahr 2019 rund 359.000 Betreuungsplätze für unter Dreijährige in Deutschland, waren es im Frühjahr 2022 nur noch 266.000. Allerdings könnte sich die Lage insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund der Flucht vieler Familien aus der Ukraine in den nächsten Jahren wieder verschärfen. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:972022&r=cis |
| By: | Simshauser, P. |
| Abstract: | The war in Ukraine and the associated 2022 energy crisis has had far-reaching effects with seaborne prices for coal and gas reaching multiples (5-6x) of their historic averages. While Europe was the epicentre, countries as far away as Australia were impacted. As a major exporter of coal and gas, domestic markets are linked to seaborne prices. Consequently, forward prices for 2023 delivery in Australia’s National Electricity Market surged from ~$48 in 2021 to $156/MWh in 2022 at one point peaking at $247/MWh. Household electricity tariffs were set to in-crease by 11% in 2023 and 35% in 2024. In late-2022, the Commonwealth Government intervened by setting fuel price caps of $125/t and $12/GJ for coal and gas, respectively. Given an estimated market heat rate of ~8.2GJ/MWh, forward prices reduced to ~$105/MWh. In this article, price increases before- and after- policy interventions are analysed. 2024 tariff increases after policy intervention are forecast to increase by 16.5% (cf.35%), benefiting all customers. State Government hardship policy remains vitally important, however. Underlying levels of fuel poverty in 2024 are forecast at 12.1% pre-policy, and 6.7% after policy intervention, with State-level hardship policies making the larger (3.2 percentage point) contribution to this result. |
| Keywords: | Electricity markets, energy policy, fuel poverty |
| JEL: | D4 L5 L9 Q4 |
| Date: | 2203–01–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2307&r=cis |
| By: | Sahakyan, Mher |
| Abstract: | Yerevan needs to create concrete and real road map for developing its relations with Beijing. China is a young, eastern superpower of the World, which provides tremendous investments. It is already in the neighborhood of Armenia, but Armenian diplomacy still was not able to bring any Chinese serous investment to Armenia. Armenia is also a member of EAEU, which provides an opportunity to Yerevan to implement its policy towards Beijing in multilateral level as well, using the fact that Russia and China decided in 2015 to conjunct EAEU and China’s BRI and that the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the People’s Republic of China was signed on May 17, 2018 in Astana. According to this document, the Parties agreed to develop cooperation in agriculture, energy, transport, industrial cooperation, information and communication infrastructure, technology and innovation, finance, and environment. Thus, Armenia needs to investigate the opportunities that this agreement provides to boost the Sino-Armenian relations bilaterally as well as multilaterally. Statistics provided by China’s General Administration of Customs shows that the volume of trade between the two economies totaled US $994 million in 2020, of which US $222 million was Armenia’s export to China and US $772 was its import from that country. Therefore, Armenia has a negative balance with its bilateral trade with China. The other worrying moment in this trade relations is also that, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, China’s imports from Armenia are mostly minerals, while China exports clothes, shoes, machinery, chemicals, equipment, construction materials and food to Armenia. To conclude, Yerevan needs to find ways and negotiate with China so that the latter increases purchases of different goods already produced in Armenia, not only minerals. |
| Date: | 2021–11–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:thesis:ca4fy&r=cis |
| By: | Teodora Boneva; Armin Falk; Mark Fallak; Lasse Stötzer |
| Abstract: | According to a representative briq survey, two-thirds of the German population would be willing to pay hig- her prices for gas and heating if this were to increase pressure on the Russian government. Four out of five Germans would lower their room temperature to save energy. And more than half of higher-income house- holds would be willing to spend some of their income to help poorer households cope with higher energy prices. |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:030_en&r=cis |
| By: | Shumaila Yousafzai |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:asx:nugsbd:2023-17&r=cis |
| By: | Tobias Riepl; Zuzana Zavarská (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | The European Green Deal, which aims to steer the EU towards climate neutrality, has traditionally been met with a degree of reluctance by the Visegrád countries. The convergence to green targets represents a particular challenge for these economies, given their fossil fuel-intensive industrial orientation and the high labour market exposure of certain regions to coal mining. In reality, progress with the green transition in the region has been mixed. The expansion of renewables has been scaled up in Slovakia and partially in Poland, but has been stagnating in Czechia and even decreasing in Hungary. In the building sector, states’ retrofitting schemes are working well in terms of bringing down energy consumption in housing, despite the limited adoption of innovative heating techniques. In transport, the region focuses almost excessively on highly contested biofuels, whereas the use of green electricity for road transportation and rail systems remains negligible. Still, the Visegrád group has accomplished a remarkable catch-up in enhancing its energy efficiency in recent years, albeit still belonging to the most CO2-intensive regions in Europe. There are numerous obstacles to the green transition in the region, including lower starting points creating path-dependencies, lesser (albeit growing) social recognition of the climate crisis, and the fear of social fallout due to high employment in the coal and automobile sectors. At the same time, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has revealed the vulnerabilities of fossil fuel dependency, and as a result has broadened the pro-green-transition coalition. While it remains to be seen whether this momentum will turn into action, green pioneers such as Austria can take on a more active role by cooperating with and supporting the Visegrád countries in reaching their climate targets. This includes deepening cooperation on green electricity projects, strengthening basic research through cross-country consortia, or incentivising investment in the building and transportation sector, in which Austrian firms are well-positioned. |
| Keywords: | Visegrád countries, European Green Deal, green transition, renewable energy |
| JEL: | O13 Q58 Q42 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:64&r=cis |
| By: | Rüdiger Bachmann; David Baqaee; Christian Bayer; Moritz Kuhn; Andreas Löschel; Ben McWilliams; Benjamin Moll; Andreas Peichl; Karen Pittel; Moritz Schularick; Georg Zachmann |
| Abstract: | Ein Ende der Gaslieferungen aus Russland ist in letzter Zeit deutlich wahrscheinlicher geworden. Die russischen Liefermengen wurden bereits substantiell reduziert, und die Unsicherheit über künftige Lieferungen und die Versorgungslage im Winter ist groß. In dieser Studie fragen wir, was die ökonomischen Folgen eines kompletten Stopps russischer Gasimporte zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt (August 2022) wären. Seit unserer ersten Studie “Was wäre wenn” (Bachmann et al., 2022) zu den ökonomischen Effekten eines Importstopps für russische Energieträger aus dem März 2022 sind fast fünf Monate vergangen. Die durch die Studie ausgelöste Debatte hat den Blick für die Fragen und Annahmen geschärft, die für eine Einschätzung der wirtschaftlichen Kosten eines Importstopps russischer Energie entscheidend sind. In dieser Studie aktualisieren wir die Ergebnisse auf der Grundlage der Situation im August 2022.1 (i) Wir schätzen die notwendige Nachfragereduktion, die sich im Fall eines Stopps von russischen Gasimporten ab August 2022 ergeben würde und diskutieren wirtschaftspolitische Strategien, um diese Anpassung zu erreichen. (ii) Wir aktualisieren unsere Schätzung der zu erwartenden ökonomischen Kosten und diskutieren praktische Beispiele für Substitutionsmöglichkeiten im industriellen Bereich. (iii) Wir bewerten die wirtschaftspolitische Strategie der Bundesregierung, insbesondere die Entscheidung mit fortgesetzten Gasimporten aus Russland seit März 2022 die Speicherstände zu erhöhen, aber auf Maßnahmen zu einer frühzeitigen Reduzierung des Gasverbrauchs in der Stromerzeugung, in der Industrie und bei Haushalten und Gewerbe weitgehend zu verzichten. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:034&r=cis |
| By: | Jannat Salimova-Tekay (Emerging markets infrastructure finance professional) |
| Abstract: | This study assesses the landscape of Kazakhstan’s infrastructure financing. It starts with an analysis of the investment needs in the various sectors of infrastructure. It then proceeds with an assessment of the financing sources available to Kazakhstan in addressing these investment needs. Following an analysis of the challenges in developing infrastructure in Kazakhstan, the paper outlines the opportunities and modalities to expanding infrastructure finance and offers recommendations to unlock them. |
| Keywords: | Kazakhstan, infrastructure, public-private partnership, PPP, SDGs, planning, tariff regulation, privatization |
| JEL: | H54 H60 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unt:wpmpdd:wp/22/02&r=cis |
| By: | Benigno Pierpaolo; Canofari Paolo; Di Bartolomeo Giovanni; Messori Marcello |
| Abstract: | Differently from previous crises, the European institutions responded promptly to the Covid-19 pandemic by implementing an appropriate policy mix. However, this policy mix has proven to be insufficient for reducing the risks of financial instability in the EU due to the temporary horizon of the centralised fiscal policy and the persistence of adverse shocks. In fact, the pandemic’s impact was strengthened by the dramatic consequences of the war in Ukraine. The possible inefficiencies in implementing the Next Generation-EU (NG-EU) and an inadequate response to the war’s shock could trigger, at best, the revival of financial and fiscal dominance in the euro-area economies. However, as we analyse using a simple model, in the post-pandemic and war period, the overburdening of the ECB’s role would come with high costs. Hence, we argue that it is necessary to pursue sustainable development based on the successful implementation of the NG-EU and the related transformation of the on-shot centralised fiscal policy into a recurrent policy tool. |
| Date: | 2022–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ter:wpaper:00156&r=cis |
| By: | Ezequiel Cabezon; Moayad Al Rasasi |
| Abstract: | Uzbekistan has significantly improved its monetary policy framework during 2017-21. Nevertheless, the transition to inflation targeting is challenging as the country is going through a period of deep structural reforms. Therefore, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) will have to monitor structural reforms and calibrate monetary policy accordingly. This paper identifies institutional and structural gaps, and assesses the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. Institutional gaps are assessed using institutional indexes while transmission is assessed using VARs. It concludes that in the coming years, reforms will need to continue, to further improve the CBU’s governance and independence, develop financial markets, but most of all to reduce the still large footprint of the state in the financial sector as well as in the overall economy. |
| Keywords: | Uzbekistan; Inflation targeting; Monetary policy; post inflation targeting implementation; monetary policy outcome; monetary policy transmission; inflation targeting condition; transition to inflation targeting; transmission mechanism; Central bank policy rate; Inflation; Dollarization; Currency markets; Global; Central Asia and the Caucasus |
| Date: | 2022–11–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2022/229&r=cis |
| By: | Teodora Boneva; Armin Falk; Mark Fallak; Lasse Stötzer |
| Abstract: | Ausgehend von einem Durchschnittspreis von 2, 17 Euro pro Liter Super E10 gaben zwei Drittel der 2.000 Befragten an, noch höhere Preise zu akzeptieren, wenn sich dadurch mehr Druck auf Russland ausüben ließe. Rund ein Drittel würde sogar weitere Steigerungen um 30 Cent oder mehr in Kauf nehmen. Die Zahlungsbereitschaft ist dabei weitgehend unabhängig von der Häufigkeit der individuellen Autonutzung. Allerdings zeigen sich deutliche Unterschiede je nach Parteipräferenz: Während unter den Wählerinnen und Wählern der AfD nur rund 35 Prozent höhere Spritpreise akzeptieren würden, liegt die Bereitschaft unter den Grünen-Wählern bei 88 Prozent. Um die Abhängigkeit von Öl- und Gasimporten aus Russland zu reduzieren, würden ebenfalls zwei Drittel der Befragten einen weiteren Anstieg der monatlichen Heizkosten in Kauf nehmen. Knapp 58 Prozent würden mindestens 10 Euro an Zusatzkosten akzeptieren, rund 31 Prozent sogar 20 Euro oder mehr. Die Zahlungsbereitschaft nimmt mit höherem Einkommen tendenziell zu und ist im Westen Deutschlands stärker ausgeprägt als im Osten. Weniger abhängig vom Einkommen, aber ebenfalls je nach Parteipräferenz unterschiedlich groß ist die Bereitschaft zu Verhaltensänderungen, um den Energieverbrauch zu senken. So erklärten sich 82 Prozent der Befragten bereit, ihr Heizverhalten einzuschränken. Über 66 Prozent der Deutschen würden ihren Verbrauch so stark reduzieren, dass die Durchschnittstemperatur in ihrer Wohnung um mindestens ein Grad sinken würde. Mit Blick auf den sozialen Ausgleich zeigte sich rund die Hälfte der Befragten aus Haushalten mit jährlichem Bruttoeinkommen über 50.000 Euro bereit, einen Teil ihres Einkommens beizutragen, um damit Haushalte zu entlasten, die besonders unter den Preissteigerungen leiden. Knapp 30 Prozent der einkommensstarken Haushalte würden dafür sogar mehr als zwei Prozent ihres Einkommens abgeben. Bei allen Messungen zeigt sich: Menschen mit ausgeprägtem Altruismus sind eher bereit, Kosten oder Verhaltensänderungen auf sich zu nehmen, um den Druck auf Russland zu erhöhen. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:030&r=cis |
| By: | Rüdiger Bachmann (University of Notre Dame); David Baqaee (University of California, Los Angeles); Christian Bayer (University of Bonn); Moritz Kuhn (University of Bonn); Andreas Löschel (Ruhr University Bochum); Benjamin Moll (London School of Economics); Andreas Peichl (Ifo Institute for Economic Research, University of Munich); Karen Pittel (Ifo Institute for Economic Research, University of Munich); Moritz Schularick (Sciences Po Paris, University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | In diesem Artikel werden die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen eines möglichen Stopps russischer Energieimporte auf die deutsche Wirtschaft diskutiert. Wir zeigen, dass die Auswirkungen wahrscheinlich substanziell, aber handhabbar sein werden. Kurzfristig würde ein Stopp der russischen Energieimporte zu einem BIP-Rückgang zwischen 0, 5 % und 3 % führen (Zum Vergleich: Der BIP-Rückgang im Jahr 2020 auf Grund der Pandemie betrug 4, 5 %). |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:029&r=cis |
| By: | Bardt, Hubertus; Röhl, Klaus-Heiner |
| Abstract: | Ende Februar kündigte Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz unter dem Eindruck des Ukrainekrieges eine "Zeitenwende" für die Bundeswehr an. Doch nur neun Monate später scheint der verteidigungspolitische Elan verflogen: Das 2-Prozent-Ziel rückt trotz 100-Milliarden-Sondervermögen in weite Ferne und auch kurzfristig nötige Beschaffungen kommen nicht voran. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:942022&r=cis |