|
on Confederation of Independent States |
Issue of 2023‒01‒23
thirty-two papers chosen by |
By: | Park, Joungho (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kang, Boogyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Seok Hwan (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies); Kovsh, Andrey (Saint Petersburg State University) |
Abstract: | This study attempts to identify new directions for energy cooperation between Korea and Russia, focusing on the areas of natural gas and hydrogen. In particular, we derive new directions and tasks for energy cooperation between the two countries, reflecting changes in the international energy environment, such as climate change and decarbonization, which are in full swing at the global level. To this end, this study is consisted of the following four parts. Part II examines the geopolitics of energy coming into the 21st century and Russia’s new energy strategy. Part III conducts an in-depth analysis of the energy cooperation strategies of China and Japan, major Northeast Asian countries, with Russia, and Part IV comprehensively evaluates Korea’s energy strategy and Korea-Russia energy cooperation. In conclusion, Part V presents new plans for Korea-Russia energy cooperation. As a side note, after carrying out this study, the policy environment for energy cooperation with Russia has significantly changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine is expected to change the landscape of global energy and its geopolitics in profound ways. In the midst of these significant changes, it is hoped that this study will serve as a meaningful reference for analyzing and forecasting the global energy dynamics surrounding Russia. |
Keywords: | Russias Energy Strategy Korea-Russia Cooperation; Natural Gas and Hydrogen Sectors |
Date: | 2022–07–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2022_026&r=cis |
By: | Magdalena Adamus (Institute of Experimental Psychology of the Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovakia, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University, Czech Republic); Matúš Grežo (Institute of Experimental Psychology of the Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovakia) |
Abstract: | Extant literature shows that well-being is one of the key drivers of attitudes towards migrants as well as preferences for asylum and refugee policies. To investigate the underpinnings of these relationships, two studies on representative samples of 600 Slovaks each were conducted before the Russian invasion of Ukraine and during its initial phase. The results show that well- being had a stable positive relationship with attitudes towards migrants across the studies, albeit not with preferences for asylum and refugee policies. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the negative feelings elicited by the war predicted preferences for asylum and refugee policies beyond well-being. The divergence between the attitudes towards migrants and the preferences urges that there is a need to extend the traditional focus on general attitudes towards migrants. Finally, the results indicate that incorporating psychological factors, such as well-being and emotional responses to the looming threat of war, may considerably inform the debate surrounding the support for inclusive asylum and refugee policies. |
Keywords: | well-being, attitudes towards migrants, asylum and refugee policies, migration crisis, common ingroup identity model |
JEL: | D64 F22 I31 K37 |
Date: | 2023–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2023-01&r=cis |
By: | Rüdiger Bachmann (UND - University of Notre Dame [Indiana]); David Baqaee (UCLA - University of California [Los Angeles] - UC - University of California); Christian Bayer (University of Bonn); Moritz Kuhn (University of Bonn, ECONtribute - ECONtribute: Markets & public policy); Andreas Löschel (RUB - Ruhr University Bochum); Ben Mcwilliams (Bruegel); Benjamin Moll (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science); Andreas Peichl (LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians University [Munich]); Karen Pittel (LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians University [Munich]); Moritz Schularick (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, University of Bonn, ECONtribute - ECONtribute: Markets & public policy); Georg Zachmann (Bruegel) |
Abstract: | An end to gas supplies from Russia has recently become much more likely. Russian supply volumes have already been substantially reduced, and uncertainty about future supplies and the winter supply situation is high. In this study, we ask what the economic consequences would be of a complete halt to Russian gas imports at present (August 2022). Almost five months have passed since our first study, "What if" (Bachmann et al., 2022), on the economic effects of a March 2022 Russian energy import freeze. The debate sparked by the study has sharpened the focus on the issues and assumptions that are critical to estimating the economic costs of a Russian energy import freeze. In this study, we update the results based on the situation in August 2022.1 (i) We estimate the necessary demand reduction that would result if Russian gas imports were halted from August 2022 and discuss economic policy strategies to achieve this adjustment. (ii) We update our estimated expected economic costs and discuss practical examples of substitution options in the industrial sector. (iii) We evaluate the federal government's economic policy, in particular its decision to increase storage levels with continued gas imports from Russia since March 2022, but to largely forego measures to reduce gas demand in power generation, industry, and residential and commercial sectors. |
Date: | 2022–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03880930&r=cis |
By: | Christine Arriola; Charles Cadestin; Przemyslaw Kowalski; Joaquim José Martins Guilhoto; Sébastien Miroudot; Frank van Tongeren |
Abstract: | Amidst the recovery from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has resulted in new challenges to the global economy and to international trade. This report relies on detailed trade data to assess the impact of these two overlapping shocks on international trade and supply chains. In February 2022, global trade was approaching pre-Covid levels in absolute terms, but with a different product and geographical composition resulting in a continued sense of tension in the trading system. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has added a new dimension of challenges as it has led to deliberate radical interruptions of trade linkages between Russia, Ukraine and many industrialised economies, with significant repercussions on prices of key commodities in the energy and agricultural sectors. |
Keywords: | AMNE, General Equilibrium Model, ICIO analysis, Oil |
JEL: | C67 C68 F14 F17 F5 Q48 |
Date: | 2023–01–13 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:traaab:265-en&r=cis |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | The economy has maintained a strong momentum, driven by robust consumption and a surge in inflows of income, capital, business, and labor. Inflation has increased markedly due to the sharp rise in food and energy prices and the booming economy, but proactive monetary policy tightening and GDP growth deceleration are projected to bring inflation down in 2023. While robust growth should continue over the medium-term, uncertainty is elevated and downside risks are significant due to the ongoing war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, global financial tightening, slowdown in major trading partners, and high food and energy prices. Structural challenges also remain, including high unemployment, weak business environment, and low productivity growth. |
Date: | 2022–12–13 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/366&r=cis |
By: | Libman, Alexander (Freie Universität Berlin); Popova, Olga (Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS)) |
Abstract: | The paper looks at the persistence of egalitarian norms in post-Communist societies by focusing on the former members of the Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Russia and their children. Using the individual-level survey data, we show that there are striking differences between Russia and the CEE countries in this respect. While in the CEE both former members of the Communist parties and their children have stronger preferences for redistribution than the rest of the population, in Russia former CPSU members do not exhibit stronger preferences for redistribution – at the same time, their children support redistribution. |
Keywords: | Communist Party, inequality, redistribution, Russia, Visegrad group |
JEL: | D31 I30 N00 P36 P52 |
Date: | 2022–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15816&r=cis |
By: | Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Sergei Guriev (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR); Andrei Markevich (New Economic School - New Economic School) |
Abstract: | This survey discusses recent developments in the growing literature on the Russian economic history of the 19th and 20th centuries. Using novel data and modern empirical methods, this research generates new insights and provides important lessons for development economics and political economy. We organize the discussion around four strands of this literature. First, we summarize and put in comparative perspective research on the long-term trends in economic development and living standards, which shows that throughout history Russia significantly underperformed advanced economies. We also compile reliable quantifications of the human cost of Stalin's dictatorship. Second, we discuss new studies of imperial Russia that partially confirm Gerschenkron's classic conjecture on the institutional explanation for Russia's relatively low level of economic development and on the causes of the revolution. The third strand of the literature focuses on the Soviet period and explains its slowdown over time and the eventual collapse of the system by the command economy's inability to provide incentives to individual agents. The fourth strand documents the long-term economic, social, and political consequences of large-scale historical experiments that took place during both the imperial and the Soviet periods. We conclude by discussing the lessons from these four strands of the literature and highlight open questions for future research. |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03874282&r=cis |
By: | Pitukhina, Maria; Belykh, Anastasia |
Abstract: | Single-industry Arctic towns are facing a number of troublesome demographic trends: decline in the share of youth in the population structure, ageing of the population and reduction of the labor force in the labor market, general depopulation particularly characteristic of sparsely populated settlements. Concentration of people in big cities and "dying" of small towns in the Arctic are accompanied by huge demographic changes and increasing migration. Our study allows a comprehensive approach to studying 18 single-industry Arctic towns and settlements of the Russian Federation. The research is based on the methodology for assessment of demographic potential of territories developed by N.M. Rimashevskaya. Statistical data on single-industry Arctic towns and settlements was accumulated from Rosstat. Analysis of vacancies at three leading recruiting agencies of the Russian Federation helped to identify top-5 occupations in the Arctic single-industry towns. The occupations in demand were represented by both the number of vacancies the range of wages. Arctic residents’ problems in 18 Arctic towns over the past year were also analyzed via social networks. In conclusion, there are put forward proposals to improve the system of management of sustainable development and modernization of the single-industry Arctic towns. В настоящее время арктические моногорода и посёлки сталкиваются с серьёзными демографическими вызовами: уменьшение доли молодёжи в структуре населения, старение населения и сокращение рабочей силы на рынке труда, общая депопуляция. Исследование позволяет комплексно подойти к изучению 18-ти арктических моногородов и посёлков РФ. Методология исследования базируется на оценке демографического потенциала территории, предложенной членом-корреспондентом РАН Н.М. Римашевской. Статистические данные по арктическим моногородам и посёлкам были аккумулированы из открытых источников Росстата за период 2011-2020 годов. В ходе исследования были собраны данные преимущественно в разрезах демографии, миграции, рынка труда. В ходе анализа банка вакансий ведущих рекрутинговых агентств РФ (trudvsem, superjob, headhunter) были определены топ-5 востребованных профессий в каждом из 18 арктических моногородов и посёлков. Востребованные профессии представлены с числом вакансий и диапазоном заработной платы. Также были проанализированы проблемы жителей в социальных сетях в 2021 году. Преимущественно анализировались открытые группы социальной сети «Вконтакте». Были изучены около 50 открытых групп и определены основные проблемы, волнующие арктических жителей. Условно их можно разделить на 3 типа – социальные, экономические и экологические. Отмечаются также такие позитивные практики в жизни, как волонтёрство и профориентация, что даёт надежду на продолжение жизни в моногородах и посёлках. В заключении выдвигаются предложения по совершенствованию системы управления устойчивым развитием и модернизацией моногородов и посёлков в Арктике. |
Keywords: | Арктика; моногорода; город-призрак; демография; перспективные профессии |
JEL: | O15 R11 |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:115734&r=cis |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | The Georgian economy has performed strongly in 2022 as adverse spillovers expected from the war in Ukraine have not materialized thus far. Buoyant tourism revenues, a surge in war-related immigration and financial inflows, and a rise in transit trade through Georgia have lifted growth and fiscal revenues, strengthened the current account balance and the lari, and supported reserve accumulation. Inflation remains elevated, reflecting still high commodity prices and strong domestic demand. Growth and inflation are expected to moderate in 2023 with subsiding external inflows, less favorable global economic and financial conditions, smaller fiscal deficits, and a sufficiently tight monetary policy stance. In 2024, growth is projected to converge to its potential rate and inflation is forecast to fall to the NBG’s target. |
Date: | 2022–12–23 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/389&r=cis |
By: | Rüdiger Bachmann (UND - University of Notre Dame [Indiana]); David Baqaee (UCLA - University of California [Los Angeles] - UC - University of California); Christian Bayer (University of Bonn); Moritz Kuhn (University of Bonn, ECONtribute - ECONtribute: Markets & public policy); Andreas Löschel (RUB - Ruhr University Bochum); Benjamin Moll (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science); Andreas Peichl (LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians University [Munich]); Karen Pittel (LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians University [Munich]); Moritz Schularick (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, University of Bonn, ECONtribute - ECONtribute: Markets & public policy) |
Abstract: | This article discusses the economic effects of a potential cut-off of the German economy from Russian energy imports. We show that the effects are likely to be substantial but manageable. In the short run, a stop of Russian energy imports would lead to a GDP decline in range between 0.5% and 3% (cf. the GDP decline in 2020 during the pandemic was 4.5%). (i) In the case of an import stop, imports of oil and coal from Russia can be substituted from other countries, but the situation in the gas market is more challenging. An increase in gas imports from other countries, substitution of gas used for electricity production by coal or nuclear as well as refilling of storage facilities over the summer can only reduce the shortfall to about 30% of gas consumption or 8% of German energy consumption over the next 12 months. (ii) How would the German economy cope with such a shortfall of gas deliveries? The economic effects crucially depend on substitution and reallocation of energy inputs across sectors. To quantify these effects, we use a state-of the-art multi-sectoral open economy model following Baqaae and Farhi (2021) that accounts for elasticities of substitution and reallocation between different intermediate inputs. In a second step, we turn to a simplified model that helps us derive plausible bounds for the economic effects using observed elasticities for energy inputs. In the Baqaae-Farhi model, the output costs of a Russian import stop remain firmly below 1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or between 80 and 120 Euros per German citizen per year. In a more pessimistic scenario where it proves very difficult to substitute Russian gas in the short-run outside the electricity sector, the economic costs would rise to about 2-2.5% of GDP, or about 1000 Euros per German citizen over 1 year. This comes potentially on top of a large increase in energy prices for household and industry even without a shortfall of gas deliveries. Of course the effects are more detrimental in energy intensive sectors. (iii) Data from the Income and Consumption Survey (EVS) show variation in the expenditure share on energy across the income distribution. However, the distributional consequences of an increase in energy prices appear manageable. A targeted policy towards low-income households without reducing the incentives for households to save energy would be a cost effective way of ensuring a fair burden-sharing across households. It is important to maintain strong incentives for households to reduce gas usage. (iv) Economic policy should aim at strategically increasing incentives to substitute and save fossil energies as soon as possible. In case that an active embargo is politically desired, it should start as soon as possible so that economic agents can use the summer period for adjustment. To reduce dependence on imported energy, it is advisable for the government to commit to elevated fossil energy prices, in particular for natural gas, for an extended period to create incentives for households and industry to adjust quickly. |
Date: | 2022–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03881469&r=cis |
By: | Chmielewski, Łukasz |
Abstract: | The aim of the article is to present the supply and demand situation on the market of rapeseed oil and maize used for fuel purposes in Poland, as well as analyze the relationship between their prices and production, as well as the consumption of gasoline and diesel fuel. The analysis covered the 2015–2020 period and was based on data from Statistics Poland, the National Support Center for Agriculture, and the Polish Oil Industry and Trade Organization. Statistical analysis showed that between 2015 and 2020 the dynamics of the usage of raw materials to produce biofuels exceeded the growth rate of their production and harvest. The assessment of the relationship between production and consumption of fuels in Poland showed that the demand from the fuel sector had a dominant influence on the prices of rapeseed oil and maize during the period under consideration, and fuel production had a less significant share in shaping wholesale prices of rapeseed oil and purchase prices of maize. Biofuels are an important and topical issue both in the context of the new energy policy of the European Union (EU) and Poland until 2040 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with one of the consequences being the energy crisis and the announcement of the EU becoming independent from Russian energy. In such a situation, biofuels and raw materials for their production may turn out to be an important element of improving energy security. |
Keywords: | Crop Production/Industries, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods |
Date: | 2022–09–29 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iafepa:329860&r=cis |
By: | Ekaterina Borisova; Timothy Frye; Koen Schoors; Vladimir Zabolotskiy |
Abstract: | Understanding demand for state regulation is a foundational issue for social science. To account for this demand, existing theories rooted in market failure and government failure have focused on various forms of trust, but have paid little attention to fear. We test how fear and trust shape demand for government regulation by drawing on especially precise measures of Covid-related regulations gathered in a survey of more than 23, 000 respondents in 61 Russian regions. We show that fear of contracting the virus is directly related to greater demand for regulation. In addition, the impact of trust is conditional on the level of fear. Higher interpersonal trust is related to lower demand for Covid-19 regulation, while higher institutional trust is associated with greater demand, but, provided fear is sufficiently great, demand for regulation will be high regardless of levels of interpersonal and institutional trust. These results inform debates about theories of regulation, identify critical scope conditions for existing research on trust and demand for regulation, and open a fruitful line of research by examining how fear of social bads shapes support for state intervention. |
Keywords: | fear, trust, demand for regulation, Covid-19, Russia |
JEL: | D64 H11 I12 Z13 |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10156&r=cis |
By: | Oleg Itskhoki (University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA)); Dmitry Mukhin (London School of Economics (LSE); Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM)) |
Abstract: | We show that the exchange rate may appreciate or depreciate depending on the specific mix of sanctions imposed, even if the underlying equilibrium allocation is the same. Sanctions that limit a country’s imports tend to appreciate the country’s exchange rate, while sanctions that limit exports and/or freeze net foreign assets tend to depreciate it. Increased precautionary household demand for foreign currency is another force that depreciates the exchange rate, and it can be offset with domestic financial repression of foreign currency savings. The overall effect depends on the balance of currency demand and currency supply forces, where exports and official reserves contribute to currency supply and imports and foreign currency precautionary savings contribute to currency demand. Domestic economic downturn and government fiscal deficits are additional forces that affect the equilibrium exchange rate. The dynamic behavior of the ruble exchange rate following Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the resulting sanctions is entirely consistent with the combined effects of these mechanisms. |
Date: | 2022–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfm:wpaper:2206&r=cis |
By: | Olivier Najar,; Pascale Scapecchi; et Ysaline PADIEU |
Abstract: | From 2010 to 2019, the international community committed USD 1, 700 billion in loans for developing countries. While multila-teral development banks continued to provide the bulk of financings (60% of the total), close to 20% came from relatively new actors, amongst which the BRICS countries – primarily China, Russia and, to a lesser extent, India – played a significant role.This paper presents different issues associated with the relative rise of three donors from the emerging world: China, India and Türkiye, looking at the circumstances which led to their emergence, their respective particularities and objectives, and their impact on the existing framework(s) used to define and measure official development assistance (ODA). |
Keywords: | Chine, Inde, Turquie |
JEL: | E |
Date: | 2023–01–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:avg:wpaper:en14502&r=cis |
By: | Букенов Амантай (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Самат Молдир (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Тайбекова Аида |
Abstract: | Из-за наличия широкого набора эконометрических подходов прогнозисты часто сталкиваются с проблемой выбора наиболее подходящей модели для прогнозирования ВВП определенной страны или региона. Для решения этой задачи в последнее время центральные банки все чаще стали прибегать к практике комбинирования различных прогнозов и моделей. В Национальном Банке на текущий момент также используется методика комбинированного подхода в краткосрочном прогнозировании ВВП Казахстана. Исследование описывает систему краткосрочного прогнозирования ВВП методом конечного использования Казахстана и показывает эффективность комбинирования прогнозов по различным эконометрическим моделям. |
Keywords: | ВВП, краткосрочный прогноз, комбинирование прогнозов |
JEL: | C01 C19 C82 |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aob:wpaper:36&r=cis |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | Namibia has been severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic but has started to gradually recover. After a sharp contraction in 2020, with worsening fiscal imbalances and socio-economic disparities, a modest recovery began in 2021 and strengthened in the first half of 2022. Mining activity rebounded while manufacturing and tertiary sector activities gradually started to recover. Inflationary pressures have increased, as higher international oil and food prices due to Russia’s war in Ukraine were passed-through. The political context remains stable, with elections scheduled in 2024. |
Date: | 2022–12–14 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/364&r=cis |
By: | Lee, Sora (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade); Kang, Sungwoo (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) |
Abstract: | ● The value of the Korean won (KRW) to the US dollar (USD) recently fell to its weakest level since 2009, and its real effective exchange rate (REER) was even lower. - The KRW to USD rate exceeded 1, 400 won per dollar due to the tight monetary policy of major economies, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and fears of a recession. - Korea’s REER in July also posted a 4.8% year-on-year drop, boosting the price competitiveness of Korean exports. ● But since 2010, FX rates have had less of an impact on the exports of major Korean industries. - Exports of general machinery, cars, displays, and semiconductors have been less affected by FX fluctuations. - FX rates have a relatively smaller effect on the export of intermediate goods than that of final goods. ● The reduced influence of exchange rates on exports is due to Korea’s sophisticated export structure and greater participation in the global production system. - Since 2000, the Korean government has prioritized advanced technologies. Thanks to this policy, hightech industries, which value technological prowess over price competitiveness, now account for a relatively high proportion of exports. - With the globalization of production systems, intra-country trade, overseas production, and trade in intermediate goods have also expanded, reducing the impact of FX rates on export prices. ● It is important to upgrade the economic structure and establish a consistent support system for sectors most vulnerable to fluctuations in FX rates. - Companies highly vulnerable to FX risks should receive policy support and monitoring to prepare for price fluctuations. - Long-term tasks include pursuing differentiation with comparative advantage based on key technologies, securing a leading position in supply chains, and upgrading Korea’s economic structure by increasing the contributions of domestic consumption to economic growth. |
Keywords: | Monetary Policy; recession; FX rates; Export Structure |
JEL: | F18 F21 O24 |
Date: | 2022–10–19 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kietrp:2022_020&r=cis |
By: | Дауренова Жансая (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Елизарова Оксана (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Ускенбаев Азат |
Abstract: | НБРК продолжает цикл исследований, посвященных уточнению методологических оценок некоторых показателей платежного баланса. В исследовании представлена оценка импорта автомобилей с иностранными регистрационными номерами стран ЕАЭС, ввозимых частными лицами-резидентами. |
Keywords: | импорт автомобилей из ЕАЭС, оценка неучтенного импорта, Единая страховая база данных |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aob:wpaper:34&r=cis |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | The repercussions of the war in Ukraine are threatening economic and social stability. Following a slight uptick in July-August, new COVID-19 cases have declined to almost nil recently while the vaccination rate remains low at around 22 percent of the population. The Gambia is also suffering from more frequent climatic shocks, including a recent major flooding. The country continues to advance social and justice reforms. Following a parliamentary election, President Barrow reshuffled the Cabinet in May 2022, without any expected change in the overall direction of economic policies. |
Date: | 2022–12–21 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/385&r=cis |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | Supported by a large policy package, Rwanda’s economy rebounded in 2021 after contracting in the preceding year due to the COVID-19 shock. However, the country now faces multi-faceted challenges—pandemic scars, headwinds from the war in Ukraine, and climate-related shocks, meanwhile inflationary pressures have increased markedly. Downside risks are significant from the war spillovers, through further pressures on energy, food, and fertilizer prices, global financial tightening, and slowdown in major trading partners, in addition to climate-related shocks. Against this backdrop, the authorities have requested a new Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) and an arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) to support their efforts in maintaining macroeconomic stability, advancing their reform agenda, including on climate to enhance Rwanda’s resilience to climate-related shocks, and insuring against downside risks. They will cancel the current PCI (expiring in June 2023) upon approval of the new PCI. |
Date: | 2022–12–19 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/381&r=cis |
By: | Stéphanie Balme (CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Mathieu Duchâtel (Institut Montaigne); Jean-François Huchet (Inalco - Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales); Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean (Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)); Baptiste Favelloz (Journaliste Asialyst, Journaliste France 24); Mathilda Lacroix (Inalco - Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales); Joris Zylberman (Asialyst); Pierre-Jean Vigny (Inalco - Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales); Unité Tice-Dsirn (Inalco - Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales); Christine Ho (Inalco - Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales) |
Abstract: | L'invasion russe en Ukraine est, à n'en pas douter, scrutée de très près par les stratèges politiques et militaires chinois. Depuis le début de la guerre, Pékin affiche une neutralité bienveillante à l'égard de Moscou, refusant de condamner les agissements du Kremlin, tout en rappelant du bout des lèvres la nécessaire "souveraineté de l'Ukraine". Cette position, qui provoque la colère de Washington, reflète surtout l'embarras dans lequel la Chine est désormais plongée. Elle est certes soucieuse de ne pas fissurer son alliance avec Moscou face aux démocraties occidentales, mais elle veut éviter de passer pour un état paria aux yeux de la communauté internationale. Des sanctions occidentales pourraient toucher durement son économie, déjà fragilisée par les conséquences de la guerre. Sur le terrain militaire, les grandes difficultés rencontrées par l'armée russe ne passent pas inaperçues aux yeux des généraux chinois. La Chine souhaite accélérer sa réunification avec Taïwan, par la force si nécessaire. Mais le scénario ukrainien montre que même les armées les plus puissantes du monde peuvent faire face à la résistance acharnée d'un adversaire en théorie bien inférieur. Quelles leçons la Chine va-t-elle tirer du conflit ukrainien, dans ses ambitions sur Taïwan, dans sa relation avec l'Occident et la Russie ? |
Keywords: | Relations Chine -- Russie, Relations économiques extérieures -- Chine -- XXIe siècle, Relations Chine-Taïwan, Relations internationales, Geopolitique, Strategie politique -- Chine, Guerre russo-ukrainienne (2022-....) -- Influence, Economie -- Chine -- XXIe siècle, Nouvelles routes de la soie |
Date: | 2022–05–18 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03694963&r=cis |
By: | Arvitio, Christian |
Abstract: | Resesi adalah kondisi atau keadaan dimana ekonomi pada suatu negara sedang mengalami trend penurunan, hal ini dapat dilihat dari angka dari Produk Domestik Bruto yang berada pada angka minus. Seperti yang kita ketahui, satu dari sekian banyak efek dari resesi adalah penurunan penghasilan masyarakat yang berakibat pada lemahnya daya beli masyarakat, sementara harga property yang cenderung akan turun akibat menurunnya daya beli masyarakat akan mendorong ternjadinya resesi yang berkelanjutan pada suatu negara dikarenakan pendapatan kas Negara akan mengalami penurunan akibat dari rendahnya PPN yang diterima oleh Negara. Dampak lain yang akan terjadi adalah adanya kemungkinan Pemutusan Hubungan Kerja (PHK) secara masal, sehingga banyaknya pengangguran yang akan memperparah kondisi resesi dikarenakan kekuatan atau daya beli masyrakat yang tergolong lemah. Disisi lain output dari perusahaan yang melakukan PHK akan menurun, sehingga pembayaraan pajak pada Negara juga akan ikut menurun. Dilihat dari situs tradingeconomic.com, disebutkan bahwasannya growth-rate produk domestik bruto (PDB) dari Indonesia pada saat ini disebutkan berada pada angka 5.44 yang mana hal ini menunjukkan growth-rate dari Indonesia masih baik-baik saja dan belum mendekati ataupun menunjukkan angka negatif. Meskipun memang pada periode Juli 2020 sampaidengan Januari 2021 PDB Indonesia berada pada angka negatif, hal ini dikarenakan stagnansi ekonomi akibat pandemi Covid-19 yang berdampak pada hampir seluruh negara didunia. Growth-rate Indonesia pada periode ini cenderung meningkat dibandingkan periode-periode sebelumnya yang menunjukkan angka dibawah 5.44. Banyak muncul spekulasi bahwasanya ditahun 2023 diramalkan perkonomian dunia akan mengalami ketidak stabilan. Menteri Keuangan Sri Mulyani mengatakan negara tengah mewaspadai kenaikan suku bunga yang berpotensi menimbulkan gejolak pasar keuangan (Hidayat, 2022). Beberapa penyebab terjadinya resesi ditahun 2023 antara lain adalah adanya pandemi Covid-19 yang dua tahun kebelakang melemahkan sektor-sektor penting diseluruh dunia yang mana dampak terberat dirasakan oleh sektor ekonomi dunia yang dua tahun terakhir melemah, selanjutnya yang diduga sebagai penyebab daripada resesi 2023 adalah adanya invasi yang dilakukan Russia terhadap Ukraina. Indonesia sendiri kemungkinan tidak akan terlalu merasakan dampak langsung dari terjadinya invasi Russia ke Ukraina, hal ini dipicu oleh Indonesia tidak tergantung oleh komoditas ekspor dari Russia ataupun Ukraina, yang akan merasakan dampak langsung dari invasi tersebut adalah negara-negara yang berada di Benua Eropa karena negara-negara tersebut memiliki ketergantungan untuk menggunakan produk dari Russia dan Ukraina terutama adalah penggunaan gas dari Russia. |
Date: | 2022–12–13 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:msn2e&r=cis |
By: | Hernandez, Manuel A.; Ceballos, Francisco; Paz, Cynthia; Berrospi, Maria Lucia |
Abstract: | Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Guatemalan farmers have endured multiple challenges brough about by national and local restrictions to movement as well as disruptions in agricultural value chains. Similarly, farmers have been exposed to several external shocks such as ETA and IOTA tropical storms that hit the country in late 2020 and the recent conflict in East Europe and price crisis. This study examines the long-term effects of the COVID-19 environment on the food security and nutrition of rural households in the Western Highlands of Guatemala. The analysis is based on information from a panel of 1, 262 smallholder households in the departments of Huehuetenango, Quiche, and San Marcos, collected during four survey rounds during November-December 2019 (face-to-face), May-June 2020 (by phone), May-June 2021 (by phone), and May-June 2022 (by phone). The study places special emphasis on evaluating changes in agricultural and non-agricultural income sources —including remittances—, and changes in dietary diversity —including consumption of animal-sourced foods (ASF) and fruits and vegetables (F&V)— at the household level, as well as among women between 15 and 49 years and children between 6 and 23 months. The results show some improvements in 2022 in income, food security and household dietary patterns in relation to previous years, but the levels are still lower than those reported before the pandemic (in 2019). The study also explores the effect of recent changes in the availability and prices of agricultural inputs faced by the smallholders as a result of the war between Ukraine and Russia, among other factors. |
Keywords: | GUATEMALA, LATIN AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, agricultural value chains, armed conflicts, children, Coronavirus, coronavirus disease, Coronavirinae, COVID-19, diet, dietary diversity, dietary protein, farm inputs, farmers, farms, food security, fruits, households, household food security, hurricanes, hurricane surges, income, income transfers, nutrition, oceanography, phenomena, remittances, shock, smallholders, surveying, survey methods, tropical oceanography, vegetables, war, women, animal-sourced foods (ASF) |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:othbrf:136484&r=cis |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | In the wake of the Covid pandemic, Serbia embarked on a well-paced consolidation path to rebuild buffers, supported by a program under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI). Given higher energy prices and domestic electricity production problems, high global inflation, weaker trading partner growth, and spillovers from Russia’s war in Ukraine, the authorities have requested financial support under a two-year Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) of SDR 1, 898.92 million (290 percent of quota, about EUR 2.4 billion). The SBA supports economic and financial policies to address external and fiscal financing needs, maintain macroeconomic and financial stability, and continue to strengthen the economy’s performance and resilience through structural reforms. The PCI was cancelled upon approval of the SBA. |
Date: | 2022–12–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/384&r=cis |
By: | Thöne, Michael |
Abstract: | Im Sommer 2022 gleiten Deutschland und Europa von einen akuten Krise in die nächste. Die Coronapan-demie ist nicht bewältigt, zugleich sind die Folgen des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine immer drückender zu spüren. Der erste Teil des Papiers diskutiert das Verhältnis solcher akuter Krisen zu chronischen Krisen wie dem Klimawandel, dem demografischen Wandel oder auch den Investitionslücken in Infrastrukturen und Sicherheit. Dabei steht das scheinbare Paradox im Vordergrund, dass der verflochtene föderale Staat auf akute Krise besser reagiert als auf lange vorhersehbare, chronische Krisen. Neben institutionellen Gründen (u.a. der Verschuldungsmöglichkeit für unvorhersehbare Notlagen) spielt hier der transformative Charakter von chronischen Krisen eine zentrale Rolle: Transformationen bringen nicht nur notwendige Modernisierungen, sie verändern auch Verteilungspositionen und Machtkonstellationen. Politische Blockaden können hier "lohnender" sein als bei akuten Krisen. Der zweite Teil des Papiers rückt für Deutschland die chronischen Krisen in den Vordergrund. Er umreißt die fünf zentralen Transformati-onsaufgaben, die das Land in den kommenden zwanzig Jahren gleichzeitig und kumulativ bewältigen muss. In ihrem finanziellen Volumen sind die noch nicht zusammen betrachtet worden. Der gesamtstaatliche Aufwand, diese Aufgaben parallel umzusetzen, wird auf mittelfristig 300 Milliarden Euro im Jahr ge-schätzt (8% des BIP). Steuererhöhungen, diskretionäre Ausgabenkürzungen oder eine modernisierte Schuldenbremse könnten da allenfalls kleinere Lösungsbeiträge leisten. Um die fünf großen Transformationen unter einen Hut zu bekommen, bedarf es einer sechsten Transformation: Der grundlegenden Modernisierung des öffentlichen Sektors, einschließlich des öffentlichen Dienstes. Anhand eines europäischen Effizienz-Scores für Staatsleistungen wird für Deutschland deutlich, dass der öffentliche Sektor nicht sakrosankt sein kann. Hier stecken sehr große Potenziale, die kommenden Finanzierungslücken zu schließen. So schwer das auch wird: Ohne tiefgreifende Modernisierung wird Deutschland weder das Geld, noch die Leute haben, um als leistungsfähiger Staat die akuten Krisen zu überwinden und zugleich die großen Zukunftsaufgaben zu bewältigen. |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:uoccpe:224&r=cis |
By: | Minford, Patrick (Cardiff Business School); Zhu, Zheyi (Cardiff Business School) |
Abstract: | We look for statistically significant effects of Brexit events in UK data relationships. We find evidence of trade disruption by Brexit departure from the single EU market, much as we would expect. However, with investment, we find no statistically significant effects of Brexit. With GDP, inflation and interest rates we find some positive effects due to the fall in the pound. Previous work using weighted averages of selected other countries to mimic UK behaviour is inconsistent with economic theory stressing the key role of idiosyncratic country structure and shocks; it is also vulnerable to selection bias and does not test for the statistical significance of Brexit events, which have occurred in the context of enormous turbulence in the past few years in all economies due to Covid and the Ukraine war, besides accompanying large fiscal and monetary policy fluctuations. |
Date: | 2023–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2023/1&r=cis |
By: | Анатолійович, Трященко Віталій; Романівна, Титар Тетяна |
Abstract: | Стаття присвячена актуальним питанням щодо управління інформаційним забезпеченням підприємства. З’ясовано, що неодмінною умовою ефективного функціонування підприємства є повне і достовірне інформаційне забезпечення бізнес-процесів. Вивчено праці вітчизняних і зарубіжних вчених-економістів. Проаналізовано кількість підприємств України, які здійснювали електронну торгівлю. Досліджено частка кількості підприємств України від загальної їх кількості, які: 1) здійснювали електронну торгівлю, у загальній кількості підприємств за видами продажів; 2) мають вебсайт; 3) які купують послуги хмарних обчислень. Доведено, що в епоху діджиталізації для формування належного інформаційного забезпечення потрібно: 1) створювати і розвивати спеціальні банки даних; 2) мати спеціальні технічні засоби і програмні продукти для роботи з великими масивами інформації; 3) прийняття на основі їх обробки ефективних управлінських рішень. |
Date: | 2022–12–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:9cgsz&r=cis |
By: | NINDL Elisabeth (European Commission - JRC) |
Abstract: | This report presents the results of the 2022 survey of the top 1 000 EU companies by R&D investment in 2020, conducted between June and September 2022. The survey is intended to provide insights into the research and development activities of the R&D investors listed in the 2021 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (Scoreboard 2021). The objective of this survey is to gather future expectations for R&D investment and gain first-hand information on barriers and drivers and the role of various activities that influence the level and direction of R&D investment. The survey addresses financing and collaboration, technology transfer and open innovation, and the effects of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. The response rate stood at 12%. The number of responses increased by 31.5% compared to the previous year, and the respondents accounted for over 26% of the R&D investment of the top 1 000 EU corporate investors in R&D. The results show a strong recovery in R&D investment after the COVID-19 pandemic, and the respondents expect this positive development to continue in 2022 and 2023. The main drivers of R&D investment are environmental sustainability and digitalisation. The respondents’ capital investment is largely driven by technologies to reduce emissions and to adapt to Industry 4.0. The survey thus confirms that innovative EU companies are actively helping to meet the targets set out in the European Green Deal and the green and digital transformation (the Twin Transition). |
Keywords: | R&D, Survey, EU Industrial R&D Scoreboard, Innovation, Growth |
Date: | 2022–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc131984&r=cis |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | On July 8, 2022, the IMF Executive Board approved 42-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangements under High Combined Credit Exposure (HCCE) (391 percent of quota, about US$650 million) to help Benin meet pressing financing needs and support the country’s National Development Plan centered on achieving SDGs. The program is off to a strong start notwithstanding elevated uncertainty. While there is broad consensus that sound macroeconomic management in recent years is generating tangible dividends for the economy as a whole, the public is frustrated over the fact that this is taking time to translate into improved socioeconomic conditions for all. This sentiment has been compounded by temporary import price pressures since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Legislative elections will be held in early January 2023, with related risks to the program expected to be limited. |
Date: | 2022–12–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/383&r=cis |
By: | Maya, Bintang Avida Gusti |
Abstract: | Resesi 2023 mungkin akan berdampak di seluruh negara di dunia yang disebabkan oleh banyak faktor seperti adanya inflasi yang meningkat drastis sebagai dampak dari konflik Rusia-Ukraina. Peningkatan inflasi tersebut diikuti oleh kebijakan moneter bank sentral di Eropa serta Amerika dengan dinaikkannya nilai suku bunga yang juga berdampak bada seluruh bank sentral di dunia, salah satunya adalah Indonesia. Resesi dalam perpektif makro ekonomi merupakan dampak dari inflasi yang melibatkan unsur ekonomi seperti penurunan daya beli masyarakat, pendapatan nasional yang turun, sempitnya kesempatan kerja, serta meningkatnya laju inflasi. Sebuah negara dapat dikatakan akan mengalami resesi ketika banyak ditemukannya PHK pada perusahaan, lapangan kerja yang menyempit, kenaikan bahan pokok pangan, dan jumlah permintaan melebihi penawaran. |
Date: | 2022–12–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:afwrx&r=cis |
By: | Fatika, Putri |
Abstract: | Resesi ekonomi global berpotensi akan melanda seluruh dunia pada 2023. Sebuah kondisi di mana perekonomian negara memburuk. Hal ini ditandai semakin menurunnya Produk Domestik Bruto (PDB) dan meningkatnya angka pengangguran. Resesi ini dipicu karena adanya pengetatan moneter oleh banyak bank sentral, serta dampak berlarut-larut dari perang Ukraina dan Rusia, hingga kebijakan zero Covid-19 yang belum semua negara mampu melaksanakannya membuat kondisi ekonomi global masih belum stabil dan kokoh. Resesi ekonomi juga menjadi salah satu tantangan dan ancaman terbesar bagi seorang pengusaha. Terutama dalam mempertahankan kelangsungan bisnisnya. |
Date: | 2022–12–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:rukpw&r=cis |
By: | Herda-Kopańska, Justyna; Kulawik, Jacek |
Abstract: | Subsidies based on agricultural production are a common form of subsidies in many countries, both less developed (due to their economic difficulties in achieving a satisfactory level of food self-sufficiency) and highly developed. However, at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, this support was not so popular. It was only in the second decade that it began to be restored, which is sometimes referred to as recoupling. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian–Russian war are undoubtedly two important circumstances that have increased interest in these subsidies. Therefore, it is important to identify theoretical and socio-political justifications for using these subsidies and the problems related to preparing schemes for determining their unit rates. After conducting the analysis, it turned out that the microeconomic theory rather provides arguments against the wide use of agricultural production subsidies. The justifications for pursuing a policy which refers to the difficulties in particular sectors of agriculture are also unconvincing. The calculation of unit payment rates is a challenge due to the lack of a solid methodology and sufficiently reliable source data. |
Keywords: | Agricultural Finance, Crop Production/Industries |
Date: | 2022–09–29 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iafepa:329857&r=cis |