|
on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | SJ, Balaji; Babu, Suresh Chandra |
| Abstract: | Russia’s war on Ukraine shows no signs of subsidence. Its economic and societal adversities have already been felt worldwide but keep evolving, with food and energy being the most affected. Low-income, food-deficit nations importing from these two countries – many of which are in Northern Africa and Western and Central Asia – face critical challenges. The South Asian region, which has grappled with surging commodity prices and supply constraints even before the war, is likely to witness further inflation with rising food and oil prices. India is home to around 18% of the world’s population and accounts for 74% of the South Asian population. It is predicted to be the fastest-growing big economy this year. The country’s central bank (RBI) predicts that GDP will grow by 7.5% in FY 2022-23 (RBI, 2022), while many international organizations forecast growth between 6.4% and 8.2% (ADB, 2022; IMF, 2022; United Nations, 2022; World Bank, 2022). Still, in the wake of the ill effects of COVID-19, the country’s dependence on imports such as oil, fertilizers, and edible oils, and given surging domestic food and nonfood inflation in recent months, raises concerns about economic stability and possible interventions that might curtail fragility. The country consumes around 5 million barrels of crude oil daily but imports over 89% of its requirement from overseas. Crude oil prices have increased by 27% in just four months since the start of the war (February- June 2022). Edible oils have similarly increased, with palm and soybean oil prices rising by around 14% and 18%, respectively. The price of sunflower seed oil has increased by 42%, of which 86% originates from Ukraine and Russia. Fertilizer import dependency from the conflict regions is also sizeable. Russia was the 5th largest supplier of fertilizers to India in 2021-22, and Ukraine and Belarus were the 9th and 10th largest suppliers. The rise in prices of both finished fertilizers and fertilizer inputs has prompted the Government to double the fertilizer subsidy budgeted earlier this year. This policy brief investigates India's susceptibility to the war's disruptions and higher prices for commodities where import dependence is high. It then discusses potential income, food, and nutritional impacts on farmers, the poor, and the vulnerable. It also evaluates the Government’s policy measures such as subsidization, social safety nets, and trade diversification to reduce the impact of the war. Finally, it explores the market opportunities the conflict has created and the required structural reforms that would equip the country to handle such shocks in the future |
| Keywords: | AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, CENTRAL AFRICA, EAST AFRICA, NORTH AFRICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, WEST AFRICA, food security, war, agriculture, agricultural sector, agricultural products, fertilizers, oil and gas industries, shock, |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:resapn:23&r=cis |
| By: | Sigit Perdana (EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Marc Vielle (EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Maxime Schenckery (IFPEN - IFP Energies nouvelles - IFPEN - IFP Energies nouvelles) |
| Abstract: | The recent economic sanctions against Russia can jeopardise the sustainability of the European Union's (EU) energy supply. Despite the EU's strong commitment to stringent abatement targets, fossil fuels still play a significant role in the EU energy policy. Furthermore, high dependency on Russian energy supplies underlines the vulnerability of the EU energy security. Using a global computable general equilibrium model, we prove that the current EU embargo on coal and oil imported from Russia will have adverse supply effects, substantially increasing energy prices and welfare costs for the EU resident. Although it reduces emissions, extending the embargo to include natural gas doubles this welfare cost. The use of coal is likely to increase, especially with respect to EU electricity generation, given the current constraints of additional import capacities from non-Russian producers. The impact on Russia once the EU extends the sanctions to natural gas is less substantial than on the EU. Russian welfare cost will increase less than 50%, indicating that extending the current restriction to boycott Russian gas is a costly policy option. |
| Keywords: | European union,Russia,Computable general equilibrium model,Fit for 55 package,Imports ban |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03887431&r=cis |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | Less than two years after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine has triggered the biggest military confrontation in Europe since World War II. Many OECD countries have reacted to Russia’s aggression by providing military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and by imposing economic sanctions on Russia, which has accentuated supply chain disruptions, especially in the energy sector. A combination of these supply shocks with a demand shock caused by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to tackle the pandemic has created inflationary pressures on a scale not seen in decades. Central banks around the world are acting to fulfil their price stability mandates by increasing interest rates and by engaging in quantitative tightening (primarily the selling of government bonds to reduce central bank balance sheets), all of which put pressure on borrowing costs at a time when governments are engaging in expansionary fiscal policy to alleviate the impact of inflation. The objective of this policy note is to examine the main consequences of this challenging environment for the fiscal stance of different levels of governments. These include the weakening outlook for government revenues in times of high expenditure pressures from a more rapid energy transition as well as high borrowing costs. |
| Keywords: | energy crisis, fiscal federalism, state and local governments, subnational fiscal projections, tax policy |
| JEL: | H12 H68 H77 |
| Date: | 2023–01–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ctpaab:42-en&r=cis |
| By: | Miller, Marcus (University of Warwick, CAGE and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | Francis Fukuyama’s bold prediction that Western liberal democracy is ‘the final form of human government’ was promptly challenged by Samuel Huntington, who foresaw the future as a continuing clash of civilisations. This latter view has found support in the recent Beijing declaration by China and Russia of a ‘New World Order’ with distinct spheres of influence for different cultures. After discussing the contrast between such historical perspectives (of ‘immaculate convergence’ versus cultural diversity), we outline two accounts of how forms of governance emerge from competitive struggle (either domestically or between nation states). However, to set the scene for applying these perspectives to current events, the paper begins with a summary of three eras of political economy post World War II - including the current ‘age of the strongman’, to use the terminology of Gideon Rachman. Subsequently, these various perspectives are employed to see what light they may throw on the disastrous turn of events following the Beijing declaration, with a focus on Russia, where the history of a powerful central state has played a crucial role. How enduring the Russian example may prove in the Darwinian struggle of cultural competition is, of course, a key issue for our time. |
| Keywords: | Individualism ; Collectivism ; Culture ; Social Contracts ; Social preferences ; Neofeudalism ; Despotism ; New World Order. JEL Codes: C70 ; C73 ; N00 ; P00 ; P50 ; Z10 ; Z13 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:647&r=cis |
| By: | Ugur Aytun (Kütahya Dumlupinar University); Cem Özgüzel (OECD) |
| Abstract: | On 24 November 2015, Turkish military shot down a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian-Turkey border after it violated Turkish airspace for about 17 seconds. Russia retaliated by imposing an embargo on 17 agricultural HS-6 level products from Turkey that would be effective for 22 months. We exploit this natural experiment to evaluate the impact of sanctions on Turkish exports and exporters. Using restrictive customs and firm-level data in a triple difference framework, we estimate the effect of these sanctions on the exports towards Russia, for embargoed and non-embargoed products. We estimate a total trade loss of $3.25bn for Turkish exports, 65% of which stemming from non-embargoed products. We investigate the underlying mechanism through firm-level analysis. First, we find that number of firms that trade with Russia and export volumes decreased dramatically. Second, firms re-routed their exports to bordering countries to circumvent the sanctions. Finally, we find that medium and large firms managed to adjust to the crisis while small firms suffered the main effects of the embargo. |
| Date: | 2021–08–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erg:wpaper:1482&r=cis |
| By: | Park, Joungho (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kang, Boogyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Seok Hwan (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies); Kwon, Won Soon (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies); Kovsh, Andrey (Saint Petersburg State University) |
| Abstract: | 본 연구는 천연가스와 수소 분야를 중심으로 한국과 러시아 간의 새로운 에너지 협력방안을 모색하는 데 핵심 목표를 두고 있다. 특히 지구촌 차원에서 본격화되고 있는 기후변화와 탈탄소화 등 국제 에너지 환경 변화를 반영한 새로운 에너지 협력 방향과 과제를 제시하고자 했다. This study explores new directions for energy cooperation between Korea and Russia, focusing on the areas of natural gas and hydrogen. In particular, we derive new directions and tasks for energy cooperation between the two countries, reflecting changes in the international energy environment, such as climate change and decarbonization, which are in full swing at the global level. In Chapter 2, this paper examines the geopolitics of energy coming into the 21st century and Russia’s new energy strategy. First, while tracing changes in energy geopolitics and hegemony in the 21st century, we analyzed changing factors that directly or indirectly affect the new hegemony structure, such as technological development, the growth of alternative energy markets, and climate change issues. Then, we reviewed the main contents and points of Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2035 and hydrogen energy development plan, identifying the direction of Russia’s energy strategy toward Northeast Asia.In Chapter 3, this study conducts an in-depth analysis of the energy cooperation strategies of China and Japan, major Northeast Asian countries, with Russia. In particular, we comprehensively reviewed the progress, major achievements and characteristics of China and Japan’s cooperation with Russia in the natural gas sector. In addition, this study draws policy implications for Korea based on a careful review of energy policy directions for Russia pursued by China and Japan, which have recently declared carbon neutrality.Chapter 4 comprehensively evaluates Korea’s energy strategy andKorea-Russia energy cooperation. Korea’s energy cooperation with Russia has been an area of great interest since the early days of diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia. However, looking at the overall situation so far, energy cooperation between the two countries has had nearly no remarkable achievements other than the Korea Gas Corporation introducing natural gas from Sakhalin. Cooperation between the two countries in the field of gas remains at the level of commercial relations based on purchases and sales. In this regard, we proposed a plan for Korea-Russia cooperation that reflects changes in the new energy market.(the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | 경제협력; 에너지산업; economic cooperation; energy industry |
| Date: | 2021–12–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2021_013&r=cis |
| By: | Christine Rifflart (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | Alors que l'Espagne accusait le plus fort retard des pays occidentaux dans le processus de rattrapage post-Covid, la reprise engagée au second semestre 2021 n'a pas résisté à la montée des tensions inflationnistes amplifiées par la guerre en Ukraine. Malgré la mise en place de mesures d'urgence de lutte contre l'inflation et ses conséquences, la hausse des prix de l'énergie et la montée des incertitudes géopolitiques ont brisé la croissance. |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03881159&r=cis |
| By: | Rüdiger Bachmann (UND - University of Notre Dame [Indiana]); David Baqaee (UCLA - University of California [Los Angeles] - UC - University of California); Christian Bayer (University of Bonn); Moritz Kuhn (University of Bonn, ECONtribute - ECONtribute: Markets & public policy); Andreas Löschel (RUB - Ruhr University Bochum); Benjamin Moll (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science); Andreas Peichl (LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians University [Munich]); Karen Pittel (LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians University [Munich]); Moritz Schularick (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, University of Bonn, ECONtribute - ECONtribute: Markets & public policy) |
| Abstract: | This article discusses the economic effects of a potential cut-off of the German economy from Russian energy imports. We show that the effects are likely to be substantial but manageable. In the short run, a stop of Russian energy imports would lead to a GDP decline in range between 0.5% and 3% (cf. the GDP decline in 2020 during the pandemic was 4.5%). (i) In the case of an import stop, imports of oil and coal from Russia can be substituted from other countries, but the situation in the gas market is more challenging. An increase in gas imports from other countries, substitution of gas used for electricity production by coal or nuclear as well as refilling of storage facilities over the summer can only reduce the shortfall to about 30% of gas consumption or 8% of German energy consumption over the next 12 months. (ii) How would the German economy cope with such a shortfall of gas deliveries? The economic effects crucially depend on substitution and reallocation of energy inputs across sectors. To quantify these effects, we use a state-of the-art multi-sectoral open economy model following Baqaae and Farhi (2021) that accounts for elasticities of substitution and reallocation between different intermediate inputs. In a second step, we turn to a simplified model that helps us derive plausible bounds for the economic effects using observed elasticities for energy inputs. In the Baqaae-Farhi model, the output costs of a Russian import stop remain firmly below 1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or between 80 and 120 Euros per German citizen per year. In a more pessimistic scenario where it proves very difficult to substitute Russian gas in the short-run outside the electricity sector, the economic costs would rise to about 2-2.5% of GDP, or about 1000 Euros per German citizen over 1 year. This comes potentially on top of a large increase in energy prices for household and industry even without a shortfall of gas deliveries. Of course the effects are more detrimental in energy intensive sectors. (iii) Data from the Income and Consumption Survey (EVS) show variation in the expenditure share on energy across the income distribution. However, the distributional consequences of an increase in energy prices appear manageable. A targeted policy towards low-income households without reducing the incentives for households to save energy would be a cost effective way of ensuring a fair burden-sharing across households. It is important to maintain strong incentives for households to reduce gas usage. (iv) Economic policy should aim at strategically increasing incentives to substitute and save fossil energies as soon as possible. In case that an active embargo is politically desired, it should start as soon as possible so that economic agents can use the summer period for adjustment. To reduce dependence on imported energy, it is advisable for the government to commit to elevated fossil energy prices, in particular for natural gas, for an extended period to create incentives for households and industry to adjust quickly. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03881469&r=cis |
| By: | Christian Reiner (Research Office, Lauder Business School, Austria) |
| Abstract: | The Great Recession in 2008/09, COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the proliferation of protectionist policies have resulted not only in a stagnation, but in a retreat of globalisation. This paper identifies four factors in order to understand the ultimate causes of the current crisis of globalisation: distributional effects, Rodrik's trilemma, the absence of a hegemon and the rejection of the logic of hyperglobalisation in the global South. Whether the future will be more or less globalised depends, beside political power, on the ambivalent effects and interplay of digitization and climate change. |
| Keywords: | Globalisation; political economy; Rodrik's trilemma; democracy; distribution |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ico:wpaper:141&r=cis |
| By: | Qu, Chunzi (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics); Bang, Rasmus Noss (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In 2022, the EU finds itself in the midst of an energy crisis due to the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine and has to accelerate its path to energy independence. Part of the EU’s strategy is to double down on the transition to a renewable-intensive energy system. However, this has raised concerns about whether the EU risks swapping one type of energy dependence for another, namely fuel import dependence for metal import dependence. This paper investigates to what extent the EU would rely on metal imports if it is to execute its current energy plan, and whether a nuclear-intensive electricity production system could be a better option. When compared to today’s electricity mix, we find that a renewable-intensive electricity mix will increase the overall energy security in the EU – the reduction in fuel import dependence more than compensates for the increase in metal import dependence. However, we also find that a nuclear-intensive electricity mix can increase the overall energy security in the EU even further. When compared to a renewable-intensive electricity mix, a nuclear-intensive mix does not only have lower metal import requirements in terms of volume and value, but also reduces risk of bottleneck problems related to rare earths and silicone. Still, even with a nuclear-intensive energy mix, the EU will still rely on metal imports, and face potential bottleneck risks in terms of chromium. |
| Keywords: | Energy policy; Energy security; Mineral security; Renewable energy; Nuclear energy; Ukraine crisis |
| JEL: | Q28 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q54 Q56 |
| Date: | 2022–12–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2022_014&r=cis |
| By: | Cooper, Luke |
| Abstract: | This report offers a summary analysis of the acute economic challenges facing the Ukrainian war effort and critically reviews the current policy agenda of the Government of Ukraine. Ukraine’s success in the war to date is reflective of popular support for the war-effort. Citizens are willing to mobilise and sacrifice to protect the country’s democratic public authority from its military overthrow by Russia. Despite serious social and economic problems, this has hitherto allowed Ukraine to avoid the societal collapse and state fragmentation, which are major risks to Ukraine’s ability to win the war. To mitigate these risks, it is recommended that the Ukrainian government adopt a policy of social partnership and aim to achieve full employment, so that all resources can be directed to support the war-effort. |
| JEL: | E6 |
| Date: | 2022–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:117570&r=cis |
| By: | Paul J. J. Welfens (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW)); Tian Xiong (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW)); David Hanrahan (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW)) |
| Abstract: | The analysis looks into European Union income redistribution policies and also places a focus on certain theoretical, institutional and empirical aspects of a future enlargement of the EU to admit Ukraine as a member; while suggestions for policy reforms in the EU and for a transition process for new member countries are also presented. Moreover, the role of the Banzhaf power index in terms of the intra-EU allocation of EU grants and loans under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (part of the Next Generation EU plan) as well as EU transfers to regions/national institutions in EU countries are considered – within a cross country analysis. As independent variables in the regression analysis for the grant/loan ratio on the one hand and the EU transfers/GDP of recipient countries we consider the relative per capita income (in purchasing power parity figures) of recipient countries, Corona death ratios and related indicators as well as the Banzhaf power index (for the European Council) which has changed after BREXIT and which would also change in the context of an EU-Ukraine enlargement. The Banzhaf power index measures power in the context of weighted majority decisions in the European Council. The regressions show several significant variables – but the Banzhaf power index is insignificant for the grants-to-loans ratio of recipient EU countries; and we even can state a new Banzhaf index paradox. The regression analysis for the grant loan ratio is the first to date in the literature. There is considerable potential for a new X-EXIT in the context of a Ukraine enlargement where lessons from BREXIT should be carefully considered if one is to avoid further such disintegration cases. As prior to previous enlargements, topics such as the role of redistribution and fiscal competences at an EU level in relation to revenue-raising and spending have been raised, one can assume that these issues will be to the fore once again if the prospect of a Ukraine-enlargement becomes more likely. One lesson to be drawn is that Ukraine should get lower EU transfers per capita than was the case for Poland in 2005. The required reforms in the EU are pointed out on the one hand, on the other hand politico-economic reflections suggest that the implementation of such reforms will be rather difficult; not least in the context of the fast aging of societies in Germany, Italy and Spain after 2025 – with the caveat that strong immigration from Ukraine could slow down the greying of societies particularly in Germany and Italy, so that anti-EU sentiments could become weakened under certain conditions. An EU enlargement to admit Ukraine is finally considered in a scenario perspective. |
| Keywords: | Intra-EU Income Redistribution, EU Ukraine Enlargement, Banzhaf Power Index, Grant-loan Ratio, Immigration, Constitutional EU Reforms |
| JEL: | F02 K33 N44 P00 R00 |
| Date: | 2022–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwu:eiiwdp:disbei325&r=cis |
| By: | Babasyan, Davit; Gu, Yunfan; Melecky, Martin |
| Abstract: | Uzbekistan is one of the late transition economies. This paper compares the earlyexperience and challenges that Uzbekistan confronts in transitioning its banking system to market principlesagainst the earlier experience with banking transitions from Poland, Russia, and Vietnam, and other relevant evidencefrom the literature. To that effect, the paper uses new data on Uzbekistan’s banking sector, the data on past transitioneconomies, and qualitative and quantitative evidence from the literature. Uzbekistan’s latest experience with bankingtransition generates important lessons for countries that have yet to transition. Namely, how much can a newtransitioning country reasonably expect to accomplish within the medium term Which banking reforms are the most essentialand how should they best be sequenced How can expectations about efficient capital reallocation be managed, access tofinance made more equitable, and transition risks of financial instability be mitigated What are thecomplementary reforms in the real sector, especially of state-owned enterprises and the competition framework, thatneed to happen in tandem for the new banking market to function properly |
| Date: | 2022–03–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9984&r=cis |
| By: | Jean C. Kouam (Nkafu Policy Institute, Yaoundé, Cameroon); Simplice A. Asongu (Yaoundé, Cameroon) |
| Abstract: | The study analyses the nature of the nexus between budget deficit and economic growth given inflation trends. It focuses on data from the six CEMAC countries for the period 2000 to 2021. The employs unit root tests and the generalized method of moments (GMM) for the empirical evidence. The following results are established: (i) the level of inflation above and below which the nexus between budget deficit and economic growth changes sign is about 1.8%. (ii) Below this threshold, each 1% decrease in budget deficit induces an increase in economic growth of about 0.30%; but above the threshold, economic growth decreases by 1 % when budget deficit increases by 0.08%. In view of the war in Ukraine and the global economic situation, which require countries to take adequate measures to strengthen the resilience of their economies, including through high-impact economic activities, any national policy aimed at reducing the budget deficit should be preceded by the reduction of inflation to below 1.8%. Otherwise, any measures put in place by the monetary authorities to stabilize prices would not have the expected effect on economic growth and would hence, be counterproductive. In terms of theoretical underpinnings, at the inflation threshold, the findings are consistent with the “Ricardian equivalence†theorem on the absence of any tangible incidence of budget deficits on economic prosperity while above (below) the inflation threshold, the findings are in line with neoclassical economists (Keynesian perspective) on a negative (positive) linkage between budget deficits and economic growth. This study complements the extant studies by providing thresholds at which budget deficit affects economic growth. |
| Keywords: | CEMAC, Inflation, Economic growth, Budget deficits, Non-linear effects |
| JEL: | E23 F21 F30 L96 O55 |
| Date: | 2022–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:22/098&r=cis |
| By: | Halit Yanikkaya (Gebze Technical University); Abdullah Altun (Gebze Technical University); Pinar Tat (Gebze Technical University) |
| Abstract: | This paper tracks the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions embedded in global value chains (GVCs) in 186 countries for the period 1990-2015. It then looks at the determinants of the emissions considering both country- and sector-level variables in a gravity-like framework. Our graphical visualization displays that, as expected, developed countries appear to be both major GHG emission producers and outsourcers in the highly fragmented world. Indeed, the trade activities of China, the US, Germany, Japan, and Russia contribute 40 percent of total global emissions. Moreover, while higher capital stock is attributable to higher GHG emissions embedded in GVCs, our empirical results reveal that sectors’ renewable energy consumption can be seen as an emission-decreasing factor. While higher income and financial development levels seem to decrease air quality, regional or global integration in trade agreements seems to be consistent with the current increasing efforts and concerns regarding environmental issues. Given the current trajectory and the findings of this paper, negotiating environmental policies across nations, an adaptation of greener production technologies in the production process, and cost-sharing plans between governments and producers should be carefully considered to decrease environmental degradation and sustain natural resources. |
| Date: | 2022–08–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erg:wpaper:1572&r=cis |
| By: | ERF; FDL |
| Abstract: | In the chaotic global post-COVID-19 economy, with the ongoing war in Ukraine, the challenge of adjusting to the global stagflation that is engulfing the world is particularly hard for the oil importing countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. A regional commission of experts, working under the auspices of the Economic Research Forum (ERF), and the Finance for Development Lab (FDL), was asked to evaluate the macro-economic risks ahead, and to make recommendations on the best course correction to avoid them. After an elaborate process of analysis, consultation, and deliberation, the Commission came up with four sets of recommendations, which are developed in this report: First, the recent macroeconomic shock waves are making an already weak economic situation catastrophic. Public debts are rising fast towards unsustainable levels. The challenge ahead is stark: inaction would lead to a financial crisis; but austerity alone could stabilize debt only in the very short term and at the cost of high social tensions. Economic growth is already falling, poverty rising, and the middle-class further weakened, all threatening a rise of social unrest. Failing to develop a convincing response raises the threat of a vicious cycle of economic, social, and political declines, including a retreat into populism, and destructive social polarization. Second, the immediate debt challenge forces countries to adopt painful decisions. While some reduction in government expenditure is unavoidable, much of the political capital invested in adjusting to high indebtedness should go towards improving growth prospects. Public expenditure should be reoriented to safety nets and pro-growth spending. Debt restructuring can only go so far, and countries should not expect too much from it. IMF support will be necessary. It needs to be more generous, but it also need to be made conditional on launching credible national revival strategies, as opposed to the austerity-only based approaches of the past. Third, a pro-growth macroeconomic framework is necessary to ignite growth. But it is not sufficient. In order to achieve a shift in expectation, structural reforms are needed. The reform agenda not only includes the “old” challenges of improving growth prospects and modernizing the state, it should also address the new challenges of relocalization and climate change. On all these fronts, the medium-term reform agenda needs to be initiated in credible ways to create a major expectation shock that can affect the short term - to encourage the private sector into initiate a supply response, and to encourage citizens to start buildin social trust. The fourth recommendation is to recognize that economic reforms are eminently political exercises that need to mobilize the political elites to work. The latter need to believe that the risks ahead are catastrophic, but that a better future is possible, and to convey these messages to the citizens with brutal honesty. Politically, they need to organize an open dialogue with the private sector and civil society to find new mutually beneficial arrangements - political, social, and economic - that can unlock the countries’ true potential. A gradual process if it starts in earnest is possible - improved trust in institutions and confidence about the future will support collective action and generate a virtuous process of progress on all fronts. In addition, there are enormous new opportunities to expand regional and global cooperation that can and should be mobilized in support of reformist national programs. |
| Date: | 2022–10–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erg:wpaper:prr43&r=cis |
| By: | Lee, Kwon Hyung (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Son, Sung Hyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Jang, Yunhee (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Ryou, Kwang Ho (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Dawoon (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 지난 2020년 3월 세계보건기구(WHO)가 팬데믹을 선언한 이후 기후위기에 대한 세계 각국의 공동대응 노력이 강화되었다. 2050년 탄소중립 목표를 설정함으로써 화석연료에 대한 의존도를 크게 줄이고 저탄소 에너지원을 더 많이 활용하는 에너지 전환(energy transition)을 추진하고 있는 것이다. 이에 따라 석유산업에 대한 의존도가 큰 중동 산유국은 석유산업의 다각화가 에너지전환시대에 생존하기 위한 국가 과제가 되었다. 이러한 배경에서 본 연구는 사우디아라비아와 UAE를 중심으로 석유산업 다각화를 위한 주요 계획, 전략, 추진 동향 등을 살펴보고 대외협력관계 분석에 기초한 협력 수요를 파악함으로써 한-중동 석유산업 다각화 협력 확대방안을 제시하고자 한다. 이는 중동 산유국의 핵심 성장동력인 석유산업을 중심으로 미래 협력 가능성을 살펴보고, 향후 보다 심층적인 한중동 경제협력관계를 구축하는 데 기여할 것이다. 또한 그 과정에서 국내 기업이 중동에 진출하여 참여할 수 있는 새로운 사업 기회를 모색하고, 체계적인 진출 전략을 수립하는 데에도 활용할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.(the rest omitted) <p> The aim of this research is to examine various mid-to-long termplans, policies, and business cooperation cases to promote diversification in the Middle Eastern petroleum industry, suggesting policy proposals for cooperation between Korea and the Middle East to deepen industrial diversification in the region. <p> Chapter 2 analyzes global factors that have influenced the oil industry, and examines the trends of diversification in the oil industry and characteristics of diversification in major countries. Increasing oil price volatility and the expanding efforts of the internationalcommunity to make a transition to a carbon-neutral economy haveacted as a factor in diversifying the oil industry. As the trend of low oil prices has continued since the second half of 2014, the raw materials for manufacturing petrochemical products have become available at cheaper prices, and this has led to increased investment in downstream sectors such as oil refining and petrochemicals. In addition, as efforts to reduce carbon emissions in the oil industry have expanded, the share of natural gas production increased, investment in hydrogen and carbon reduction technology expanded, and digital technology was actively introduced to increase the efficiency of oil industry operations. In the downstream sector, the United States is focusing on ethylene production using ethane derived from shale gas, and China is continuing its efforts to expand facilities and diversify feed stocks to improve its own production capacity. In the area of hydrogen and carbon reduction, European countries such as Norway and Germany, along with the United States, China, and Russia, are increasing investments in hydrogen utilization and green hydrogen technology development.(the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | 경제협력; 에너지산업; economic cooperation; energy industry |
| Date: | 2021–12–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2021_002&r=cis |
| By: | Luigi Biagini; Federico Antonioli; Simone Severini |
| Abstract: | Total factor productivity (TFP) is a key determinant of farm development, a sector that receives substantial public support. The issue has taken on great importance today, where the conflict in Ukraine has led to repercussions on the cereal markets. This paper investigates the effects of different subsidies on the productivity of cereal farms, accounting that farms differ according to the level of TFP. We relied on a three-step estimation strategy: i) estimation of production functions, ii) evaluation of TFP, and iii) assessment of the relationship between CAP subsidies and TFP. To overcome multiple endogeneity problems, the System-GMM estimator is adopted. The investigation embraces farms in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom using the FADN samples from 2008 to 2018. Adding to previous analyses, we compare results from different countries and investigate three subsets of farms with varying levels of TFP. The outcomes confirm how CAP negatively impacts farm TFP, but the extent differs according to the type of subsidies, the six countries and, within these, among farms with different productivity groups. Therefore there is room for policy improvements in order to foster the productivity of cereal farms. |
| Date: | 2022–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2212.03503&r=cis |