nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2022‒09‒05
fifteen papers chosen by

  1. Die Folgen des Kriegs in der Ukraine und der Energiekrise für Wirtschaft und Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland By Zika, Gerd; Schneemann, Christian; Weber, Enzo; Zenk, Johanna; Kalinowski, Michael; Maier, Tobias; Wolter, Marc Ingo
  2. Catching-up and falling behind : Russian economic growth,1690s-1880s By Broadberry, Stephen; Korchmina, Elena
  3. How Do Economic Activities Spur the COVID‐19 Pandemic in Russia? A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis By Iwasaki, Ichiro
  4. Valuation of European firms during the Russia-Ukraine war By Bougias, Alexandros; Episcopos, Athanasios; Leledakis, George N.
  5. World Economy Summer 2022 - Inflation is curbing global growth By Gern, Klaus-Jürgen; Kooths, Stefan; Reents, Jan; Sonnenberg, Nils; Stolzenburg, Ulrich
  6. Ordnungspolitische Leitlinien für ein Elektrizitätsgrundkontingent zum Fixpreis. Antworten auf 15 Fragen zum WIFO-Modell By N. N.
  7. Denmark: 2022 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Alternate Executive Director for Denmark By International Monetary Fund
  8. Deutsche Wirtschaft im Sommer 2022 - Erholung kommt mühsam voran By Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Jannsen, Nils; Kooths, Stefan; Meuchelböck, Saskia; Sonnenberg, Nils
  9. Rwanda: Sixth Review Under the Policy Coordination Instrument and Monetary Policy Consultation Clause-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Rwanda By International Monetary Fund
  10. Weltwirtschaft im Sommer 2022 - Inflationsschub bremst die Expansion By Gern, Klaus-Jürgen; Kooths, Stefan; Reents, Jan; Sonnenberg, Nils; Stolzenburg, Ulrich
  11. German Economy Summer 2022 - Slowly progessing recovery By Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Jannsen, Nils; Kooths, Stefan; Meuchelböck, Saskia; Sonnenberg, Nils
  12. Crypto Rewards in Fundraising: Evidence from Crypto Donations to Ukraine By Jane; Tan; Yong Tan
  13. A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California By Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Daichi Shimamoto
  14. Oil Windfalls and Regional Economic Performance in Russia* By Julia Skretting
  15. The Repercussions of War Risks By Eric Tong

  1. By: Zika, Gerd (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Schneemann, Christian (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Weber, Enzo (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; Univ. Regensburg); Zenk, Johanna (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Kalinowski, Michael (BIBB); Maier, Tobias (BIBB); Wolter, Marc Ingo (GWS)
    Abstract: "This research report describes the medium- and long-term impacts of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis on the economy and labour market in Germany. Based on model calculations, two scenarios are simulated: one scenario that includes the current war in Ukraine and reflects the actual developments (reference scenario) and one scenario in which a war in Ukraine could have been avoided theoretically (alternative scenario “Peace in Europe”). A comparison of both scenarios illustrates the possible impacts of the war on different economic sectors and occupational groups in Germany. The results have to be interpreted within the context of high uncertainty concerning the course of war. Depending on further developments, the results may deviate from the actual future economic consequences. Nevertheless, the impact on the German economy and labour market can be shown based on the assumptions made. Further conclusions can be drawn with regard to the scope of impact on economic sectors and occupational groups. However, since there is a high degree of uncertainty, especially with regard to the further price development of energy prices, an aggravation scenario was also calculated, in which it was assumed that the energy price increases in the coming months would be twice as high as previously observed. The scenarios have been modelled based on different assumptions and findings which were derived from the escalation stage as of the end of May 2022. It is assumed that the sanctions against Russia remain in place throughout the whole period analysed, even if the war will be ended. Further assumptions relate to the number of Ukrainian refugees that migrate to Germany, the development of energy and import prices, merchandise exports, government spending on defence and national security as well as relief packages for businesses and households adopted by the government. The results show that the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis will have negative medium- and long-term impacts on the German economic output and the labour market. According to the calculations, the price-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) will be 1.7 percent lower in 2023. The economic growth is mainly weakened by the rise in prices for fossil raw materials. They put a strain on the export industry as well as consumer spending. Lower export activities have the strongest impact on the weaker economic performance. Until 2030 the German economy loses 260 billion Euros of value added. The labour market is also negatively affected. Between 2022 and 2028 the employment decreases by an average of 150,000 workers in comparison to the expectations before the start of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis. The labour force in Germany is increasing due to the influx of refugees. However, the weaker economic and earnings prospects lead to an almost unchanged labour supply in the first few years. Only from 2025 onwards will the influx be reflected in a higher labour supply. From a labour market perspective, the hospitality sector is - once more, after troubled times during the COVID 19-pandemic - most affected by the impacts of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis. Lower consumer spending leads to a much-reduced demand for labour. Employment also decreases in the industry sector. Due to lower labour intensities, however, the decrease in the industry sector is less pronounced than in other labour-intensive service sectors. In contrast, the public administration, defence and social insurance institutions as well as the educational sector will have a higher demand for labour as a consequence of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis. This holds true for the medium- and long-term and is also reflected in the occupational groups. While current labour shortages in the hospitality sector may relax due to a reduced demand for employees, the labour shortages intensify for teachers in schools of general education, social workers and curative education therapists. Differentiating for requirement levels, the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis induce a shift of employees towards more complex tasks in the long-term. A comparison of the labour market according to sector-occupational-combinations illustrates that the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis do not solely result in job reductions but also in job creation. In sum, the job reductions dominate but there will be structural changes in the labour market. This is particularly noticeable in the medium-term and diminishes over time. In view of these findings, weaker economic output, lower employment and structural changes with regard to sectors and occupations have to be expected in the upcoming years. On one hand, the challenge for policy makers and economic actors will be the reintegration of workers who have lost their jobs due to the impacts of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis. On the other hand, reactions to tightening labour shortages are required, as shortages intensify in certain occupations as a consequence of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis. If refugees from Ukraine settle for longer periods in Germany, their labour market integration bears an additional chance. However, if the energy price increases are twice as high as observed so far (+160%), next year's GDP would be almost four percent lower than in the alternative scenario. In 2030, GDP would be half a percent lower. Under these assumptions, 660,000 people (1.5%) fewer would be employed on the labour market after three years than in the alternative scenario "Peace in Europe". In 2030, 70,000 people (0.2%) jobs would still be affected by the downsizing." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
    Keywords: IAB-Open-Access-Publikation
    Date: 2022–08–09
  2. By: Broadberry, Stephen (Nuffield College, Oxford); Korchmina, Elena (University of Southern Denmark)
    Abstract: This paper provides decadal estimates of GDP per capita for the Russian Empire from the 1690s to the 1880s. GDP per capita in the 1880s was barely 3 per cent higher than in the 1690s, but this was not the result of continuous stagnation. Rather, positive growth during the first half of the eighteenth century was followed by negative growth between the 1760s and 1800s and stagnation from the 1800s to the 1880s. The main driver of this variation in GDP per capita was the relationship between population and land, with land per capita increasing to the 1760s, then declining to the 1800s and staying stable during the nineteenth century. This suggests that serfdom may not have been as strong a barrier to eighteenth century growth as has often been suggested, nor its abolition in 1861 as significant for subsequent growth. Although large-scale industry grew more rapidly than the rest of the economy, particularly after Peter the Great’s reforms in the early eighteenth century, this had only a minor effect on the economy as a whole, as it was starting from a very low base and still only accounted for 10 per cent of GDP by the 1880s. Russian economic growth before the 1760s resulted in catching-up on northwest Europe, but this was followed by a period of relative decline, leaving mid-nineteenth century Russia further behind than at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Key words: Great Divergence ; China ; regional variation ; GDP per head
    Date: 2022
  3. By: Iwasaki, Ichiro
    Abstract: Russia is one of the few countries in the world that has opted for almost no policy measures involving the strong suppression of economic activity in the face of the epidemic disaster brought about by the new coronavirus (COVID-19). This makes Russia a valuable subject of social experiments through which the association between economic activity and the spread of the virus can be explored. This paper presents a dynamic panel data analysis to examine the extent to which different types of economic activity contribute to the spread of COVID-19 infection using monthly and quarterly panel data of Russian regions between March 2020 and April 2021. The results strongly supported our expectation that economic activities have a greater impact on the levels of COVID-19 transmission when they involve a larger number of inhabitants or stimulate greater consumption or social activities among citizens. It was also revealed that Russian regions vary greatly in terms of the routes that link economic activity to the spread of COVID-19. These results have important policy implications for current and future epidemic control.
    Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, economic activity, dynamic panel data analysis, Russia
    JEL: C33 E32 I15 I18 R11
    Date: 2022–08
  4. By: Bougias, Alexandros; Episcopos, Athanasios; Leledakis, George N.
    Abstract: We infer the asset value dynamics of European firms during the Russia-Ukraine war via the structural model of Merton (1974). Using high-frequency stock price data, we find that the war led to lower corporate security prices and higher asset volatility, eventually shifting asset values closer to the default region. On average, the balance sheet of European firms is expected to shrink by 2.05% and their 1-year default probability to increase from 0.32% to 2.12%. Regression analysis on asset and equity returns as well as default probability changes suggests that these effects are stronger for firms with large revenue exposure to Russia.
    Keywords: European firms; Merton model; Russia-Ukraine war; Asset returns; Default risk
    JEL: G12 G14 G32
    Date: 2022–07–16
  5. By: Gern, Klaus-Jürgen; Kooths, Stefan; Reents, Jan; Sonnenberg, Nils; Stolzenburg, Ulrich
    Abstract: In a situation with already elevated inflation, the war in Ukraine and the zero-covid policy in China have led to additional upward pressures on prices and reinforced the global supply chain problems. Real wages are declining in many countries, dampening personal consumption expenditures even though households are often able to draw from a substantial amount of extra savings accumulated during the pandemic. Given the widespread inflationary pressures, central banks have shifted towards a more restrictive monetary policy stance. Against this backdrop, the outlook for global growth has weakened. We forecast global growth of 3.0 percent in 2022 and 3.2 percent in 2023 (measured in terms of purchasingpower parities), representing a reduction by 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points for 2022 and 2023, respectively. The forecast is based on the assumption that commodity prices have peaked, which would reduce inflationary pressures considerably going forward. However, there is the risk that inflation proves to be more persistent than central banks expect. In such a case, central banks would need to step on the brakes more than assumed, with the risk of a recession in advanced economies and a pronounced deterioration in financial conditions in emerging markets.
    Date: 2022
  6. By: N. N.
    Abstract: Durch die Verknappung des Gasangebots infolge des Krieges in der Ukraine sind über den Preisbildungsmechanismus der "Merit Order" die Strompreise stark angestiegen. Ein Elektrizitätsgrundkontingent zum reduzierten Fixpreis kann hohe Preissteigerungen dämpfen und private Haushalte entlasten. Im vorliegenden WIFO Research Brief werden 15 Fragen zu einem Elektrizitätsgrundkontingent beantwortet.
    Keywords: TP_GrueneTransformation
    Date: 2022–08–16
  7. By: International Monetary Fund
    Abstract: The strength of the economic recovery bodes well for the rebound in activity to persist, but uncertainty remains high due to the war in Ukraine and the pandemic, with risks tilted to the downside. With employment above pre-pandemic levels, however, labor market pressures have increased. High energy prices have propelled inflation to a historic high. The current account remains elevated. High household debt constitutes a key source of risk as house price growth remains strong.
    Keywords: government support package; government finance statistics data; liability positions vis-à-vis nonresident; money market rate; headline inflation; Labor markets; COVID-19; Mortgages; Securities; Global
    Date: 2022–06–16
  8. By: Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Jannsen, Nils; Kooths, Stefan; Meuchelböck, Saskia; Sonnenberg, Nils
    Abstract: Die deutsche Wirtschaft steuert weiter durch unruhiges Fahrwasser. Zwar setzt sich der Aufholprozess in den kontaktintensiven Dienstleistungsbranchen in hohem Tempo fort, und die Unternehmen im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe sitzen auf prall gefüllten Auftragsbüchern. Allerdings verringert die hohe Inflation die Kaufkraft der verfügbaren Einkommen und wirkt so einer höheren Konsumdynamik entgegen. Zudem haben sich die Lieferengpässe zuletzt durch den Krieg in der Ukraine wieder verschärft. Im Ergebnis gewinnt die Erholung erst in der zweiten Jahreshälfte wieder an Kraft, wenn die Preise nicht mehr ganz so rasch steigen und die Lieferengpässe nachlassen. Insgesamt rechnen wir wie im Frühjahr für dieses Jahr mit einem Anstieg des Bruttoinlandsprodukts von 2,1 Prozent. Im Jahr 2023 dürfte die Zuwachsrate 3,3 Prozent betragen (Frühjahr: 3,5 Prozent). Die Inflation wird im laufenden Jahr mit 7,4 Prozent so hoch wie noch nie im wiedervereinigten Deutschland ausfallen. Auch im kommenden Jahr wird der Preisauftrieb mit 4,2 Prozent wohl noch überdurchschnittlich hoch sein. Die Erholung der Erwerbstätigkeit setzt sich fort. Die Effektivverdienste werden kräftig steigen, auch weil die Arbeitskräfteknappheiten einen historischen Höchststand erreicht haben. Im laufenden Jahr wird der Anstieg mit knapp 5 Prozent aber hinter der Inflationsrate zurückbleiben. Die Haushaltdefizite der öffentlichen Hand werden sinken, da die Einnahmen kräftig zunehmen und die pandemiebedingten Ausgaben zurückgefahren werden. Im Jahr 2023 dürften die öffentlichen Schulden in Relation zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt bei etwas über 60 Prozent liegen.
    Keywords: Konjunkturprognose,Stabilisierungspolitik,Frühindikatoren,Ausblick,Konjunktur Deutschland,Fiskalpolitik & Haushalt,Arbeitsmarkt
    Date: 2022
  9. By: International Monetary Fund
    Abstract: The economy has emerged from the COVID-19 pandemic with scars that would likely take time to reverse. Supported by the authorities’ policy support, growth rebounded strongly to 10.9 percent in 2021. Spillovers from the war in Ukraine are compounding pandemic challenges by weighing on growth, increasing inflationary pressures and social needs, and straining fiscal balances amid high uncertainty and rising food insecurity concerns. Lower external demand and higher global commodity prices are projected to lower growth to 6 percent in 2022. Headline inflation is projected to rise from 0.8 percent in 2021 to 9.5 percent in 2022, exceeding the central bank’s benchmark level (5 percent). The National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) raised the policy rate by 50 basis points in February 2022. While the near-term outlook is marred by uncertainty from the geopolitical risks that could prolong the spillovers from the war in Ukraine, the medium-term outlook remains favorable, supported by the authorities’ commitment to structural reforms. The change in World Bank financing terms under IDA20 will increase the volume of loans, hence the debt-to-GDP ratio for Rwanda, but given the higher concessionality of the loans, the expected impact on the present value of debt path is marginal.
    Date: 2022–06–29
  10. By: Gern, Klaus-Jürgen; Kooths, Stefan; Reents, Jan; Sonnenberg, Nils; Stolzenburg, Ulrich
    Abstract: Der Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine und die strikte No-Covid-Politik in China haben die ohnehin bereits kräftige Inflation weltweit verstärkt und dazu geführt, dass Lieferengpässe wieder zugenommen haben. Die Reallöhne gehen in vielen Ländern deutlich zurück und dämpfen den privaten Konsum, auch wenn vielfach auf zusätzlich Ersparnisse zurückgegriffen werden kann, die während der Pandemie entstanden sind. Angesichts des hohen Inflationsdrucks sind die Notenbanken auf einen Kurs der monetären Straffung eingeschwenkt oder haben ihn verschärft. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben sich die Aussichten für die Weltkonjunktur spürbar eingetrübt. Wir rechnen nunmehr mit einem Anstieg der globalen Produktion um nur noch 3,0 Prozent in diesem und 3,2 Prozent im nächsten Jahr (berechnet auf der Basis von Kaufkraftparitäten). Damit haben wir unsere Prognose vom März um 0,5 bzw. 0,4 Prozent abgesenkt. Dabei ist ein leichter Rückgang der Rohstoffpreise im Prognosezeitraum unterstellt, womit sich der Preisauftrieb von dieser Seite im Prognosezeitraum stark verringert. Problematisch wäre es, wenn sich die Inflation als hartnäckiger erweisen würde, als von den Notenbanken erwartet. Dann müsste die Geldpolitik stärker bremsen als unterstellt, mit der Gefahr einer Rezession in den fortgeschrittenen Volkswirtschaften und einer ausgeprägten Verschlechterung der finanziellen Rahmenbedingungen in den Schwellenländern.
    Keywords: Fortgeschrittene Volkswirtschaften,Schwellenländer,monetary policy,Amerika,Asien,Konjunktur Welt,China,Schwellen-& Entwicklungsländer,Europa,USA
    Date: 2022
  11. By: Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Jannsen, Nils; Kooths, Stefan; Meuchelböck, Saskia; Sonnenberg, Nils
    Abstract: The German economy navigates troubled waters. The catch-up process in the contact-intensive service industries is continuing at a fast pace and companies in the manufacturing sector are sitting on wellfilled order books. However, high inflation is reducing the purchasing power of disposable incomes and thus dampening the recovery in consumption. In addition, supply bottlenecks have recently worsened again due to the war in Ukraine. As a result, the recovery will regain strength only in the second half of the year, when prices will no longer rise as rapidly and supply bottlenecks will begin to ease. Overall, we expect GDP to increase by 2.1 percent this year, as in our spring forecast. In 2023, GDP will grow by 3.3 percent (spring forecast: 3.5 percent). At 7.4 percent, inflation in the current year will be higher than ever before in reunified Germany. Next year, inflation will probably remain high with 4.2 percent. The recovery in employment continues. Effective earnings will rise strongly, also because labor shortages have reached an all-time high. In the current year, however, the increase of about 5 percent will lag behind the rate of inflation. Public budget deficits will decline as revenues increase strongly and pandemic-related expenditures are reduced. In 2023, public debt in relation to GDP is expected to be slightly above 60 percent.
    Date: 2022
  12. By: Jane (Xue); Tan; Yong Tan
    Abstract: Extrinsic incentives such as a conditional thank-you gift have shown both positive and negative impacts on charitable fundraising. Leveraging the crypto donations to a Ukrainian fundraising plea that accepts Ether (i.e., the currency of the Ethereum blockchain) and Bitcoin (i.e., the currency of the Bitcoin blockchain) over a seven-day period, we analyze the impact of crypto rewards that lasted for more than 24 hours. Crypto rewards are newly minted tokens that are usually valueless initially and grow in value if the corresponding cause is well received. Separately, we find that crypto rewards have a positive impact on the donation count but a negative impact on the average donation size for donations from both blockchains. Comparatively, we further find that the crypto rewards lead to an 812.48% stronger donation count increase for Ethereum than Bitcoin, given that the crypto rewards are more likely to be issued on the Ethereum blockchain, which has higher programmability to support smart contracts. We also find a 30.1% stronger decrease in average donation amount from Ethereum for small donations ( $250). Our study is the first work to look into crypto rewards as incentives for fundraising. Our findings indicate that the positive effect of crypto rewards is more likely to manifest in donation count, and the negative effect of crypto rewards is more likely to manifest in donation size.
    Date: 2022–07
  13. By: Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Daichi Shimamoto
    Abstract: We apply a Regression Discontinuity based approach to screen for collusion developed in Kawai et al. (2022) to public procurement data from five countries. We find that bidders who win by a very small margin have significantly lower backlog than those who lose by a very small margin in the sample of procurement auctions from Indonesia, suggesting that bidders collude by bid rotation. Our results suggest that the proportion of noncompetitive auctions is at least about 5% for all E-procurement auctions and about 3% for all auctions in Indonesia. We cannot reject the null of competition in other countries.
    JEL: L41 O52 O53
    Date: 2022–07
  14. By: Julia Skretting
    Abstract: I construct a novel dataset to investigate the effects of oil income in regions of Russia. My data combines regional level data on oil endowments and a wide range of economic series for 85 geographical regions of Russia. Focusing on exogenous oil windfall gains induced by movements in oil prices, I compare outcomes in oil endowed regions to outcomes in other areas. In doing so, I show that oil resources do not seem to benefit regional economic growth. Indeed, I provide evidence that oil windfalls lead to an expansion of the local public sector and a contraction of the private sector, resulting in lower profitability and a decline in economic growth. Overall, my results indicate that only a small share of revenues benefits the local population and that there are signs of missing money.
    Keywords: Natural Resource Curse, Rent Seeking, Dutch Disease, Regional Windfalls
    Date: 2022–08
  15. By: Eric Tong
    Abstract: I study the effects of the Russo-Ukrainian war on global financial markets of 87 developed and emerging economies. The methodology builds on Rigobon and Sack (2004) that focus on the shift in volatility on days of intense war news. I find that war risk caused considerable decline in asset prices, heightened stress in the financial system, and spike in commodity prices. However, the long-term risk-free rates remain anchored, suggesting that flight-to-safety behaviour was contained and had not morphed into an exodus of capital outflows towards the safest assets in the US. Over time, I find that the effects of a single, one-off war shock are transitory, peaking in about 15 days and dissipating within the month. This clarifies that the lasting impact of the war in the real world is attributable to a stream of war shocks rather than a persistent, singular shock. In a state-dependent model, I find that nations that share borders and have strong trade ties with the belligerents and NATO member states are more affected by war shocks. In contrast, financial markets of advanced and emerging economies do not exhibit significant differences. These results may inform strategies of nations and shape future outcomes.
    JEL: F30 F50 G10
    Date: 2022–08

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