|
on Confederation of Independent States |
|
Issue of 2022‒08‒29
fifty-nine papers chosen by |
| By: | Shadrin Artem (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation were consolidated with a surplus to the tune of Rb604.7 bn, budgets of municipal districts and urban okrugs with a surplus of Rb29.2 bn, budgets of inner urban municipalities of federal cities with a surplus of Rb0.2 bn, budgets of municipal areas - a surplus of Rb21.4 bn, budgets of urban settlements — a surplus of Rb2.5 bn, budgets of rural settlements — a surplus of Rb2.8 bn, budgets of territorial government extrabudgetary funds — a surplus of Rb18.0 bn. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, regional and municipal finances, loan market, debt market |
| JEL: | H71 H72 H74 H76 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1198&r= |
| By: | Dezhina Irina (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, the sphere of science underwent institutional changes connected with completion of the system of state management of science. Collegiate bodies were created, which contribute to the strengthening of centralization and unification of accountability for budget financing. The state program of scientific and technological development was formed, which now combines all budget expenditures for civil research and development. Priority support for university science continued with a stronger focus on practical applications. The influence of the pandemic was clearly noticeable in the field of technological innovations. There was a reduction of internal expenses of companies on research and development with a simultaneous decrease in the intensity of partnerships with academic institutions and universities. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, R&D, science, technology |
| JEL: | O31 O32 O3 I28 I2 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1206&r= |
| By: | Izryadnova Olga (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The economic situation in 2021 demonstrated recovery of both demand and supply in domestic and foreign markets after the pandemic crisis of 2020. The positive dynamics were supported by a simultaneous recovery of domestic consumer and investment demand and by increased contribution of net exports to the economic growth. Economic recovery has been significantly influenced by the starting conditions for recovery from the 2020 pandemic recession, characterized by a sharp fall in services and a decline, albeit less profound, in the goods sector. Other challenges were associated with volatile global hydrocarbon market, reduced external trade and disruptions in value added chains. In addition, longer than anticipated internal and external health constraints at the beginning of the pandemic increased the differentiated functioning of various economic activities. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, fixed investment, GDP, inflation |
| JEL: | E20 E21 E22 E60 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1204&r= |
| By: | Grishina Elena (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, the total index of personal money income in real terms gained 3.4% in 2020, and that of wages and salaries of employees, 3.5%. Due in the main to the low base effect, real income from entrepreneurial activity increased significantly (+17.3%), as did the real money income from all the other sources (+9.6%), including, among other things, the incomes resulting from tax avoidance through illegal cash-out. Property income shrank in real terms by 7.3%. At the same time, social benefits in real terms did not change on the previous year, amounting to 112.1% relative to the 2019 level due to the significant lump-sum cash benefits paid in August - September 2021 to families with children aged 6 to 18 years, pensioners, and law enforcement officers, in a total amount of more than Rb600 bn. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, households, income, poverty |
| JEL: | I30 I31 I31 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1210&r= |
| By: | Malginov Georgiy (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Radygin Alexandr (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | From 2016, statistical data began to be published within the framework of the System of Public Property Management Efficiency Estimates. It was approved by RF Government Decree No. 72 dated January 29, 2015, to replace the public sector monitoring data collected and released by the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) since the early 2000s in compliance with RF Government Decree No. 1 dated January 4, 1999 (as amended on December 30, 2002). The System contains data on the number of federal state unitary enterprises (FSUEs) and joint-stock companies (JSCs) with the participation of the Russian Federation in their capital, which had been previously published, as a rule, in the government privatization programs for the next period (from 2011 – for a 3-year period, and prior to 2011 – for a 1-year period). |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, public sector, privatization |
| JEL: | K11 H82 L32 L33 L38 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1207&r= |
| By: | Malginov Georgiy (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sternik Sergey (Moscow State University of Civil Engineering); Kulakov K. (Financial University) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, the situation on the Russian real estate market was mainly affected by factors that emerged in the initial period of the COVID-19 pandemic (state- subsidized mortgages, increased state support for developers) and trends that commenced to form in previous years (the expansion of the individual housing construction (IHC) segment as an alternative to blocks of flats (BF)). The growth of real disposable household income by more than 3%, while the government supported the industry and offered preferential mortgages, contributed to high demand for housing, especially in H1 2021. The desire to preserve family capital amid the record inflation rate (8.4%) and rising prices for all types of real estate encouraged Russians to be active on the housing market. In H2 2021, there was a decline in interest in mortgages. Housing lending commenced to shrink on the back of the gradual increase of the Bank of Russia key rate 8.5% by the end of the year against 4.25% at the beginning of the year. In addition, trends in the primary housing market were shaped by an increase in the cost of building materials and land, labor shortages, as well as the tightening of the program of concessional mortgage lending. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, residential property prices, housing market, housing construction |
| JEL: | K11 H82 L32 L33 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1211&r= |
| By: | Avxentyev Nikolay (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sisigina Natalya (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, the Russian public health system continued to operate under extreme overload induced by the spread of the novel coronavirus infection. In many respects, the second year of the pandemic turned out to be harder than the first one. Despite the measures taken to prepare medical institutions and launch of large-scale immunization, Russia failed to achieve a steady decline in losses from COVID-19 and return to pre-pandemic volumes of medical services provision in other public health areas. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, health care system |
| JEL: | I1 I15 I18 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1213&r= |
| By: | Barbashova Natalia (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Arkashkin Igor (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Belev Sergey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Leonov Elisei (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Deryugin Alexander (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sokolov Ilya (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Tishchenko Tatiana (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, budget revenues of the enlarged government (BEG) amounted to Rb48.1 trillion, while the volume of the expenditures came to Rb47.1 trillion. Compared to 2019 and 2020, the BEG revenues in 2021 gained Rb8.6 and Rb9.9 trillion, respectively, or 0.8 and 1.2 p.p. GDP to 36.8% of GDP (Table 6). In 2021, oil and gas revenues as a share of GDP decreased relative to 2019 by 0.4 p.p. of GDP and increased by 2.5 p.p. of GDP relative to 2020; their share of total revenues in BEG was 19.4% in 2021 versus 20.9% and 12.9% in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Non-oil and gas revenues show an increase of Rb7.5 trillion and 1.2 p.p. of GDP in 2021 vs. GDP relative to 2019 and an increase of Rb5.5 trillion and a decline of 1.3 p.p. GDP vs. 2020. By the end of 2021, the budget surplus of the enlarged government amounted to slightly more than Rb1.0 trillion, which is equivalent to 0.8% of GDP. Thus, the BEG in the reporting year returned to a surplus, as it was at the end of the pre- pandemic 2019. The observed stability in the revenues of the RF budget system in recent years indicates the existing opportunities for maintaining the balance of the BEG in the medium term, if the geopolitical and macroeconomic conditions in the world do not deteriorate. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, intergovernmental relations, fiscal policy, budget system, revenues, expenditures, Bank of Russia |
| JEL: | E62 H5 H61 H62 H68 H7 H72 H77 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1196&r= |
| By: | Barinova Vera (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Zemtsov Tsepan (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Tsareva Yulia (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | Recently, the Russian government’s policy aimed at developing the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector has included: the implementation of a reform of control and oversight activities; simplification of registration procedures for legal entities and individual entrepreneurs; digitalization of tax authorities; introduction of a tax maneuver for IT companies; expansion of support infrastructure facilities, etc. However, the contribution of SMEs to the economy remains modest compared to developed countries, and the sector’s performance deteriorated over the past two years. In 2021, the pandemic-induced harsh conditions for small businesses were: decreasing income, anti-epidemiological measures (lockdown in November, introduction of QR codes, masking regime, etc.). A considerable part of Russian small business belongs to the spheres that were among the most affected ones: retail trade in non-food products, provision of household services, and public catering. The coronavirus-induced crisis is unique in the scale of the imposed restrictions, due to the high contagiousness of the new infection and its duration. The situation is accentuated by the recurrence of morbidity waves, the emergence of new strains of the virus, and, consequently, the uncertainty of the end date and unpredictability of entrepreneurial risks. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, small businesses, medium-sized enterprises, OVID-19, lockdown |
| JEL: | C53 E37 L21 L52 I18 I19 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1208&r= |
| By: | Kazenin Konstantin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Analysis of fertility trends in the Russian Federation by regions and by children of different birth orders (i.e. first child in the family, second child, etc.) in 2021 is necessary because of the expected impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on birth rate in the previous year. Most births in 2021 reflect reproductive decisions made during the first and second waves of the pandemic, i.e. the period of the “first shock†caused by the spread of the new virus and restrictive measures. Studies show that there was a very strong tendency to postpone childbearing during this period resulted in the decline of birth rate in some countries comparable to the decline after the economic crisis in 2009. However, studies available suggest that the impact of the pandemic on the birth rate may vary significantly across different birth orders: in a number of Western European countries, couples having at least one child were more frequently refusing family expansion plans in the first wave of the pandemic compared to childless couples. This explains the need to consider fertility trends in 2021 separately for children of different birth orders. The need to study interregional differences is associated with a sharp imbalance of Russian regions in the severity of the epidemic process, measured in particular by such an indicator as excess mortality. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, fertility, childbirth, pandemic |
| JEL: | I18 I19 J13 J11 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1209&r= |
| By: | Tsukhlo Sergey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In January 2021, demand quite expectedly exhibited negative dynamics under the influence of a large and extremely unusual for the economy set of factors. The balance of actual sales change decreased by 10 points, which looked modest against the expected 30 points decline a month earlier. Most likely, the rigidity of lockdown measures, successes of both the domestic medical science and pharmaceutical industry allowed the country as a whole and the industry in particular to avoid a negative epidemiological scenario at the beginning of the year. The same circumstances ensured recovery of demand forecasts after the December collapse. In January, they regained 12 points out of the 30 points lost a month earlier. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, industrial sector, industrial output |
| JEL: | C53 E37 L21 L52 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1203&r= |
| By: | Bogonos, Mariia; Litvinov, V.; Martyshev, P.; Neyter, R.; Nivievskyi, O.; Piddubnyi, I.; Stolnikovich, H. |
| Keywords: | Crop Production/Industries, International Relations/Trade |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea22:322823&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Slovakia is highly vulnerable to the war in Ukraine, given its geographical proximity, heavy reliance on energy imports from Russia, and high integration into global value chains. The shock occurs against the backdrop of an incomplete recovery from the pandemic, with activity hampered by breakdowns in global supply chains and resurgent infection waves. Growth is projected to slow to 2.2 percent and inflation to surge to over 10 percent in 2022, with sizable downside risks amidst exceptionally large uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | money market rate; climate mitigation goal; policy priority; Policy recommendation; liability positions vis-à-vis nonresident; IMF's transparency policy; Inflation; Housing prices; Mortgages; Labor markets; Global; Europe |
| Date: | 2022–06–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/202&r= |
| By: | Malitz, David M. (Ed.); Sriyai, Surachanee (Ed.) |
| Abstract: | Undoubtedly, the war in Ukraine has far-reaching political and economic implications for many regions of the world, including East and Southeast Asia. The governments' reactions to the war have varied considerably ranging from fully supporting Ukraine in alliance with the United States and the European Union, as Japan and Korea have done, to the full backing of Russia by North Korea and Myanmar. That said, many governments in Southeast Asia remain neutral. Nonetheless, the responses to the war in the public spheres neither necessarily agree with their respective governments' stances, nor are they expected to be homogenous. This collection of articles serves as a preliminary attempt to take stock of the reactions of selected civil societies in East and Southeast Asian countries to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by analyzing the respective countries' public sentiment through press and social media. While the reactions of the publics of East and Southeast Asian societies have no direct influence on global society, they will shape their governments' future courses, where they can be expressed and where elections are held. As the long-term consequences of the geopolitical and economic shifts initiated by this conflict will only slowly become fully discernible, their analysis is of great interest. The papers have been presented and discussed at an online workshop jointly organized by the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen (IN-EAST), the German Institute of Japanese Studies, Tokyo (DIJ), the Chair of Transregional Southeast Asian Studies at Humboldt University Berlin, and the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine,East Asia,ASEAN,Southeast Asia,civil society,public opinions |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:udedao:135&r= |
| By: | Ignatov Aleksandr (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Dorokhina K. (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Larionova Marina (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Popova Irina (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sakharov Andrey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Shelepov Andrey (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, the US, the European Union and the UK consolidated their efforts to bolster their influence in international economic institutions. In the context of the increased importance of digitalization and the climate change agenda, they sought to secure the leadership in establishing new rules of global climate change management and in the collective regulatory framework for digital economy. Amidst this growing competition and geopolitical tensions, the ongoing pandemic and uneven economic recovery, the efficacy of multilateral cooperation has become an important factor in Russia’s pursuit of its national interest, foreign policy priorities and development goals. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, international organizations, international institutional arrangements |
| JEL: | F5 F53 F55 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1217&r= |
| By: | Podverbnykh Ulyana (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The COVID-19 pandemic crisis had a significant impact on the Russian economy. After multiple shocks caused by 2020 coronavirus pandemic and the worsening economic situation in the country, the Russian labor market showed a stable positive trend in 2021. In 2020, the number of people employed decreased by 1,332,000 or by 1.9% compared to 2019. However, gradual employment growth began in October 2020 and continued through all 12 months of 2021, reaching a pre-crisis value of 7,231,700 by December 2021 |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, labor market, unemployment, employment |
| JEL: | J21 J22 J23 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1221&r= |
| By: | Mkrtchian Nikita (RANEPA); Florinskaya Yulia (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | After a sharp fall in 2020, Russia’s net migration in 2021 was the highest in recent years. According to the estimates based on the Rosstat’s operative information on the population, which decreased by 692,900 people in 2021, and on the natural population decline (in 2021 — 1,042.7 thousand people), the migration gain was 349,800 people. At the same time, according to the last published data for January-November 2021 the positive migration balance for 11 months already made up 371,400 people, and there is no reason to believe that there was a migration loss in December. Monthly dynamic of the index allows us to assume that the net migration will exceed 400,000 people. The reason for the discrepancy in these data is not clear. But no matter how Rosstat estimates the final results of migration gain for the year, it is obvious that its magnitude was extremely high in 2021. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, migration, internal migration, temporary migration, long-term migration |
| JEL: | J61 J62 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1219&r= |
| By: | Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Schlecht, Ingmar; Wang, Runxi |
| Abstract: | To counter rising gas prices and corresponding Russian profits, many scholars point to import tariffs on Russian gas as a preferred policy instrument. While this makes sense in the case of oil, for the case of gas we observe the opposite. This is due to the structure of the EU-Russia gas market, where Russia holds a monopoly over the EU’s residual gas demand and the EU, if it would engage in joint procurement, has market power itself potentially acting as monopsony. However, it has not yet chosen to exercise its market power. Under these conditions, an external price cap for Russian gas can be considered to be the more appropriate policy instrument, because a price cap tends to take away economic incentives for Russia to use its market power, increasing gas prices through decreasing supply. Under such circumstances, we show that an external price cap is superior to a tariff in the sense that for any tariff there exists a price cap that makes both the EU and Russia better off. Consequently, the EU can always design a price cap that gives Russia the same welfare (so it is equally likely to accept), but makes the EU better off compared to imposing a tariff. |
| Keywords: | price cap,Russia,gas market,tariff,sanctions |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:261834&r= |
| By: | Khasanova Ramilya (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | According to the Rosstat provisional data, Russia’s population on January 1, 2022 was 145.5 million. The decline of the population in Russia has been observed since 2018 according to the pre-pandemic Rosstat median projection predicting that population decline will continue until the end of the projection period (2035). However, the spread of coronavirus infection had a significant impact on the population size in 2020—2021. According to provisional data from Rosstat, the Russian population has reduced by 692.900 compared to 2021. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, birth rate, mortality rate, natural population growth |
| JEL: | J1 J10 J11 J13 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1220&r= |
| By: | Marina A. Kartseva (RANEPA); Anatoly A. Peresetsky (New Economic School) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we use unique nationally representative data from the 25th wave of Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, (RLMS-HSE) for 2016. Based on the survey data, we investigate the impact of sandwich generation caregiving on the health behavior of Russian women—their health behavior, self-assessed health and life satisfaction. We found that sandwich generation caregiving reduces the likelihood of medical examinations, and regular meals, the effect is especially pronounced for working women. A small reduction in alcohol consumption is observed. The likelihood of smoking is reduced (especially for women under 50). The likelihood of being overweight increases, the proportion of chronic diseases decreases, and self-assessed health improves (these effects are especially pronounced for women who are non-pensioners). The proportion of depression decreases. These effects may be the result of an inattentive attitude to one's health and a consciousness of the social significance of fulfilling one's duty. The latter also affects the decreasing number of sandwich generation givers (SGC) dissatisfied with life in general. |
| Keywords: | sandwich generation, sandwich caregiving, Russia, female caregivers, health, health behavior, life satisfaction, informal care JEL Classifications: I12, I31, J14, J16 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0289&r= |
| By: | Kaukin Andrey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Miller Evgenia (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, output in the extractive sector of the Russian industry went up due to the influence of factors that appeared at the beginning of 2021: growth of demand for thermal coal and natural gas from European and Asian countries; weakening of the effect of restrictions related to the OPEC+ agreement on the back of higher quotas for daily oil production by the member countries. The manufacturing sector also demonstrated growth in 2021, which was achieved owing to high prices and growing external demand for the products of industries that occupy a significant share in the structure of industrial production (metallurgy, chemical industry, oil refining industry). |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, production, external and internal demand, GDP structure |
| JEL: | G28 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1205&r= |
| By: | Yulia Vymyatnina; Aleksandr Chernykh |
| Abstract: | In this paper we test whether environmental characteristics of assets influence their returns for the case of Russian financial market. Our main hypothesis based on the relevant literature is that if a spread between ``greenÕÕ and ``brownÕÕ assetsÕ yield exists, it should be in favour of the brown assets. We employ relevant econometric models separately for stocks and for bonds. For the stock market we used realized returns and estimated the role of the green factor in the yield using the three-factor Fama-French model. While the resulting coefficient was not significant, on the whole we have observed that the realized return of the climate-risk hedge portfolio had a negative value over a nearly ten-year observation period. We have also demonstrated the applicability of the green factor calculations for estimating the degree of climate risk exposure for individual companies. Using data on a number of green bonds and their chosen ``twinÕÕ bonds, we calculate the difference in the premium in the yield to maturity over that of a similar government bond for all pairs of ``twinÕÕ bonds and proceed to check if this difference is significant, and if it can be attributed to the Greenium factor. We find that over the stable period in Russian financial markets (allowing for the most stable results) ``greenÕÕ bonds have lower yield to maturity Ñ a result that is in line with previous results for other markets and suggests that green financing might be cheaper for companies. On the whole our results suggest that environmental considerations might be relevant in the Russian financial market during stable macroeconomic periods. |
| Keywords: | ESG, sustainable investing, Greenium, Russia |
| JEL: | G10 G12 |
| Date: | 2022–08–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eus:wpaper:ec2022_01&r= |
| By: | Volovik Nadezhda (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, the global economy recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak of 2020. However, the pandemic continued to be a serious problem throughout 2021, especially with the emergence of new strains such as Delta in Q2 2021 and Omicron in Q4 2021. Vaccination has proven effective in mitigating the adverse effects of coronavirus on human health. However, unequal access to vaccines and the higher invasiveness of new strains have left many people still vulnerable to the virus, which fuels the pandemic and puts pressure on the sustainability of the global economic recovery. In addition, its recovery has been held back by persistent disruptions in supply chains and pressure from rising tradable commodity prices. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, terms of trade, regional pattern |
| JEL: | F10 F13 F19 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1201&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | After a deeper pandemic-induced recession than the rest of the euro area in 2020, the Portuguese economy gained ground in 2021, and growth strengthened further in 2022:Q1. Employment reached pre-pandemic levels in 2021:H2 and GDP in 2022:Q1. Nonetheless output is expected to remain below pre-pandemic trend over the medium term. While growth in 2022:Q1 was supported by a strong bounce back in tourism and domestic demand, the recovery for the rest of the year is expected to be hampered by the war in Ukraine despite limited direct linkages with Russia and Ukraine, due to higher commodity prices, supply-side disruptions, and weaker confidence and external demand. The outlook is clouded by uncertainty relating to the war, new virus waves, and the ultimate effect of the pandemic on corporate, bank, and public sector balance sheets. While declining and with improved composition, public debt would remain high. |
| Keywords: | portfolio investment data collection system; money market rate; insolvency regime; priority Portugal; asset quality; RRP fund; strengthening capital buffer; Energy prices; Inflation; Fiscal stance; Global |
| Date: | 2022–06–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/203&r= |
| By: | Burdyak Alexandra (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The volume of retail trade in 2021 exceeded that of the previous year by 7.3% in comparable prices; the volume of paid services consumed by households increased by 17.6% in annual terms.2 In 2021, growth in household consumption of goods and services was largely of a recovery nature, after as a result of pandemic-related restrictions their indices had declined in 2020 by 3.2% and 14.8% relative to 2019, respectively. The two-year movement of the volume of paid services (2019–2021) is near zero (+0.2%). The two-year growth in retail sales of foodstuffs, including beverages and tobacco products, amounted to 0.6%. The sales of non- food goods gained 7.1% relative to 2019. The cumulative retail turnover growth over two years amounted to 3.9% in comparable prices. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, retail trade, consumer price index, household consumption, paid services, |
| JEL: | E21 H31 I18 I19 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1223&r= |
| By: | Zubov Sergey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | At the end of 2021, the Russian banking system boasted of 370 credit institutions. A year earlier, their number constituted 406. During the year, the number of active credit institutions decreased by 36. The number of license revocations amounted to 26, voluntary revocation of licenses — 11. The number of banks with a universal license at the end of the year stood at 232 banks (248 at the beginning of the year), and with a basic license - 103 banks (118 at the beginning of the year). The number of non-bank credit institutions dropped by 5 to 35. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, banking sector, profit, capital, corporate loans, retail lending |
| JEL: | E41 E51 G28 G21 G24 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1199&r= |
| By: | Fang, Ming; Jin, Songqing; Deininger, Klaus W. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy, Production Economics, Productivity Analysis |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea22:322437&r= |
| By: | Baeva Marina (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Knobel Alexander (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The WTO system, in particular the mechanism for resolving trade disputes, has been in crisis for five years now. The main reasons are as follows: growth of protectionism, trade wars, the COVID-19 pandemic, systemic challenges, primarily freezing of the Appellate Body (AB). According to the U.S., AB goes beyond its authority, sometimes making decisions outside of WTO law, posing rights or obligations for member countries that are not provided for by existing WTO agreements, violates the deadlines for appellate review. The U.S. blocked decisions to appoint new AB members. Many WTO member countries agree on the need for reforms. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, WTO, trade disputes |
| JEL: | F10 F13 F19 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1200&r= |
| By: | Balandina Galina (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The year 2021 saw the accomplishment of reforms within the scope of the Comprehensive Program for Development of the RF Federal Customs Service till 2020 and the Strategy of the Development of the RF Customs Service till 2020. The main transformations are related primarily with the introduction of modern information technologies in customs procedures making it feasible to switch over to automatic registration of customs declarations and automatic (with no involvement of customs officials) release of goods. Vladimir Bulavin, Head of the RF Federal Customs Service declared that in 2021 25% of customs declaration were issued in an automatic mode when importing goods and nearly 43% when exporting. “After carrying out customs reforms, the customs authorities have achieved an optimal operating mode: at present 68%, 80% and 98% of customs declarations are released within an hour, 4 hours and a day, respectively, while only 2% of declarations are sent for checking. From January through November 2021, customs authorities registered in an automatic mode over 4.1 mn declarations and released automatically over 1.34 mn declarations.†2 Notably, an increase in the share of consignments with an automatic release of goods takes place amid a 37% pickup in foreign trade as compared with 2020. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, customs regulation |
| JEL: | F10 F13 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1214&r= |
| By: | Gondauri, Davit |
| Abstract: | Georgia's railway network is a key segment of the TRACECA, the shortest route from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Basin. Georgian Railway Corridor has a number of advantages over pipeline, alternative railways and auto transport. Changing the quality of crude oil does not occur during rail transportation, no pipelines for oil products. The Russian rail routes have a competitive disadvantage compared to Georgia as Novorossiysk Port is typically frozen in winter and operations are frequently delayed. The Russian and Iranian routes are significantly longer than the Georgian route, which increases costs, risks, and transportation time. The railway route running through Iran is less attractive than the Georgian route due to the tense political relations between Iran and the West. Railway transportation is considered safer and more environmentally friendly than road transportation. Expensive bulk transportation - in cases of bulk transportation, the railway is considered cheaper than the road. |
| Keywords: | Georgian railway,BRI,TRACECA,EVA,CAGR,GDP |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:opodis:20224&r= |
| By: | Shagaida Natalia (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Uzun Vasily (RANEPA); Ternovskiy Dmitry (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | At the beginning of 2020,6 the FAO set out guides about risks that can arise during a pandemic. The key world-wide risks are: panic buying, which can lead to temporary shortages; a decrease in allocations from donors to the poorest countries; the threat to population movement (including migrant workers), limiting the mobility of resources for agriculture and finished products; a high probability of restrictions on economic activity and, as a result, a decline in income, jeopardizing economic access to food. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, agricultural production, food security |
| JEL: | Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 I18 I19 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1202&r= |
| By: | Abramov Alexander (RANEPA); Radygin Alexandr (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Chernova Maria (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The market for Russian stocks was characterized by growth nearly throughout the whole year 2021; however, starting from November, it began to display a trend towards its downward adjustment. As shown in Fig. 1, among the 43 national stock indexes denominated in different currencies around the world, a positive annual return in 2021 was demonstrated by the composite indexes of 33 countries. The highest growth was achieved by the Argentina index (33.5%), followed closely by the S&P 500 (26.9%). The growth of Russia’s indexes, the RTS and IMOEX, was almost the same: 15.0% and 15.1%, respectively. However, over the first two months of 2022, the situation changed significantly: in January-February, IMOEX fell by a record 38.4%, and the RTS Index, by 41.3%. Over the same period of 2022, a majority of the 43 national stock indexes moved downward, except only a few of them, which were mainly those of developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Malaysia, Norway, Singapore, Turkey, the Philippines, and the RSA. The main reason behind this massive adjustment of national stock indexes was the announcement, in mid-December 2021, of the leaders of the US Federal Reserve System (FRS) that in March 2022 they planned to curtail the current quantitative easing program, and so there was a high probability that the interest rates set by the Central Bank would begin to climb. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, stock market, bond market, corporate bond market, derivatives market, private investors |
| JEL: | G01 G12 G18 G21 G24 G28 G32 G33 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1197&r= |
| By: | Ponomarev Yuri (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Borzykh Ksenia (RANEPA); Aliev S. (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | After a dramatic decline of the main performance indicators of the transportation industry on the back of acute implications of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, the year 2021 saw the signs of recovery of this sector, however, the indicators (the transportation volume) remained below the pre-pandemic level. The rates of recovery of the transportation industry correlate closely with the dynamics of related industries (intersectoral linkages), such as tourism, the building industry and retail trade. A pickup in transportation services was driven by the lifting of restrictions and a revival of global production, business activity and logistics chains. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, transportation industry, freight tariffs, passenger traffic, railways |
| JEL: | L91 L92 L93 L99 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1215&r= |
| By: | Thierry Warin |
| Abstract: | The world has changed and companies are facing a perfect storm, with catastrophic risks that have a very low probability of occurrence, but for which the consequences are enormous. The war in Ukraine is impacting global supply chains already constrained by the COVID-19 pandemic. Ukraine is responsible for about 70% of the world's neon and Russia controls 44% of the world's supply of palladium, both of which are essential inputs in semiconductor production. Semiconductors are themselves essential to the manufacture of cars, smartphones or even medical equipment. With Taiwan producing nearly two-thirds of the world's semiconductors, China's move to reunify with the island of Taiwan raises significant concerns. In this complex geopolitical context, some companies are considering reshoring or nearshoring, i.e. the repatriation of specific activities within national ou regional borders. Is this the right solution or not? In this short text, Thierry Warin, Fellow CIRANO and responsible of the CIRANO Pole on Data Science for Trade and Intermodal Transportationfor argues that the solutions to recent complex supply problems must themselves be complex. We need to use the tools we have access to today: massive data, computing power and new methods of analysis. The global trade system must adapt to a new technological paradigm, that of artificial intelligence and data science. The alternative of using the same mental patterns as in the past and proposing binary solutions is no longer acceptable today. There is no more time to lose. Le monde a changé et les entreprises sont confrontées à une tempête parfaite, avec des risques catastrophiques dont la probabilité d'occurrence est minime, mais pour lesquels les conséquences sont énormes. La guerre en Ukraine a un impact sur les chaînes d'approvisionnement mondiales déjà limitées par la pandémie de COVID-19. L’Ukraine est responsable d’environ 70 % du néon sur la planète et la Russie contrôle 44 % des approvisionnements mondiaux en palladium, deux intrants indispensables dans la production des semi-conducteurs. Les semi-conducteurs sont eux-mêmes indispensables à la fabrication de voitures, de téléphones intelligents ou même d’équipements médicaux. Avec Taïwan qui produit près des deux tiers des semi-conducteurs du monde, la velléité de la Chine de procéder à la réunification avec l’île de Taïwan soulève d’importantes inquiétudes. Dans ce contexte géopolitique complexe, certaines entreprises envisagent le rapatriement de certaines activités à l’intérieur des frontières nationales — le reshoring — ou régionales — le nearshoring. Est-ce, oui ou non, la bonne solution ? Dans ce court texte, Thierry Warin, Fellow CIRANO et responsable du Pôle CIRANO en science des données pour les échanges commerciaux et le transport intermodal, soutient que les solutions aux problèmes complexes d'approvisionnement récents doivent elles-mêmes être complexes. Nous devons utiliser les outils auxquels nous avons accès aujourd'hui : les données massives, la puissance de calcul et les nouvelles méthodes d'analyse. Le commerce mondial doit s'adapter à un nouveau paradigme technologique, celui de l'intelligence artificielle et de la science des données. L'alternative qui serait d'utiliser les mêmes schémas mentaux que par le passé et de proposer des solutions binaires n'est plus acceptable aujourd'hui. Il n'y a plus de temps à perdre. |
| Keywords: | Supply chains,Data science,Relocation,International trade,Global value chains, Chaînes logistiques,science des données,relocalisation,commerce international,chaînes de valeur mondiales |
| Date: | 2022–08–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:circah:2022pe-05&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The economy proved resilient to Covid-19 and continued recovering in 2021, with growth estimated at 7 percent. Growth is forecasted to slow to 6 percent this year due to the war in Ukraine. Inflation increased to 4.2 percent last year, on the back of surging food prices, and is expected at 5.5 percent this year, while the current account deficit is projected to reach 4.8 percent of GDP. Risks are tilted to the downside, as a result of the war in Ukraine, global financing conditions, and regional instability. |
| Date: | 2022–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/205&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The fallout from the war in Ukraine has hit the German economy before it regained its pre-pandemic GDP level, with effects running through higher energy costs, the possibility of gas shortages and broader supply disruptions, and weaker confidence. Consumer price inflation has spiked above 8 percent, largely because of energy price increases, but inflation pressures are becoming more widespread. |
| Date: | 2022–07–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/229&r= |
| By: | Bozhechkova Alexandra (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Trunin Pavel (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, the rapid acceleration of the rate of inflation and overshooting by the actual inflation of the RF Central Bank’s target were the key challenges to the monetary policy following a fast recovery of demand amid limited capacities to increase supply of numerous goods and the easing of the monetary and fiscal policies. As a result, the RF Central Bank has switched over to the tightening of the monetary policy and raised the key interest rate at all its meetings of the Board of Directors since March 2021. In 2021, the key interest rate picked up by 4.25 p.p. from 4.25% annually to 8.5% annually, a record-high since 2017. It is noteworthy that such a lengthy phase of tightening of the monetary policy was observed for the first time since 2014. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, monetary policy, money market, exchange rate, inflation, balance of payments, fiscal policy |
| JEL: | E31 E43 E44 E51 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1195&r= |
| By: | Apevalova Elena (RANEPA); Polezhaeva Natalia (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In April 2020, more than half of the world population lived in countries where strict restrictions on movement were being imposed, disrupting people’s lives, business activity and international mobility. These containment measures resulted in a sharp decline in total consumption and in a shrinking of trade. The global economy lost 4.3%, which is 6 times the scale of the global recession of 2008—2009.2 Global foreign direct investment (FDI), which is considered to be a catalyst for economic development and corporate governance improvement, fell by 42% in 20203 relative to 2019. The decline was experienced in the main by developed countries, where these particular investment flows plummeted by 69% (in Europe, the decline amounted to 101%; in the USA, to 49%). In transition economies, FDI declined by 77%. In the developing countries, FDI lost about 12% on average. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, corporate governance |
| JEL: | M15 M16 O31 I18 I19 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1222&r= |
| By: | Apevalova Elena (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Polezhaeva Natalia (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In recent years, an important trend in the evolvement of Russia’s legislation has been the increasing level of responsibility of companies’ CEOs and controlling entities as a result of the introduction, in 2017, of a new chapter in the Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)†, titled “Responsibility of the debtor’s CEO and other individuals and entities in a bankruptcy case†, and the subsequent rapid increase in the number of cases where the latter were brought to subsidiary liability. Within the framework of that chapter, additional (subsidiary) liability of a company’s CEO and the individuals and entities controlling the company is envisaged; the latter can be recognized to be the those who (both individuals and legal entities) for not more than 3 years prior to the emergence of signs of bankruptcy (as well as after their emergence and prior to the receipt, by an arbitration court, of the petition concerning the recognition of the debtor to be bankrupt), had enjoyed the right to issue to the debtor instructions that the latter was obliged to implement, or had had “the ability to otherwise determine the actions of the debtor, including the execution of transactions and the determination of their terms†. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, corporate governance, bancruptcies |
| JEL: | I18 I19 G32 G33 G34 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1212&r= |
| By: | Gern, Klaus-Jürgen; Kooths, Stefan; Reents, Jan; Sonnenberg, Nils; Stolzenburg, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | In a situation with already elevated inflation, the war in Ukraine and the zero-covid policy in China have led to additional upward pressures on prices and reinforced the global supply chain problems. Real wages are declining in many countries, dampening personal consumption expenditures even though households are often able to draw from a substantial amount of extra savings accumulated during the pandemic. Given the widespread inflationary pressures, central banks have shifted towards a more restrictive monetary policy stance. Against this backdrop, the outlook for global growth has weakened. We forecast global growth of 3.0 percent in 2022 and 3.2 percent in 2023 (measured in terms of purchasingpower parities), representing a reduction by 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points for 2022 and 2023, respectively. The forecast is based on the assumption that commodity prices have peaked, which would reduce inflationary pressures considerably going forward. However, there is the risk that inflation proves to be more persistent than central banks expect. In such a case, central banks would need to step on the brakes more than assumed, with the risk of a recession in advanced economies and a pronounced deterioration in financial conditions in emerging markets. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkeo:91&r= |
| By: | Klyachko Tatiana (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | In 2020, most school teachers, secondary vocational education instructors, lecturers of higher educational establishments (HEE), as well as learners believed that the pandemic would not last for long and, consequently, the adopted measures, including a shift to distance learning would be over soon. Late in 2020 and early in 2021, it became clear that the pandemic would continue for quite a long time and the existing approaches both to instruction and learning had to be adjusted. On one side, new technologies started to be utilized, while on the other side there was more comprehension of the existing resources being at the disposal of educational establishments, teachers and learners. Accordingly, the process of assessing shortages of technical equipment, skilled teachers and managers, as well as financial resources began. |
| Keywords: | Education system, general education, vocational education, distance learning, higher education |
| JEL: | I21 I22 I23 I24 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1218&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | CEMAC ended 2021 in a fragile external position, with gross reserves at only 2.7 months of prospective imports and net foreign assets (NFA) at their lowest level in decades, despite the availability of Fund financing, the SDR allocation, and monetary policy tightening. The terms of trade shock this year is expected to be broadly positive for CEMAC. This more favorable outlook is, however, subject to heightened external uncertainties associated with the fallout from the war in Ukraine (notably global inflation pressure, global growth uncertainties, and high oil price volatility), faster-than-anticipated global financial tightening, possible emergence of new COVID strains and risks from cryptoassets. Current high oil prices, if sustained, will help rebuild fiscal and external buffers, provided fiscal policies remain prudent. Shielding vulnerable populations from soaring energy and food prices adds to the complexity of navigating this uncertain environment, given CEMAC’s already limited policy options. |
| Date: | 2022–07–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/208&r= |
| By: | Ademmer, Martin; Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Jannsen, Nils; Kooths, Stefan; Meuchelböck, Saskia; Sonnenberg, Nils |
| Abstract: | The German economy is once again facing strong headwinds. The war in Ukraine is leading to a surge in commodity prices, additional supply bottlenecks and dwindling sales opportunities. These factors are hitting the economy in a phase in which the dampening effects of the pandemic are fading out and a strong recovery has begun to emerge. Higher commodity prices reduce the purchasing power of disposable incomes and thus dampen private consumption, while new supply bottlenecks will weigh on industrial production in the coming months. At the same time, sales opportunities deteriorate at least temporarily due to the sanctions and the uncertainty caused by the war. The negative effects, however, are cushioned because private households have accumulated large amounts of extra savings since the beginning of the pandemic, softening the blow to private consumption caused by higher inflation. In addition, manufacturing firms have an unusually high stock of orders, which will buffer lower sales opportunities. As a result, the recovery is likely to continue this year, albeit at a noticeably slower pace than previously expected. Overall, we expect GDP to rise by 2.1 percent this year (winter forecast: 4 percent) and by 3.5 percent in 2023 (winter forecast: 3.3 percent). At 5.8 percent, inflation is likely to be higher this year than ever before in reunified Germany. Even if commodity prices stop rising and supply bottlenecks gradually ease, inflation is still likely to be unusually high at 3.4 percent next year, also because recent producer price increases are only gradually being passed through to consumers. The labor market is expected to remain robust. Public spending will rise in response to the war and its economic consequences, so that budget deficits will remain at elevated levels for a longer period. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:261364&r= |
| By: | Ademmer, Martin; Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Jannsen, Nils; Kooths, Stefan; Meuchelböck, Saskia; Sonnenberg, Nils |
| Abstract: | The German economy is once again facing strong headwinds. The war in Ukraine is leading to a surge in commodity prices, additional supply bottlenecks and dwindling sales opportunities. These factors are hitting the economy in a phase in which the dampening effects of the pandemic are fading out and a strong recovery has begun to emerge. Higher commodity prices reduce the purchasing power of disposable incomes and thus dampen private consumption, while new supply bottlenecks will weigh on industrial production in the coming months. At the same time, sales opportunities deteriorate at least temporarily due to the sanctions and the uncertainty caused by the war. The negative effects, however, are cushioned because private households have accumulated large amounts of extra savings since the beginning of the pandemic, softening the blow to private consumption caused by higher inflation. In addition, manufacturing firms have an unusually high stock of orders, which will buffer lower sales opportunities. As a result, the recovery is likely to continue this year, albeit at a noticeably slower pace than previously expected. Overall, we expect GDP to rise by 2.1 percent this year (winter forecast: 4 percent) and by 3.5 percent in 2023 (winter forecast: 3.3 percent). At 5.8 percent, inflation is likely to be higher this year than ever before in reunified Germany. Even if commodity prices stop rising and supply bottlenecks gradually ease, inflation is still likely to be unusually high at 3.4 percent next year, also because recent producer price increases are only gradually being passed through to consumers. The labor market is expected to remain robust. Public spending will rise in response to the war and its economic consequences, so that budget deficits will remain at elevated levels for a longer period. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkeo:89&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Since program approval, Niger has been facing a more challenging international context, including the fall-out from the war in Ukraine, which is exacerbating pressures on food and fertilizer prices. Moreover, unfavorable rainfall and a deterioration in the security situation led to a deceleration of growth to 1.3 percent in 2021 and an acute food crisis. A temporary deviation of fiscal deficit targets from the program in 2022-23 is needed to respond to urgent expenditure pressures, while the medium-term outlook is largely unchanged favored by the start of oil exports through the new pipeline. |
| Date: | 2022–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/227&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Germany entered COVID-19 with strong public and private sector balance sheets, and large financial buffers. The financial sector has weathered well the shocks related to COVID-19 and the impact of the war has been limited so far. However, financial conditions have tightened recently and risks to the economy and the financial system have increased. The main risks relate to an escalation of the war that could be associated with a Russian gas shut off and higher commodity prices, a global resurgence of COVID-19 with extended supply chain disruptions, and de-anchoring of inflation expectations in the U.S. and advanced Europe. Structural vulnerabilities related to persistent low bank profitability and misalignments in the real estate sector prices indicated in the 2016 FSAP remain a concern. |
| Date: | 2022–07–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/231&r= |
| By: | Lisandra Flach; Isabella Goruevich; Leif Grandum; Lisa Scheckenhofer; Feodora Teti; Isabella Gourevich |
| Abstract: | The Ukraine war and geopolitical tensions pose major challenges for supply chains. Whereas shortages of microchips became a symbol of supply chain disruptions during Covid-19, a survey from June 2022 from the ifo Institute shows that over 74% of German manufacturing firms report production disruptions due to shortages of different types of inputs and raw materials. The production of key technologies that are necessary, for instance for the energy transition, often depends on imported raw materials. Therefore, it is important to evaluate Germany’s raw material dependencies at the product level to identify the risk of future supply chain disruptions. This paper identifies nine critical raw materials, which have a high degree of supplier concentration and are used in more than half of the key technologies. For these raw materials, we provide a detailed analysis on Germany’s dependency on imports. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:econpb:_43&r= |
| By: | Greyling, Talita; Rossouw, Stephanié |
| Abstract: | During the global response to COVID-19, the analogy of fighting a war was often used. In 2022, the world faced a different war altogether, an unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since 2020 the world has faced these unprecedented shocks. Although we realise these events' health and economic effects, more can be known about the happiness effects on the people in a country and how it differs between a health and a war shock. Additionally, we need to investigate if these external shocks do affect wellbeing, how they differ from one another, and how long it takes happiness to adapt to these shocks. Therefore, this paper aims to compare these two external shocks for ten countries spanning the Northern and Southern hemispheres to investigate the effect on happiness. By investigating the aforementioned, we also re-examine the adaptation theory and see whether it holds at the country level. We use a unique dataset derived from tweets extracted in real-time per country. We derive each tweet's underlying sentiment by applying Natural Language Processing (machine learning). Using the sentiment score, we apply algorithms to construct daily time-series data to measure happiness (Gross National Happiness (GNH)). Our Twitter dataset is combined with data from Oxford's COVID-19 Government Response Tracker. We find that in both instances, the external shocks caused a decrease in GNH. Considering both types of shocks, the adaptation to previous happiness levels occurred within weeks. Understanding the effects of external shocks on happiness is essential for policymakers as effects on happiness have a spillover effect on other variables such as production, safety and trust. Furthermore, the additional macro-level results on the adaptation theory contribute to previously unexplored fields of study. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1129&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Kenya’s economy has been rebounding strongly in a challenging environment. Global shocks from the war in Ukraine and related trade disruptions—alongside more challenging financing conditions for frontier markets due to a normalization of monetary policy in advanced economies—will impact the external position in the near term. Inflation is set to increase, albeit temporarily, with the pass-through of global price shocks. Domestically, shortfall in rains and the continuing drought in the semi-arid regions are adding to uncertainties and pressuring vulnerable groups. The authorities view their IMF-supported program as a key policy anchor in the face of these shocks. While surging global fuel prices have made containing the cost of recently granted fuel subsidies urgent, Kenya’s strong fiscal performance provides scope to cushion the adjustment to these shocks without exceeding program deficit targets. Strong performance of tax revenues is a key driver of this resilience. Policy tradeoffs will remain difficult, however, heading into August elections. |
| Date: | 2022–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/232&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Economic recovery is gaining momentum but remains fragile amid the on-going COVID-19 pandemic and Ukraine war’s ripple effects. Despite oil exports benefiting from high oil prices, the war’s impact on prices of food and other essentials weighs on households and businesses. Over the medium term, challenges from climate change and the global transition to low-carbon economies persist. In this context, steadfast reform implementation is needed to reduce fragility through job creation and higher incomes. Debt remains sustainable but is classified as “in distress” due to arrears; a financing assurances review was conducted. Debt vulnerabilities to negative oil price shocks remain. A three-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement in the amount of SDR 324 million (200 percent of quota) was approved by the IMF Executive Board on January 21, 2022. |
| Date: | 2022–07–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/226&r= |
| By: | Anatoliy Kostruba (Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University); V. Mikhailov,; S. Shniukov,; T. Kharytonova,; K. Hryhorieva,; M. Tkalych, |
| Abstract: | The current version of the Tax Code allows for misinterpretation of the interpretation of the term "primary processing of mineral resources". In particular, the tax authorities believe that the primary processing of mineral raw materials includes magnetite concentrate, which in this case is subject to taxation. That is, a number of mining and processing enterprises have faced the problem of double taxation, which threatens significant financial losses. Accordingly, this led to the choice of topic for writing this article, the purpose of which is to conduct research on changes in mineral forms of minerals (iron ore), their aggregate-phase state, crystal chemical structure during production processes at mining, crushing and concentrating production of Kryvyi Rih mining and processing enterprises, and establishing at what stage of production the primary processing of minerals for the purposes of rent taxation is completed and whether the position of enterprises on limiting primary processing by the stage of fragmentation meets the requirements of the Tax Code of Ukraine. |
| Keywords: | Tax code,subsoil use,double taxation,mineral resources,iron ore basin,geology,minerals |
| Date: | 2022–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03685274&r= |
| By: | Mau Vladimir (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | The coronavirus pandemic that the world was first faced with in late 2019 and early 2020 presented a key challenge to socioeconomic and political development across the majority of developed and developing countries. Over the recent decades, and perhaps even the entire postwar period (since 1945), it became the most powerful shock for the global economy. The shrinkage, in 2020, of global GDP by 3.4% was significantly greater than that observed during the acute phase of the 2009 crisis (by 1.3%). Over the entire period after World War II, there were only two episodes when global GDP demonstrated negative dynamics, in 2009 and 2020. Next comes the slowdown in 1982, when that indicator was still on the rise, but it gained just 0.41%. Although the crisis caused by the pandemic was initially triggered by non- economic factors, its economic consequences were very significant. The pandemic produced some huge macroeconomic and structural shifts. However, for an adequate assessment of these shifts, they should be analyzed in the context of more general trends, including the structural crisis of 2008—2009; in our opinion, that crisis was at the time just checked, but by no means overcome. In fact, the world was then faced with a structural crisis that was not followed by structural reforms, because the governments of the world’s leading countries managed to “pay off†(that is, to mitigate its consequences at the cost of avoiding “creative destruction†(the term suggested by J. Schumpeter1). The upshot was a decade of low growth and stunted globalization, unprecedented increases in budget deficits and central bank balance sheets, and exceptionally low inflation. All these phenomena taken together were later described by the terms “new normal†and “long-term stagnation†. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, COVID-19, economic growth, economic crisis, economic policy |
| JEL: | P16 P26 P48 I18 I19 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2022-1216&r= |
| By: | Hannu Laurila |
| Abstract: | Cash money can be a rational devise of saving as an insurance against external uncertainty. Liquid money, controlled by a stable and trustworthy central bank, offers an insurance against stock market crashes, bankrupts and other economic turmoils that endanger the yield of illiquid saving modes. In turbulent times, the value-carrying property of money is accentuated, and the recent dark episodes including the last financial crisis, the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have made the public in Europe respond to uncertainty by increasing their cash holdings. The paper constructs a simple life cycle framework for the analysis of rational and irrational motives to save money, answers to questions about the effects of saving liquid money on illiquid saving and education and examines the inherent cost of the use of cash as a saving mode. The main findings of the paper are the following. The insurance motive to save money increases total savings by replacing deposit saving more than one-to-one. The share of deposit savings depends positively on the expected interest rate, while the share of cash savings is the higher the less there is inflation. Deposit saving correlates positively and education negatively with the expected market interest rate thus affecting their relative proportion, but education does not affect the implicit price paid for cash insurance. Incorporating money illusion adds an internal bias to life-time optimization. Misjudgment of the inflation rate makes consumers save excessively in cash at the cost of market deposits and increases the cost of using cash as rational insurance against external uncertainty. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tam:wpaper:2235&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | This virtual technical assistance (TA) mission supported the Agency in strengthening certain elements of its risk-based supervisory framework. The mission provided recommendations and training to the Agency on the assessment of banks’ recovery plans and interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB). The mission benefited from simultaneous translation. The priorities for the forthcoming TA missions were discussed with the Agency (strengthening cybersecurity in financial institutions, and assessment of banks’ liquidity within the SREP framework). |
| Date: | 2022–07–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/212&r= |
| By: | Jacques Fontanel (CESICE - Centre d'études sur la sécurité internationale et les coopérations européennes - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble) |
| Abstract: | There are many factors of crisis in the daily life of the citizens of this world. Thus, the four great eternal problems of humanity (pandemics, war, religious intolerance, hunger), which for a time man believed capable, if not of eradicating, at least of controlling, have come back to challenge international chancelleries, philosophers or the whole of suffering humanity.-The famous pandemics such as the plague or smallpox seemed to have been solved when Covid-19 appeared. Of course, the appearance of new pandemics was not excluded, but the modern world, imbued with its technicality, has always thought that it had the logistical, scientific and medical means to find a quick solution to the lethality of this threat.-With nuclear weapons and the opening of most countries to free trade under the control of the World Trade Organization, conflicts between the great powers seemed highly unlikely, given the destructive consequences of nuclear weapons capable of eradicating life on Earth. Moreover, the economic interdependencies that lead to the respect of the "soft market" favor situations of negotiations for a lasting peace, considering the economic stakes of the partners, who have no interest in becoming belligerents.-Philosophical and religious issues seemed to lead to more secularism and less intolerance. Today, the principles of life that bring people together diverge, between a Western world based on republican principles, but also on an inequitable consumer society, the world of the great contesting powers that are not very sensitive to democratic values and are concerned with establishing a less American-centric world that is more open to their own ideologies (China, Russia, India, Middle Eastern states, for example) and finally the countries of the rest of the world (the Third World in perpetuity) still sucked in by economic scarcity and hunger, continuing imbalances of state power, national and international wars and conflicts, and religious issues.-Religious beliefs and divergent notions of the concept of democracy do not lead to a peaceful world, especially because of proselytizing and the will to power expressed by great powers. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03703460&r= |
| By: | Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Jannsen, Nils; Kooths, Stefan; Meuchelböck, Saskia; Sonnenberg, Nils |
| Abstract: | The German economy navigates troubled waters. The catch-up process in the contact-intensive service industries is continuing at a fast pace and companies in the manufacturing sector are sitting on wellfilled order books. However, high inflation is reducing the purchasing power of disposable incomes and thus dampening the recovery in consumption. In addition, supply bottlenecks have recently worsened again due to the war in Ukraine. As a result, the recovery will regain strength only in the second half of the year, when prices will no longer rise as rapidly and supply bottlenecks will begin to ease. Overall, we expect GDP to increase by 2.1 percent this year, as in our spring forecast. In 2023, GDP will grow by 3.3 percent (spring forecast: 3.5 percent). At 7.4 percent, inflation in the current year will be higher than ever before in reunified Germany. Next year, inflation will probably remain high with 4.2 percent. The recovery in employment continues. Effective earnings will rise strongly, also because labor shortages have reached an all-time high. In the current year, however, the increase of about 5 percent will lag behind the rate of inflation. Public budget deficits will decline as revenues increase strongly and pandemic-related expenditures are reduced. In 2023, public debt in relation to GDP is expected to be slightly above 60 percent. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkeo:92&r= |
| By: | ITF |
| Abstract: | This report provides scenarios for future transport demand and CO2 emissions in North and Central Asia up to 2050 to help decision makers chart pathways to sustainable, resilient transport. The scenarios reflect existing policy initiatives and specific constraints in the region. They also examine the potential impact of policies addressing the challenges and opportunities for transport from Covid-19. |
| Date: | 2022–06–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:itfaac:105-en&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The economy started to recover in 2021—with growth, fiscal performance, and the current account outperforming program expectations. Inflation remained subdued in 2021, but has picked up in recent months. Growth is expected to strengthen to 2.4 percent in 2022, but is being marked down by 0.3 ppts. from the third review, reflecting global economic headwinds, including tighter financial conditions and spillovers from the war in Ukraine. Although Jordan’s wheat reserves provide assurance on near-term food security, persistently high food and fuel prices pose a major near-term policy challenge, especially given high unemployment (23 percent) and limited fiscal space. The current account deficit is projected to widen to 6.7 percent of GDP in 2022, as a larger fuel import bill dominates strong tourism receipts and robust exports. |
| Date: | 2022–07–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/221&r= |
| By: | Urutyan, Vardan; Hovhannisyan, Vardges; Khachatryan, Armen |
| Keywords: | Marketing, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agribusiness |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea22:322588&r= |