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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Alessandro Borin (Bank of Italy); Francesco Paolo Conteduca (Bank of Italy); Enrica Di Stefano (Bank of Italy); Vanessa Gunnella (European Central Bank); Michele Mancini (European Central Bank); Ludovic Panon (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | We provide a quantification of the impact through international trade of the restrictive measures and related trade disruptions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We first exploit the multi-sector, multi-country, general equilibrium trade model by Antr’and Chor (2018). In this framework, Russia would suffer greatly from trade disruptions. Adding restrictive measures on energy exports would further amplify this loss. For sanctioning countries, the welfare impact is modest. This result arises mainly because the used model allows for a high degree of substitutability across inputs and countries, a feature arguably unrealistic especially in the short-run. When we relax this assumption by relying on the framework proposed by Bachmann et al. (2022) extended to a multi-country setting, we show that the impact on sanctioning countries might increase markedly in the short run and would be very sensitive to small changes in countries’ possibility to diversify away from Russian energy. |
| Keywords: | war, trade disruptions, energy shock, international trade, global value chains |
| JEL: | F51 F15 F17 Q43 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_700_22&r= |
| By: | Jacques Fontanel (CESICE - Centre d'études sur la sécurité internationale et les coopérations européennes - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble) |
| Abstract: | La Russie s'est engagée dans une « opération spéciale » contre l'Ukraine, « la petite Russie ». L'action militaire devait être rapidement conduite, encouragée par une part importante de citoyens ukrainiens. Au contraire, les combats militaires ont mis en évidence la résistance du peuple ukrainien, soutenu par l'aide en équipement militaires et les sanctions politico-économiques imposées à la Russie principalement par l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis.. De fait, le conflit touche les intérêts de l'ensemble des pays du monde, avec les sanctions exercées sur le système monétaire et financier russe, sur l'exercice interrompue pour la Russie |
| Keywords: | War,economic war,economic sanctions,NATO,famine,Russia,Russie,Ukraine,Guerre,guerre économique,sanctions économiques,OTAN |
| Date: | 2022–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03703457&r= |
| By: | Zubarev, Andrey; Kirillova, Maria |
| Abstract: | The relationship between the economies of various countries and their dependence on the world markets indicate that for econometric analysis of the impact of external shocks on a particular economy, it is necessary to use a model of the global economy. The aim of this paper is to build a global vector autoregression model (GVAR), including Russia as one of the regions, and to obtain the impact of some external economic shocks on Russian macroeconomic indicators. We build a model that includes 41 of the world's major economies, including Russia, and the oil market. The special features of our model are structural shifts in the dynamics of Russian output and the new specification of oil supply and oil demand. Impulse response functions are used to obtain quantitative estimates. In this paper, we analyze the reaction of outputs, oil production volumes and oil prices in response to the output shock of the United States. In response to the negative shock of output in the world's leading economy, outputs in the rest of the world declined for at least the first year after the shock. There was also a significant decline in oil prices and no significant change in oil production volumes in most countries. |
| Keywords: | global vector autoregression, GVAR, oil prices, GDP, oil production, impulse response function |
| JEL: | C32 E17 |
| Date: | 2022–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113762&r= |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Alexandra Bykova (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Rumen Dobrinsky (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Selena Duraković; Richard Grieveson (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Doris Hanzl-Weiss (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Marcus How; Gabor Hunya (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Branimir Jovanović (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Niko Korpar (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Sebastian Leitner (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Isilda Mara (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Olga Pindyuk (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Sandor Richter (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Bernd Christoph Ströhm; Maryna Tverdostup (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Nina Vujanović (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Zuzana Zavarská (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Adam Żurawski |
| Abstract: | Winter Forecast Update Strong Growth but Big Downside Risks in 2022 Economic Forecasts for Eastern Europe for 2022-24 In CESEE, both inflation and COVID-19 cases are rising rapidly. Plan A in the region seems to be to hope that both problems largely resolve themselves, with real interest rates set to remain mostly negative and COVID-19 restrictions limited. Our baseline macroeconomic outlook for the region is relatively upbeat, reflecting adaptability, resilience, and the assumption that the vast majority of COVID-19 cases in the current and any further waves of the pandemic will be very mild. Although CESEE growth will slow from 5.7% last year to 3.2% in 2022, this reflects the phasing-out of favourable base effects from 2020 and the weak performance of the region’s two biggest economies, Russia and Turkey. In both EU-CEE and the Western Balkans, real growth will top 4% this year – a slowdown from 2021, but still a healthy rate of expansion. However, there are material downside risks to these forecasts, especially owing to the possibility that high inflation will dampen economic growth momentum. Meanwhile, political risks are at their highest since 2014 in the former Soviet Union, and highest since the 1990s in the Western Balkans. A Russian invasion of Ukraine would lead to a renewed exchange of sanctions with the West and an even sharper spike in energy prices, damaging the economies of both sides. Overview by Richard Grieveson Most economies in CESEE will post robust growth again this year, but both Russia and Turkey are set for a slowdown, and downside risks have risen across the region. Political risks in CESEE in 2022 by Marcus How Political risks in CESEE are at their highest level since the 1990s, due to a combination of the threats of war in Ukraine and secession in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some key elections in EU-CEE. Country updates Albania Strong rebound in investment and consumption boosts growth by Isilda Mara Belarus Economic prospects remain gloomy by Rumen Dobrinsky Bosnia and Herzegovina Political tensions reach the highest level since the 1990s by Selena Duraković Bulgaria New government, but major economic policy changes unlikely by Rumen Dobrinsky Croatia Solid growth following stellar recovery by Bernd Christoph Ströhm Czechia Resilient growth despite bumps in the road by Zuzana Zavarská Estonia Growth approaching the limits by Maryna Tverdostup Hungary Time to step on the brakes by Sándor Richter Kazakhstan Stable outlook despite recent turmoil by Alexandra Bykova Kosovo Growth momentum hampered by energy crisis by Isilda Mara Latvia Further restrictions slow down recovery by Sebastian Leitner Lithuania Economic catch-up continues amidst the pandemic by Sebastian Leitner Moldova Hit by Russian gas price hikes by Gábor Hunya Montenegro Ambitious economic reform increases both optimism and the fiscal risks by Nina Vujanović North Macedonia Can the new government stimulate the economy? by Branimir Jovanović Poland Personal income tax reform off to a bad start by Adam Żurawski Romania Stable government helps meet conditions for EU assistance by Gábor Hunya Russia Geopolitical escalation on the cards by Vasily Astrov Serbia Public spending lifts the economy by Branimir Jovanović Slovakia Semiconductor shortage still constrains future growth by Doris Hanzl-Weiss Slovenia Stable economic outlook to shape key election year by Niko Korpar Turkey Weaker growth after currency collapse by Richard Grieveson Ukraine Threat of military invasion by Russia by Olga Pindyuk |
| Keywords: | CESEE, economic forecast, Central and Eastern Europe, Southeast Europe, Western Balkans, EU, euro area, CIS, coronavirus, COVID-19, Omicron, China, zero-COVID, pandemic, restrictions, lockdowns, EU Recovery and Resilience Facility, NextGenerationEU, semiconductors, credit, investment, exports, FDI, labour markets, unemployment, inflation, exchange rates, monetary policy, fiscal policy, near-shoring, political risks |
| JEL: | E20 E21 E22 E23 E24 E31 E32 E5 E62 F21 F31 H60 I18 J20 J30 O47 O52 O57 P24 P27 P33 P52 |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:mpaper:mr:2022-01&r= |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Russia and China challenge the liberal order and rule of law on a global and regional level. The Trump administration has facilitated the support of the move away from the liberal international order and the ‘Westphalian’ system of states that America had defended for centuries. Extremism is thriving around the world, including in sub-Saharan Africa, fuelled by the aftermath of colonialism, poverty and Islamist ideologies. Regions with limited statehood became failed states where violent conflicts threatened regional security and stability. Russia benefited from the resulting power vacuum. Moscow focused on countries that were formerly French and Portuguese colonies, which Moscow believed are easier to infiltrate. Under these conditions, Putin is free to exploit the political and social contradictions in Africa and destabilize the Western order, even at the risk of the rise of Islamic terrorism. Terrorist criminal pipelines and corrupt states have been exploited by Russian arms dealers across Africa for decades. These included notorious support for the Taylor regime in Liberia in the early 2000s, including the infamous Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, dubbed the ‘merchant of death’. The cooperation was based on state control of ports of entry and exit for criminal organizations to safeguard profit-sharing, diplomatic passports, including associated immunity, and the rule of law, which ensured the smooth marketing of these companies. Today, Russia benefits primarily from providing ‘security’ to autocratic leaders, including arms sales, advice and training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against Islamic terrorism in exchange for access to African resources and markets. Aside from Al-Quida, the Islamic State (ISIS), Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab other local Islamic organizations are fuelling terrorism in SSA. Moscow is particularly interested in the Horn of Africa to control important trade routes of global importance. |
| Keywords: | Russia; Vladimir Putin; Sub-Saharan Africa; global power; African resources; fragile state; poverty; extremism; Islamist terrorism; Boko Haram; ISIS; arms deals; arms industry; Eritrea; Nigeria; Ghana; Senegal; Mali; Burkina Faso; Mozambique; Somalia; Kenya; South Sudan; Horn of Africa; Postcolonialism; Westphalian sovereignty; fake news; Françafrique; African Studies; |
| JEL: | E26 F13 F35 F52 F54 H56 N17 N47 O17 P16 P26 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–06–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113618&r= |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | The impacts of the war in Ukraine will be felt severely within OECD economies, especially in border regions on the front-line of the humanitarian refugee crisis. The economic impacts, in particular those driven by rising energy prices, will also be spatially differentiated, affecting some regions more than others. Italy is no exception, with gas-intensive industries concentrated in northern regions, and wheat-based food and farming prevailing in southern regions and islands. While, overall, Russia accounted for a minor share of Italian exports, some regions and industries are more vulnerable than others to falls in bilateral trade, including destinations popular with high per-capita expenditure Russian tourists. |
| Keywords: | commodities, employment, spatial analysis, tourism, trade |
| JEL: | F16 F51 J43 O13 R11 R12 |
| Date: | 2022–07–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:cfeaaa:2022/08-en&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Recovery was strong in 2021, but there are headwinds from the war in Ukraine. 2021 output was 1 percent higher than in 2019, but 2 percent below pre-Covid trends; unemployment is back to pre-crisis levels. Inflation has picked up (2.5 percent in April), but below other advanced economies. Strong exports/merchanting led to a higher current account surplus. Although the energy mix (nuclear, hydro) has limited exposure to Russia, exposures of commodity traders and indirect channels could be important. Growth is likely to slow to 2¼ percent in 2022 (¾ ppt. drag from the war). Risks are to the downside (war escalation, Covid developments, real estate). Covid outlays are lower in 2022, but still large (1.2 percent of GDP). Outlays related to Ukraine are likely to be accommodated as extraordinary. The Swiss National Bank is closely monitoring inflation, seeing it returning to the 0–2 percent range this year. The authorities reactivated the sectoral CCyB for residential real estate. They are pursuing pension and labor reforms, climate initiatives, energy security, and renewed EU engagement. |
| Date: | 2022–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/171&r= |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Famines are almost always man-made often used as a deterrent. Since ancient times, food and hunger have been a weapon of war. Among the most notorious examples in Africa are the Herero and Namaqua genocide in German South-West Africa (now Namibia) from 1904 to 1908. It was the first genocide of the 20th century. Also, the subsequent famines in Biafra (South-East Nigeria, 1967-1969), when an estimated 1.5 million people starved to death, the 1980 famine in Uganda, one of the worst in African history, when 21% of the population died, and the recurring famines in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan since the 1990s have been burned into human memory. The use of food as a weapon was condemned as a war crime by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. Since most African countries are Least Developed Countries (LLCs), they will suffer the hardest in the aftermath of Putin's war in Ukraine, especially Africa's poor. They have already suffered the consequences of drought, the corona pandemic and Islamist terrorism. Their already weakened position will be exacerbated by the spill-over effects of Russian aggression in Ukraine, which will further exacerbate hunger and poverty in Africa. All the more so as international development aid to Africa is likely to suffer from a massive redirection of aid to rearmament. Last but not least, Putin's war in Ukraine will have a major impact on EU-Africa relations. In view of the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic for Africa, it will further damage the mutual trust between both partners. About 86% of Africans have yet to receive two doses of vaccine. A growing number of African heads of state and government no longer see Western countries as reliable partners. |
| Keywords: | Russie, invasion, Ukraine, Afrique, famine, commerce international, pouvoir alimentaire, marchés d'armes, État fragile, terrorisme islamiste, Maghreb, Égypte, Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Libye, Afrique subsaharienne, Afrique du Sud, Cameroun, Mozambique, Éthiopie, Kenya, Ouganda , Somalie, Namibie, Nigeria, Soudan, sécurité énergétique, Chine, UE, USA |
| JEL: | E26 E31 F02 F13 F35 F51 F54 H56 N47 N57 N77 P26 Q17 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–04–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112809&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Despite significant economic shocks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, twin natural disasters, and the war in Ukraine, Barbados has made good progress in implementing its Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT) plan to restore fiscal and debt sustainability, rebuild reserves, and increase growth. International reserves increased to US$1.5 billion at end-2021 supported by IFI loans. This, and a successful 2018-19 public debt restructuring, helped rebuild confidence in the country’s macroeconomic framework. Economic growth is projected at 11 percent for 2022 premised on a robust recovery of tourism, which is expected to return to pre-pandemic levels by 2024. The outlook nonetheless remains highly uncertain, and risks are elevated, including from higher global commodity prices following the Russian invasion of Ukraine that are feeding into inflation. Since Barbados imports the bulk of its food and energy needs, the government has adopted temporary VAT caps on oil products to contain retail price increases (fiscal cost of 0.3 percent of GDP). While fiscal accommodation was needed to respond to the pandemic and natural disasters over the past two years, the authorities are committed to running primary surpluses from FY2022/23 onwards which need to reach 5-6 percent of GDP in three years, consistent with meeting the 60 percent of GDP debt target by FY2035/36. |
| Date: | 2022–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/176&r= |
| By: | Krebs, Tom |
| Abstract: | This policy report studies the effects of a sudden stop of natural gas imports from Russia on the German economy. The analysis focuses on the supply-side effects that arise when a gas shortage affects production in the gas-intensive manufacturing sectors, with a corresponding production disruption that propagates along the value chain and through the entire economy. In a baseline scenario, a hypothetical gas embargo implemented in May 2022 leads to a short-run decline in aggregate output between 3.2 percent and 8 percent of GDP. In an alternative scenario, in which Germany can easily replace Russian gas imports by alternative imports, the short-run decline in aggregate output following the embargo is between 1.2 percent and 3 percent of GDP. In addition to the supply-side effects, an embargo causes a reduction in output via the demand-side channel. According to recent simulation studies, the demand-side effects of an energy embargo (coal, oil, natural gas) reduce GDP between 2 percent and 4 percent in the short run. These results underscore the high degree of uncertainty regarding the economic consequences of a sudden stop of Russian gas imports in the short run. Finally, an immediate gas embargo also causes permanent economic damage and has significant social implications. In policy terms, the results show the need for the German government to act as swiftly as possible to ensure independence from Russian energy imports. In addition, Germany's future energy system needs to be more resilient to macroeconomic and geopolitical shocks. |
| Keywords: | energy,sanctions,network effects |
| JEL: | D2 E1 Q4 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:22021&r= |
| By: | Tunio, Mohsin Waheed |
| Abstract: | This paper first looks for Sudden Stops in capital inflows to nineteen emerging economies of Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Africa as Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2008) based on the country-specific data availability from January 1990 to May 2022. The paper then introduces the notion of Systemic Sudden Stop as the one triggered by exogenous factors and measured in terms of a rise in Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spreads. The author finds out that four countries i.e. Indonesia, Thailand, Poland, and Egypt have already entered into the Systemic Sudden Stop phase while other emerging economies could also be at a greater risk of the similar situation. The major risks to emerging markets come from the commodity prices and rising inflation due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict; tightening financial conditions; mounting uncertainty; and recessionary fears. Nevertheless, on the positive note, net ratings of emerging market sovereign bonds have improved in comparison with the year 2020, and EMBI spreads have not increased much due to greater risk being already priced-in, especially in high yield. |
| Keywords: | sudden stops, capital inflows, capital outflows, emerging markets, exchange rate, current account, EMBI spreads |
| JEL: | F31 F32 F39 F41 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113693&r= |
| By: | Tunio, Mohsin Waheed |
| Abstract: | This paper first looks for Sudden Stops in capital inflows to nineteen emerging economies of Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Africa as Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2008) based on the country-specific data availability from January 1990 to May 2022. The paper then introduces the notion of Systemic Sudden Stop as the one triggered by exogenous factors and measured in terms of a rise in Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spreads. The author finds out that four countries i.e. Indonesia, Thailand, Poland, and Egypt have already entered into the Systemic Sudden Stop phase while other emerging economies could also be at a greater risk of the similar situation. The major risks to emerging markets come from the commodity prices and rising inflation due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict; tightening financial conditions; mounting uncertainty; and recessionary fears. Nevertheless, on the positive note, net ratings of emerging market sovereign bonds have improved in comparison with the year 2020, and EMBI spreads have not increased much due to greater risk being already priced-in, especially in high yield. |
| Keywords: | sudden stops, capital inflows, capital outflows, emerging markets, exchange rate, current account, EMBI spreads |
| JEL: | F31 F32 F39 F41 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113751&r= |
| By: | Gerards Iglesias, Simon |
| Abstract: | In der politischen Debatte um womöglich zu hohe Brennstoffpreise und "ungerechtfertigte" Gewinne der Mineralkonzerne infolge des Ukraine-Krieges gibt es auffallende Parallelen zu den Ölpreiskrisen der 1970er und frühen 1980er Jahre. Auch die Ideen politischer Entscheidungsträger ähneln sich frappierend und setzten damals wie heute marktwirtschaftliche Prinzipien auf den Prüfstand. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:542022&r= |
| By: | Gabriel Di Bella; Mr. Mark J Flanagan; Mr. Frederik G Toscani; Alex Pienkowski; Karim Foda; Martin Stuermer; Svitlana Maslova |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the implications of disruptions in Russian gas for Europe’s balances and economic output. Alternative sources could replace up to 70 percent of Russian gas, allowing Europe to avoid shortages during a temporary disruption of around 6 months. However, a longer full shut-off of Russian gas to the whole of Europe would likely interact with infrastructure bottlenecks to produce very high prices and significant shortages in some countries, with parts of Central and Eastern Europe most vulnerable. With natural gas an important input in production, the capacity of the economy would shrink. Our findings suggest that in the short term, the most vulnerable countries in Central and Eastern Europe — Hungary, Slovak Republic and Czechia — face a risk of shortages of as much as 40 percent of gas consumption and of gross domestic product shrinking by up to 6 percent. The effects on Austria, Germany and Italy would also be significant, but would depend on the exact nature of remaining bottlenecks at the time of the shutoff and consequently the ability of the market to adjust. Many other countries are unlikely to face such constraints and the impact on GDP would be moderate—possibly under 1 percent. Immediate policy priorities center on actions to mitigate impacts, including to eliminate constraints to a more integrated gas market via easing infrastructure bottlenecks, to accelerate efforts in defining and agreeing solidarity contributions, and to promote stronger pricing pass through and other measures to generate greater energy savings. National responses and RePowerEU contains many important measures to help address these challenges, but immediate coordinated action is called for, with specific opportunities in each of these areas. |
| Keywords: | Energy supply; natural gas; production output |
| Date: | 2022–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2022/145&r= |
| By: | Carl Grekou; Emmanuel Hache; Frédéric Lantz; Olivier Massol; Valérie Mignon |
| Abstract: | La guerre en Ukraine provoque de multiples bouleversements, parmi lesquels la scène énergétique occupe une place de premier plan. L’Europe, très fortement dépendante des hydrocarbures russes, est tout particulièrement touchée. Ce Policy Brief analyse les enjeux et défis, pour l’Europe, du conflit russo-ukrainien sur les marchés gazier et pétrolier. Il dresse un panorama complet de la production et des échanges de gaz et de pétrole prévalant avant la guerre, puis met en évidence la dépendance des économies européennes aux hydrocarbures russes dont les impacts économiques se sont manifestés dès le début des hostilités. Il décrit de façon approfondie les différents canaux via lesquels le choc à la hausse des prix des énergies pourrait déclencher une spirale inflationniste à même de faire craindre le retour de la stagflation qui a miné les économies européennes dans les années 1970 et 1980. La devise européenne n’est pas épargnée par ce conflit et sa dépréciation participe à la transmission de la hausse des prix de l’énergie à l’inflation de la zone euro. Plusieurs pistes sont enfin explorées qui pourraient permettre aux pays européens de s’émanciper de la dépendance russe : (i) introduction d’une réelle concurrence sur le marché gazier et prévention d’éventuelles ruptures d’approvisionnement en réglementant les obligations de stockage, (ii) diversification des sources d’approvisionnement en hydrocarbures et (iii) accélération de la transition énergétique en dépit des obstacles de court terme. |
| JEL: | E3 E66 F51 L71 Q34 Q35 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepipb:2022-37&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The authorities’ policy response aided a robust recovery from the COVID-19 shock in 2021 with output growth above expectations reflecting pent-up demand and strong export performance. However, spillovers from the war in Ukraine are expected to dampen growth, raise inflation, and widen the current account deficit this year. The recovery in 2021 and scaling back of pandemic measures led to a decline in the fiscal deficit and government debt. Inflation is expected to remain higher for longer, reflecting elevated global food and commodity prices. The NBG has increased its policy rate by 3 percentage points since March 2021. |
| Date: | 2022–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/188&r= |
| By: | Voigtländer, Michael |
| Abstract: | Der deutsche Wohnungsmarkt hat in den 2010er Jahren einen langen und starken Boom erlebt, doch mit den veränderten makroökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen im Zuge der Pandemie und des Kriegs gegen die Ukraine, insbesondere den steigenden Zinsen und der großen Unsicherheit, dürfte die Zeit starker Preissteigerungen vorbei sein. Ein Blick zurück bis in die 1970er Jahre legt nahe, dass sich Anleger in den nächsten Jahren zwar auf niedrigere, aber stabile Renditen einstellen können. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:532022&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The Andorran economy is recovering strongly from the pandemic, supported by a rebound in tourism, retail trade, construction, and professional services. Real GDP is expected to reach pre-crisis levels in the second half of 2022. While the unemployment rate is amongst the lowest in Europe and continues to decline, pockets of vulnerability remain. Notwithstanding significant policy buffers, there are still substantial downside risks, notably the impact in Europe of the war in Ukraine, higher than expected inflation, and a resurgence of infection rates. |
| Date: | 2022–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/179&r= |
| By: | Galen Sher; Jing Zhou; Ting Lan |
| Abstract: | We analyze the potential impacts on the German economy of a complete and permanent shutoff of the remaining Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, accounting for the curtailment of flows through Nord Stream 1 that has already taken place. We find that such a scenario could lead to gas shortages of 9 percent of national consumption in the second half of 2022, 10 percent in 2023 and 4 percent in 2024, which would be worse in the winter months, and would likely fall on firms, given legal protections on households. We combine the effects of less gas on production with the consequent effects of reduced supply of intermediate goods and services to downstream firms, and with reduced economic activity due to rising uncertainty. Together, these three channels reduce German GDP relative to baseline levels by about 1.5 percent in 2022, 2.7 percent in 2023 and 0.4 percent in 2024, with no gains in subsequent years from deferred economic activity. The associated rise in wholesale gas prices could increase inflation by about 2 percentage points on average in 2022 and 2023. Our simulations suggest that the economic impacts can be reduced significantly by having households voluntarily share a small part of the burden, and by rationing gas supplies more to more gas-intensive and downstream firms. We also suggest other ways to enhance German energy security. |
| Keywords: | Energy supply; energy security; natural gas; embargo; rationing; fragmentation |
| Date: | 2022–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2022/144&r= |
| By: | Mr. Andrea Pescatori; Mr. John C Bluedorn; Mr. Christoffer Koch; Silvia Albrizio; Martin Stuermer |
| Abstract: | We assess the supply-side effects on European Union (EU) economic activity if Russian gas imports were to suddenly cease. Unlike other studies, we account for the global scope of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. In the absence of frictions, an open-economy, multi-sector general equilibrium model suggests that the adverse economic impact on the EU shrinks five-fold if integration with the global LNG market is considered. While greater integration provides a buffer for the EU through trade, the flip side is that other LNG importers (such as Japan, South Korea, and Pakistan) see adverse effects from higher prices. |
| Keywords: | Supply disruptions; commodities; natural gas; energy; international trade; sanctions; spillovers |
| Date: | 2022–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2022/143&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Uzbekistan embarked on an ambitious reform path in 2017, starting to liberalize its economy after years of state control. Incomes are still relatively low compared to other emerging economies and the role of the state is still large. Uzbekistan weathered the pandemic relatively well. Strong fundamentals, ample policy buffers, and high gold prices allowed the authorities to take strong actions to mitigate the impact of the pandemic and growth accelerated to 7.4 percent in 2021. |
| Date: | 2022–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/189&r= |
| By: | Paul J. J. Welfens (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW)); David Hanrahan (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW)) |
| Abstract: | Nach dem Scheitern des Projekts der Transatlantischen Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft haben die Europäische Union und die Vereinigten Staaten über Optionen nachgedacht, wie die transatlantische Zusammenarbeit in einem angemessenen Rahmen organisiert werden kann – im Handels- und Technologierat (TTC) wurde ein anderer Ansatz vereinbart. Solche Initiativen sind grundlegende Pfeiler der transatlantischen Wirtschaftsintegration. Die USA und die EU haben in der Tat eine neue Initiative gestartet, die sich auf zehn Politikfelder stützt, die Potenzial für eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit haben; es gibt einen dreifachen Fokus, nämlich auf gemeinsame Werte, auf Optionen für eine bessere gemeinsame Standardsetzung und auf die Zusammenarbeit in neuen Bereichen, z.B. der digitalisierten Wirtschaft. Mit dem Russland- Ukraine-Krieg hat sich die Relevanz einer verstärkten transatlantischen Zusammenarbeit verstärkt, nicht zuletzt, weil dieser militärische Konflikt indirekt die Frage aufwirft, inwieweit sich mittelfristig auch die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen dem Westen und China verschlechtern könnten. Während die zehn Bereiche, die von der EU und den USA im Rahmen des TTC in Betracht gezogen werden, in der Tat für entscheidende Felder stehen, sollte man nicht übersehen, dass drei weitere Felder bisher weitgehend vernachlässigt wurden: (i) die Integration der IKT-Märkte bzw. die transatlantische Integration der internetbasierten Märkte; (ii) die Herausforderungen für die transatlantische Zusammenarbeit – und die Chancen für beide Seiten – im Bereich der klimastabilisierenden Innovationen; und (iii) die entscheidende Rolle des Abbaus von Hindernissen für transatlantische Direktinvestitionen. Letztere haben sich als von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Produktionsdynamik und das Verhältnis zwischen Leistungsbilanz und Bruttoinlandsprodukt erwiesen, und zwar in dem um Direktinvestitionen erweiterten DSGE-Makromodell von Roeger/Welfens (2021), das es auf neue Weise ermöglicht, z. B. die nationalen und internationalen Auswirkungen von Produkt- und Prozessinnovationen zu berücksichtigen. Es sollte auch betont werden, dass die internationalen Spillover-Effekte von IKT-Innovationen einen größeren Bedarf an transatlantischer politischer Zusammenarbeit implizieren, die paradoxerweise auch mehr Zusammenarbeit zwischen den nationalen Regierungen der EU-Länder und den Regierungen der US-Bundesstaaten erfordert. Was die verstärkte transatlantische wirtschaftspolitische Zusammenarbeit betrifft, so sollten neue Initiativen in diesem Bereich nicht fälschlicherweise als Ersatz für eine langfristige Zusammenarbeit in den Foren internationaler Organisationen angesehen werden. |
| Keywords: | EU, USA, Handel, Innovation, Handels- und Technologierat, IKT, Win-Win, Innovationspolitik, transatlantische Zusammenarbeit |
| JEL: | F02 F13 F55 F69 O38 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwu:eiiwdp:disbei317&r= |
| By: | Beer, Sonja |
| Abstract: | China und Russland sind sich in den letzten Jahren immer nähergekommen, nicht nur politisch, sondern auch als Handelspartner. China ist der wichtigste Handelspartner Russlands. Russland hat in den letzten zehn Jahren vor allem seine Anteile an den gesamten chinesischen Energieimporten stark ausgebaut und zählt zurzeit zu einem der wichtigsten Energielieferanten Chinas. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:452022&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | On July 28, 2021, the IMF Executive Board approved a 36-month extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with a total access of SDR 388.8 million (180 percent of quota) to help Gabon respond to the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic and support the authorities’ economic and financial reform program. A nascent economic recovery is underway, and the outlook is broadly positive but remains subject to considerable uncertainty and a range of risks. The war in Ukraine will affect the economy through various channels, including higher food and fuel prices. |
| Date: | 2022–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/216&r= |
| By: | Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Jannsen, Nils; Kooths, Stefan; Meuchelböck, Saskia; Sonnenberg, Nils |
| Abstract: | Die deutsche Wirtschaft steuert weiter durch unruhiges Fahrwasser. Zwar setzt sich der Aufholprozess in den kontaktintensiven Dienstleistungsbranchen in hohem Tempo fort, und die Unternehmen im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe sitzen auf prall gefüllten Auftragsbüchern. Allerdings verringert die hohe Inflation die Kaufkraft der verfügbaren Einkommen und wirkt so einer höheren Konsumdynamik entgegen. Zudem haben sich die Lieferengpässe zuletzt durch den Krieg in der Ukraine wieder verschärft. Im Ergebnis gewinnt die Erholung erst in der zweiten Jahreshälfte wieder an Kraft, wenn die Preise nicht mehr ganz so rasch steigen und die Lieferengpässe nachlassen. Insgesamt rechnen wir wie im Frühjahr für dieses Jahr mit einem Anstieg des Bruttoinlandsprodukts von 2,1 Prozent. Im Jahr 2023 dürfte die Zuwachsrate 3,3 Prozent betragen (Frühjahr: 3,5 Prozent). Die Inflation wird im laufenden Jahr mit 7,4 Prozent so hoch wie noch nie im wiedervereinigten Deutschland ausfallen. Auch im kommenden Jahr wird der Preisauftrieb mit 4,2 Prozent wohl noch überdurchschnittlich hoch sein. Die Erholung der Erwerbstätigkeit setzt sich fort. Die Effektivverdienste werden kräftig steigen, auch weil die Arbeitskräfteknappheiten einen historischen Höchststand erreicht haben. Im laufenden Jahr wird der Anstieg mit knapp 5 Prozent aber hinter der Inflationsrate zurückbleiben. Die Haushaltdefizite der öffentlichen Hand werden sinken, da die Einnahmen kräftig zunehmen und die pandemiebedingten Ausgaben zurückgefahren werden. Im Jahr 2023 dürften die öffentlichen Schulden in Relation zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt bei etwas über 60 Prozent liegen. |
| Keywords: | Konjunkturprognose,Stabilisierungspolitik,Frühindikatoren,Ausblick,Konjunktur Deutschland,Fiskalpolitik & Haushalt,Arbeitsmarkt |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkkb:92&r= |
| By: | Gern, Klaus-Jürgen; Kooths, Stefan; Reents, Jan; Sonnenberg, Nils; Stolzenburg, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | Der Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine und die strikte No-Covid-Politik in China haben die ohnehin bereits kräftige Inflation weltweit verstärkt und dazu geführt, dass Lieferengpässe wieder zugenommen haben. Die Reallöhne gehen in vielen Ländern deutlich zurück und dämpfen den privaten Konsum, auch wenn vielfach auf zusätzlich Ersparnisse zurückgegriffen werden kann, die während der Pandemie entstanden sind. Angesichts des hohen Inflationsdrucks sind die Notenbanken auf einen Kurs der monetären Straffung eingeschwenkt oder haben ihn verschärft. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben sich die Aussichten für die Weltkonjunktur spürbar eingetrübt. Wir rechnen nunmehr mit einem Anstieg der globalen Produktion um nur noch 3,0 Prozent in diesem und 3,2 Prozent im nächsten Jahr (berechnet auf der Basis von Kaufkraftparitäten). Damit haben wir unsere Prognose vom März um 0,5 bzw. 0,4 Prozent abgesenkt. Dabei ist ein leichter Rückgang der Rohstoffpreise im Prognosezeitraum unterstellt, womit sich der Preisauftrieb von dieser Seite im Prognosezeitraum stark verringert. Problematisch wäre es, wenn sich die Inflation als hartnäckiger erweisen würde, als von den Notenbanken erwartet. Dann müsste die Geldpolitik stärker bremsen als unterstellt, mit der Gefahr einer Rezession in den fortgeschrittenen Volkswirtschaften und einer ausgeprägten Verschlechterung der finanziellen Rahmenbedingungen in den Schwellenländern. |
| Keywords: | Fortgeschrittene Volkswirtschaften,Schwellenländer,monetary policy,Amerika,Asien,Konjunktur Welt,China,Schwellen-& Entwicklungsländer,Europa,USA |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkkb:91&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Considerable macroeconomic gains were achieved in 2021: the economic rebound was stronger than envisaged, driven by the non-extractive sector; CPI inflation declined to 5.3 percent year-on-year, accompanied by a stable exchange rate as the central bank stopped providing financing to the government; and an improved external position supported reserves accumulation. The 2021 fiscal outturn was also better-than-projected although domestic arrears accumulated. Despite excess liquidity, the banking sector faces vulnerabilities. The war in Ukraine is pushing up the cost of living and rising the fiscal costs associated with the fuel subsidy. Despite this and deteriorating global economic prospects, the outlook remains favorable and provides opportunities to consolidate macro stability and scale up structural reforms, though significant downside risks remain, and severe fragility persists. |
| Date: | 2022–07–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/210&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Greece has weathered the pandemic well, with a considerably stronger-than-expected recovery. Reforms progressed in several areas, including digitalization, privatization, improving the fiscal policy mix, and bank balance sheet repair. Greece finalized its early repayment to the IMF on April 4 and is expected to graduate from the quarterly European Institutions’ Enhanced Surveillance framework on schedule by August 2022. Despite the adverse impact of the war in Ukraine, growth is projected to remain robust at 3.5 percent this year. High energy prices are expected to push up average inflation to 6.1 percent. Public debt is on a downward trajectory and rollover risks appear manageable. The external position last year was moderately weaker than that consistent with fundamentals and desirable policies. |
| Date: | 2022–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/173&r= |
| By: | Blockmans, Steven |
| Abstract: | Without any formal notification, China recently declined customs clearances for shipments from Lithuanian firms in the pharmaceutical, electronics, and food sectors, and warned multinationals of secondary sanctions if they did not sever their ties with Lithuania. These covert actions were taken in response to Lithuania’s invitation to Taiwan, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims as its own territory, to open a ‘representative office’ in Vilnius. No other country has ever found itself at the receiving end of such intense and politically motivated Chinese economic pressure. These actions on the part of the PRC are politically explosive because it raises serious questions about the international conduct of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). If it can simply wipe a country off its trade book, a state belonging to the EU’s customs territory no less, then what does it mean to be a member of the WTO, or a signatory to any other number of international agreements? And, given the lamentable state the WTO is in: could the European Commission’s newly proposed anti-coercion instrument bring any solace to Lithuania and the EU? |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:cepswp:34908&r= |
| By: | Paul J. J. Welfens (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW)); David Hanrahan (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW)) |
| Abstract: | Following the failure of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership project, the European Union and the United States have considered options on how to organize transatlantic cooperation within what may be considered an adequate framework – a different approach has been agreed in the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). Such initiatives are fundamental pillars of transatlantic economic integration. The US and the EU have indeed started a new initiative which is based on ten policy fields which have potential for enhanced cooperation; there is a triple focus, namely on common values, on options for better joint standard-setting and on cooperating in new fields, e.g. the digitalized economy. With the Russo-Ukraine War, the relevance of more transatlantic cooperation has been reinforced, not least since this military conflict indirectly raises the issue of to what extent economic relations between the West and China could also deteriorate in the medium term. While the ten areas considered by the EU and US within the framework of the TTC indeed stand for crucial fields, one should not overlook that three additional fields have been largely neglected so far: (i) ICT market integration and the transatlantic integration of internet-based markets, respectively; (ii) challenges for transatlantic cooperation – indeed win-win opportunities – in the field of climate-stabilizing innovations; and (iii) the crucial role of reducing barriers to transatlantic foreign direct investment. The latter have been shown to be of critical relevance for output dynamics and the current account-Gross Domestic Product ratio, namely in the FDI-enhanced DSGE macro model of Roeger/Welfens (2021) which allows in a new way to consider, for example, the national and international effects of product innovations and process innovations. It should also be emphasized that the international spillover effects of ICT innovations imply that there is a broader need for transatlantic policy cooperation which, paradoxically, also requires more cooperation between national governments of EU countries and the governments of US states. As regards enhanced transatlantic economic policy cooperation, new initiatives here should not mistakenly be considered a substitute for long-term cooperation in the fora of international organizations. |
| Keywords: | EU, US, Trade, Innovation, Trade and Technology Council, ICT, Win-Win, Innovation Policy, Transatlantic Cooperation |
| JEL: | F02 F13 F55 F69 O38 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwu:eiiwdp:disbei316&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Ireland’s economy has rebounded strongly from the pandemic. GDP surpassed its pre-pandemic trend in 2021:Q4—one of the few euro area countries to do so. COVID-support measures have been appropriately unwound, and the fiscal position improved significantly. The financial sector weathered the pandemic crisis well and remains resilient. While the outlook is strong, uncertainty is substantial due to the indirect impacts of the war in Ukraine. Several pre-pandemic challenges remain: housing shortages, infrastructure, social and green investment gaps, and the need to strengthen multinational enterprises’ inward linkages to broaden growth and make it more inclusive. There is also a need to address the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) legacy effects on the financial system and tackle the factors contributing to high lending interest rates. |
| Date: | 2022–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/213&r= |
| By: | DELIPETREV Blagoj (European Commission - JRC); CHUKALIEV Ordan; IDRIZI Bashkim |
| Abstract: | This report contains a set of extended abstracts presented at the workshop "Digital Transformation, Data and AI in the Western Balkans", that was held between 9 and 11 December 2021 in Skopje, North Macedonia. The workshop aim was to discuss Europe's ambition to become the world-leading region for developing and deploying cutting edge, ethical and secure AI, data and digital transformation services and to promote a human-centric approach in the global context. It concluded that this agenda is also important for the Western Balkan (WB) region, which can, in turn, adopt and benefit from these emerging technologies. The workshop hosted 102 participants from 12 countries including EU Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia and Italy; candidate and potential candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo (This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence), North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey; European neighbourhood policy countries associated to Horizon 2020: Moldova and Ukraine. During the three workshop days, participants discussed the state of play of digital transformation in the respective countries, the implementation of AI in education, society, public services, business, exchanged good practices, established partnerships, and ultimately learned from each other. |
| Keywords: | Digital Transformation, Data, AI, Western Balkan, Enlargement, Integration |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc129903&r= |
| By: | G. EL MAHI (Centre de recherches en Economie Régionale et Politique Economique (CERPE), Université de Namur); C. KOZICKI (Centre de recherches en Economie Régionale et Politique Economique (CERPE), Université de Namur); E. LECUIVRE (Centre de recherches en Economie Régionale et Politique Economique (CERPE), Université de Namur); J. VOGLAIRE (Centre de recherches en Economie Régionale et Politique Economique (CERPE), Université de Namur); H. BOGAERT (Centre de recherches en Economie Régionale et Politique Economique (CERPE), Université de Namur) |
| Abstract: | Ce rapport présente les perspectives budgétaires de la Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles à horizon 2027. Ces perspectives ont pour point d’amorçage le budget 2022 initial de la Communauté française. Elles intègrent l’impact de la guerre d’Ukraine au travers du coût d’accueil et de scolarisation des enfants de réfugiés. Aussi, elles prennent en compte la revue à la baisse par la Commission européenne fin juin 2022 des subventions dans le cadre du plan de relance RRF. Enfin, bien que ces perspectives intègrent les derniers paramètres macroéconomiques publiés par le Bfp en juin 2022, il demeure de nombreuses incertitudes que ce soit sur le plan sanitaire, économique et financier. |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nam:spolec:2202&r= |