|
on Confederation of Independent States |
|
Issue of 2022‒08‒15
forty-five papers chosen by |
| By: | Gorodnichenko, Yuriy (University of California, Berkeley); Kudlyak, Marianna (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco); Sahin, Aysegül (University of Texas at Austin) |
| Abstract: | In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The ensuing war has a devastating destructing impact in Ukraine. This article focuses on the humanitarian cost of war. The article develops a framework for the analysis of the effect of a war on country’s human capital. We then identify the following key directions for rebuilding and further developing human capital in Ukraine: quantity and quality of schooling for children, quality of higher education, training and retraining programs for adults, assistance for people with disabilities, post-deployment re-integration into the civilian sector, population growth and fertility, and promotion of self-motivating mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | human capital, growth, schooling, skills of the future, health, war, displacement |
| JEL: | I2 J24 O4 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izapps:pp185&r= |
| By: | Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Schlecht, Ingmar |
| Keywords: | gas market,Russia,European Union,game theory,external price cap |
| JEL: | F13 Q40 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:261345&r= |
| By: | Fremerey, Melinda |
| Abstract: | Derzeit prüft die EU-Kommission den Antrag der Ukraine auf eine EU-Mitgliedschaft. Ein Schnellverfahren für eine Aufnahme der Ukraine in die EU ist im Gespräch, aber eher unwahrscheinlich. Die letzten EU-Erweiterungen um Bulgarien und Rumänien in 2007 und Kroatien in 2013 wurden zum Teil kritisch beurteilt und endeten in einem nach wie vor anhaltenden Kontrollverfahren für Rumänien und Bulgarien. Unabhängig von den derzeitigen politischen Motiven für eine Aufnahme der Ukraine in die EU soll der Antrag der Ukraine zum Beitritt zur EU als Anlass genommen werden, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Ukraine näher zu betrachten. Daher wird in einem deskriptiven Vergleich anhand ausgewählter Indikatoren die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Ukraine mit den Entwicklungen der letzten drei EU-Beitrittsländer gegenübergestellt, um daraus Schlüsse für eine Beitrittsperspektive der Ukraine zu ziehen. Der Vergleich zeigt, dass die Ukraine wirtschaftliche Schwächen insbesondere bei der Entwicklung des Bruttoinlandsprodukts aufweist und sich die Lücke zu den letzten drei Beitrittsländern am aktuellen Rand vergrößert. Positiv auffällig ist die Entwicklung des IT-Sektors des Landes sowie der hohe Anteil der Bevölkerung im erwerbsfähigen Alter und der überdurchschnittliche Bildungsstand der 30 bis 34-Jährigen. In den Bereichen Arbeitslosigkeit, Bruttowertschöpfung der Industrie und Außenhandel war die Ukraine Anfang der 2000er im Vergleich zu den letzten drei EU-Beitrittsländern gleich auf oder sogar bessergestellt. Nach der Annexion der Krim und der Ausrufung der 'Volksrepubliken' in der Ostukraine im Jahr 2014 verschlechterten sich jedoch viele Indikatoren ab 2015 maßgeblich. Aufgrund des russischen Angriffskrieges gegen die Ukraine wird die Ukraine in ihrer wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung erneut zurückgeworfen. Eine weitere Ursache für die bisher weniger positive Entwicklung der Ukraine im Vergleich zu den anderen süd- und osteuropäischen Vergleichsländern ist das Problem der Korruption. Im Korruptionsranking liegt die Ukraine aktuell auf Platz 122 von 180 und somit im Vergleich zu anderen europäischen Ländern weit hinten. Für eine erfolgreich Aufnahme in die EU führt somit kein Weg für die Ukraine daran vorbei, großflächig die Korruption zu bekämpfen. Die Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU-Mitgliedstaaten vertreten sehr unterschiedliche Meinungen zu einer EU-Erweiterung und zu einer schnellen Aufnahme der Ukraine in die EU. Die strikten Beitrittskriterien stellen nicht nur die übrigen Anwärter auf eine EU-Mitgliedschaft (wie z.B. Albanien und Montenegro), sondern, wie im Fall von Bulgarien und Rumänien, auch bereits bestehende EU-Staaten vor eine Herausforderung. Eine starke wirtschaftliche und politische Kooperation auf allen Ebenen zwischen der EU und der Ukraine könnte daher aktuell gewinnbringender sein als eine sofortige Aufnahme der Ukraine in die EU. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:322022&r= |
| By: | Andrea Boitani; Catalin Dragomirescu-Gaina |
| Abstract: | Russia has become more integrated and dependent on global developments over the last decades, despite being ruled by an increasingly autocratic regime. How does Russian media cover the associated economic and policy challenges? To answer, we use the economic policy uncertainty indexes as proxies for media coverage, together with a limited set of variables reflecting both domestic and international developments. Our main findings come from a VEC model estimated with two cointegrating vectors, encompassing two long-term equilibria. A first cointegrating vector describes the domestic political context, highlighting the key role that media coverage can play in supporting autocratic regimes. While the second cointegrating vector is associated with international developments, portraying swings in global risk appetite, we find that deviations from it can, too, drive popular support for the incumbent president. To see more precisely how Russian media coverage can be used as a policy instrument, we employ several narrative proxies and find that (only in the short run) some of these might be used to exert control and influence, while others to justify policy errors or successes. |
| Keywords: | economic policy uncertainty; media coverage; cointegration analysis |
| JEL: | C50 D80 F50 P50 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:496&r= |
| By: | Vedev Alexey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | A slump in prices on the world oil market in Q1 2020 significantly aggravated negative trends in the Russian economy. The decline in economic activity and the outflow of non-residents' funds from the Russian market had an adverse impact on the national credit and banking system. A possible strengthening of the sanctions pressure on Russia in the near future could further exacerbate the situation and slow down the growth rate of the Russian economy. However, the scale of these consequences and the extent of their negative impact will largely depend on the stabilization measures taken by the government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, their completeness and timeliness. Despite the fact that financial markets and credit and banking institutions continued to function practically at full capacity during the crisis induced by the coronavirus pandemic, the risks in the banking sphere have significantly increased and additional measures may be required from the regulator at any moment. It is primarily related to such directions of regulative activity of the Bank of Russia as improvement of organization and methodology of banking supervision, monitoring of stability of the banking sector, inspection of credit institutions. With that in mind, the tasks of increasing efficiency of the system of banking sector regulation and ensuring its sustainability are becoming more and more urgent. Meanwhile, global economic trends now increasingly require banks to accelerate the transition from traditional business models to the formation of a financial ecosystem based on the use of modern digital tools. This requires modernization of the entire banking supervision system, implementation of new regulatory principles and control methods, adaptation of traditional approaches to new conditions. The study will analyze the negative effects of oil shocks on the financial condition of banks operating in the Russian Federation. It will also analyze in detail the relevant international experience of overcoming crisis phenomena in the financial sector resulting from price volatility in energy markets. The result of the study will be the development of recommendations to improve banking supervision and regulation in order to implement organizational and stabilizing measures and strengthen confidence in banks as financial intermediaries, as well as proposals for the introduction of new mechanisms to neutralize banking risks in the technological transformation of the Russian financial sector. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, banking regulation, economic growth, oil prices, Bank of Russia, banking sector |
| JEL: | G21 G24 G28 O13 O43 O47 Q32 E58 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:wpaper:wpaper-2022-1188&r= |
| By: | Akhvlediani, Tinatin; De Groen, Willem Pieter |
| Abstract: | After President Vladimir Putin madly went ahead with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it is clear that sanctions will no longer have a deterring effect on the outbreak of war. However, imposing sanctions can still make this war very costly for Putin and perhaps make him and his inner circle reconsider continuation of the war and find a negotiated solution. The EU, together with its allies, has shown impressive unity in imposing severe sanctions against Russia, yet some options remain open for the EU to further exploit its economic leverage over Putin’s regime. This Policy Insight reviews the EU’s imposed sanctions against Russia and looks at the possibilities to increase their effectiveness, drawing upon lessons learned in the past. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:cepswp:35899&r= |
| By: | Gros, Daniel |
| Abstract: | The EU does not have an army. It thus cannot defend Ukraine from a Russian invasion, but it can at least put itself in a situation in which it does not depend on gas deliveries from a potential aggressor, a dependence that many argue would only become more severe with the formal opening of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline connecting Russia with Germany. Diminishing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas requires the creation of a credible European Strategic Gas Reserve for emergency situations. This cannot be achieved overnight but some first practical steps can be taken quickly and, importantly, cheaply. Such action, which should be spearheaded at the European level, would send a powerful signal that the EU is indeed willing to act and put its money where its mouth is, namely in the defence of its core values and strategic interests. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:cepswp:35125&r= |
| By: | Starodubrovskaya Irina (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Kazenin Konstantin (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides findings of a quantitative study conducted among natives of Dagestan and their descendants living in the city of Astrakhan. The pall was taken by personal interviewing; the total number of respondents between 15 and 70 years of age was 491. The pall revealed both the socio-demographic characteristics of the Daghestani migrant community in Astrakhan and the specifics of the integration of its members into the urban environment. |
| Keywords: | Urbanization, southern Russia, quantitative investigation |
| JEL: | O18 P25 R23 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:wpaper:wpaper-2022-1189&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Ellis, Mia; Pauw, Karl; Thurlow, James; Smart, Jenny |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | CAMBODIA, SOUTH EAST ASIA, ASIA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, commodities, fertilizers |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:16&r= |
| By: | N. N. |
| Abstract: | Die globale Wirtschaftserholung nach Abflauen der COVID-19-Krise hat in der zweiten Jahreshälfte 2021 die Preise für Erdgas und Erdöl deutlich anziehen lassen. Dazu kam in Europa eine von Russland aktiv betriebene Verknappung von Gas, die schon vor dem Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine zu einer Explosion der Gaspreise geführt hat. Der Krieg in der Ukraine, die von der EU gegenüber Russland verhängten Sanktionen und die Gegenreaktionen Russlands tragen weiter zur Verteuerung von Energie bei. So haben sich die Herausforderungen für die Transformation des europäischen Energiesystems in der zeitlichen und sachlichen Dimension schlagartig vergrößert. Das WIFO versucht mit diesem Research Brief eine Orientierung für die wirtschaftspolitischen Entscheidungsträger zu geben, indem auf der Grundlage der bestehenden Energiemarktordnung der Preisbildungsmechanismus für Strom über die Merit-Order analysiert und Handlungsoptionen innerhalb dieses Systems zur Dämpfung der Strompreise vorgestellt werden. |
| Date: | 2022–07–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:rbrief:y:2022:i:18&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Ellis, Mia; Deb Pal, Barun; Smart, Jenny; Takeshima, Hiroyuki; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | NEPAL, SOUTH ASIA, ASIA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:13&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Mahrt, Kristi; Minten, Bart; Pauw, Karl; Randriamamonjy, Josée; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | MYANMAR, BURMA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, ASIA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, gross national product |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:14&r= |
| By: | Ha, Jongrim; Kose, Ayhan M.; Ohnsorge, Franziska |
| Abstract: | Global inflation has risen sharply from its lows in mid-2020, on rebounding global demand, supply bottlenecks, and soaring food and energy prices, especially since the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine. Markets expect inflation to peak in mid-2022 and then decline, but to remain elevated even after these shocks subside and monetary policies are tightened further. Global growth has been moving in the opposite direction: it has declined sharply since the beginning of the year and, for the remainder of this decade, is expected to remain below the average of the 2010s. In light of these developments, the risk of stagflation—a combination of high inflation and sluggish growth—has risen. The recovery from the stagflation of the 1970s required steep increases in interest rates by major advanced-economy central banks to quell inflation, which triggered a global recession and a string of financial crises in emerging market and developing economies. If current stagflationary pressures intensify, they would likely face severe challenges again because of their less well-anchored inflation expectations, elevated financial vulnerabilities, and weakening growth fundamentals. |
| Keywords: | Inflation; growth; COVID-19; global recession; monetary policy; fiscal policy; disinflation |
| JEL: | E31 E32 E52 Q43 |
| Date: | 2022–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113306&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Randriamamonjy, Josée; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | SENEGAL, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:8&r= |
| By: | Belev Sergey (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Moguchev Nikita (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Komarnitskaya Anna (RANEPA); Tishchenko Tatiana (RANEPA); Matveev E. (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | This article presents the main results of research on the topic of the fiscal policy issues and experiences in the context of spread of the coronavirus infection in 2020. This article aims to analyze the effect of the adopted fiscal policy measures on the Russian economy. The main method to measure the performance of fiscal policy in the context of cyclical smoothing is to estimate the fiscal multipliers. The corresponding multipliers for the Russian Federation were calculated from the impulse response functions estimated using BVAR modeling. The values of the multipliers of expenditures on the national economy and of debt financed expenditures are sufficiently small, and multipliers of other categories of public expenditures are even negative. Thus, there is no reason to expect a significant increase in aggregate output from stimulating fiscal policy. Analysis of the policy of "tax holidays" for SMEs showed that the most affected categories of SMEs should be completely exempted from 2019- and 2020-year taxation. In this case budget tax expenses will be insignificant, and the number of bankruptcies will be reduced considerably. Unprecedented in its scale, terms, yields and currency structure, the borrowing policy in the fall of 2020 should be treated as successful. However, there are reasonable doubts that a combination of factors will make it possible to repeat the success in 2021. In this regard, the fiscal policy of the federal government should be adjusted in the following ways: the tax burden on the extraction of solid minerals should be increased, expenditure side of the budget should be optimized and the funds from the National welfare fund should be used to finance the federal budget deficit. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, Covid-19, fiscal policy, SME sector |
| JEL: | I18 I19 L25 L26 E62 E63 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:wpaper:wpaper-2022-1190&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Ellis, Mia; Pauw, Karl; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | TANZANIA, EAST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, gross national product |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:11&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Ellis, Mia; Pauw, Karl; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | UGANDA, EAST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:12&r= |
| By: | Polbin Andrei (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an econometric analysis of the labor supply function of married women in Russia based on data from RLMS HSE and methodology from the work [Heckman, MaCurdy, 1980], in which decisions about entering the labor market and the intensity of work are made within a dynamic optimization tsk. It is shown that the husband's leisure and the number of children in the household have a negative effect on the woman's hours worked. The estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages is close to 0.16. |
| Keywords: | labor supply, Frisch elasticity, hours of work, job turnover |
| JEL: | E24 J22 J24 J41 J63 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:wpaper:wpaper-2022-1194&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Duchoslav, Jan; Pauw, Karl; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | MALAWI, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, gross national product |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:10&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Pauw, Karl; Randriamamonjy, Josée; Thurlow, James; Ulimwengu, John M. |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, CENTRAL AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, commodities, fertilizers |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:17&r= |
| By: | Chapoto, Antony; Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Ellis, Mia; Pauw, Karl; Smart, Jenny; Subakanya, Mitelo; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | ZAMBIA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, commodities, fertilizers |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:15&r= |
| By: | Itskhoki, Oleg; Mukhin, Dmitry |
| Abstract: | Stabilising the exchange rate allows the Russian government to anchor inflation expectations and support consumption but comes at the cost of the financial repression of domestic savers. |
| Keywords: | F31; F41; F51 |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2022–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:115564&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty. |
| Keywords: | BANGLADESH, SOUTH ASIA, ASIA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, commodities, fertilizers, gross national product |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:3&r= |
| By: | Gros, Daniel |
| Abstract: | There is no silver bullet. Renewables or new conventional energy supplies will take years to become available at the scale needed. However, high prices do induce substitution to other fuels and encourage energy savings – not only in Europe, but also in other markets, thus potentially freeing up gas for Europe. This CEPS Policy Insights paper makes the calculations to show that by considering Europe and Asia as one interconnected energy market, high gas prices could, on their own, bring about the necessary reduction in (global) gas demand to free up enough resources for Europe. This could be achieved even over a period as short as 9-12 months, thus in time to keep Europe warm and fully operational through the next winter, without having to rely on Russian gas. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:cepswp:35815&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Randriamamonjy, Josée; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the increase occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty. |
| Keywords: | MALI, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:7&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Randriamamonjy, Josée; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty. |
| Keywords: | NIGER, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:6&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Kedir Jemal, Mekamu; Smart, Jenny; Taffesse, Alemayehu Seyoum; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty. |
| Keywords: | ETHIOPIA, EAST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, commodities, fertilizers |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:2&r= |
| By: | Breisinger, Clemens; Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Mbuthia, Juneweenex; Omune, Lensa; Oseko, Edwin Ombui; Pradesha, Angga; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the increase occurring since February. There is wide variation across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent, and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, and the weighted average price of fertilizer has doubled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development partners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty. |
| Keywords: | KENYA, EAST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:1&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Pauw, Karl; Smart, Jenny; Thurlow, James; Asante, Seth; Patil, Pranav |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent, and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has doubled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development partners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty. |
| Keywords: | GHANA, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, gross national product |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:9&r= |
| By: | Andam, Kwaw S.; Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Pradesha, Angga; Thurlow, James |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty. |
| Keywords: | NIGERIA, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, gross national product |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:4&r= |
| By: | Joshua Aizenman; Yothin Jinjarak; Donghyun Park; Huanhuan Zheng |
| Abstract: | We analyze the sovereign bond issuance data of eight major emerging markets (EMs) - Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey from 1970 to 2018. Our analysis suggests that (i) EM local currency bonds tend to be smaller in size, shorter in maturity, or lower in coupon rate than foreign currency bonds; (ii) EMs are more likely to issue local-currency sovereign bonds if their currencies appreciated before the global financial crisis of 2008 (GFC); (iii) inflation-targeting monetary policy increases the likelihood of issuing local-currency debt before GFC but not after; and (iv) EMs that offer higher sovereign yields are more likely to issue local-currency bonds after GFC. Future data will allow us to test and identify structural changes associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2206.09218&r= |
| By: | Diao, Xinshen; Dorosh, Paul A.; Thurlow, James; Spielman, David J.; Smart, Jenny; Benimana, Gilberthe; Mugabo, Serge; Rosenbach, Gracie |
| Abstract: | Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors have contributed to the crisis, such as export bans and continued supply chain disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, between June 2021 and April 2022, the global prices of palm oil and wheat increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively. At the same time, the price of fertilizer doubled, while crude oil and natural gas prices have also risen substantially. However, wide variation also exists across commodities, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent, and rice prices declining by 13 percent (Figure 1). |
| Keywords: | RWANDA, CENTRAL AFRICA, AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA, AFRICA, Ukraine, poverty, food security, armed conflicts, crises, prices, shock, agrifood systems, equality, diet, commodities, fertilizers |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:gccbrf:5&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Iceland's economy has weathered multiple shocks since 2019 relatively well. The economic outlook is positive but suggests long-term scarring. The risks are tilted to the downside and are associated with the global impact of a potential escalation in the war in Ukraine, the pandemic, economic disruptions, and tighter global financial conditions. On the upside, tourism and new innovative industries could help the economy recover faster. |
| Date: | 2022–06–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/193&r= |
| By: | Juan José Almagro Herrador; Mihai Macovei; Moritz Bizer |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the role of the euro in the Southern neighbourhood of the EU, notably in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Our analysis is based on a survey conducted by the European Commission in 2021 on the use of the euro and other currencies in these countries, as well as other relevant sources and is performed across five main dimensions: cross-border trade transactions, remittances, foreign exchange reserves, external public debt and the commercial banking sector. It finds that the use of the euro in Southern Neighbourhood countries is higher, on average, than in the world and in the EU’s Eastern Neighbours (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), although the US dollar remains the foreign currency of reference in the region. The US dollar’s continued strong role reflects historical developments and monetary arrangements, as well as the greater liquidity and dominant role of the US dollar in global financial markets. The region remains a heterogeneous group, with the euro playing a more prominent role than the US dollar in Maghreb countries (i.e. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The extensive use of the euro for trade invoicing across countries seems highly correlated with the depth of economic and trade relations with euro area countries and the EU at large. Around one third of inward remittances are denominated in euro and over one third of the external public debt stock is denominated in euro on average, higher than the global average. The banking sector and foreign reserves remain heavily dollarised across countries. Based on these findings, the paper highlights new areas, such as green finance and NextGenerationEU bond issuance, which together with other policy initiatives could foster a higher use of the euro in the region. |
| JEL: | E41 E42 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:euf:dispap:163&r= |
| By: | Linda S. Goldberg; Robert Lerman; Dan Reichgott |
| Abstract: | Will developments in technology, geopolitics, and the financial market reduce the dollar’s important roles in the global economy? This post updates prior commentary [here, here, and here], with insights about whether recent developments, such as the pandemic and the sanctions on Russia, might change the roles of the dollar. Our view is that the evidence so far points to the U.S. dollar maintaining its importance internationally. A companion post reports on the Inaugural Conference on the International Roles of the U.S. Dollar jointly organized by the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of New York and held on June 16-17. |
| Keywords: | dollar; international role; reserve currency |
| JEL: | E5 F31 |
| Date: | 2022–07–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednls:94424&r= |
| By: | Blockmans, Steven |
| Abstract: | One of the costs of Brexit is the weakened ability of both the UK and the EU to shape a strong joint response to Russia’s threats to pan-European security. In the standoff over Ukraine, the need for close cross-Channel cooperation is particularly acute for any effective sanctions package negotiated with the US. Yet, post-Brexit relations between the UK and the EU are currently governed by a narrow Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) which does not include a designated chapter on political dialogue and that, barring a handful of exceptions, does not contain any provisions on cooperation on foreign and security matters. Fortunately, the preparatory work undertaken to reach the bilateral accord contains the answer to the question on how trust between the parties can be regained through procedural means. This policy brief highlights the embers of the Brexit bonfire that might be raked up to rekindle the flame of dialogue and cooperation between the UK and the EU in foreign affairs and security policy. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:cepswp:35406&r= |
| By: | Knobel Alexander (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Kuznetsov Dmitry (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Lyubimov Ivan (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Over 30 years, Moscow's economy, once among the key industrial centers, has gone through a process of sectoral structural transformation, today is predominantly engaged in the provision of services. However, human capital along with labor represents another common production factor in Moscow's economy. The accumulation of knowledge allows the process of reindustrialization to be realized in Moscow, the distinguishing feature of which is the use not so much of simple labor, but of complex skills and knowledge that are required to perform complex industrial operations and manage automated systems. Many new industries in Moscow are preceded by design and research stages, thus localizing more complex links in production chains. Human capital is also used to render technological services, among which we indicate complex projects to transform the city transportation network, modern medical services, and university education. The further development of the Moscow economy and the inflow of foreign investments is connected with a more intensive use of one of the main production factors - human capital. Such development agrees with the existing world experience, in which obtaining investment in more advanced technological links was associated with the accumulation of knowledge, skills and know-how. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, investment, human capital, economic development |
| JEL: | F20 J24 O10 O12 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:wpaper:wpaper-2022-1191&r= |
| By: | Muhammad Ayaz (UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour); Charlotte Fontan Sers (ESC PAU - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce, Pau Business School); Hélène Maisonnave (EDEHN - Equipe d'Economie Le Havre Normandie - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université); Mazhar Mughal (ESC PAU - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce, Pau Business School) |
| Abstract: | The 2022 Ukraine conflict has contributed to a major spike in international commodity prices. In this study, we design a top-down, macro-micro simulation analysis to focus on the price shock due to four major commodities, namely wheat, vegetable oil, petroleum, and fertilizers. We combine Computable General Equilibrium simulations with household survey data from the Pakistan Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) 2018-19 to estimate macro-and microeconomic impact of the global commodity crisis. We come up with evidence for a significant, non-negligible negative impact of the price shock, both at the aggregate and the household level. The real GDP shrinks and households real consumption and income decrease. The drop in consumption and income is more visible among farm households, with the two falling by 5% and 3.48% respectively. In the same vein, the $3.2 headcount poverty rate at the 2018 purchasing power parity increases by 1.15%. This is much higher than the 0.21% increase in the $1.9 poverty rate. The drop in consumption and income appears to be proportionally greater among the lower and middle-income households than those at the bottom of the income distribution. This is reflected in a slight drop in overall income inequality. Besides, while the increase in headcount poverty is greater among farm households, it is the urban households which show the worst decline in food security, both in terms of incidence and intensity of food insecurity. This set of results underscores the vulnerability of Pakistani households to surge in commodity prices. The role of petrol prices in driving poverty among rural farm households and that of food stuff (wheat and vegetable oil prices) in aggravating urban food security is particularly evident. |
| Keywords: | Food security,macro-micro models,Ukraine war,Pakistan |
| Date: | 2022–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03718240&r= |
| By: | Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Tripier, Sébastien |
| Abstract: | La guerre en Ukraine fait entrer les économies européennes dans une stagflation, une période de faible croissance économique et de forte inflation. La conjonction de ces deux phénomènes nourrit les craintes d’érosion du pouvoir d’achat, la hausse des prix à la consommation s’accompagnant d’une plus faible progression des revenus de l’activité économique à distribuer. La cause première de cette plus faible croissance et de cette forte inflation étant la hausse des prix des produits énergétiques, le gouvernement français à mis en place un « bouclier tarifaire », visant à contenir la poussée inflationniste pour le consommateur et ainsi préserver son pouvoir d’achat. Cette note mesure l’impact de la crise actuelle sur le pouvoir d’achat des Français et évalue l’efficacité du bouclier tarifaire sur les revenus des Français. Nous montrons que cette mesure permet de faire gagner près d’un point de PIB par tête. Cela représente 41 € par mois et par habitant, si l’on considère le PIB par tête comme indicateur du pouvoir d’achat, et 35 € par mois si l’on considère la rémunération du travail par employé comme indicateur du pouvoir d’achat. Nos évaluations soulignent donc l’effet important du bouclier tarifaire pour le pouvoir d’achat des Français. Elles montrent également que les baisses des taux de marge des entreprises en cette période de crise soutiennent le pouvoir d’achat en favorisant une répartition en faveur de la rémunération du travail. |
| Keywords: | Inflation, énergie, bouclier tarifaire |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpm:notmac:2203&r= |
| By: | Taguchi, Hiroyuki |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates the export values of manufactured goods for the Central Asian countries by using a gravity trade model, and investigates the roles of institutional qualities in manufacturing exports based on the World Governance Indicators. The findings of this study are summarized as follows. With Kazakhstan being a benchmark country, the remaining four Central Asian countries have downward deviations in manufacturing exports and institutional qualities. Then the institutional qualities such as control of corruption, government effectiveness and rule of law are identified to be the major factors to explain the differences in the manufacturing exports’ performances. |
| Keywords: | Central Asia; manufacturing exports; institutional qualities; World Governance Indicators; gravity trade model |
| JEL: | F14 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113585&r= |
| By: | Wrobel, Ralph |
| Abstract: | Armenia has already signed some agreements with China to participate in the BRI project while no concrete measures are financed by the initiative. But what are the economic advantages and disadvantages of the BRI? While funding of some for Western financiers unattractive projects by China is a good chance for some participating countries a resulting "debt trap" is dangerous for them. Additionally, it can be shown easily that China's investments have mostly some geopolitical aspects which make the projects more advantageous for China than for the participating countries themselves. Especially, when in the BRI participating countries cannot pay back their debts a transfer of natural resources respective of infrastructure like ports ore pipelines to China may be the consequence. Therefore, Armenia is in a dilemma between strengthening cooperation with China and benefitting from that, on the one hand, and the risk of losing economic as well as political independence, on the other hand. |
| Keywords: | Belt and Road Initiative,Armenia,Geopolitics,Debt-Trap |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:opodis:20221&r= |
| By: | Céline Antonin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Elliot Aurissergues (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christophe Blot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Magali Dauvin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Amel Falah (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Sabine Le Bayon (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Pierre Madec (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Catherine Mathieu (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Hervé Péléraux (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Mathieu Plane (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christine Rifflart (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Raul Sampognaro (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Paul Malliet (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Eric Heyer (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Xavier Timbeau (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | L'activité économique mondiale a progressé rapidement en 2021, comblant en partie la chute de 2020. Pourtant, à peine remise de la pandémie de Covid-19, l'économie mondiale doit faire face à une nouvelle série de chocs. La résurgence de l'inflation observée à partir de l'été dernier en est le premier symptôme. Cette inflation est d'abord liée à l'écart entre l'offre et la demande de produits énergétiques, ce qui a eu pour conséquence de faire augmenter non seulement le prix du pétrole mais également ceux du gaz et des biens alimentaires. Malgré l'amélioration de la situation sanitaire, le virus circule toujours entraînant des dysfonctionnements dans les chaînes de production. Il en résulte des difficultés d'approvisionnement qui alimentent également les tensions sur les prix. Depuis février, l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie accroît le risque d'un ralentissement économique mondial, en amplifiant l'augmentation des prix énergétiques et alimentaires. De plus, ce conflit s'accompagne de tensions géopolitiques qui ont fortement accru l'incertitude en raison des menaces d'extension du conflit ou d'escalade des sanctions. Ainsi, outre les ménages qui subissent des pertes de pouvoir d'achat, les entreprises pourraient se montrer plus réticentes à investir au cours des prochains mois. Même si les gouvernements prennent des mesures pour amortir l'impact de la hausse des prix, la sortie du « Quoi qu'il en coûte» se traduit par la réduction des mesures de soutien budgétaire. Quant aux banques centrales, leur soutien ne peut plus être aussi facilement assuré que précédemment, dès lors que l'inflation dépasse largement leur cible. Elles ont même soit amorcé, soit annoncé, un resserrement de la politique monétaire. Dans la situation conjoncturelle actuelle, ces décisions contribueraient au recul de la demande. |
| Keywords: | perspectives économiques,économie mondiale,situation sanitaire,inflation |
| Date: | 2022–05–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03697354&r= |
| By: | Céline Antonin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Elliot Aurissergues (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christophe Blot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Magali Dauvin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Amel Falah (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Sabine Le Bayon (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Pierre Madec (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Catherine Mathieu (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Hervé Péléraux (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Mathieu Plane (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christine Rifflart (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Raul Sampognaro (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Paul Malliet (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | L'activité économique mondiale a progressé rapidement en 2021 permettant de combler en partie la chute qui avait été observée en 2020. Pourtant, à peine remise de la pandémie de Covid-19, l'économie mondiale doit faire face à une nouvelle série de chocs. La résurgence de l'inflation observée à partir de l'été dernier en est le premier symptôme. Elle est d'abord liée à l'écart entre l'offre et la demande de produits énergétiques, ce qui a eu pour conséquence de faire grimper non seulement le prix du pétrole mais également celui du gaz et des biens alimentaires. Malgré l'amélioration de la situation sanitaire, le virus circule toujours entraînant des dysfonctionnements dans les chaînes de production. Il en résulte des difficultés d'approvisionnement qui alimentent également les tensions sur les prix. Depuis février, l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie est venue amplifier le risque d'un ralentissement économique mondial, en amplifiant l'augmentation des prix énergétiques et alimentaires. Ce conflit s'accompagne de tensions géopolitiques qui ont fortement accru l'incertitude en raison des menaces d'extension du conflit ou de l'escalade des sanctions. Ainsi, outre les ménages qui souffrent de pertes de pouvoir d'achat, les entreprises pourraient se montrer plus réticentes à investir au cours des prochains mois. Même si les gouvernements prennent des mesures pour amortir l'impact de la hausse des prix, la sortie du « Quoi qu'il en coûte » se traduit par la réduction des déficits publics. Quant aux banques centrales, leur soutien ne peut plus être assuré dès lors que l'inflation dépasse largement leur cible. Elles ont même soit amorcé, soit annoncé, un resserrement de la politique monétaire. Dans le contexte actuel, ces décisions contribueraient au recul de la demande. En France, la hausse des prix de l'énergie contribuerait à accroître l'inflation de 1,9 point en moyenne en 2022. Hors bouclier tarifaire et remise de 15 centimes hors taxe sur le litre de carburant, la contribution de l'énergie à l'inflation aurait été de 4 points en 2022. Hors mesures budgétaires spécifiques, le choc énergétique lié au pétrole, au gaz et à l'électricité aurait amputé la croissance française de 1,3 point de PIB en 2022. En tenant compte de la réponse budgétaire, l'impact du choc énergétique serait réduit à -0,7 point de PIB, soit quasiment de moitié. L'ensemble des nouveaux chocs (prix de l'énergie, vague Omicron, difficultés d'approvisionnement, incertitudes géopolitiques, remontée des taux) affectant l'économie française amputerait le PIB de 2,3% en 2022 mais les nouvelles mesures budgétaires mises en place pour y répondre permettraient de compenser les chocs, notamment le choc énergétique, à hauteur de 0,8% du PIB. A l'aune de ces nouveaux chocs, nous avons révisé notre prévision de croissance pour la France de 4,2% à 2,7% en 2022. Après un premier trimestre de stagnation du PIB, la croissance s'établirait à 0,2% au deuxième trimestre, puis évoluerait à un rythme de 0,3% aux troisième et quatrième trimestres 2022. À la fin de l'année 2022, la croissance du PIB de la France, en glissement annuel, serait de 0,7%, avec un acquis pour l'année 2023 de seulement 0,4%. |
| Keywords: | économie mondiale,inflation,situation sanitaire,augmentation des prix,banques centrales,politique monétaire |
| Date: | 2022–05–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03697275&r= |
| By: | Belloc, Ignacio; Molina, José Alberto; Velilla, Jorge |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes how intrahousehold bargaining power impacts labor supply, for seventeen European countries. To that end, we estimate a collective model using the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions for the period 2004-2019, and we study the validity of several potential distribution factors; that is to say, variables that impact labor supply only through intrahousehold bargaining power. Results show some degree of heterogeneity in the responses of labor supply to intrahousehold bargaining power. Spouses' education and the age gap operate as distribution factors in central European countries, such as Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. On the other hand, in the Mediterranean South countries, the share of unearned income of the wife operates as a distribution factor in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and in countries of Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania), the sex ratio, wives' non-labor income share, spouses' age and education gap, and the fertility rate all operate as distribution factors. In northern economies, such as Denmark and Estonia, we find evidence for share of unearned income, age gap, and fertility rate, while in islands, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, the sex ratio, the share of unearned income, the age and education gap, and the fertility rate are suitable bargaining power variables. The results are consistent with theoretical sharing rules, and distribution factors that empower a given spouse are mainly positively correlated with increases in the share of income they attract from intrahousehold bargaining. |
| Keywords: | household labor supply,collective model,distribution factors,EU-SILC |
| JEL: | D13 J22 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1132&r= |
| By: | Polterovich, Victor |
| Abstract: | It is shown that the program of institutional changes, outlined in a number of articles of the author, is even more relevant in the current context of sanctions and needs to be further elaborated. Due to restrictions on import and export flows, the need to form long chains of added value within the country is increasing. Business cannot cope with this task on its own. To solve it the institutions of catching-up development are needed, including the system of indicative planning headed by the general development agency and the national innovation system aimed at borrowing of technologies with a gradual increase of own innovative developments. It is advisable to conduct the reform of economic governance as a continuation of the reform of project activities carried out in 2018-2019. New institutions must ensure economic growth by forming a set of mega-projects and programs, coordinated with each other and with the budget, based on the coordination of efforts of the state, business and society at the federal, regional and municipal levels. The increased necessity of differentiated progressive income tax introduction is underlined. The expediency of forming consortiums, expanding the system of sector research institutes and increasing investment in education are noted. |
| Keywords: | institutional reform, economic growth, value added chains, indicative planning, national innovation system, anti-inflationary policy |
| JEL: | I25 O21 P11 P21 |
| Date: | 2022–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113807&r= |