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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Richter, Wolfgang |
| Abstract: | After military maneuvers near the borders, Moscow started a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Before that, it has denied such an intent. It had been accusing Kiev of escalating the situation in the Donbas and the West of encouraging Ukraine to do so by taking sides in a biased manner. In mid-December 2021, it made clear in two draft treaties what it is after, namely preventing a further expansion of NATO to the east and obtaining binding assurances to this end. In doing so, it is invoking the NATO-Russia agreements of the 1990s. Moscow voiced fears that Ukraine's accession to NATO in particular would endanger Russia's security and the strategic balance with the US. The US and NATO had signaled a willingness to engage in dialogue on arms control issues, but they were not prepared to revise the principles of the European security order. Obviously, Moscow did not accept this and resorted to the use of force. It ignored the chance to embark on a new dialogue as an opportunity to de-escalate the situation and restore military predictability through arms control without abandoning principles. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:162022&r= |
| By: | Minzarari, Dumitru |
| Abstract: | The ongoing military and political escalations in and around Donbas - including the increase in Russian military deployments near Ukraine's borders - represent one of the most severe security crises in Europe since Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014. The patterns of Russian military deployments, the structure of forces, and the types of observed military hardware strongly suggest the risk of an offensive operation rather than an exercise. Given the existing political costs, that operation is likely to take indirect forms by using the cover of Russian military proxies in Donbas. This crisis represents both a major challenge and an opportunity for the European Union (EU) to conduct practical work on developing its strategic autonomy and offer leadership in strengthening the security in its immediate neighbourhood. What should the EU do in practical terms to discourage further military escalation around Donbas, or at least increase the costs for such a development? |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:272021&r= |
| By: | Paul, Michael |
| Abstract: | Russia assumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council at the 12th Ministerial in Reykjavik, on 20 May 2021. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described his first meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken the previous day as 'constructive'. Two days before the meeting, however, Lavrov warned the West against encroaching in the Arctic: 'It has been absolutely clear for everyone for a long time that this is our territory.' But what exactly did he mean? The polar region claimed by Russia in its March 2021 submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf? Or the ongoing disputes over the Northern Sea Route? Moscow is working to fortify its positions in the Arctic through a combination of aggressive rhetoric and offers of dialogue, in another example of its ambivalent policy mix of security and cooperation. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:482021&r= |
| By: | Horovitz, Liviu; Wachs, Lydia |
| Abstract: | Any conflict with a nuclear power like Russia carries the risk that nuclear weapons could be used, and President Vladimir Putin is aggressively exploiting such concerns. With its nuclear threats, the Kremlin is moving away from Russia's doctrine that ascribes a protective role to its nuclear arsenal. In this way, Moscow aims not only to deter Western governments from providing more substantial support to Ukraine, but also to intimidate the Western public. However, as long as NATO does not intervene directly in Ukraine and the Russian regime does not feel existentially threatened, both intentional and unintentional nuclear use remain extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, Moscow's nuclear threats still entail significant negative consequences. If Russia succeeds in using nuclear deterrence to shield an offensive conventional war, this could further destabilise Europe and the global security order. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:292022&r= |
| By: | Minzarari, Dumitru |
| Abstract: | The Biden-Putin summit in June 2021 has brought more questions than answers. It was a highly debated move - particularly in the United States - ever since the possibility of the event was announced in April. The outcomes of the high-profile bilateral meeting are still elusive. Despite these, the summit offered a few valuable insights on United States-Russia bilateral relations as well as on how the two countries seem to perceive each other. Among them, Russia views strategic stability to be of key importance for its ability to influence world affairs. The biggest concerns of the United States include cybersecurity and reducing Russia's disruptive behaviour, which instrumentalises instability in conflicts around the world. The revelations following the summit serve as useful signals but offer few reasons for optimism with regard to the United States and Russia engaging on a solid common agenda, and more likely for them to continue pursuing opposing interests. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:412021&r= |
| By: | Fischer, Sabine |
| Abstract: | Russia is experiencing a wave of state repression ahead of parliamentary elections on 19 September 2021. The crackdown is unusually harsh and broad, extending into previously unaffected areas and increasingly penetrating the private sphere of Russian citizens. For years the Russian state had largely relied on the so-called "power vertical" and on controlling the information space through propaganda and marginalisation of independent media. The political leadership, so it would appear, no longer regards such measures as sufficient to secure its power and is increasingly resorting to repression. The upshot is a further hardening of autocracy. Even German NGOs are experiencing growing pressure from the Russian state. This trend cannot be expected to slow, still less reverse in the foreseeable future. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:402021&r= |
| By: | Fischer, Sabine |
| Abstract: | The invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has catapulted Russia from hard autocracy into dictatorship. The relationship between state and society is growing increasingly totalitarian. This is no bolt from the blue: Today's wartime censorship and repression are based on laws passed successively since the early 2010s. Vladimir Putin's decision to go to war has absolutised the Russian power vertical. The negation of rights has accelerated, propaganda is massive and the suppression of independent media, opposition and civil society comprehensive. This will not change as long as Putin remains in power. But in the medium term the immense pressure generated by the war and the Western sanctions could bring about domestic political change and see an end to Putin's regime. The conceivable scenarios, however, point to destabilisation rather than democratisation. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:302022&r= |
| By: | Minzarari, Dumitru |
| Abstract: | Despite what looked like tremendous efforts by the West to deter Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the Kremlin started a full-scale military invasion across the Ukrainian border from the north, east, and south. Clarifying why these deterrence efforts did not work as expected could provide useful insights for building more effective strategies to stop Russia's aggression. It would also allow for adjusting future policies of deterrence against Russia. The EU and NATO should consider their misperceptions about Russia that undermined their ability to politically and militarily discourage Russia's aggression. They also should consider what actions have fuelled Russia's misperceptions about the West and emboldened the Kremlin to launch its military invasion of Ukraine. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:332022&r= |
| By: | Lippert, Barbara |
| Abstract: | As Russian tanks and artillery advanced on Kharkiv and Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an application to join the European Union. He called for a special admission procedure to secure swift accession for Ukraine, yet Ukraine did not first aspire to EU membership under missile fire. Much like Moldova and Georgia, it sees its current status of association with the EU as a precursor to accession. The 28 February application was a call for help from the dreadful war. Initial responses from the European Commission and the European Parliament indicated much political sympathy for Ukraine's urgent call, but the EU leaders do not hold forth the prospect of swift accession. This restraint results from the experience that membership negotiations are generally challenging and protracted and that there are no short cuts to the goal. There are, indeed, EU interests that run counter to an explicit memership perspective. The EU should in any case add a security component flanking its policy of integration and cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:212022&r= |
| By: | Fischer, Sabine; Stanzel, Angela |
| Abstract: | Russia and China are seen as the main beneficiaries of the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan regarding their political influence and potential exertion of power. In both the Chinese and Russian debate, however, alongside triumphant comments about Western failure, serious concerns about the regional security situation are being voiced. Western actors should seek a more nuanced understanding of Beijing's and Moscow's perspectives. This could also lead to opportunities for cooperation that would serve to stabilise Central Asia and Afghanistan. In view of the intensifying global systemic rivalry, however, the scope for cooperation will remain limited. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:502021&r= |
| By: | Zabanova, Yana; Westphal, Kirsten |
| Abstract: | In October 2020, Russia adopted a roadmap for hydrogen development, and a full-length Hydrogen Development Concept is expected soon. Even though Russia remains somewhat sceptical about hydrogen's much-vaunted transformative potential, it is interested in using its natural gas wealth to become a leading exporter of this new energy carrier and views Germany as a key partner in this effort. In the absence of a serious national decarbonisation agenda in Russia, stimulating hydrogen production primarily for exports and without significant domestic demand will be a challenge. Still, amid Russia's steadily worsening political relations with the West, clean energy (and hydrogen in particular) is one of the few promising areas of cooperation between Germany and Russia, with the potential to become a major steppingstone for the development of hydrogen value chains in both countries. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:342021&r= |
| By: | Ålander, Minna; Paul, Michael |
| Abstract: | Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is not based on legitimate or reasonable security interests - it is a blatant rejection of Europe's security order. President Vladimir Putin already made this clear in his televised address on 21 February preceding the attack. Previously, Finland and Sweden had recalled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act of 1975, to which Russia - as the successor state of the Soviet Union - has committed itself. According to the Helsinki Final Act, the sovereign equality of the signatory states is to be respected - and with it their right to choose their alliances freely. Moscow's military aggression not only pushes Helsinki and Stockholm closer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to an unprecedented extent, but it also makes the containment of Russian power an urgent matter once again. In the long term, it will have implications on the stability in the High North as well. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:242022&r= |
| By: | Dalay, Galip; Isachenko, Daria |
| Abstract: | The Ukraine crisis poses two particularly uneasy questions for Turkey: How to uphold a power balance in the Black Sea? And how to manage its relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West? So far, Ankara's policy towards Moscow consists of both deterrence and dialogue. In regards deterrence, Turkey is closer to the non-EU members of NATO such as the US and the UK. Meanwhile, Turkey's policy of dialogue is similar to that of EU members, most notably Germany. However, while there is a certain degree of similarity between the stances of Turkey and some Western countries in the current crisis, their convergence of interests has not yet resulted in any meaningful cooperation. In the short term, the parallel track of deterrence and dialogue still gives Turkey some leeway to continue its multi-vector manoeuvring. The Ukrainian imbroglio is, however, a manifestation of a crisis concerning the current European security order, or more precisely the lack thereof, thus making it necessary to define the role of not only Russia but also Turkey in any European design for a new security architecture. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:92022&r= |
| By: | Nina Boyarchenko; Richard K. Crump; Anna Kovner; Or Shachar |
| Abstract: | The Russian invasion of Ukraine increased uncertainty around the world. Although most U.S. companies have limited direct exposure to Ukrainian and Russian trading partners, increased global uncertainty may still have an indirect effect on funding conditions through tightening financial conditions. In this post, we examine how conditions in the U.S. corporate bond market have evolved since the start of the year through the lens of the U.S. Corporate Bond Market Distress Index (CMDI). As described in a previous Liberty Street Economics post, the index quantifies joint dislocations in the primary and secondary corporate bond markets and can thus serve as an early warning signal to detect financial market dysfunction. The index has risen sharply from historically low levels before the invasion of Ukraine, peaking on March 19, but appears to have stabilized around the median historical level. |
| Keywords: | corporate bond market conditions; invasion of Ukraine |
| JEL: | E5 G12 |
| Date: | 2022–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednls:94285&r= |
| By: | Whelsy Boungou (BSE - Bordeaux Sciences Economiques - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Alhonita YatiÉ (BSE - Bordeaux Sciences Economiques - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Using stock returns from a sample of 94 countries over the period from 22 January to 24 March 2022, we document a negative relationship between the Ukraine–Russia war and world stock market returns. We thus provide the first empirical evidence. |
| Keywords: | Stock index,War,Ukraine,Russia |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03675532&r= |
| By: | von Ondarza, Nicolai; Overhaus, Marco |
| Abstract: | The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is forcing Europeans into a confrontational security order. This also makes European strategic sovereignty - n defence policy, but also in economics, technology, energy policy, and institutional framework - a more significant goal for the European Union (EU). Until now, however, a central narrative has been that the EU must be able to act autonomously without the United States (US). In the new security environment, the primary aim of strategic sovereignty should be protecting EU member states and asserting common European interests. For the foreseeable future, however, the Union remains confronted with a fundamental dilemma that can only be attenuated but not fully resolved: In Europe's new confrontational security order, its strategic dependence on the US is likely to grow, while America's long-term alliance commitments remain fraught with question marks. Strategic sovereignty must therefore include the pursuit of Europe's collective defence capability in close cooperation and coordination with the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:312022&r= |
| By: | Bardt, Hubertus; Grömling, Michael; Schmitz, Edgar |
| Abstract: | Seit über einem Monat führt Russland einen Angriffskrieg in der Ukraine. Auch die deutsche Wirtschaft spürt zunehmend die Folgen. Eine laufend aktualisierte IW-Umfrage zeigt: Vor allem hohe Energiepreise und Lieferschwierigkeiten belasten die Unternehmen immer stärker. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:332022&r= |
| By: | Tastan, Kadri |
| Abstract: | Russia's attack on Ukraine has once again highlighted Europe's heavy dependence on Russian natural gas and thus, among other things, underlined the significance of energy cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Turkey. Traditionally, Turkish-European energy relations have prioritised the diversification of energy resources in the face of Europe's dependence on Russia. The new emerging political, geopolitical, and energy context will have repercussions on Turkish-European energy relation. However, it is the ambitious process of decarbonisation of the economy and energy launched by the EU that will decisively shape the nature and future of Turkey-EU energy relations. Indeed, both European and Turkish interests related to energy security, energy affordability, and climate change mitigation require EU-Turkey cooperation in the decarbonisation process, which is expected to be very challenging. Energy transition is the key to medium- and long-term energy security for both sides. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:232022&r= |
| By: | Smolnik, Franziska; Sarjveladze, Mikheil; Tadumadze, Giorgi |
| Abstract: | Since the parliamentary elections in October 2020, Georgia's government and opposition have found themselves in a political deadlock. This is evidenced above all by the fact that the majority of elected opposition parties have boycotted entering parliament. The country is not only facing domestic political challenges. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh has also changed the regional constellation. While Russia and Turkey have positioned themselves as influential actors in the region, the EU has been barely visible. For Georgia, which is the only country in the South Caucasus to have clear EU and NATO ambitions, this change is a potential threat to its pro-Western course. Tbilisi continues to have high expectations of the EU, which claims to be a geopolitical actor. Both the new regional context and the Georgian domestic political crisis should be an inducement for the EU to engage more with its eastern neighbourhood, and especially to give new impetus to its relations with Euro-Atlantic orientated Georgia. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:262021&r= |
| By: | Diermeier, Matthias |
| Abstract: | Die in Folge des russischen Angriffs auf die Ukraine verhängten Sanktionen finden in den europäischen Bevölkerungen eine breite Zustimmung. Betrachtet man hingegen das Abstimmungsverhalten der Europaparlamentarier in den Jahren nach der Annexion der Krim, zeigen sich mögliche Risse in der anti-russischen Front. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:372022&r= |
| By: | Eldem, Tuba |
| Abstract: | On June 26, the Turkish government began constructing the first bridge over Canal Istanbul, the huge waterway project designed to run parallel to the Bosporus Strait. Ankara has presented the megaproject as a strategic move that will turn Turkey into a logistics base and grant it geopolitical leverage over both regional and international trade and transportation routes. However, Turkey's political opposition considers Canal Istanbul to be a rent-seeking project designed to attract international - probably Chinese and Arab - investment in the hope of reviving Turkey's deteriorating economy. The Canal may also affect the Montreux Convention, the decades old treaty that governs the Turkish Straits. Given the rivalry between the US and Russia, questions around the Montreux Convention will add another point of contention, increase tensions and may also present serious consequences for Turkey. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:432021&r= |
| By: | Minzarari, Dumitru; Stewart, Susan |
| Abstract: | The recent debate about providing military assistance to Ukraine has relevance for the efforts to overcome the current impasse in the Minsk Process and the Normandy Format in particular, and thus the search for a resolution to the conflict regarding the Donbas. But it also concerns larger questions of Germany's role in Europe, and in security policy more generally. It touches on Germany's ability to adapt to situations in which other countries are willing to envisage military solutions to existing conflicts. In this sense, it fits into discussions about a more geopolitical EU. And it offers Berlin a way to reinforce its commitment to European security and stability by more actively resisting the redrawing of international borders. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:422021&r= |
| By: | Mintel, Julina; von Ondarza, Nicolai |
| Abstract: | Since Brexit, the United Kingdom (UK) has been increasing its focus on bilateral relations with EU member states, in particular in the field of foreign and security policy. One year after the end of the transition period, London has achieved its first successes: The UK has won over Germany and a number of European Union (EU) member states in its efforts to deepen bilateral relations and has agreed on new coordination structures. In order to demonstrate their importance to European security, the British have engaged intensively in crisis situations, such as the one on the Polish/Lithuanian EU external border with Belarus as well as the Russian military build-up around Ukraine. The EU, on the other hand, has no interest in this bilateralisation. Instead of insisting on a standard third-country model that does not suit London and faced with the possible return of a large-scale war in Europe, the EU and the UK should urgently work towards a joint security partnership. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:142022&r= |
| By: | Werner, Dirk; Jansen, Anika; Pierenkemper, Sarah; Hickmann, Helen; Garb, Maria |
| Abstract: | Der Angriffskrieg Russlands auf die Ukraine hat eine Flüchtlingswelle ausgelöst, im Zuge derer bereits viele Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainer nach Deutschland gekommen sind und noch weitere kommen werden. Für die Geflüchteten stehen Schutz, Kinderbetreuung und familiäre Versorgung im Vordergrund. Vielfach wird derzeit gefordert, die Geflüchteten möglichst unkompliziert und schnell in den Arbeitsmarkt zu integrieren. Dies wird zeitnah jedoch nur für diejenigen Erwachsenen möglich sein, die nicht mit Kinderbetreuung oder Pflege von Angehörigen gefordert sind. Bei der Integration in Beschäftigung sind daher eine kurzfristige und eine mittel- bis langfristige Perspektive zu unterscheiden. Kurzfristig stehen die Chancen auf Teilhabe am Arbeitsmarkt durch die sogenannte Massenzustrom-Richtlinie auf Basis von § 24 AufenthG für ukrainische Geflüchtete günstig, da Personen neben einem vorübergehenden Schutz von einem bis drei Jahren auch Zugang zum Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland haben (BMI, 2022). Mittelbis langfristig sollte eine möglichst nachhaltige Integration in qualifizierte Beschäftigung mitgedacht werden. Die Chancen am Arbeitsmarkt können Geflüchtete am besten nutzen, wenn sie eine Tätigkeit entsprechend ihrer Qualifikation ausüben. Hierfür spielt die formale Anerkennung vorhandener Berufsqualifikationen aus der Ukraine eine wichtige Rolle. Eine Anerkennung gibt Transparenz über die vorhandenen Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten und erleichtert den Einstieg in eine qualifikationsadäquate Beschäftigung. Seit dem Inkrafttreten des Anerkennungsgesetzes im Jahr 2012 besteht für alle Personen die Möglichkeit, ihren ausländischen Berufsabschluss in Deutschland anerkennen zu lassen. Voraussetzung ist, dass die Person eine formale und staatlich anerkannte Aus- oder Weiterbildung abgeschlossen hat. In den Jahren 2016 bis 2020 wurden insgesamt 6.213 Anerkennungsverfahren für ukrainische Berufsabschlüsse beschieden. Viele Anerkennungen entfallen auf Berufe, die auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt große Fachkräfteengpässe aufweisen, wie beispielsweise in der Gesundheits- und Krankenpflege. 48,5 Prozent der beschiedenen Anerkennungen von Frauen aus der Ukraine waren im Jahr 2020 für Engpassberufe. Bei den ukrainischen Männern waren es 49,0 Prozent. Ein Blick auf das ukrainische Bildungssystem zeigt, dass es in der Ausbildung zwar oftmals einen geringeren Praxisanteil als in der deutschen dualen Ausbildung gibt, aber dennoch gute Chancen auf eine Anerkennung bestehen. Die Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainer, die bereits vor Kriegsausbruch in Deutschland lebten, sind gut in den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt integriert. Viele arbeiten in qualifizierten Jobs als Fachkraft oder auf Expertenniveau. Bislang vorliegende Untersuchungen zeigen, dass auch das Bildungsniveau der neu ankommenden Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainern hoch ist. Die bislang offiziell registrierten 384.000 ukrainischen Geflüchteten bringen also gute Voraussetzungen mit, um auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt Fuß zu fassen, sofern ihre familiäre Situation dies zulässt und sie eine Beschäftigung anstreben. |
| JEL: | J24 J44 J89 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:252022&r= |
| By: | Adar, Sinem |
| Abstract: | Undermining the foundational pillars of the post-Cold War security order, Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine is a watershed event for Europe and the wider world, Turkey included. While Ankara is trying to protect its economy and security interests, anti-Western narratives dominate the public debate. The war has indeed accentuated anti-Westernism as one of the main fault lines of political competition. Given the geopolitical imperatives that February 24 brought to the fore, it is highly likely that, in the short-term, Turkey's NATO membership and its Association Agreement with the EU will - geopolitically and economically - continue to anchor it to the West. Whether or not a full strategic alignment with the EU will accompany such an anchoring is far from certain, however, mainly due to Turkey's domestic political dynamics, but also due to the unclarity about how far the EU is willing to move beyond a transactional approach. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:252022&r= |
| By: | Jongrim Ha; M. Ayhan Kose; Franziska Ohnsorge |
| Abstract: | Global inflation has risen sharply from its lows in mid-2020, on rebounding global demand, supply bottlenecks, and soaring food and energy prices, especially since the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine. Markets expect inflation to peak in mid-2022 and then decline, but to remain elevated even after these shocks subside and monetary policies are tightened further. Global growth has been moving in the opposite direction: it has declined sharply since the beginning of the year and, for the remainder of this decade, is expected to remain below the average of the 2010s. In light of these developments, the risk of stagflation—a combination of high inflation and sluggish growth—has risen. The recovery from the stagflation of the 1970s required steep increases in interest rates by major advanced-economy central banks to quell inflation, which triggered a global recession and a string of financial crises in emerging market and developing economies. If current stagflationary pressures intensify, they would likely face severe challenges again because of their less well-anchored inflation expectations, elevated financial vulnerabilities, and weakening growth fundamentals. |
| JEL: | E31 E32 E52 Q43 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2022-41&r= |
| By: | Minzarari, Dumitru |
| Abstract: | The euphoria felt by both domestic and foreign liberal audiences following the victory of a pro-reform party in Moldova is now receding. The new Moldovan leadership has stumbled in fulfilling its main electoral promise, namely to fight corruption by effectively reforming the justice system. There is a growing realisation that justice reform initiated and conducted with Western support over the last decade, and based on the implementation of existing best practices, might not be the most effective approach considering Moldova's conditions. With corrupt courts and a public prosecutor office that is still connected to former kleptocrats, Moldova is a model weak state. A more suitable approach to justice reform would be to first establish prerequisites that would lead to the impartiality of the legal system before granting it political independence. This may also prove a more suitable model of justice reform for other Eastern Partnership countries undermined by strongmen and tycoons. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:272022&r= |
| By: | Schmitz, Andrea |
| Abstract: | Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbours have generally reacted pragmatically to the Taliban's seizure of power there. For the autocratically ruled, secular states on the periphery of the former Soviet empire, economic cooperation and the stabilisation of humanitarian and political conditions in Afghanistan are at the forefront of their interests in maintaining relations with their southern neighbour. According to official discourse, Central Asia's entrenched secularism is not challenged by the Taliban's Islamism. On social media in Central Asia, however, the Islamic emirate of the Taliban is portrayed as a political counter-model; one which is more positively received in countries with greater discursive freedom and under governments whose policies more openly confront the Taliban. This reveals a trend towards Islamist-inspired identity formation that will be difficult to stop through censorship and repression. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:172022&r= |
| By: | Tomaz Ponce, Dentinho (University of the Azores - Department of Agricultural Sciences) |
| Abstract: | A Ciência Regional tem tratado mais das regiões do que das suas fronteiras assumindo-as usualmente como periferias facilmente conectadas com distância e acessibilidade, mas que evita tratar a função das fronteiras como barreira ou organização do espaço ou mesmo analisar a sua criação que, no caso de fronteiras entre países, são normalmente definidas por guerras e conflitos. A guerra da Rússia com a Ucrânia e a obrigação de pensá-la leva-nos a colocar o desenho e a função das fronteiras na agenda da Ciência Regional. Neste documento de trabalho exploramos a ideia de fronteira como espaço mínimo de proteção de portos de bacias que confluem com o mar, procuramos a sua aplicação à fronteira da Ucrânia, recolhemos percepções da fronteira entre a Moldávia e a Ucrânia, a Roménia e a Ucrânia e, em ambiente de guerra, entre a Ucrânia e a Rússia. Com base numa visita de poucas horas num dia de guerra, intuímos sobre a estratégia de invasão russa e sobre a dualidade entre fronteiras e contrabando. Finalmente argumentamos sobre a urgência de estudar os custos e benefícios das sanções econômicas como arma de guerra e sobre os efeitos de vários cenários de evolução da guerra incluindo a integração da Ucrânia na Europa. |
| Keywords: | Odessa; Guerra da Ucrânia; Ciência Regional |
| JEL: | R10 |
| Date: | 2022–05–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nereus:2022_003&r= |