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on Confederation of Independent States |
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Issue of 2022‒06‒20
forty-five papers chosen by |
| By: | Cheng, Manqing |
| Abstract: | Located at the geopolitical centre of Eurasia, Ukraine has been an important arena for great power game for nearly three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The West, principally the United States and Europe, and the Russian Federation have therefore been heavily involved in Ukraine's internal and external development. Their ideological, economic, and geopolitical interests clashed in a fierce battle that led to multiple political regime changes in Ukraine, and ultimately plunged Europe into an intractable security situation. This paper takes the rivalry between the US, Europe and Russia in Ukraine as a starting point to examine the dilemma facing European security in the context of the great power game, the root causes behind the Ukraine crisis, its far-reaching consequences for geopolitics and global patterns and the implications for regional peace in other parts of the world. |
| Date: | 2022–05–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:xdg6n&r= |
| By: | Martina Halouskov\'a (Department of Finance, The Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University); Daniel Sta\v{s}ek (Department of Finance, The Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University); Mat\'u\v{s} Horv\'ath (Department of Finance, The Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of event-specific attention indices - based on Google search queries - in predictive price variation models before and during the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. We extend our analyses to the importance of geographical proximity and economic openness to Russia within 51 global equity markets. Our results demonstrate that attention to the conflict is significant at the onset of and during the invasion and helps predict volatility. Finally, we find a positive dependency between attention significance and the geographical distance to Moscow and a negative dependency on the degree of economic openness to Russia. |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2205.05985&r= |
| By: | Abay, Kibrom A.; Breisinger, Clemens; Glauber, Joseph W.; Kurdi, Sikandra; Laborde Debucquet, David; Siddig, Khalid |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the implications of the Russian-Ukraine crisis on global and regional food security. We start with a global vulnerability analysis to identify most vulnerable regions and countries. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is particularly vulnerable to trade shocks because of its high food import dependence. Thus, we provide descriptive evidence characterizing how food systems and policies impact vulnerability to the price shock in selected MENA countries: Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen. Within these countries, we show that the crisis will differentially impact poor and non-poor households as well as rural and urban households. Although the absolute level of food insecurity may still be higher in rural areas where larger numbers of poor households are located, urban poor are likely to suffer most because of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and associated hikes in food prices, especially in those countries where social protection and food subsidies are missing. On the policy side, we review lessons from previous food crises and identify actions needed to take (and to avoid) to protect most vulnerable countries and households in the short-term while also highlighting long-term policy options to diversify food, fertilizer and energy production and trade. |
| Keywords: | MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AFRICA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, EASTERN EUROPE, UKRAINE, EUROPE, food security, food crises, food prices, conflicts, fertilizers, farm inputs, poverty, economic shocks |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:menawp:39&r= |
| By: | Dalay, Galip |
| Abstract: | Syria is central to the current shape of Turkey-Russia relations. It offers a model of partnership for both countries in a context where their interests are competitive. However, the Syrian-centric cooperation between Turkey and Russia is also special and is thus unlikely to be replicated elsewhere due to structural constraints and contextual nuances. The limits of the Syrian-style model of cooperation between Ankara and Moscow can be observed in Libya as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. Even though the institutional and elite ownership of Turkey's Western relations has weakened, no similar institutional basis exists in Turkey's relations with Russia. As such, the current Ankara-Moscow axis is to a great extent defined by the personal ties between the countries' leaders and geopolitical imperatives. However, if the current shape of relations endures much longer, these personalised relations will gain structural foundations. A major problem for Turkey in its relations with Russia remains the asymmetry, even if interdependent, in favour of Moscow. Yet, the nature of asymmetry is dynamic and subject to change, as Turkey has engaged in what can be termed dependency reduction on Russia, both geopolitically and structurally (energy-wise). Developments at the broader international level, a new administration in the US, and rising tension between Ukraine and Russia indicate that Turkey would face more constraints and higher costs for its hitherto geopolitical balancing act between the West and Russia. The close relations in recent years between Ankara and Moscow also point to the need for Turkey and the West to redefine the nature of their relations, as the Cold War framework of Turkey-US relations and the accession framework of Turkish-European relations increasingly appear to be ill-suited to the present realities. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:52021&r= |
| By: | Paul, Michael; Swistek, Göran |
| Abstract: | Russia wants to realise a high degree of self-regulated stability in the Arctic. Moscow considers this necessary for overcoming the many problems and obstacles to development that are linked to its ambitious plans as well as the consequences of climate change. The regression of sea ice is perceived as a loss of security by the Kremlin, which reinforces its traditional siege mentality. Russian foreign policy is shaped by a reflexive priorisation of security policy above all, even in the Arctic region. Moscow tries to guarantee its national security (including economic interests) by using a broad spectrum of military build-up and corresponding strategic initiatives, which include new nuclear weapons systems. Other Arctic states as well as neighbouring countries and NATO consider these efforts a threat. Russia takes a defensive attitude in the Arctic, but it is prepared for rapid escalation in the event of confrontation. Russia's Arctic policy is a part of its strategy for exerting economic and political influence over Europe. Cooperation between its Northern and Baltic fleets is therefore increasingly important to preserve its geostrategic interests, project power and to defend its territory. The Arctic states have to perform a delicate balancing act: they want to secure sea routes and resources but avoid spiralling escalation in the region. The dialogue on military security should be revived in order to contain the consequences of the security dilemma. Opportunities for cooperation do exist, for example on climate and environmental projects, sustainable and environmentally sound energy use, infrastructure, maritime safety and security as well as economic cooperation. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:32022&r= |
| By: | Isachenko, Daria |
| Abstract: | Relations between Turkey and Russia are a puzzle to many in the West. How sustainable is the relationship? What is it grounded on? And what can the West learn from it? Central to the relationship is its bilateral nature. Relations between Ankara and Moscow are based on the mutual recognition of security interests. The resulting dynamics have shaped Turkish-Russian cooperation since the 1990s and can be observed in the current partnership in Syria. Mutual regard for the other's security concerns is facilitated by the prospect of collaborative projects that promise greater advantages than continued conflict. Trust is of secondary importance, as is the quality of personal relations between the Turkish and Russian presidents. More important is the interdependence between Russia and Turkey. The potential for confrontation or cooperation between Ankara and Moscow in regional conflicts depends on current priorities rather than past rivalries. The form and extent of their collaboration are determined not by which side of the conflict they are on, but by their respective motives. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:72021&r= |
| By: | Nobuhiro Hosoe (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan) |
| Abstract: | We use a computable general equilibrium model of world trade to quantify the possible impact of economic sanctions imposed by the Western and other countries in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. If senders chose 100% import tariffs and export taxes on trade with Russia, Russia’s GDP would decline by 3–7% due to a significant reduction in exports. By contrast, the GDP loss for those countries would be the largest for Europe but only about 0.2%, and 0.05% for Japan. The effect of China’s participation in the sanctions is more significant than that of India. There are concerns about food and energy crises due to economic sanctions against Russia, but food supplies would not be a serious problem for either senders or third parties. The impact on energy supplies would affect all senders to some extent, for example with a reduction of energy consumption by 3% in and a rise in electricity and town gas prices by 3–4% in Japan. |
| Keywords: | Russian invasion; Ukraine; economic sanctions; energy security; food security; simulation |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ngi:dpaper:22-06&r= |
| By: | Bruno Castanho Silva (Cologne Center for Comparative Politics); Jens Wäckerle; Christopher Wratil |
| Abstract: | Western powers have discussed and implemented several policies in response to the full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. One such possible answer was an immediate embargo on all Russian energy exports to the EU. While seen as a strong measure against Russia's war effort, some EU governments were unenthusiastic, due to potential negative economic impacts on the short run, by pressuring prices for consumers and fueling inflation. Public opinion also seemed divided on the matter. We use a framing survey experiment in Germany (n = 3,251) to test what factors influence support for an immediate embargo against Russian energy. Results indicate that out of seven possible frames tested, the only one that has an effect on embargo support is whether the rest of the German public is in favor or not. Results are in line with contemporary models of public opinion formation and legitimacy, and shed light on the conditions that may help framing other potentially costly issues to garner public support, such as measures to tackle climate change. |
| Keywords: | public opinion; survey experiment; Russian energy embargo; foreign policy; Ukraine war |
| JEL: | D91 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:170&r= |
| By: | Simola, Heli |
| Abstract: | The EU, US and several other countries have responded with a wide range of new economic sanctions on Russia in response to the military attack on Ukraine. These sanctions include various restrictive measures on trade with Russia. In this brief, we examine the potential short-term effects of trade sanctions on Russian production with an input-output framework. We find that the trade sanctions can have substantial negative effects on Russian production when Russia is unable to find alternative markets for imports and exports. |
| Keywords: | Russia,trade,sanctions,input-output |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitb:42022&r= |
| By: | Hutter, Christian (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Weber, Enzo (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; Univ. Regensburg) |
| Abstract: | "With the Russian war against Ukraine, global economic conditions changed abruptly. We provide first causal evidence of effects of the energy crisis on Germany as Europe’s most important economy. Combining cost structure data, national accounts and administrative labour market data, we identify effects in a sectoral panel setting. The results show that via the channel of energy intensity, production decreased by about 1 percent with the onset of the war, but turnover increased, mirroring sales from stock. Firms safeguard employment via short-time work with 10 percent additional applications. Vacancy posting was reduced already in anticipation by 8 percent." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) |
| Keywords: | IAB-Open-Access-Publikation |
| JEL: | E23 H56 J63 Q43 |
| Date: | 2022–05–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabdpa:202210&r= |
| By: | Adar, Sinem; Asseburg, Muriel; Azizi, Hamidreza; Klein, Margarete; Yacoubian, Mona |
| Abstract: | In Syria, the immediate effects of the war in Ukraine have made an already difficult humanitarian situation even worse. Protracted violence in Ukraine or an expansion of the Ukraine war into a larger NATO-Russia confrontation would endanger multilateral cooperation on conflict management, conflict resolution and humanitarian issues in Syria. Protracted conflict in Ukraine could also disrupt the volatile status quo in Syria, potentially endangering ceasefire agreements, tilting the power balance in favour of Iran and thereby increasing the risk of military escalation between Iran and its antagonists, complicating the fight against ISIS, and endangering cross-border humanitarian aid deliveries. Europeans should attempt to insulate the war in Ukraine from Syria as much as possible, double down on efforts to renew the UN Security Council resolution that allows for humanitarian access to northwest Syria and contribute to the long-term objective of an inclusive regional security architecture. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:322022&r= |
| By: | Jean-Sébastien Lenfant (PRISM Sorbonne - Pôle de recherche interdisciplinaire en sciences du management - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | Eugen Slutsky is well-known to any graduate student in economics for two landmark articles and two operational concepts bearing his name, one in the field of consumer and utility theory ("the Slutsky equation"), the other in the field of the theory of cycles, introducing autonomous and exogenous causes in the analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations ("the Slutsky-Yule effect"). Because of the historical and political circumstances he had to confront in Ukraine, and then in Russia and in the U.S.S.R. in the first half of 20th century, Slutsky was prevented from devoting himself fully to mathematical economics, and he only published a handful more of articles dealing with economics. Over the last twenty years, researchers in Europe, Ukraine and Russia have been involved in making his contributions to mathematics and economics better known. By now, we get a clearer picture of Slutsky's views on economics and we know his network of connections with Western scholars who contributed to draw attention to his work. This essay highlights Slutsky's lasting importance in economics, focusing on the fate of his major and lesser known works. |
| Keywords: | Slutsky equation,Economic cycles,Praxeology theory,Utility Theory |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03628273&r= |
| By: | Tulun, Teoman Ertuğrul; Tulun, Mehmet Oğuzhan |
| Abstract: | Western countries and Russia are locked into an ideological conflict and dangerous brinkmanship over the future of Ukraine, NATO-member and EU-candidate Turkey has drawn attention due to its efforts to maintain a delicate balance in its relations with its Western allies, Russia, and Ukraine. Such a stance has highlighted Turkey's foreign policy and its place in its region and, in fact, the world. Antiquated Cold War-era mindsets view Turkey as a mere frontline asset of the Western world and that Turkey's deviation from such a role is inherently threatening for the West. Turkey's best interest lays in adopting Constructive Eurasianism that on the one hand values Turkey's institutionalized connections with the West, and on the other hand looks into the potential offered by increased ties with Turkey's east. Constructive Eurasianism values and respects Turkey's NATO membership and supports its EU candidacy, even though the latter promises the Turkish people an improbable future. However, it also recognizes that some of the florid language employed by Western countries with emphasis on democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, and the "value-based relationship" rhetoric masks centuries-old imperialistic ambitions and an arrogant attempt to intervene in the domestic politics of other countries. Considering all these issues, Constructive Eurasianism, unlike other forms of Eurasianism advocated, "will benefit Turkey because it rejects creating new rivalries and antagonisms, and instead seeks to create new avenues for cooperation so that Turkey can position itself properly in a changing world." As such, Constructive Eurasianism will allow Turkey to continue to be an integrated part of the West and at the same time to function as a true nexus between the West and the East. |
| Date: | 2022–05–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:72c8d&r= |
| By: | Schaller, Christian |
| Abstract: | Völkerrechtsverbrechen, die während des Krieges in der Ukraine begangen werden, können sowohl vor nationalen Gerichten als auch vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof verfolgt werden. Deutsche Strafgerichte sind auf Basis des Universalitätsprinzips ebenfalls in der Lage, solche Taten zu ahnden. Dabei wird es vor allem um Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit gehen. Über das Verbrechen der Aggression hat der Internationale Strafgerichtshof in Bezug auf Staatsangehörige der Russischen Föderation keine Gerichtsbarkeit. Da es sich bei dem russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine zugleich um einen Angriff auf die Charta der Vereinten Nationen und auf die internationale Ordnung als solche handelt, sollte ein internationales Sondertribunal geschaffen werden, das speziell darauf ausgelegt ist, die gegen die Ukraine begangene Aggression strafrechtlich aufzuarbeiten. Schwer vorstellbar ist, dass Präsident Putin oder Außenminister Lawrow in absehbarer Zeit vor einem nationalen oder internationalen Strafgericht belangt werden. Personen unterhalb dieser Ebene, insbesondere die in der Ukraine eingesetzten Soldaten, müssen aber damit rechnen, für Völkerrechtsverbrechen zur Verantwortung gezogen zu werden. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:52022&r= |
| By: | Pavel Vashchenko; Alexei Verenikin; Anna Verenikina |
| Abstract: | The article is devoted to the competitiveness analysis of Russian institutions of higher education in international and local markets. The methodology of research is based on generalized modified principal component analysis. Principal components analysis has proven its efficiency in business performance assessment. We apply a modification of this methodology to construction of an aggregate index of university performance. The whole set of principal components with weighting coefficients equal to the proportions of the corresponding explained variance are utilized as an aggregate measure of various aspects of higher education. This methodology allows to reveal the factors which exert positive or negative influence on university competitiveness. We construct a kind of objective ranking of universities in order to estimate the current situation and prospects of higher education in Russia. It is applicable for evaluation of public policy in higher education, which, by inertia, aims to promote competition rather than cooperation among universities. |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2205.04426&r= |
| By: | International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) |
| Abstract: | The per kilo sweet potato (2020 real) price in Port Moresby and Lae in the 1st quarter of 2022 were nearly double the per kilo sweet potato price of the 1st quarter of 2021. The price of cassava and taro held stable in quarter 1 with minimal price changes between January and April across all markets. While, globally, commodity food prices are rising due to supply chain issues and concerns over the Russia-Ukraine conflict, thus far rice prices in PNG remain stable. Vitamin dense fresh vegetables are more costly than staple foods in PNG. However, in Goroka, Mt. Hagen, and Lae, the kg prices of broccoli, carrot and cabbage in the first quarter of 2022 were comparable to taro and cooking banana. |
| Keywords: | PAPUA NEW GUINEA, OCEANIA, prices, food prices, legumes, vegetable legumes, markets, staple crops |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:pngfpb:april2022&r= |
| By: | , AlFerganus |
| Abstract: | В статье рассматриваются некоторые вопросы регулирования малого предпринимательства в стране и регионе, на материалах Ферганской области Республики Узбекистан. Предложены направления реформирования в административной и налоговой сферах. The article discusses some issues of regulation of small business in the country and the region, based on the materials of the Ferghana region of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The directions of reform in the administrative and tax spheres are proposed. |
| Date: | 2022–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:5yg29&r= |
| By: | Dang, Hai-Anh H.; Abanokova, Kseniya |
| Abstract: | Measuring the intergenerational mobility of welfare provides key inputs for policies, but very few studies examine intergenerational mobility of subjective well-being (SWB), particularly in a poorer, transitional country context. We make new contributions by analyzing rich panel SWB data from Russia over the past quarter century, which address various shortcomings with traditional income data. We find that intergenerational SWB mobility-as measured by subjective wealth and life satisfaction-exists, with daughters having higher transmission of SWB from their mothers than sons. Adding other child and parent characteristics to the multivariate regression models can reduce the estimated impacts of mothers' SWB by up to 40% but does not change the gender gaps in the intergenerational transmission. Our results are robust to different model specifications and sample restrictions. |
| Keywords: | intergenerational mobility,life satisfaction,subjective wealth,gender,panel data,Russia |
| JEL: | D6 I3 J6 O1 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1088&r= |
| By: | Dang, Hai-Anh (World Bank); Abanokova, Kseniya (Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg Branch) |
| Abstract: | Measuring the intergenerational mobility of welfare provides key inputs for policies, but very few studies examine intergenerational mobility of subjective well-being (SWB), particularly in a poorer, transitional country context. We make new contributions by analyzing rich panel SWB data from Russia over the past quarter century, which address various shortcomings with traditional income data. We find that intergenerational SWB mobility—as measured by subjective wealth and life satisfaction—exists. While daughters have less subjective wealth and life satisfaction than sons, daughters have higher transmission of SWB from their mothers. Adding other child and parent characteristics to the multivariate regression models can reduce the estimated impacts of mothers' SWB by up to 40%, but does not change the gender gaps. Our results are robust to different model specifications and sample restrictions. |
| Keywords: | intergenerational mobility, life satisfaction, subjective wealth, gender, panel data, Russia |
| JEL: | D6 I3 J6 O1 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15244&r= |
| By: | Mikhail Pomazanov |
| Abstract: | A direct method for calculating default rates by industry and target corporate segments is not possible given the lack of statistical data. The proposed paper considers a model for filtering the dynamics of the probability of default of corporate companies and other borrowers based on indirect data on the dynamics of overdue debt supplied by the Bank of Russia. The model is based on the equation of the balance of total and overdue debts, the missing links of the corresponding time series are built using the Hodrick_Prescott filtering method. In retail lending segments (mortgage, consumer lending), default statistics are available and supplied by Credit Bureaus. The presented method is validated on this statistic. Over a historical limited period, validation has shown that the result is trustworthy. The resulting default probability series are exogenous variables for macro_economic modelling of sectoral credit risks. |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2205.05984&r= |
| By: | Geis-Thöne, Wido; Klös, Hans-Peter; Krey, Kerstin; Plünnecke, Axel |
| Abstract: | Vor dem Hintergrund des Kriegs in der Ukraine muss sich Deutschland auf die Aufnahme einer hohen Zahl Geflüchteter vorbereiten. Hilfreich ist dabei, dass die Anwendung der "Massenzustrom-Richtlinie" die administrativen Prozesse vereinfacht und bereits vielfältige Unterstützungsangebote existieren. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:262022&r= |
| By: | Westphal, Kirsten; Pastukhova, Maria; Pepe, Jacopo Maria |
| Abstract: | Although electricity grids shape and define both political and economic spaces, the geopolitical significance of electricity remains underestimated. In political communities and beyond, such grids establish new channels for projecting geopolitical influence and new spheres of influence. In the Europe-Asia continental area, integrated electricity grids meet interconnectors - that is, cross-border transmission lines linking different electric grids. Interconnectors define new, partly competing vectors of integration that extend beyond already integrated electricity grids. In this context, it is attractive for non-EU states to belong to the electricity system of continental Europe. This is because interconnected synchronous systems form 'grid communities' that share a 'common destiny' - not only in terms of electricity supply but also in terms of security and welfare. Germany and the EU must develop an electricity foreign policy in order to optimise, modernise, strengthen and expand the European electricity grid. Above all, however, Germany and the EU should help shape interconnectivity beyond the EU's common integrated electricity grid. China is gaining considerable influence in the electricity sector, setting standards and norms as well as expanding its strategic outreach - to the benefit of its own economy. Its efforts are part of Beijing's larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an attempt to reorient global infrastructure and commercial flows. In the EU's eastern neighbourhood, geopolitical issues have dominated the configuration of electricity grids since the end of the Cold War. There is unmistakable competition over integration between the EU and Russia. The eastern Mediterranean region, the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, and Central Asia are, each in their own way, changing from peripheral zones into interconnecting spaces. The EU, China, Russia and - across the Black Sea - Iran and Turkey are competing in these zones to influence the reconfiguration of electricity grids. And in South and Southeast Asia, India's influence is on the rise. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:62022&r= |
| By: | Puls, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Russlands Überfall auf die Ukraine ist dabei, die Welthandelsströme deutlich zu verändern. Russland wird von den Logistiknetzen abgekoppelt und zahlreiche Lieferketten müssen umgelenkt werden. Die Folgen belasten die Logistikbranche sehr stark. Sie reichen von drastisch steigen Charterraten für Tanker bis hin zu möglichen Versorgungsengpässen, wenn ukrainische Lkw-Fahrer ihre Arbeitsplätze verlassen, um ihre Heimat zu verteidigen. Betroffen sind alle Verkehrsträger, wenn auch in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:272022&r= |
| By: | Kınıklıoğlu, Suat |
| Abstract: | Turkey's neo-Eurasianist ideologues describe themselves as 'Kemalist Eurasianists'. They argue that 'Eurasianism calls for a cultural, military, political and commercial alliance with Turkey's eastern neighbors, notably Russia, Iran, the Turkic countries of Central Asia, and even Pakistan, India and China' and is 'hostile towards any type of pro-Western policy in the Eurasian space. Turkey's neo-Eurasianists transformed from incarcerated villains to coalition partners in government and the bureaucracy. This spectacular reversal of fortunes could only materialize due to the special circumstances that arose from the ruthless power struggle between Turkey's Islamists. Nationalist-Islamism and Eurasianism overlap as they both despise Western dominance in the international order, feel threatened by the liberal cultural-civilizational siege of the West and thus have a common counter-hegemonic view of the world. Turkish Islamists and Eurasianists believe that a post-Western world is in the making. They argue that the unipolarity of the 1990s is over and that the West is essentially in an unstoppable decline - not least because of its degeneration in values. The true significance of Turkish 'Eurasianism' does not lie in its capacity to shape foreign and security policy although that cannot be totally disregarded; rather, its real contribution to the current regime comes from its critical role in widening and solidifying consent to authoritarian rule in Turkey. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:72022&r= |
| By: | Dario Caldara; Sarah Conlisk; Matteo Iacoviello; Maddie Penn |
| Abstract: | Global geopolitical risks have soared since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Investors, market participants, and policymakers expect that the war will exert a drag on the global economy while pushing up inflation, with a sharp increase in uncertainty and risks of severe adverse outcomes. As an example of these concerns, the April 2022 edition of the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook contains more than 200 mentions of the word "war." |
| Date: | 2022–05–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfn:2022-05-27-2&r= |
| By: | Wietschel, Martin; Dütschke, Elisabeth; Eichhammer, Wolfgang; Ragwitz, Mario; Spillmann, Thorsten; Steinbach, Jan |
| Abstract: | [Einleitung ...] Dieses Kurzpapier diskutiert einige wichtige Optionen, mit welchen Maßnahmen die kurzfristigen Einsparpotenziale von Erdgas gehoben werden können, und die gleichzeitig geeignet sind, auch die mittel- und langfristigen Potenziale zu adressieren. Das Papier konzentriert sich dabei auf die Erdgasnachfrage im Gebäudesektor. Es erhebt nicht den Anspruch, alle Alternativen zu behandeln. Die folgenden Maßnahmen werden diskutiert: * Wirkung von Preissignalen auf die Erdgasnachfrage * Förderung von Informationskampagnen zu Energieeinsparmöglichkeiten * Anreizsysteme für Versorger und Endkund:innen zu Einsparmaßnahmen * Stärkung des Energieberatermarkts und Ausweitung Energieberatung und der Energie-Checks * Förderung von Fortbildungen in Heizungsunternehmen. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fisisi:s062022&r= |
| By: | Ersanilli, Evelyn; van der Gaag, Marieke |
| Abstract: | The MOBILISE project examines why some people respond to discontent by protesting, others by migrating while yet others stay immobile. It focuses Ukraine, Poland, Morocco and Argentina and migrants from these countries who live in Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain. The first part of this paper reports on the second wave of the panel survey among migrants from Argentina, Poland and Ukraine, and the national population of Argentina and Ukraine. Across target groups, 12 to 21 per cent of wave one respondents completed the second wave.. This is higher than might be expected in the absence of interviewer encouragement or material incentives. Analyses of the results suggest attrition bias on age, education and political interest, but these are modest in size. There is no evidence of attrition bias on Facebook use or migration aspiration. The second part of the paper presents the set-up and results of an online survey among migrants from and nationals in Poland in early 2021. The paper compares the results of the migrant surveys in 2019 and 2021 to find that the composition of the samples obtained are very similar, though the cost per respondent in 2021 was considerably higher. The latter is mostly likely a result of a higher ad budget. The online national sample is higher educated, more interested in politics, more active on Facebook, less often supportive of the ruling party and more often aspires to migrate than the face-to-face sample. This mostly replicates the pattern we found in earlier analyses of the Argentinian and Ukrainian online and face-to-face national surveys. |
| Date: | 2022–05–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:twrzq&r= |
| By: | Jongrim Ha (World Bank); M. Ayhan Kose (World Bank; Brookings Institution; CEPR; CAMA); Franziska Ohnsorge (World Bank; CEPR; CAMA) |
| Abstract: | Global inflation has risen sharply from its lows in mid-2020, on rebounding global demand, supply bottlenecks, and soaring food and energy prices, especially since the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine. Markets expect inflation to peak in mid-2022 and then decline, but to remain elevated even after these shocks subside and monetary policies are tightened further. Global growth has been moving in the opposite direction: it has declined sharply since the beginning of the year and, for the remainder of this decade, is expected to remain below the average of the 2010s. In light of these developments, the risk of stagflation—a combination of high inflation and sluggish growth—has risen. The recovery from the stagflation of the 1970s required steep increases in interest rates by major advanced-economy central banks to quell inflation, which triggered a global recession and a string of financial crises in emerging market and developing economies. If current stagflationary pressures intensify, they would likely face severe challenges again because of their less well-anchored inflation expectations, elevated financial vulnerabilities, and weakening growth fundamentals. |
| Keywords: | Inflation; growth; COVID-19; global recession; monetary policy; fiscal policy; disinflation. |
| JEL: | E31 E32 E52 Q43 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koc:wpaper:2204&r= |
| By: | Frindert, Jim; Dribbusch, Heiner; Schulten, Thorsten |
| Abstract: | Trotz anhaltender Pandemie normalisierte sich 2021 im Vergleich zum Vorjahr das bundesdeutsche Tarifgeschehen. In der Folge erreichte auch das Arbeitskampfgeschehen wieder das Niveau der Vor-Corona-Jahre. Das Arbeitskampfvolumen lag 2021 mit rund 590.000 arbeitskampfbedingten Ausfalltagen im Vergleich der vergangenen 15 Jahre im oberen Mittelfeld. Zwar bestanden weiterhin erschwerende Rahmenbedingungen für die Durchführung von Streiks, allerdings hatte dies anders als noch 2020, als lediglich 157 Arbeitskämpfe stattgefunden haben, keinen spürbaren Einfluss auf die Anzahl der Tarifkonflikte mit Streikfolge: Nach der Schätzung des WSI waren 2021 rund 917.000 Streikteilnehmer*innen an insgesamt 213 Arbeitskämpfen beteiligt. Wie sich die Wirtschaftslage in Deutschland angesichts der durch den Krieg in der Ukraine bedingten Verwerfungen entwickeln wird, ist im Frühjahr 2022 schwer vorherzusehen. Prognostizierte Inflationsraten von 6 bis 8 Prozent belasten die Tarifrunden. Inwieweit sich dies insgesamt auf das Arbeitskampfgeschehen im Jahr 2022 auswirken wird, bleibt abzuwarten. |
| Keywords: | Branchenentwicklungen,Konjunktur/Finanzmärkte,Wirtschaft |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wsirep:74&r= |
| By: | Kempin, Ronja (Ed.) |
| Abstract: | French President Emmanuel Macron has announced his goal of revitalising Franco-German relations and founding a 'new partnership' between Paris and Berlin. However, in foreign and security policy, and in certain areas of his Europe policy, this aspiration has rarely been fulfilled. The main reasons are structural changes in international relations, which the French and German sides have reacted to differently. Paris is looking for new ways of preserving its autonomy in defence policy and of filling the strategic vacuum that has been created by the waning US interest in Europe and its periphery. Berlin emphasises the development of NATO and the EU as fundamental organisations for German foreign policy. Reconciling bilateral interests is also complicated by national solo efforts, indifference, and inadequate exchange of experience. The first precondition for intensifying bilateral cooperation is for Paris and Berlin to conduct a comprehensive review of the international conflict situation in their existing cooperation formats as regards foreign and security policy. The two governments need to discuss openly to what extent their national interests are concerned, and then determine concrete measures. Second, they must refrain from national solo efforts and be sensitive to the other's pressure points in foreign, security and Europe policy. The Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly needs to urge the executive of both countries to fulfil the Élysée Treaty and the Aachen Treaty. The findings presented here will be complemented by case studies on Libya, the Common Security and Defence Policy, the Economic and Monetary Union, Russia, NATO, and Turkey. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:42021&r= |
| By: | Daniele Valenti (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of Milan); Andrea Bastianin (Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, University of Milan and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Matteo Manera (Departments of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan-Bicocca and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei) |
| Abstract: | We present a weekly structural Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model of the US crude oil market. Exploiting weekly data we can explain short-run crude oil price dynamics, including those related with the COVID-19 pandemic and with the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The model is set identified with a Bayesian approach that allows to impose restrictions directly on structural parameters of interest, such as supply and demand elasticises. Our model incorporates both the futures-spot price spread to capture shocks to the real price of crude oil driven by changes in expectations and US inventories to describe price fluctuations due to unexpected of variations of above-ground stocks. Including the futures-spot price spread is key for accounting for feedback effects from the financial to the physical market for crude oil and for identifying a new structural shock that we label expectational shock. This shock plays a crucial role when describing the series of events that have led to the spike in the price of crude oil recorded in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19; WTI price; futures-spot price spread; speculation; structural VAR; Bayesian VAR |
| JEL: | C32 Q02 Q41 Q43 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2022.11&r= |
| By: | Halbach, Uwe |
| Abstract: | Im zweiten Karabach-Krieg vom Herbst 2020 vermittelte Russland einen Waffenstillstand und erweiterte seine militärische Präsenz im Südkaukasus, indem es eine Friedenstruppe im restlichen Berg-Karabach stationierte. In diesem Krieg hatten aserbaidschanische Streitkräfte die Südprovinz Karabachs und die zuvor von armenischen Truppen kontrollierten Territorien in dessen Umgebung eingenommen. Laut internationalen Beobachtern hat die Dominanz Russlands und der Türkei bewirkt, dass sich die geopolitischen Koordinaten im Kaukasus auf Kosten westlicher und globaler Akteure verlagerten. In Moskaus Perspektive besteht der Kaukasus aus Russlands Föderationssubjekten im Nordteil und seinem "nahen Ausland" im Südteil der Region. Für seine Politik im Südkaukasus nutzte der Kreml ungelöste Territorialkonflikte als machtpolitische Hebel. Mit seiner Unterstützung für die von Georgien abtrünnigen Landesteile Abchasien und Südossetien will Moskau das am stärksten nach Westen ausgerichtete "nahe Ausland" bestrafen. Im Karabach-Konflikt dagegen war Russland trotz enger sicherheitspolitischer Verbindung mit Armenien auf Neutralität bedacht und stellte sich nicht grundsätzlich gegen westliche Konfliktmediatoren im Verhandlungsrahmen der OSZE. Russlands Ordnungsmacht im Südkaukasus wird durch die enge militärische Allianz der Türkei mit Aserbaidschan eingeschränkt. Auch Iran tritt verstärkt als Akteur in der Region auf. Das geopolitische Gewicht dort verschiebt sich zu den historischen Regional- und Großmächten. Globale und westliche Akteure sind aber noch nicht aus der Region verbannt. Der Karabach-Konflikt bleibt im Brennpunkt internationaler Politik. Das wurde sechs Monate nach Kriegsende offenbar, als die Grenzkonflikte zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan sich im Mai 2021 erneut zuspitzten. |
| Keywords: | Nordkaukasien (Russische Föderation),Nahes Ausland (Russische Außenpolitik),Regionalmacht |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:102021&r= |
| By: | Angenendt, Steffen; Biehler, Nadine; Bossong, Raphael; Kipp, David; Koch, Anne |
| Abstract: | Europe is currently experiencing the largest refugee crisis since World War II. The European Union (EU) has activated the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time. Accordingly, refugees from Ukraine can freely choose where to go, and they have the right to work and receive social benefits in their chosen host country. Even if the number of refugees appears overwhelming, the EU should stick to this approach and build on refugees' social ties and the strong engagement by civil society. A mandatory EU-wide relocation scheme cannot and should not be advanced against the will of many member states and affected refugees. The forced displacement from Ukraine can be managed if self-relocation is actively supported across the entire Schengen zone, if the EU provides sufficient solidarity and financial support for reception and integration measures, and if member states start preparing for sustainable long-term stays from the outset. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:262022&r= |
| By: | Giovanni Andrea Cornia |
| Abstract: | The transition to the market economy and liberal democracy of the former communist countries of Europe represents the most vivid example of how potentially favourable economic and political reforms may lead to massive mortality crises. The transition of these countries was universally greeted as a key step towards world peace and economic progress. The months preceding the beginning of this historic watershed were characterised by widespread hopes for improvements in political freedoms, economic growth, living standards, and life expectancy which, during the prior 20 years had improved more slowly than in capitalist OECD countries, or had deteriorated. Despite these hopes, the years after 1989 were characterised by a severe transformational recession, a fall in output and incomes, the rapid impoverishment of large sections of the population, rising income and assets concentration, widespread social dislocations and an acute mortality crisis. Despite its magnitude and a growing number of studies, the transition mortality crisis has attracted limited political attention by national authorities and international agencies. When it was acknowledged, it was attributed to past shocks or irrelevant factors, retarding in this way the introduction of appropriate policy responses. In a way, the recent European mortality crisis is a telling example of how potentially favourable reforms may lead to large health and social costs. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2022_04.rdf&r= |
| By: | Bossong, Raphael |
| Abstract: | Die EU-Innenpolitik und die Schengen-Zone stecken in einer Strukturkrise: blockierte Reformen in der Migrations- und Asylpolitik, eingeschränkte Personenfreizügigkeit, erodierendes gegenseitiges Vertrauen. Wie sich der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine auf alle diese Fragen auswirkt, ist noch offen. Flexible oder differenzierte Formen der europäischen Zusammenarbeit werden oft als Weg gesehen, Blockaden zu überwinden. Allgemeine Konzepte, etwa für ein Kerneuropa, führen aber praktisch nicht weiter. Je nach Thema müssen die Vor- und Nachteile der differenzierten Integration sorgfältig abgewogen werden. Vergangenes Jahr ist die Europäische Staatsanwaltschaft als Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit eingerichtet worden. Mit diesem in den EU-Verträgen vorgesehenen Verfahren konnte eine neue Integrationsperspektive eröffnet werden. Insgesamt ist der Spielraum für weitere Vorreitergruppen in der EU-Innenpolitik gering und die Kosten steigen. In der EU-Asylpolitik ist der Problemdruck indes so groß, dass derartige Ansätze als Notlösung trotzdem sinnvoll und unausweichlich sein können. "Koalitionen der Willigen" zur europäischen Verteilung von Schutzsuchenden waren bisher wenig erfolgreich. Auch die Reform des Schengen-Regimes wird die teilnehmenden Staaten kaum dazu bewegen, mehr Asylbewerber aufzunehmen. Neue Maßnahmen zum Umgang mit ukrainischen Flüchtlingen im Rahmen der Massenzustrom-Richtlinie sind ein wichtiger und richtiger Schritt in Richtung Solidarität, lösen aber noch nicht die Strukturprobleme der EU-Asylpolitik. Um rechtlich verbindliche Verfahren zur Verteilung von Asylsuchenden zu schaffen, sollte auf mittlere Sicht eine Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit geprüft werden, insbesondere in Verbindung mit Asylgrenzverfahren und einem Krisenmechanismus für große Flüchtlingsbewegungen. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:32022&r= |
| By: | Bähr, Cornelius; Fremerey, Melinda; Fritsch, Manuel; Obst, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Russland ist nicht nur ein wesentlicher Gas-Exporteur für Deutschland, sondern liefert auch wichtige Rohstoffe für die deutsche Industrie. Deutschland und der Weltmarkt sind vor allem bei Nickel, Palladium und Chrom abhängig von russischen Exporten. Dies sind Rohstoffe, die zum Teil schwierig zu substituieren sind. Daher sind neue Handelsbeziehungen zu alternativen Exportnationen für diese Rohstoffe essenziell. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:312022&r= |
| By: | Margaryta Klymak; Stuart Baumann |
| Abstract: | Governments are the largest buyers in most countries and they tend to operate budgets that expire at the end of the fiscal year. They also tend to spend disproportionately large amounts right at year-end. This use-it-or-lose-it spending pattern has been observed in a number of countries and is considered a problem due to possible waste. This could be the case if firms increase their prices to profit from a government’s greater demand at the end of the fiscal year. We investigate this previously unexplored possibility using a novel granular dataset of Ukrainian government procurement auctions over the period between 2017 and 2021. First, we document that the prices bid by firms are significantly higher in the last month of a fiscal year. Second, we employ a neural network technique to infer supplier costs from bidding behaviour. We estimate that suppliers charge around a 7.5% higher margin on less competitive tenders at the end of a fiscal year. Third, we demonstrate how results change depending on the type of the procured good, the length of the buyer-supplier relationship, and whether the procurement was expedited as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. Our findings imply that substantial government funds could be saved if the extent of the year end spending could be moderated. |
| Date: | 2022–04–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:968&r= |
| By: | Fremerey, Melinda; Iglesias, Simon Gerards |
| Abstract: | Ein Gasembargo gegen Russland wird derzeit heftig diskutiert. Ein potenzieller Ausfall von Gas in der deutschen Industrie würde vor allem die Branchen der Grundstoffchemie, Papierindustrie sowie die Metallerzeugung und Glas- und Keramikherstellung hart treffen. Diese Industrien weisen einen hohen Gasverbrauch und ein geringes Substitutions- und Einsparpotential von Gas auf. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:402022&r= |
| By: | Paul, Michael; Swistek, Göran |
| Abstract: | Russland will ein hohes Maß selbstbestimmter Stabilität in der Arktis erhalten. Das hält Moskau für nötig, um die vielen Probleme und Entwicklungshindernisse zu überwinden, die mit den eigenen ambitionierten Plänen, aber auch mit den Folgen des Klimawandels verbunden sind. Der Rückgang des Meereises hat einen subjektiv empfundenen Verlust an Sicherheit zur Folge, der die traditionelle Belagerungsmentalität verstärkt. Zudem ist die russische Außenpolitik auch in der Arktis von einem reflexartigen Primat der Sicherheitspolitik gekennzeichnet. Moskau versucht, die nationale Sicherheit inklusive wirtschaftlicher Interessen mit einem breiten Spektrum rüstungs- und militärpolitischer Aktivitäten zu gewährleisten, das neue nukleare Einsatzmittel einschließt. Dieses Bestreben werten die anderen Arktisanrainer und die Nato zunehmend als bedrohlich. Russland nimmt eine defensive Haltung in der Arktis ein, ist im Konfliktfall aber auf eine rasche Eskalation vorbereitet. Arktispolitik ist ein Mittel der russischen Strategie für Europa, um wirtschaftlich und politisch Einfluss zu nehmen. Dabei wird das Zusammenwirken von Nord- und Ostseeflotte immer wichtiger, wenn es darum geht, geostrategische Interessen zu wahren und das Hoheitsgebiet zu verteidigen. Die arktischen Staaten müssen eine schwierige Balance halten: Sie wollen die Seewege und Ressourcen sichern, zugleich aber eine Eskalationsspirale in der Region verhindern. Um die Folgen des Sicherheitsdilemmas zu begrenzen, sollte der Dialog über militärische Sicherheit reaktiviert werden. Zudem gibt es weiterhin Kooperationsmöglichkeiten. Beispiele sind Klima- und Umweltprojekte, nachhaltige und umweltverträgliche Energienutzung, Infrastruktur, maritime Sicherheit und Wissenschaftszusammenarbeit. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:192021&r= |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Boris Johnson’s populist policy against immigrants and asylum seekers, dumped in detention camps in Rwanda, may not succeed because of legal constraints. Yet, his political agenda will probably work nevertheless, given the growing xenophobia among his electorate. Against expert advice, Home Secretary Priti Patel promised the autocratic ruler in Kigali, Paul Kagame, responsible among others for retribution killings of his army (RPF), to transfer an initial £120m to deter the migrants and to make them 'settle and thrive' in Rwanda. However, London would have to pay much more in the proposed 'economic transformation and integration fund' for the current cost. It is highly unlikely that Rwanda will be able to cope with additional immigrants as it is already struggling to accommodate its own more than 130,000 refugees. Moreover, in the past, also Denmark and Israel had tried in vain to execute similar policies to get rid of undesirable migrants and settle them in Rwanda and Uganda. Johnson's scheme reminded Britain's foremost historian of Nazi Germany, Sir Richard Evans, of Hitler's ploy to deport Jews to Madagascar. Thus, policies purported to aim at 'migration control' may not control migration, but reconfigure potential host societies along ethnic, racial, linguistic, and xenophobe lines. The burden of colonial heritage persists in attempts to reject 'strangers' through populist politics, culture and public discourse. This policy was revived and adjusted in the post-Brexit era, as exemplified by the preferential treatment given to Ukrainian migrants. Racism works best when it's overtly selective. Treating some migrants as “worthy” and others as “undeserving” avoids accusations of racism. It allows racist voters to be fooled into believing that they are personally virtuous while secretly or unconsciously indulging their basest instincts. |
| Keywords: | United Kingdom, Rwanda, immigration, refugees, African migration to UK, post-colonialism, peace-building, identity politics, nationalism, xenophobia, discrimination, African poverty, famine, Sub-Saharan Africa, human rights, Boris Johnson, Paul Kagame |
| JEL: | E24 E26 E61 F22 F24 F35 F52 F54 F66 J46 J61 J71 K37 N17 N37 N47 N97 P16 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–05–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113099&r= |
| By: | Isachenko, Daria |
| Abstract: | Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und Russland stellen viele im Westen vor Rätsel. Wie tragfähig ist das Verhältnis, welche Rolle spielt der Westen darin, worauf stützt es sich, und was kann der Westen daraus lernen? Von zentraler Bedeutung ist der bilaterale Rahmen. Die Beziehungen zwischen Ankara und Moskau fußen auf der gegenseitigen Anerkennung der Sicherheitsinteressen des jeweils anderen. Die sich daraus ergebende Schlüsseldynamik ist nicht nur in der aktuellen türkisch-russischen Partnerschaft in Syrien zu beobachten, sondern prägte bereits die Zusammenarbeit in den 1990er Jahren. Das gegenseitige Eingehen auf Sicherheitsbedenken des anderen Partners wird durch die Aussicht auf gemeinsame Projekte erleichtert, deren Umsetzung mehr Vorteile verspricht als ein Verharren im Konflikt. Vertrauen spielt dabei ebenso eine untergeordnete Rolle wie die Qualität der persönlichen Beziehungen zwischen dem türkischen und dem russischen Präsidenten. Vielmehr kommt es auf die Interdependenzen an, die Russland und die Türkei miteinander verbinden. Das Potenzial für Konfrontation oder Kooperation zwischen Ankara und Moskau in regionalen Konflikten bemisst sich nach den gegenwärtigen Prioritäten, nicht nach Rivalitäten der Vergangenheit. Ausschlaggebend für Form und Ausmaß der Zusammenarbeit ist nicht die Frage, auf welcher Seite des Konfliktes sie stehen, sondern die nach ihren jeweiligen Beweggründen. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:162021&r= |
| By: | Kempin, Ronja (Ed.) |
| Abstract: | Frankreichs Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat das Ziel ausgegeben, die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen zu revitalisieren und eine "neue Partnerschaft zwischen Paris und Berlin zu begründen. In der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie in Teilen der Europapolitik konnte dieser Anspruch jedoch selten eingelöst werden. Hauptgrund hierfür sind strukturelle Veränderungen in den internationalen Beziehungen, auf die Frankreich und Deutschland unterschiedlich reagieren: Paris sucht neue Wege, seine verteidigungspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit zu erhalten und das strategische Vakuum zu füllen, das entstanden ist durch das nachlassende Interesse der USA an Europa und seiner Peripherie. Berlin setzt auf die Weiterentwicklung von Nato und EU als grundlegenden Organisationen deutscher Außenpolitik. Zudem erschweren nationale Alleingänge, Desinteresse und ein ungenügender Erfahrungsaustausch einen bilateralen Interessenausgleich. Eine neue Intensität der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit setzt erstens voraus, dass sich Paris und Berlin in ihren bestehenden außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Kooperationsformaten einer Gesamtschau der internationalen Gemengelage stellen. Sie müssen ihre jeweilige Betroffenheit sowie ihre Interessen offen besprechen und aus ihnen konkrete Maßnahmen ableiten. Zweitens müssen sie sich darauf verständigen, dass nationale Alleingänge unterbleiben und ein Desinteresse an den außen-, sicherheits- und europapolitischen Druckpunkten des Partners nicht geduldet wird. Die Deutsch-Französische Parlamentarische Versammlung sollte die Exekutiven beider Länder dazu anhalten, den Élysée-Vertrag wie den Vertrag von Aachen zu erfüllen. Zu diesen Ergebnissen kommen die sechs Fallstudien zu Libyen, zur Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, zu Russland, zur Nato und zur Türkei. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:42021&r= |
| By: | Westphal, Kirsten; Pastukhova, Maria; Pepe, Jacopo Maria |
| Abstract: | Die geopolitische Bedeutung von Strom wird unterschätzt, obwohl Stromnetze Räume konstituieren. Sie etablieren neue Einflusskanäle und Machtsphären in politischen Gemeinwesen und über sie hinaus. Im Kontinentalraum Europa-Asien treffen Verbundnetze und Interkonnektoren, also grenzüberschreitende Übertragungsnetzverbindungen, aufeinander. Interkonnektoren markieren neue, teilweise konkurrierende Integrationsvektoren, die Verbundnetze transzendieren. Dabei ist die Zugehörigkeit zum europäischen Netzverbund attraktiv, denn synchrone Netze sind Schicksalsgemeinschaften, in denen Sicherheit und Wohlfahrt geteilt werden. Deutschland und die EU müssen eine Strom-Außenpolitik entwickeln, um das europäische Stromnetz zu optimieren und modernisieren, zu verstärken und zu erweitern. Vor allem aber sind Deutschland und die EU gefordert, Interkonnektivität über das eigene Verbundnetz hinaus mitzugestalten. Chinas Strategie, mit seiner Belt and Road Initiative Infrastrukturen auf das Reich der Mitte auszurichten, wird auch beim Strom immer offensichtlicher. Dabei setzt Peking Standards und Normen und baut seine strategische Reichweite auch zum Vorteil der eigenen Wirtschaft aus. In der östlichen EU-Nachbarschaft dominiert die Geopolitik seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts die Konfiguration der Stromnetze. Eine Integrationskonkurrenz zwischen der EU und Russland ist unübersehbar. Das östliche Mittelmeer, der Kaspische Raum und Zentralasien wandeln sich von Peripherien in neue Verbindungsräume. Dort konkurrieren die EU, China, Russland und jenseits des Schwarzen Meeres auch Iran und die Türkei um Einfluss bei der Neukonfiguration der Stromnetze. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpstu:142021&r= |
| By: | Michael Böheim (WIFO); Jürgen Janger; Angela Köppl; Franz Sinabell; Mark Sommer (WIFO); Stefan Schleicher (WIFO) |
| Abstract: | Dieser Research Brief schlägt ausgewählte potentiell in der kurzen Frist anwendbare wirtschaftspolitische Optionen vor, um den volkswirtschaftlichen Schaden einer deutlichen Reduktion des in Österreich verfügbaren Gases möglichst gering zu halten und gleichzeitig die angestrebte grüne Transformation zumindest nicht auszubremsen. Im Mittelpunkt stehen ökonomische Mechanismen zur Gasallokation an Unternehmen und zur Beanreizung von Verbrauchseinsparungen. Die Optionen sind nicht im Detail ausgearbeitet, sondern sollen die Debatte auf bisher kaum bedachte Sachverhalte lenken, um besser informierte Entscheidungen zu ermöglichen und vertiefte interdisziplinäre Analysen anzustoßen, die für eine praktische Implementierung notwendig wären. |
| Keywords: | TP_Ukraine |
| Date: | 2022–05–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:rbrief:y:2022:i:12&r= |
| By: | Lübkemeier, Eckhard |
| Abstract: | Only a Europe that provides for its own defence can be a fully sovereign Europe. As is the case for the US, Europe would have to be capable of protecting its core security interests without depending on its transatlantic partner. Structural incentives as well as recent developments militate in favour of establishing such intra-NATO status parity. Structurally, unilateral dependence, even among friends, comes at a price. This timeless incentive is reinforced by recent developments: the demise of the old West, with or without Trump; China's twofold challenge; an emerging Sino-American rivalry; a resurgent Russia; the new world disorder; Macron's offer to his European partners. European self-defence has to meet four key requirements: broader and greater European integration, sufficient military capabilities, effective strategy, and political leadership. Defence autonomy requires an independent nuclear deterrent capability. In the case of the EU, neither primary deterrence, reserved for a single state, nor extended deterrence, such as that provided by the United States, would be adequate. Instead, Europe would have to create a novel type of 'integrated deterrence'. Underpinned by a solid community of solidarity and trust, this would be based on French nuclear forces, with the French president maintaining exclusive decision-making authority. Germany and France would have to seize the initiative by 'taking their bilateral relations to a new level', as stated in the Aachen Treaty of January 22, 2019. They would have to lead by example, bring about the progressive integration of their armed forces and an alignment of their strategic cultures. This would demand a great deal of Germany in terms of defence spending and redefining its 'culture of military restraint'. To initiate such a process of rethinking and repositioning will require an open-minded debate on the role of the military for a Europe that 'takes its fate into its own hands' (Chancellor Angela Merkel). |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:12021&r= |