|
on Confederation of Independent States |
Issue of 2022‒05‒30
nineteen papers chosen by |
By: | Alhonita Yatie (BSE - Bordeaux Sciences Economiques - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of fear, uncertainty and market volatility caused by the Ukraine-Russia war on crypto-assets returns (Bitcoin and Ethereum) and Gold returns. We use the searches on Wikipedia trends as proxies of uncertainty and fear and two volatility indices: S&P500 VIX and the Russian VIX (RVIX). The results show that Bitcoin, Ethereum and Gold failed as safe havens during this war. |
Keywords: | War,Russia,Ukraine,crypto-assets,Gold,Safe haven |
Date: | 2022–03–30 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03625196&r= |
By: | Whelsy Boungou; Alhonita Yatie (BSE - Bordeaux Sciences Economiques - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
Abstract: | As a topical issue, this paper studies the responses of world stock market indices to the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia. Using daily stock market returns in a sample of 94 countries and covers the period from 22 January 2022 to 24 March 2022, we consistently document a negative relationship between the Ukraine-Russia war and world stock market returns. Our results point to a larger impact at the onset of war, especially during the first two weeks after the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The reaction of global stock markets was weaker in the weeks that followed. Furthermore, we find that these effects were most pronounced for countries bordering Ukraine and Russia, as well as for those UN member states that demanded an end to the Russian offensive in Ukraine. Overall, we provide the first empirical evidence of the effect of the Ukraine-Russia war on world stock market returns. |
Keywords: | War,Ukraine,Russia,Stock index |
Date: | 2022–03–30 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03624985&r= |
By: | Marco Boccaccio (Università Sapienza di Roma - Dipartimento di Studi Giuridici, Filosofici ed Economici) |
Abstract: | The crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine stresses the problem of the dependence of most European countries from Russian gas supply. As a response to this situation, the European Commission on March, 8th 2022 adopted the EU power Communication pointing the lines of a possible reaction at European level to the crisis. The strategy is developed at three different levels. The first is devoted to emergency measures, mostly related to the problem of high prices; the second one is related to the problem of gas supply for the next winter; the third one is a long term goal, that of reducing the dependence from Russian gas at all. |
Keywords: | war and economic crisis, energy, price regulation, state aid |
JEL: | A F K K32 Q41 |
Date: | 2022–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gfe:pfrp00:00053&r= |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | Real GDP growth rebounded strongly in 2021 and early 2022, driven by a pickup in construction, trade, and services activities, and benefiting from strong policies and a gradual improvement of the pandemic, notwithstanding its various waves. In 2022, the budget aimed at continuing a gradual fiscal consolidation, while still providing temporary and targeted support to the economy, and monetary policy aimed at continuing its tightening cycle that started in late-2020 to cool down inflation. The favorable near-term outlook, however, is set to be interrupted by the spillovers from the war in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia, given Armenia’s economic links and exposure to the Russian economy. Growth has been revised down markedly this year, while inflationary pressures are expected to persist, keeping inflation above the Central Bank of Armenia’s (CBA) target in 2022. |
Date: | 2022–05–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/130&r= |
By: | Mohammad Reza Farzanegan (University of Marburg); Sven Fischer (University of Marburg) |
Abstract: | We study the acceptability of war as a necessary tool to obtain justice under certain conditions across individuals from Russia and Ukraine in 2011. We discuss which socio-economic, political and individual characteristics shape the support for using destructive military force to achieve justice. Overall, the acceptance of war for justice is relatively low in both countries. Using logistic regressions, we found that there are characteristics that significantly reduce the support for war for justice in both countries, such as gender and level of happiness. Support in both countries is also significantly larger among respondents who are interested in politics and are married. Additionally, there are conditions which produce different results between the countries, such as religiosity, country aims, employment, confidence in the government, concern over possible war and political orientation. |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202216&r= |
By: | Mohammad Reza Farzanegan (University of Marburg); Hassan F. Gholipour (Western Sydney University) |
Abstract: | Why did some countries vote not to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United National General Assembly’s first emergency session since 1997? Our study examines different economic, political, geographic and historical reasons behind the voting behaviour of several countries in favour of Russia. Probit regressions show that higher dependence on military exports from Russia, years ruled by leftists, access to Russian markets for exports, being a major recipient of Russian aid, being former members of Soviet Union and sharing borders with Russia are positively associated with the probability of voting in favour of Russia. Factors which reduce the probability of support for Russia over the Ukraine invasion are higher levels of civil and political freedom within a country and percentage of exports from Russia to partners in total Russia exports. |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202217&r= |
By: | Antezza, Arianna; Frank, André; Frank, Pascal; Franz, Lukas; Rebinskaya, Ekaterina; Trebesch, Christoph |
Abstract: | This paper presents the 'Ukraine Support Tracker', which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This second version covers the period January 24 until April 23, 2022. We measure support from Western governments, namely by the G7 and European Union member countries. Private donations, help for refugees outside of Ukraine, or aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP. In billions of Euros, by far the largest bilateral supporter of Ukraine is the United States, followed by Poland, the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany. In percent of donor GDP, small Eastern European countries stand out as particularly generous. |
Keywords: | International aid,military aid,war,geoeconomics |
JEL: | F35 F51 H56 H63 H84 H81 |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2218&r= |
By: | Simola, Heli |
Abstract: | Russia's brutal military aggression on Ukraine has led to extensive economic sanctions by Western countries and the withdrawal of many foreign companies from Russian markets. The isolation of Russia from the international community has substantially restricted its access to advanced technologies and eroded the country's economic growth potential. Our analysis suggests that Russia has fairly limited possibilities for import substitution in high-technology sectors. China, which could play a key role as an alternative source for inputs, has seen its share of Russian imports, including high-tech inputs, increase substantially in recent years. The extent to which China is willing to support Russia in the current situation remains unclear, however. |
Keywords: | Russia,trade,sanctions,import substitution |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitb:32022&r= |
By: | Berger, Eva M.; Bialek, Sylwia; Garnadt, Niklas; Grimm, Veronika; Other, Lars; Salzmann, Leonard; Schnitzer, Monika; Truger, Achim; Wieland, Volker |
Abstract: | [Introduction] The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022 has intensified the discussion of Europe's reliance on energy imports from Russia. A ban on Russian imports of oil, natural gas and coal has already been imposed by the United States, while the United Kingdom plans to cease imports of oil and coal from Russia by the end of 2022. The European Commission has announced on 5 April 2022 to ban coal imports from Russia (Europäische Kommission, 2022a). It has been wrestling with the idea of an oil and gas embargo against Russia. At the same time, Russia may decide to stop its energy exports to countries that are imposing sanctions. The German Federal Government is currently opposing an energy embargo against Russia (BMWK, 2022a). However, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) is working on a strategy to reduce energy imports from Russia (BMWK, 2022b, 2022c). The urgency to reduce dependency on Russian gas seemed to have increased particularly after the Russian president announced Russia would accept only the Russian currency Ruble for energy exports - even though the issue seems to have been solved by energy importers opening accounts at the Gazprom bank. On 30 March 2022 the BMWK has declared early warning, i.e., the first of three crises levels according to the emergency plan for gas (BMWK, 2022d), which is based on the EU regulation 2017/1938 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply (BMWK, 2022d). The crisis level of early warning primarily serves at improving information flows and cooperation between the relevant authorities; currently, no market intervention is undertaken. In this paper we first give an overview of the German and European reliance on energy imports from Russia with a focus on gas imports (Section II) and we discuss price effects (Section II.1), alternative suppliers of natural gas (Section II.2), and the potential for saving and replacing natural gas (Section II.3). In Section III, we provide an overview of estimates of the consequences on the economic outlook if the conflict intensifies. Section IV concludes. |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:svrwwp:012022&r= |
By: | Gabriel J. Felbermayr; Hendrik Mahlkow; Alexander-Nikolai Sandkamp |
Abstract: | With ever-increasing political tensions between China and Russia on one side and the EU and the US on the other, it only seems a matter of time until protectionist policies cause a decoupling of global value chains. This paper uses a computable general equilibrium trade model calibrated with the latest version of the GTAP database to simulate the effect of doubling non-tariff barriers - both unilateral and reciprocal - between the two blocks on trade and welfare. Imposing trade barriers almost completely eliminates bilateral imports. In addition, changes in price levels lead to higher imports and lower exports of the imposing country group from and to the rest of the world. The targeted country group increases exports to the rest of the world and reduces imports. Welfare falls in all countries involved, suggesting that governments should strive to cooperate rather than turning away from each other. By imposing a trade war on Russia, the political West could inflict severe damage on the Russian economy because of the latter’s smaller relative size. |
Keywords: | trade, non-tariff barriers, global value chains, quantitative trade model, China, Russia, European Union |
JEL: | F11 F13 F14 F17 |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9721&r= |
By: | Whelsy Boungou (PSB - Paris School of Business); Alhonita Yatie (BSE - Bordeaux Sciences Economiques - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
Abstract: | As a topical issue, this paper studies the responses of world stock market indices to the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia. Using daily stock market returns in a sample of 94 countries and covers the period from 22 January 2022 to 24 March 2022, we consistently document a negative relationship between the Ukraine-Russia war and world stock market returns. Our results point to a larger impact at the onset of war, especially during the first two weeks after the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The reaction of global stock markets was weaker in the weeks that followed. Furthermore, we find that these effects were most pronounced for countries bordering Ukraine and Russia, as well as for those UN member states that demanded an end to the Russian offensive in Ukraine. Overall, we provide the first empirical evidence of the effect of the Ukraine-Russia war on world stock market returns. |
Keywords: | Stock index,War,Ukraine,Russia |
Date: | 2022–03–29 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03623580&r= |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | Malaysia’s economy is showing signs of a gradual yet steady recovery thanks to the authorities’ impressive vaccine rollout, swift and coordinated implementation of multi-pronged support measures. The recovery nevertheless remains uneven and the output gap sizeable, with significant downside risks. Going forward, the authorities should calibrate macroeconomic policies to the pace of the recovery, while preserving policy space given pandemic-related uncertainties, and simultaneously accelerate structural reforms. |
Keywords: | inflation expectation; transitory inflation pricing; staff statement; authorities project headline inflation; Ukraine-Russia conflict; COVID-19; Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT); Tax refunds; Global |
Date: | 2022–04–28 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/126&r= |
By: | Julien Gourdon (FERDI - Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International, AFD - Agence française de développement); Audrey-Anne de Ubeda (FERDI - Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International) |
Abstract: | Plus d'un mois après le début de la guerre en Ukraine et alors que le conflit s'enlise, la situation pourrait devenir intenable pour les pays d'Afrique. Les questions de l'approvisionnement et de la dépendance de certaines économies africaines aux marchés russe et ukrainien constituent le premier point de tension, aux conséquences immédiates. Parallèlement, l'envol des prix des biens alimentaires et de l'énergie constituent une sérieuse menace pour la sécurité alimentaire. Enfin, compte tenu de leur environnement macroéconomique dégradé, de nombreuses économies africaines n'ont que peu de marge de manœuvre pour soutenir leur population et font face à une forte tension budgétaire. |
Keywords: | Afrique,Chaînes d'approvisionnement,Conflit Russie-Ukraine |
Date: | 2022–04–14 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03648348&r= |
By: | Glauben, Thomas; Svanidze, Miranda; Götz, Linde Johanna; Prehn, Sören; Jaghdani, Tinoush Jamali; Djuric, Ivan; Kuhn, Lena |
Abstract: | Der Krieg in der Ukraine hat die seit zwei Jahren bestehende angespannte Versorgungslage auf den internationalen Agrarrohstoffmärkten nochmals verstärkt. Die Preise für Agrarrohstoffe, wie Getreide und Pflanzenöle, übersteigen schon seit Herbst 2021 die Hochpreisniveaus der Nahrungskrisen vor gut einem Jahrzehnt und haben mit Einmarsch russischer Truppen in die Ukraine nochmals angezogen. Besonders betroffen sind die nachfrageboomenden Weizenimporteure in der MENA-Region und in Afrika südlich der Sahara. Russland und die Ukraine sind deren Hauptlieferanten. Lieferengpässe aus der Schwarzmeerregion, gepaart mit hohen Preisen, belasten die ohnehin kritische Ernährungssituation in diesen Regionen zusätzlich. Dennoch, nach gegenwärtigem Stand können die Weizenmärkte im laufenden Wirtschaftsjahr bedient werden. Zusätzliche Exporte aus anderen Regionen, darunter Indien, den USA, und Australien, werden die geringeren Liefermengen aus Russland und vor allem der Ukraine im Rest der laufenden Saison weitgehend ausgleichen. Die Entwicklungen für das nächste Wirtschaftsjahr und darüber hinaus sind hingegen schwer vorauszusehen. Neben der Entwicklung des Konfliktes und dessen Folgen hängen sie natürlich weiterhin von den gängigen agronomischen Fundamentalfaktoren in zentralen Angebots- und Nachfrageregionen ab. In solchen Knappheitssituationen zeigt sich, dass eine global agierende Nahrungswirtschaft und insbesondere wettbewerblich organisierte internationale Handelsstrukturen geeignet sind, Krisen und Risiken zu begegnen. Lieferausfälle aus bestimmten Regionen lassen sich durch Lieferungen anderer Regionen kompensieren. Entsprechend kann nur ein Mehr an internationaler Vernetzung gefordert werden. Vor Rufen nach planwirtschaftlichen Transformationen oder gar Autarkie muss eindringlich gewarnt werden. Alles dies würde zu Lasten hungernder Menschen im globalen Süden gehen. |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iamopb:44&r= |
By: | Vîntu, Denis |
Abstract: | This paper presents a quarterly structural macroeconomic model for the Republic of Moldova, which is known as the macroeconomic data model (MDM). This model can be used to assess economic conditions in the Republic of Moldova, forecast the macro economy, analyze policy options, and deepen our understanding of the functioning of a market economy. Some of the key features of the model are highlighted. First, the report looks at the Moldovan economy as a whole and finds that it is a small and open economy. Second, the model is small enough to be manageable for forecasting and simulation exercises, but still has enough detail for most purposes. Third, the model is designed to have a stable equilibrium over a long period of time, in accordance with classical economic theory, while its short-run dynamics are demand-driven. Fourth, the current version of MDM is mostly backward-looking, i.e. Expectations are influenced by the inclusion of lagged variables. The MDM uses a quarterly frequency data set, which allows for a more detailed analysis of the dynamics. The data is mostly estimated based on historical information. The paper includes stochastic long-run simulation results. The relationship between inflation, interest rates, unemployment and economic growth is important. |
Keywords: | Republic of Moldova, macroeconometric modelling, open and small economy, inflation, interest rate, unemployment, economic growth, classical economics, Keynesian economics. |
JEL: | C13 E21 E30 E41 E44 |
Date: | 2022–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112931&r= |
By: | International Monetary Fund |
Abstract: | This IMF report to the AHLC is the first since September 2018. Following limited engagement over the past three years, policy discussions have intensified in recent months. These discussions have focused mainly on establishing a medium term macro-fiscal framework, including the broad outlines of a reform scenario. |
Keywords: | B. PA policy; reform scenario; spending reform; policy discussion; IMF report; Arrears; Pension spending; Middle East and Central Asia |
Date: | 2022–05–02 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2022/128&r= |
By: | Josef Baumgartner; Elisabeth Christen; Gabriel Felbermayr (WIFO) |
Abstract: | Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die ökonomischen Auswirkungen einer Ausweitung der EU-Sanktionen auf Importe von Rohöl und verarbeiteten Mineralölprodukten aus Russland. Diese Sanktionen könnten in Form eines Öl-Embargos oder weniger restriktiv und dadurch mit unmittelbar weniger negativen Folgeeffekten für die Wirtschaft in der EU als Importzölle auferlegt werden. Russland ist (noch) ein bedeutender Lieferant von Erdöl und Erdölprodukten. Innerhalb der EU ist die Importabhängigkeit von russischen Öllieferungen sehr heterogen. Für Österreich ist Kasachstan das wichtigste Herkunftsland von Rohöl. Im Falle von russischen Gegenmaßnahmen sind EU-Ölimporte aus anderen GUS-Ländern gefährdet. Kurzfristig kommen vor allem die OPEC-Länder als alternative Lieferquelle in Betracht. Verarbeitete Mineralölprodukte, wie Benzin und Diesel, werden in Österreich fast ausschließlich aus anderen EU-Ländern – vor allem Deutschland – bezogen und nicht direkt aus Russland importiert. Allerdings besteht dadurch eine hohe indirekte Abhängigkeit. Eine Verknappung und in der Folge Verteuerung von Treibstoffen hätten negative Auswirkungen auf die Güter- und Personenbeförderung. Importzölle dürften im Vergleich zu einem Öl-Embargo mehrere Vorteile aufweisen. Durch eine graduelle Erhöhung verläuft die Anpassung der heimischen Wirtschaft über Preiseffekte besser als über eine unmittelbare Mengenreduktion. Zudem kann das Instrument flexibel und strategisch auf die wirtschaftliche und politische Dynamik des Konfliktes abgestimmt werden und führt in der EU neben höheren Preisen auch zu Zolleinnahmen. Als Folge eines Embargos oder einer Einführung eines äquivalenten Importzolles lassen Simulationsergebnisse für Österreich kurzfristig einen Anstieg der Inflationsrate um 0,5 bis 0,75 Prozentpunkte und eine Absenkung der Wirtschaftsleistung um 0,3% erwarten. |
Date: | 2022–05–23 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:rbrief:y:2022:i:14&r= |
By: | , viaScience |
Abstract: | The role of social significance in the development of ecotourism. In Western countries, ecotourism is a socio-economic sphere. Because, ecotourism is one of the promising sectors of economic benefit, which is developing at an accelerated pace. When the role of tourism is identified, as its main activities, it is understood to serve to create a material and intangible environment, to change the work of leisure and activities, to ensure health protection, to form the population of environmental culture and awareness |
Date: | 2022–03–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:v29dm&r= |
By: | Grömling, Michael |
Abstract: | Die Ergebnisse der IW-Konjunkturumfrage vom Frühjahr 2022 liefern eine Einschätzung gemäß der zum Befragungszeitpunkt relevanten und erwartbaren Rahmenbedingungen für unternehmerisches Handeln. Deutliche Veränderungen dieses geoökonomischen Umfeldes - etwa durch vollständig ausfallende Gaslieferungen aus Russland - würden eine Neubewertung seitens der Unternehmen erfordern. Im Vergleich zur IW-Konjunkturumfrage vom Spätherbst 2021 haben sich die Geschäftserwartungen der Unternehmen in Deutschland für das Jahr 2022 stark eingetrübt. Gleichwohl dominiert noch das Lager der zuversichtlich gestimmten Unternehmen. Während knapp ein Viertel der befragten Betriebe eine niedrigere Produktion als im Jahr 2021 erwartet, gehen zwei von fünf Unternehmen von einem Anstieg aus. Der Saldo aus positiven und negativen Erwartungen hat sich seit November 2021 jedoch mehr als halbiert. Die sich verschärfenden Produktionsbeeinträchtigungen infolge gestörter Transport- und Lieferketten und der damit einhergehende Kostenschock haben die Produktionsperspektiven in der Bauwirtschaft erheblich verdüstert. Auch die Industrie liegt nahe an der Rezessionsschwelle. Trotz Abwärtskorrekturen dominieren bei den Dienstleistern die Optimisten. In regionaler Perspektive gibt es ein enormes Erwartungsgefälle in Deutschland für das Jahr 2022. Während in Norddeutschland die pessimistisch aufgestellten Unternehmen die Oberhand haben, geben sich die Unternehmen in Nordrhein-Westfalen und Bayern noch relativ zuversichtlich. Auf Basis der gegenwärtig bestehenden Produktionserwartungen der Unternehmen in Deutschland lässt sich derzeit keine Beschäftigungs- und Investitionskrise ableiten. |
Keywords: | Unternehmensbefragung,Konjunktur,Geopolitik,Corona-Pandemie |
JEL: | C82 E32 F51 I15 |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:172022&r= |