|
on Confederation of Independent States |
|
Issue of 2022‒05‒16
twenty-two papers chosen by |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Famines are almost always man-made often used as a deterrent. Since ancient times, food and hunger have been a weapon of war. Among the most notorious examples in Africa are the Herero and Namaqua genocide in German South-West Africa (now Namibia) from 1904 to 1908. It was the first genocide of the 20th century. Also, the subsequent famines in Biafra (South-East Nigeria, 1967-1969), when an estimated 1.5 million people starved to death, the 1980 famine in Uganda, one of the worst in African history, when 21% of the population died, and the recurring famines in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan since the 1990s have been burned into human memory. The use of food as a weapon was condemned as a war crime by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. Since most African countries are Least Developed Countries (LLCs), they will suffer the hardest in the aftermath of Putin's war in Ukraine, especially Africa's poor. They have already suffered the consequences of drought, the corona pandemic and Islamist terrorism. Their already weakened position will be exacerbated by the spill-over effects of Russian aggression in Ukraine, which will further exacerbate hunger and poverty in Africa. All the more so as international development aid to Africa is likely to suffer from a massive redirection of aid to rearmament. Last but not least, Putin's war in Ukraine will have a major impact on EU-Africa relations. In view of the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic for Africa, it will further damage the mutual trust between both partners. About 86% of Africans have yet to receive two doses of vaccine. A growing number of African heads of state and government no longer see Western countries as reliable partners. |
| Keywords: | : Russia, invasion, Ukraine, Africa, famine, international trade, global power, food power, arms deals, fragile state, Islamist terrorism, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, South Africa, Cameroon, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, energy security, China, EU, USA |
| JEL: | E26 E31 F02 F13 F35 F51 F54 H56 N47 N57 N77 P26 Q17 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112767&r= |
| By: | Tapia, Pablo; Pastén, Boris; Sepulveda Velasquez, Jorge |
| Abstract: | China is the world’s largest importer and Russia one of its main exporters, particularly of energy. Consequently, foreign military activities by Russia could influence the performance of China’s energy market. The research objective is to present evidence on the effects of the 2002-2022 Russian military interventions on the returns of the Chinese energy market. Using event study methodology, we found evidence that Russian military intervention announcements had positive and negative effects on these returns. These findings suggest that the effect of these interventions could be related to the level of acceptance of each intervention and relationship between China and Russia. |
| Keywords: | China; energy markets; war; market efficiency; event study |
| JEL: | G11 G14 G15 |
| Date: | 2022–04–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112747&r= |
| By: | Koo, Kyong Hyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | The Ukrainian crisis and Russia-U.S. conflict can provide important policy implications for South Korea. This is especially true in that the external environments of Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula, which are located between great powers, share many similarities. In addition, and more importantly, this event will inevitably have a huge impact on the global economic and security order. This crisis is related to the continued geopolitical competition between the United States and Russia, the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance between the United States and the European Union, the increase in NATO’s future role and status in the European security order, Russia’s challenge to building the European security order, and the change in relations between Russia and the West. Considering the above, the policy implications for the Ukrainian crisis and Russia-U.S. conflict can be summarized as follows. First, there is a possibility that a so-called “new Cold War” confrontational structure will be formed on the Korean Peninsula. Second, the crisis in Ukraine could have a negative impact on North Korea’s denuclearization process. Third, the crisis in Ukraine and Russia- |
| Keywords: | Ukrainian Crisis; Russia-U.S. Conflict; Korean Peninsula |
| Date: | 2022–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2022_015&r= |
| By: | Ricardo Hausmann (Center for International Development at Harvard University); Agata Łoskot-Strachota; Axel Ockenfels; Ulrich Schetter (Center for International Development at Harvard University); Simone Tagliapietra; Guntram Wolff; Georg Zachmann |
| Abstract: | Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This piece argues that given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, for Europe the most efficient way to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine War, Russia |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cid:wpfacu:412&r= |
| By: | Gerda Asmus; Raphaël Franck |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes how state capacity shapes the local impact of national policies by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment in the regional expansion of the state. It uses the local discontinuity created by the boundary of the largest peasant rebellion in 18th century Russia where the state increased security forces and levied taxes more efficiently after the uprising ended. The results show that increased state capacity had limited effects on economic growth until the central government targeted specific development objectives. Namely, when rulers chose to build schools or foster industrialization, their national policies benefited areas which already had strong state capacity. |
| Keywords: | economic growth, public policies, Russia, state capacity |
| JEL: | O11 O43 N13 N14 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9616&r= |
| By: | Olivier Blanchard; Jean Pisani-Ferry |
| Abstract: | This Policy Contribution is a version of a Policy Brief published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The authors thank Thomas Belaich for research assistance, and Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Steven Fries, Philip Lane, Elina Ribakova, Guntram Wolff and PIIE colleagues for their comments. Throughout this Policy Contribution, we take mid-April as the cutoff date for data. For Europe, the war in Ukraine is a first-order economic shock. While the direct... |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:polcon:48241&r= |
| By: | Simola, Heli; Solanko, Laura |
| Abstract: | The past two decades have witnessed a major transformation of global energy markets. While growth in energy demand now comes from emerging economies, and technologies critical to oil and natural gas production have seen dramatic advances, the biggest changes in global energy markets lie ahead. For countries to meet their ambitious climate goals, demand for conventional energy sources must fall significantly and be accompanied by a massive shift in investment to renewable energy sources. Such changes can have major implications for the Russian economy, which depends heavily on oil and gas. This brief provides an overview of the latest trends in Russia's oil & gas sector in the context of evolving global energy markets. |
| Keywords: | Russia,oil,natural gas,energy transition |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitb:72021&r= |
| By: | Guido Lorenzoni; Iván Werning |
| Abstract: | This note isolates an overlooked economic force for the Ruble to appreciate in response to international sanctions limiting exports to Russia. The economic intuition is that when Russians are unable to buy the mix of foreign goods they wish, then foreign goods becomes less attractive, increasing the demand for domestic goods; to reestablish an equilibrium a real appreciation is needed to raise the relative price of domestic goods and incentivizing the accumulation of foreign assets and the import from non-sanctioning countries. We also review well-known forces for a depreciation (e.g. Russian export reduction). Our analysis emphasizes that the exchange rate is an inadequate signal of welfare impacts and the effectiveness of sanctions. |
| JEL: | E0 F3 F31 F4 F51 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29929&r= |
| By: | De Weerdt, Joachim; Duchoslav, Jan |
| Abstract: | Although geographically distant, there are multiple channels through which Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can affect the lives of Malawians. Before the invasion, Russia’s and Ukraine’s exports accounted for about 12% of total calories (Glauber and Laborde, 2022) traded in the world, and the two countries were among the top five global exporters for many important cereals and oilseeds, including wheat, barley, sunflowers and maize (Figure 1). Ukraine is also an important source of sunflower seed oil, supplying about 50% of the global market. These exports have now largely seized as a result of war-related disruptions to production and logistics as well as economic sanctions on Russia and Belarus, its ally. This shock reduction of supply is driving up food commodity prices worldwide and will continue to do so while the current situation persists. The ongoing fighting has already disrupted the planting of barley and will soon disrupt the planting of maize, wheat, and oilseeds. The choke on global supply will thus continue for months (if not years) to come. |
| Keywords: | MALAWI; SOUTHERN AFRICA; AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA; AFRICA; trade; wheat; maize; cooking oils; grain; fertilizers; policies; food prices; war; fertilizer price |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:masspn:44&r= |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk (GIGA - German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | ABSTRACT & RÉSUMÉ : Putin attaches great importance to rebuilding Russia as a world power, including relations with Africa. But while the Soviet Union used to advocate socialist modernization in Africa, Moscow no longer offers socialist ideologies. Instead, it focuses on access to African elites, particularly authoritarian leaders. It also seeks to sway elections in its favour, particularly in fragile but resource-rich states. The Kremlin says it wants to avoid competing directly with other powers active in Africa. Instead, it wants to focus on countries where neither the West nor China dominates. There it expects to be able to work more effectively. But Russia, like China, is challenging Western norms, undermining US and EU sanctions. In addition, both strategic partners support non-interference in the internal affairs of states. In addition, Russia's relations with Africa have been motivated significantly by its interest in African resources and security markets. Russia's resurgence in Africa benefits not least from Islamist terrorism, for example, in the Sahel and Mozambique. It uses fragile states and ongoing conflicts to secure lucrative arms deals and mining concessions. Moscow signed military cooperation agreements with 21 African governments, including negotiations on establishing military bases. It uses paramilitary contractors to manipulate the course of local conflicts in its favour. Since 2015, Russian-African trade has doubled to around USD 20 billion per year. Russia exported $14 billion worth of goods and services and imported about $5 billion worth of African products. In return, Moscow can count on the support of African leaders in foreign policy. Thus, Eritrea voted against a UN General Assembly resolution strongly condemning Russia's war in Ukraine. 18 other African countries abstained, including Mali, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. RÉSUMÉ : Poutine attache une grande importance à la reconstruction de la Russie en tant que puissance mondiale, y compris les relations avec l'Afrique. Mais alors que l'Union soviétique prônait la modernisation socialiste en Afrique, Moscou ne propose plus d'idéologies socialistes. Au lieu de cela, il se concentre sur l'accès aux élites africaines, en particulier les dirigeants autoritaires. Il cherche également à influencer les élections en sa faveur, en particulier dans les États fragiles mais riches en ressources. Le Kremlin dit vouloir éviter de concurrencer directement les autres puissances actives en Afrique. Au contraire, il veut se concentrer sur les pays où ni l'Occident ni la Chine ne dominent. Là, il s'attend à pouvoir travailler plus efficacement. Mais la Russie, comme la Chine, défie les normes occidentales, sapant les sanctions américaines et européennes. En outre, les deux partenaires stratégiques soutiennent la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des États. En plus, les relations de la Russie avec l'Afrique sont fortement influencées par son intérêt pour les ressources africaines et les marchés de la sécurité. La résurgence de la Russie en Afrique profite notamment du terrorisme islamiste, par exemple au Sahel et au Mozambique. Il utilise les États fragiles et les conflits en cours pour obtenir des contrats d'armement lucratifs et des concessions minières. Moscou a signé des accords de coopération militaire avec 21 gouvernements africains, y compris des négociations sur l'établissement de bases militaires. Il utilise des sous-traitants paramilitaires pour manipuler le cours des conflits locaux en sa faveur. En retour, Moscou peut compter sur le soutien des dirigeants africains en matière de politique étrangère. Ainsi, l'Érythrée a voté contre une résolution de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies condamnant fermement la guerre de la Russie en Ukraine. 18 autres pays africains se sont abstenus, dont le Mali, le Mozambique, l'Angola et l'Afrique du Sud. |
| Date: | 2022–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:gqrmp&r= |
| By: | Bert Van Roosebeke (International Association of Deposit Insurers); Ryan Defina (International Association of Deposit Insurers) |
| Abstract: | Understanding and managing the risks associated with COVID-19 is a priority area of concern for deposit insurers on a global basis. This paper investigates quarterly growth rates of covered deposits and finds statistically significant evidence that during the first six quarters of the pandemic, quarterly growth of covered deposits has shifted upwards by 1.5 %-points. On a per-quarter basis, we find evidence of statistically significant increases in the second half of 2020. Results are based on a September 2021 member survey conducted by the International Association of Deposit Insurers in conjunction with the State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency (Russian Federation). |
| Keywords: | deposit insurance, bank resolution |
| JEL: | G21 G33 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awl:surbri:2&r= |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk (GIGA - German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | ABSTRACT & RÉSUMÉ : Putin attaches great importance to rebuilding Russia as a world power, including relations with Africa. But while the Soviet Union used to advocate socialist modernization in Africa, Moscow no longer offers socialist ideologies. Instead, it focuses on access to African elites, particularly authoritarian leaders. It also seeks to sway elections in its favour, particularly in fragile but resource-rich states. The Kremlin says it wants to avoid competing directly with other powers active in Africa. Instead, it wants to focus on countries where neither the West nor China dominates. There it expects to be able to work more effectively. But Russia, like China, is challenging Western norms, undermining US and EU sanctions. In addition, both strategic partners support non-interference in the internal affairs of states. In addition, Russia's relations with Africa have been motivated significantly by its interest in African resources and security markets. Russia's resurgence in Africa benefits not least from Islamist terrorism, for example, in the Sahel and Mozambique. It uses fragile states and ongoing conflicts to secure lucrative arms deals and mining concessions. Moscow signed military cooperation agreements with 21 African governments, including negotiations on establishing military bases. It uses paramilitary contractors to manipulate the course of local conflicts in its favour. Since 2015, Russian-African trade has doubled to around USD 20 billion per year. Russia exported $14 billion worth of goods and services and imported about $5 billion worth of African products. In return, Moscow can count on the support of African leaders in foreign policy. Thus, Eritrea voted against a UN General Assembly resolution strongly condemning Russia's war in Ukraine. 18 other African countries abstained, including Mali, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. RÉSUMÉ : Poutine attache une grande importance à la reconstruction de la Russie en tant que puissance mondiale, y compris les relations avec l'Afrique. Mais alors que l'Union soviétique prônait la modernisation socialiste en Afrique, Moscou ne propose plus d'idéologies socialistes. Au lieu de cela, il se concentre sur l'accès aux élites africaines, en particulier les dirigeants autoritaires. Il cherche également à influencer les élections en sa faveur, en particulier dans les États fragiles mais riches en ressources. Le Kremlin dit vouloir éviter de concurrencer directement les autres puissances actives en Afrique. Au contraire, il veut se concentrer sur les pays où ni l'Occident ni la Chine ne dominent. Là, il s'attend à pouvoir travailler plus efficacement. Mais la Russie, comme la Chine, défie les normes occidentales, sapant les sanctions américaines et européennes. En outre, les deux partenaires stratégiques soutiennent la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des États. En plus, les relations de la Russie avec l'Afrique sont fortement influencées par son intérêt pour les ressources africaines et les marchés de la sécurité. La résurgence de la Russie en Afrique profite notamment du terrorisme islamiste, par exemple au Sahel et au Mozambique. Il utilise les États fragiles et les conflits en cours pour obtenir des contrats d'armement lucratifs et des concessions minières. Moscou a signé des accords de coopération militaire avec 21 gouvernements africains, y compris des négociations sur l'établissement de bases militaires. Il utilise des sous-traitants paramilitaires pour manipuler le cours des conflits locaux en sa faveur. En retour, Moscou peut compter sur le soutien des dirigeants africains en matière de politique étrangère. Ainsi, l'Érythrée a voté contre une résolution de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies condamnant fermement la guerre de la Russie en Ukraine. 18 autres pays africains se sont abstenus, dont le Mali, le Mozambique, l'Angola et l'Afrique du Sud. |
| Date: | 2022–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:w5zdh&r= |
| By: | Simola, Heli |
| Abstract: | With the EU adopting more ambitious emission reduction targets this year, the European Commission in July published a proposal on measures for adjusting EU climate policy. Measures include a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) that imposes a price on emissions embodied in products imported to the EU. In this policy note, we review the main lines of the CBAM proposal and discuss its potential economic effects on China, India, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine – the EU's largest import sources for products subject to CBAM. We calculate illustrative estimates for the potential cost effectsof several specifications of the CBAM for these countries and compare them against earlier estimates. We also discuss the potential aggregate economic effects of the CBAM for these economies based on earlier literature. Despite considerable variation across countries and sectors, our analysis suggests that the aggregate economic effects of the CBAM would be limited for most exporting countries. |
| Keywords: | carbon border adjustment mechanism,climate policy,international trade,emerging economies |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitb:102021&r= |
| By: | Vîntu, Denis |
| Abstract: | The article describes a specific canonical form of IS-LM model under Inflation Targeting. Throughout last two decades, economy of Republic of Moldova have gone through recurrent periods of boom and bust. This is the fascinating phenomenon of business cycles and economic fluctuations. Although long periods of high economic growth have sometimes led people to believe that the business cycle was dead, statistical data show that it is still alive and well: economic activity continues to fluctuate in an irregular cyclical manner around its long-run growth trend. and at the start of the present decade the growth rate of real GDP per capita turned negative in all of the three largest OECD economies. A fundamental challenge for macroeconomic theory is to explain why the economy goes through these cyclical movements rather than evolving smoothly over time. The two previous years of COVID-19 implications derived the capitalist market economies of the world through recurrent periods of dynamic trends. At the start of the present decade the growth rate of real GDP per capita turned negative in all of the three largest Eastern European Economies: Russia, Ukraine and Romania. We concludes that that numerous disarrays identifying with the arrangement of strategies utilized by Monetary Policy in a specific space of study financial variables and parameters can reconsider anticipated time-arrangement and/or uncertainty in terms of model errors. |
| Keywords: | IS-LM model; Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; discrete regression; stochastic dynamic general equilibrium (SDGE); prices; business fluctuations and cycles; econometric methods. |
| JEL: | C13 E21 E30 E41 E44 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112805&r= |
| By: | Kennedy, Liam |
| Abstract: | The Great Irish Famine, 1846-50, and the Great Ukrainian Famine, 1932-33 are searing episodes in the history of the two countries. On some estimates, the relative intensity of famine in the two societies was broadly the same, with famine conditions claiming the lives of one-in-eight of the population. But on closer examination it is the dissimilarities between the two episodes that dominate. The politics and ideology shaping reaction to the emerging catastrophes in the two societies were hugely contrasting. The intent of policy in the Irish case, however inadequate some of the relief measures, was to save lives. Suspicion of the peasantry (not only in Ukraine), the extraction of grain surpluses and the unleashing of state terror against "class enemies" took precedence over saving lives in the Soviet handling of the Ukrainian famine. Paradoxically, it is the collective memory of famine and its politicisation that brings the Irish and Ukrainian calamities into closer relationship with each other. |
| Keywords: | Great Irish Famine (1846-50),Great Ukrainian Famine (1932-33) |
| JEL: | N43 N44 H53 N54 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:qucehw:202203&r= |
| By: | Anna Shevyakova (LLP "Rational solutions"); Eleonorа Munsh (EPAM Kazakhstan); Malika Arystan (Karaganda Economic University of Kazpotrebsouz); Yelena Petrenko (PRUE - Plekhanov Russian University of Economics [Moscow]) |
| Abstract: | The article reveals the requirements for the entry of the world economy into the fourth industrial revolution and Industry 4.0 to the competence of personnel. Industry 4.0 promises new digital solutions to optimize the entire flow of value creation in production systems. Existing production systems are often based on a philosophy of continuous improvement and lean management. The increasing digitalisation of production processes is placing new demands on employee competence. The article discusses and analyzes the necessary competences for successful integration of Kazakhstan and Russian enterprises into Industry 4.0. The article provides systematization of company specific competences and skills of employees, as well as the author's roadmap of implementation for competence development in Industry 4.0 and on its basis recommendations and solutions for enterprises are formed. |
| Keywords: | Industry 4.0.,Competence,Roadmap,Fourth Industrial Revolution,Digitalization,Companies |
| Date: | 2021–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03583868&r= |
| By: | Andrei V. Belyi; Michael Landesmann (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Sebastian Leitner (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Isilda Mara (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Chart of the Month Non-EU immigrants and COVID-19 – Integration interrupted but not reversed by Sebastian Leitner Opinion Corner Thoughts on the EU’s migration and asylum policies by Michael Landesmann EU policy is developing increasingly in the direction of ‘Fortress Europe’, with the emphasis on external border management plus attempts to cooperate with the countries of origin and transit countries in stemming migrant and refugee flows. Instead, migration policy should be embedded in a more holistic approach that supports and nurtures the development potential of the EU’s neighbouring regions. It should also recognise that the demographic complementarity between an ‘ageing Europe’ and a population-rich and ‘young South’ could be exploited to mutual benefit. COVID-19 and remittances the case of Central Europe and the Western Balkans by Isilda Mara The dynamics of remittances in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic have been highly uneven across countries. In Central Europe, where incomes are relatively high and there are many cross-border commuters, the inflow of remittances generally declined last year. In contrast, in some Western Balkan countries, where dependence on remittances was much higher to start with and a large share of emigrants are permanently settled in some of the wealthiest European countries, remittances surged, providing a lifeline to many households affected by the pandemic. Russia and the European gas crisis by Andrei Belyi The current European gas crisis has resulted from the market cycles which are inherent to commodities. In recent years, LNG inflows have allowed the development of a competitive market, but reduced supplies in the wake of the pandemic have conditioned a sharp hike in gas prices. Although Gazprom has not been directly behind the crisis, it has taken advantage of it mostly by reducing gas flows via Ukraine. Meanwhile, Gazprom continues to fulfil its commitments under long-term oil-indexed contracts, which have existed in parallel with the competitive gas hubs. Hence, recent EU appeals to Russia to increase gas supplies are seen in Moscow as a step towards a partial return to long-term oil-indexed contracts and an opportunity to strengthen Russia’s geopolitical standing in Europe. Monthly and quarterly statistics for Central, East and Southeast Europe |
| Keywords: | non-EU migrants, employment rate, COVID-19, migration and asylum policies, demographic complementarity, remittances, liquified natural gas, long-term gas contracts, natural gas pricing |
| Date: | 2021–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:mpaper:mr:2021-10&r= |
| By: | Stiewe, Clemens; Ruhnau, Oliver; Hirth, Lion |
| Abstract: | Since September 2021, European natural gas prices are at record-high levels. On average, they have been six to seven times higher than pre-pandemic price levels. While the post-pandemic recovery of global natural gas demand has driven up prices around the world, the most important drivers for European gas prices were Russia’s less-than-usual supply since mid-2021 and its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Western efforts to abandon Russian gas imports altogether mean that high natural gas prices are likely to stay for longer. While high gas prices may be the new normal, there is uncertainty about the economic reaction to this shock. How do energy-intensive industries react? Do global value chains collapse if intermediate goods produced in Europe become uneconomic because of high energy prices? Our preliminary analysis shows that industry response to has in fact been visible from the very onset of the energy crisis. A closer look at German fertilizer production, which heavily relies on natural gas as fuel and feedstock to produce ammonia as an intermediate product, reveals that increased ammonia imports have allowed domestic fertilizer production to remain remarkably stable. |
| Keywords: | Energy demand,Demand response,European energy crisis,Natural gas |
| JEL: | Q41 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:253251&r= |
| By: | Anatolijs Kriviņš (Daugavpils University); Jānis Teivāns-Treinovskis (Daugavpils University); Vladas Tumalavičius (General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, Daugavpils University) |
| Abstract: | Global terrorism has become one of the most serious threats to the security in the world today. The number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired terrorism in the EU Member States increased approximately five-fold between 2009 and 2018. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the threats of Religiously inspired terrorism in the three Baltic States-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The study was conducted using the methods of academic literature, statistical data analysis and qualitative content analysis. This study has applied quantitative technique and qualitative technique to explore the relationship between religiously inspired terrorism and relevant factors-Internal factors, Legal migration, Illegal migration, Participation in international missions and operations, Traveling to regions where terrorist groups have a stronger presence, Student exchange programs and foreign students, Employees from other countries e.c. The study has determined that the level of terrorist threats in the Baltics has not changed in recent years and remains relatively low. The Baltic States today is not a target for religiously inspired terrorism. The level of internal threat from existing religious communities has been low and remains low. No significant terrorism-related incidents have occurred in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in previous years. There is no reason to believe that these internal risks will increase in the near future. In turn, there are significant long-term risks associated with external threats. A balanced and neutral policy towards all religious denominations should continue in all Baltic countries. As a primary task, the authors conducted an analysis of a number of theoretical and practical tax incentives assessment models. |
| Keywords: | national and state security,terrorism,illegal migration,security,religiously inspired terrorism,radicalization |
| Date: | 2021–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03583775&r= |
| By: | Vîntu, Denis |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a quarterly estimated structural macro econometric model for the Republic of Moldova, denoted macro econometric data model (MDM). This model has been developed with four uses in mind: the assessment of economic conditions in the Republic of Moldova, macroeconomic forecasting, policy analysis and deepening understanding of the functioning of market economy. Five key features of the model are highlighted. First, it treats the Republic of Moldova as a small and open economy. Second, it is a medium sized model which, while detailed enough for most purposes, is nonetheless sufficient small to be manageable in the context of forecasting and simulation exercises. Third, the model is designed to have a long run equilibrium consistent with classical economic theory, while its short run dynamics are demand driven. Fourth, the current version of the MDM is mostly backward-looking, i.e. expectations are reflected via the inclusion of lagged variables. Finally, the MDM uses a quarterly frequency data, allowing for a richer treatment of the dynamics, and is mostly estimated on the basis of historical data (rather than calibrated). The paper comprises elements of stochastic long run simulations. The relationship between: inflation, interest rate, unemployment and economic growth is significant. |
| Keywords: | Republic of Moldova, macroeconometric modelling, open and small economy; inflation; interest rate; unemployment; economic growth; classical economics; Keynesian economics. |
| JEL: | C13 E21 E30 E41 E44 |
| Date: | 2021–10–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112856&r= |
| By: | Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens; Groll, Dominik; Kooths, Stefan; Sonnenberg, Nils; Stolzenburg, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | Die Wirtschaftsleistung im Euroraum hat zuletzt erstmals wieder ihr Vor-Corona-Niveau erreicht. Die konsumbezogene Mobilität war ungeachtet der hohen Infektionszahlen seit Jahresbeginn nur wenig beeinträchtigt, und Frühindikatoren zur Zuversicht von Unternehmen und Verbrauchern zeigten bis zum Februar eine gute Stimmung an. Somit waren im Jahresverlauf eigentlich kräftige Zuwächse der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität und eine vollständige Erholung von den Belastungen der Corona-Pandemie angelegt. Vor allem im ersten Halbjahr 2022 behindern die Auswirkungen des Krieges in der Ukraine jedoch die Konjunktur. Die Wirtschaftstätigkeit wird insbesondere über den Kanal hoher Energiepreise gedämpft, wodurch heimische Kaufkraft abgezogen wird. Wenngleich Russland und die Ukraine als Absatzmärkte vielerorts nur von nachgeordneter Bedeutung sind, dürfte die wirtschaftliche Aktivität auch durch gestörte Lieferketten, weniger Handelstätigkeit und die stark gestiegene Unsicherheit beeinträchtigt werden. Für das zweite Halbjahr und das kommende Jahr erwarten wir wieder eine kräftigere Konjunktur. Insgesamt dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt im Jahr 2022 um 2,8 Prozent zulegen, gefolgt von 3,1 Prozent (2023). Die Verbraucherpreise steigen im laufenden Jahr mit voraussichtlich 5,5 Prozent so stark wie nie zuvor seit Bestehen der Währungsunion. Im Folgejahr dürfte die Teuerung mit 3,1 Prozent erneut klar oberhalb des Inflationsziels liegen. |
| Keywords: | Euroraum,Europäische Währungsunion,Frühindikatoren,Fiskalpolitik,Produktionslückenschätzung,Euro area,European Monetary Union,leading indicators,fiscal policy,output gap estimate |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkkb:88&r= |
| By: | Henri-Louis Vedie |
| Abstract: | L'invasion, par la Russie, de l'Ukraine, grenier à blé de la mer Noire, impacte lourdement le marché mondial de cette denrée, en premier lieu les principaux pays/clients importateurs des deux belligérants. L'objet de cette étude est d'analyser les conséquences de cette guerre pour l’Afrique, continent où le pain est un aliment de base. Ce qui nous conduit, tout d'abord, à rappeler les données générales de ce marché, avec une Russie et une Ukraine respectivement au premier et cinquième rangs mondiaux des pays exportateurs, avec une Union européenne (UE) qui, suite à ce conflit, apparaît être une alternative plus crédible que celle américano/ canadienne, compte tenu de sa proximité avec les pays concernés directement par les conséquences de cette crise. L'analyse, ensuite, des pays les plus dépendants du blé russe et ukrainien montre l'importance de cette dépendance africaine, avec 16 pays regroupant 40% de la population du continent, qui en dépendent à hauteur de 56% et plus. A ces 16 pays il faut ajouter les pays qui ont une dépendance inférieure à 56%. L'Algérie, le Maroc et le Nigeria. Ces trois derniers pays qui ont su diversifier leurs approvisionnements. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:ppaper:pb23-22&r= |