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on Confederation of Independent States |
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Issue of 2022‒04‒25
seventeen papers chosen by |
| By: | Banerjee, Suman (Stevens Institute of Technology); Estrin, Saul (London School of Economics); Pal, Sarmistha (University of Surrey) |
| Abstract: | Does the introduction of corporate transparency and disclosure rules in emerging economies affect compliance, and therefore earnings quality and firm performance? We explore these questions for an important emerging economy, Russia, using a natural experiment, the 2002 introduction of Russian corporate governance code. We exploit the exogenous variation in voluntary disclosure and find a significant increase in corporate disclosure among the domestic Russian firms over the period 2003-07 when firms gradually adopted some but not all disclosure rules. The immediate effect of the introduction was a drop in reported earnings. Market valuation, however, only improved for domestic firms after 2007, when all domestic firms had complied. However, cross-listed firms, which were already satisfying international standards, remained largely unaffected. Though average compliance by domestic firms was only 53%, average firm value of treated domestic firms, relative to cross-listed ones, went up by about 10%. Results are robust, confirm external validity and offer important policy implications for other emerging/transition economies. |
| Keywords: | increased disclosure, processing cost of information, market valuation, reported earnings, cost of capital, domestic vs. cross-listed firms, 2002 Russian Corporate Governance Code, difference-in-difference model, Russia |
| JEL: | G3 K29 O38 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15103&r= |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Putin attaches great importance to rebuilding Russia as a world power, including relations with Africa. But while the Soviet Union used to advocate socialist modernization in Africa, Moscow no longer offers socialist ideologies. Instead, it focuses on access to African elites, particularly authoritarian leaders. It also seeks to sway elections in its favour, particularly in fragile but resource-rich states. The Kremlin says it wants to avoid competing directly with other powers active in Africa. Instead, it wants to focus on countries where neither the West nor China dominates. There it expects to be able to work more effectively. But Russia, like China, is challenging Western norms, undermining US and EU sanctions. In addition, both strategic partners support non-interference in the internal affairs of states. In addition, Russia's relations with Africa have been motivated significantly by its interest in African resources and security markets. Russia's resurgence in Africa benefits not least from Islamist terrorism, for example, in the Sahel and Mozambique. It uses fragile states and ongoing conflicts to secure lucrative arms deals and mining concessions. Moscow signed military cooperation agreements with 21 African governments, including negotiations on establishing military bases. It uses paramilitary contractors to manipulate the course of local conflicts in its favour. Since 2015, Russian-African trade has doubled to around USD 20 billion per year. Russia exported $14 billion worth of goods and services and imported about $5 billion worth of African products. In return, Moscow can count on the support of African leaders in foreign policy. Thus, Eritrea voted against a UN General Assembly resolution strongly condemning Russia's war in Ukraine. 18 other African countries abstained, including Mali, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. |
| Keywords: | Russie, Afrique, Afrique subsaharienne, commerce international, grande puissance, matières premières africaines, État fragile, terrorisme islamiste, marché des armes, BRICS, Chine, Érythrée, Afrique du Sud, Mali, Mozambique, UE, OTAN |
| JEL: | F13 F21 F35 F51 F52 F54 G28 H56 H77 N17 N47 P16 P27 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112565&r= |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Putin attaches great importance to rebuilding Russia as a world power, including relations with Africa. But while the Soviet Union used to advocate socialist modernization in Africa, Moscow no longer offers socialist ideologies. Instead, it focuses on access to African elites, particularly authoritarian leaders. It also seeks to sway elections in its favour, particularly in fragile but resource-rich states. The Kremlin says it wants to avoid competing directly with other powers active in Africa. Instead, it wants to focus on countries where neither the West nor China dominates. There it expects to be able to work more effectively. But Russia, like China, is challenging Western norms, undermining US and EU sanctions. In addition, both strategic partners support non-interference in the internal affairs of states. In addition, Russia's relations with Africa have been motivated significantly by its interest in African resources and security markets. Russia's resurgence in Africa benefits not least from Islamist terrorism, for example, in the Sahel and Mozambique. It uses fragile states and ongoing conflicts to secure lucrative arms deals and mining concessions. Moscow signed military cooperation agreements with 21 African governments, including negotiations on establishing military bases. It uses paramilitary contractors to manipulate the course of local conflicts in its favour. Since 2015, Russian-African trade has doubled to around USD 20 billion per year. Russia exported $14 billion worth of goods and services and imported about $5 billion worth of African products. In return, Moscow can count on the support of African leaders in foreign policy. Thus, Eritrea voted against a UN General Assembly resolution strongly condemning Russia's war in Ukraine. 18 other African countries abstained, including Mali, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. |
| Keywords: | Russia, Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, African affairs, international trade, global power, African resources, fragile state, Islamist terrorism, arms deals, BRICS, China, Eritrea, South Africa, Mali, Mozambique, EU, NATO, |
| JEL: | F13 F21 F35 F51 F52 F54 G28 H56 H77 N17 N47 P16 P27 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112564&r= |
| By: | Irina Kozlovtceva (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Henry Penikas (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Ekaterina Petreneva (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Yulia Ushakova (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation) |
| Abstract: | We use the Russian banks’ 2015-2019 data to evaluate the effectiveness of the macro- prudential measures in curbing the booming consumer lending segment. We find that the measures are successful in reducing the overall loan portfolio riskiness and in capital cushion accumulation by banks. In the short-run of up to 1-2 quarters after the measure announcement date banks tend to reduce both the new loan volumes and the average consumer loan portfolio growth rate. Such reduction is more typical with the smallest market players. However, in the longer time horizon up to a year from the measure application date we observe the increase in the average credit growth rates. Such findings correspond to the experience of the emerging markets of Argentine, Colombia, Thailand. In general, we consider that the observed credit growth after the measure implementation is smaller than it could have been without the measures in place. We also expect that the observed lending growth rate brings less financial instability risks and it reflects the potential for the natural loan extension in Russia. |
| Keywords: | financial stability, risk-weight, consumer loan, macroprudential |
| JEL: | G21 G28 G32 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bkr:wpaper:wps62&r= |
| By: | Otaviano Canuto |
| Abstract: | The war in Ukraine is bringing substantial financial, commodity price, and supply chain shocks to the global economy. Sanctions on Russia are already having a significant impact on its financial system and its economy. Price shocks will have a global impact. Energy and commodity prices—including wheat and other grains—have risen, intensifying inflationary pressures from supply chain disruptions and the recovery from the pandemic. The push toward relative deglobalization received from the pandemic will get stronger. One may expect an increasing weight of geopolitics in international payments and in the access to special commodities. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:ppaper:pb18-22&r= |
| By: | Tulun, Teoman Ertuğrul |
| Abstract: | In an interview about two and a half years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron arrogantly claimed that NATO was brain dead and Europe was on the edge of the precipice, and he assertively questioned NATO's very future. Macron's prediction turned up false. NATO is not brain-dead. Today even most wealthy Nordic EU member countries are willing to join NATO. For example, according to a Deutsche Welle (DW) report, Sweden and Finland have stayed out of NATO due to their military nonalignment policy supported in the past by majorities of both Finns and Swedes now seem to change their policy due to war in Ukraine and are desirious of joining NATO. It seems possible that the EU will become much more in need of the NATO security umbrella in the coming period. On the other hand, these days, when a serious war situation is taking place right next to Turkey, it is believed that it would be beneficial to go back to the past and to remember the principle of "indivisibility of security" developed by the Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) and to explain the essence of this principle to the younger generations. In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, the participating States recognized the indivisibility of security in Europe. At the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999, the leaders of fifty-four states participating in the OSCE signed the Charter for European Security called the "İstanbul Document." Paragraph eight of the Charter for European Security involves one of the crucial principles for the security and stability of Europe in the twenty-first century. The reason for the war situation that Europe is facing in Ukraine today is that the Russian Federation and some countries in the Western bloc consider this paragraph in terms of their priorities. In order to find a solution to the war situation we face today in Ukraine, the constructive negotiation spirit of the period when the 1999 Istanbul Document was prepared must be returned. In our judgment, Turkey, in current circumstances, is one of the most appropriate OSCE countries that can best prepare the suitable ground for a revival of such constructive spirit in the new negotiations. |
| Date: | 2022–03–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:zsp42&r= |
| By: | Van Roosebeke, Bert; Defina, Ryan |
| Abstract: | Understanding and managing the risks associated with COVID-19 is a priority area of concern for deposit insurers on a global basis. This paper investigates quarterly growth rates of covered deposits and finds statistically significant evidence that during the first six quarters of the pandemic, quarterly growth of covered deposits has shifted upwards by 1.5 %-points. On a per-quarter basis, we find evidence of statistically significant increases in the second half of 2020. Results are based on a September 2021 member survey conducted by the International Association of Deposit Insurers in conjunction with the State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency (Russian Federation). |
| Keywords: | deposit insurance; COVID-19 |
| JEL: | G21 G33 |
| Date: | 2022–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112098&r= |
| By: | Ержан Ислам // Yerzhan Islam (National Bank of Kazakhstan); Сейдахметов Ансар // Seidakhmetov Ansar (National Bank of Kazakhstan) |
| Abstract: | Для центральных банков, придерживающихся политики инфляционного таргетирования, крайне важно отслеживать текущие тенденции развития инфляционных процессов. Помимо стандартного анализа влияния различных переменных необходимо понимание природы происхождения основных драйверов инфляционной динамики. В этой связи, приобретает особое значение постоянный анализ воздействия ненаблюдаемых переменных на инфляционные процессы. В рамках данной работы авторами были определены ненаблюдаемые переменные и произведена количественная оценка их влияния на динамику инфляционных процессов. // It is extremely important for central banks adhering to the policy of inflation targeting to monitor the current trends in the development of inflationary processes. In addition to the standard analysis of influence by various variables, it is necessary to understand the nature of where the main drivers of inflationary dynamics are stemming from. In this regard, the constant analysis of the impact on inflationary processes by unobserved variables is of particular importance. As part of this study, the authors have defined unobserved variables and made a quantitative assessment of their effect on the dynamics of inflationary processes. |
| Keywords: | инфляция, метод главных компонент, фактор, ненаблюдаемая переменная, вклад, декомпозиция, inflation, principal component analysis, factor, an unobserved variable, contribution, decomposition |
| JEL: | E31 E37 E39 E52 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aob:wpaper:29&r= |
| By: | Abdelaaziz Ait Ali; Fahd AZAROUAL; Oumayma Bourhriba; Uri Dadush |
| Abstract: | The Russian-Ukrainian war will have major economic and political repercussions. In this note, we focus on the war’s economic short and long term implications on the African economy. This conflict comes at very arduous context, where Africa is still struggling to set its economy on the recovery path, amid global inflationary pressures and highly uncertain context. While natural resources countries, especially energy exporters, are sensing opportunities from the crisis, other countries such as Morocco, will be hardly hit by a double whammy of soaring energy and food prices. This will add to their external imbalances and concerns about inflation persistence and the path of their public debt. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:ppaper:pb11-22&r= |
| By: | Schrader, Klaus; Laaser, Claus-Friedrich |
| Abstract: | Die Autoren zeigen, dass die Dynamik des Russlandgeschäfts nach der russischen Krimbesetzung 2014 im Zuge von Sanktionen und Gegensanktionen gebrochen wurde und Russland seitdem als Handelspartner an Bedeutung verloren hat. In einer Analyse nach Warengruppen stellen sie dar, dass einzelne Branchen und Unternehmen abhängiger vom Russlandexport sind, als es sich im Gesamthandel widerspiegelt. Überdurchschnittliche Russlandanteile weisen deutsche Schwergewichte in den Bereichen "Maschinenbau" oder "Pharma" auf, ohne dass es aber eine kritische Abhängigkeit vom Russlandexport gibt. Die Achillesferse im deutschen Russlandhandel bleibt der Import von russischem Erdgas, der kurzfristig aufgrund der Leitungsgebundenheit der Lieferungen nicht ersetzbar ist. Statt nach 2014 die Energieimporte stärker zu diversifizieren, stieg die deutsche Abhängigkeit weiter an, was sich an einem Anteil des russischen Erdgases von mittlerweile 55 Prozent zeigt. Aus Sicht der Autoren wäre Russland auf lange Sicht der große Verlierer einer wirtschaftlichen Isolation. Eine wirtschaftliche und politische Entflechtung im Zeitalter der Globalisierung käme Russland teurer als die Autarkiebestrebungen der Sowjetunion während des "Kalten Krieges". |
| Keywords: | Deutschland,Russland,Sanktionen,Internationaler Handel,Germany,Russia,Sanctions,International Trade |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:163&r= |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Famines are almost always man-made often used as a deterrent. Since ancient times, food and hunger have been a weapon of war. Among the most notorious examples in Africa are the Herero and Namaqua genocide in German South-West Africa (now Namibia) from 1904 to 1908. It was the first genocide of the 20th century. Also, the subsequent famines in Biafra (South-East Nigeria, 1967-1969), when an estimated 1.5 million people starved to death, the 1980 famine in Uganda, one of the worst in African history, when 21% of the population died, and the recurring famines in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan since the 1990s have been burned into human memory. The use of food as a weapon was condemned as a war crime by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. Since most African countries are Least Developed Countries (LLCs), they will suffer the hardest in the aftermath of Putin's war in Ukraine, especially Africa's poor. They have already suffered the consequences of drought, the corona pandemic and Islamist terrorism. Their already weakened position will be exacerbated by the spill-over effects of Russian aggression in Ukraine, which will further exacerbate hunger and poverty in Africa. All the more so as international development aid to Africa is likely to suffer from a massive redirection of aid to rearmament. Last but not least, Putin's war in Ukraine will have a major impact on EU-Africa relations. In view of the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic for Africa, it will further damage the mutual trust between both partners. About 86% of Africans have yet to receive two doses of vaccine. A growing number of African heads of state and government no longer see Western countries as reliable partners. |
| Keywords: | Russie, invasion, Ukraine, Afrique, famine, commerce international, pouvoir alimentaire, marchés d'armes, État fragile, terrorisme islamiste, Maghreb, Égypte, Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Libye, Afrique subsaharienne, Afrique du Sud, Cameroun, Mozambique, Éthiopie, Kenya, Ouganda , Somalie, Namibie, Nigeria, Soudan, sécurité énergétique, Chine, UE, USA |
| JEL: | E26 E31 F02 F13 F35 F51 F54 H56 N47 N57 N77 P26 Q17 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–04–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112768&r= |
| By: | Anna Burova (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Konstantin Egorov (New Economic School); Dmitry Mukhin (London School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies both theoretically and empirically the firm’s choice of currency for its debt. We use a parsimonious model with financial frictions to derive an intuitive sufficient statistic for the share of foreign-currency debt in firm’s liabilities and demonstrate its robustness in several extensions. Due to the risk management considerations, firms are more likely to borrow in dollars when the pass-through of the exchange rate into their profits is higher. We leverage this insight empirically using the micro-level data on loans issued by Russian banks to local firms as well as the data on firms’ balance sheets and cash flows. The data strongly supports the predictions of the model indicating that firms with profits more stable in dollars are more likely to borrow in foreign currency than firms with profits stable in local currency. These results extend to a choice between the euro and the dollar and survive after controlling for firms’ size and export status. Note that our results describe efficiency at the firm level, and they do not have direct implications for macroprudential policy as foreign currency debt may also affect exchange rate volatility, inflation and output. |
| Keywords: | currency choice, invoicing currency, borrowing currency, dollar in global economy, bank loans, exporter status, optimal debt composition |
| JEL: | D22 F31 F34 G11 G21 G32 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bkr:wpaper:wps93&r= |
| By: | Franziska Holz; Robin Sogalla; Christian von Hirschhausen; Claudia Kemfert |
| Abstract: | Der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine und die Abhängigkeit Deutschlands von Energielieferungen aus Russland erfordern ein Umdenken: Während die Debatte über ein sofortiges Energie-Embargo hochkocht, könnte auch Russland jederzeit seine Lieferungen einstellen. Deutschland bezog bisher rund 55 Prozent seines Erdgases aus Russland. Das DIW Berlin hat Szenarien entwickelt, wie das deutsche Energiesystem im europäischen Kontext schnellstmöglich von diesen Importen unabhängig werden könnte: Auf der Angebotsseite können Lieferungen anderer Erdgasexportländer einen Teil der russischen Exporte kompensieren. Die Versorgungssicherheit würde es erheblich stärken, wenn die Pipeline- und Speicherinfrastruktur effizienter genutzt wird. Auf der Nachfrageseite gibt es ein kurzfristiges Einsparpotenzial von 19 bis 26 Prozent der bisherigen Erdgasnachfrage. Mittelfristig ist insbesondere ein Schub in Richtung erneuerbarer Wärmeversorgung und höherer Energieeffizienz notwendig. Wenn Einsparpotenziale maximal genutzt und gleichzeitig die Lieferungen aus anderen Erdgaslieferländern so weit wie technisch möglich ausgeweitet werden, ist die deutsche Versorgung mit Erdgas auch ohne russische Importe im laufenden Jahr und im kommenden Winter 2022/23 gesichert. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwakt:83de&r= |
| By: | Brücker, Herbert (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Dauth, Wolfgang (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Haas, Anette (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Jaschke, Philipp (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Kosyakova, Yuliya (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Mense, Andreas (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Moritz, Michael (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Phan thi Hong, Van (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany); Wolf, Katja (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany) |
| Abstract: | "A large number of refugees were forced to leave the Ukraine as a consequence of the Russian aggression. Some 260,000 refugees of those have immigrated to Germany by March 28, 2022. All persons, who are not hosted privately by family members and friends, might be subject to administrative dispersal policies in Germany. The dispersal across the Federal States („Länder“) in Germany is carried out by the so-called „Königsteiner Schlüssel“ at present, a key based on population size and tax revenues. The Federal States in turn allocate the refugee population across the municipalities by different keys. Main criteria are population size and the availability of housing. As a result, the refugee population has been distributed in the past disproportionally into regions with weak economic prospects and above-average unemployment rates. This has hampered labor market integration considerably. Empirical studies have shown that local labor market conditions in particular have a long-lasting impact on integration chances. Thus, the initial dispersal of the refugee population has sustainable implications on future integration prospects. We advocate that the reallocation of refugees is restricted to those people who are dependent on the public provision of housing. Moreover, preferences of the refugees with respect to family ties and other networks should be considered. The presence of such networks has a significant effect on a successful integration. In case of reallocation, we argue that the local conditions for a successful integration must be considered. In this report, we discuss several aspects which are relevant for integration and vary considerably across regions: absorptive capacity of local labor markets to employ immigrants as well as the availability of child-care and housing. As an indicator for the availability of housing we use the regional rental costs, which are in our view a good proxy for shortages in the housing market. Based on these insights and corresponding empirical evidence, we propose an alternative allocation rule for dispersal policies which is based on a labor market indicator, child-care capacities and rental costs in regional housing markets. An allocation of refugees according to this rule could raise employment probabilities by 5 to 10 per cent. This would increase, however, average housing costs at the district level by 4 per cent. Nevertheless, high housing costs initially may pay-off in the long-term since the chances for labor market integration will presumably increase substantially relative to a dispersal according to the “Königsteiner Schlüssel” across the Federal States and other dispersal rules for the allocation across municipalities within the Federal States. Employment probabilities can be increased further if a higher degree of regional concentration is accepted." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) |
| Keywords: | IAB-Open-Access-Publikation |
| Date: | 2022–04–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabfob:202205&r= |
| By: | Johan Gars; Daniel Spiro; Henrik Wachtmeister |
| Abstract: | Following the oil-price surge in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, many countries in the EU are proposing to cut taxes on petrol and diesel. Using standard theory and empirical estimates, we assess how such tax cuts will influence the oil income in Russia. We find that a tax cut of 20 euro cents per liter would increase Russia's oil profits by around 11-17 million Euros per day in the short run and long run. This is equivalent to 4100-6300 million Euros in a year, 0.3-0.5% of Russia's GDP or 7-11% of its military spending. We show that a cash transfer to EU citizens, with an equivalent fiscal burden as the tax cut, reduces these side effects to a fraction. |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2204.03318&r= |
| By: | Philipp Heimberger (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Mario Holzner (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Bernhard Moshammer (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Wie sollte die Wirtschaftspolitik im Lichte der Covid-19-Krise, dem Krieg in der Ukraine sowie den laufenden Sanktionen gegen Russland neben weiteren strukturellen Herausforderungen in den kommenden Jahren ausgerichtet werden? Schon vor Ausbruch der Covid-19-Krise gab es einen Paradigmenwechsel in der makroökonomischen Wirtschaftspolitik In den Forschungsabteilungen vieler internationaler Institutionen hat man aus den Fehlern der letzten Krise gelernt Die wirtschaftspolitischen Empfehlungen verweisen auf die Gefahr eines verfrühten Schwenks zu einer restriktiven Budget- und Geldpolitik. Österreich kam besser durch die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise 2008/2009 als andere Eurozonenländer. Insbesondere auf Ebene der Gemeinden kam es allerdings danach zu einem Investitionsstau, der wichtige Investitionen in Bildung, Gesundheit und Soziales kostete. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert dieser Policy-Brief einige ausgewählte Maßnahmen, die dem neuen wirtschaftspolitischen Paradigma folgend wirtschaftliche Erholung fördern und gleichzeitig die Adressierung struktureller gesellschaftlicher Herausforderungen insbesondere in Bereichen der Daseinsvorsorge sicherstellen könnten. Dabei fokussieren wir mit Blick auf Digitalisierung und Ökologisierung auf die Bereiche Gebäude und Wohnen, öffentliche Infrastruktur, Bildung und Soziales, wobei Vorschläge für mögliche Investitionsschwerpunkte diskutiert werden. Diese sollen nicht zuletzt dazu beitragen, die Abhängigkeit von fossilen Brennstoffen wie zum Beispiel (russischem) Gas abzubauen. |
| Keywords: | EU, Österreich, Kommunen, Wirtschaftskrise, Ukraine-Krieg, Covid-19, Erholung, grüner Wandel, Digitalisierung, Daseinsvorsorge, Investitionen, Wohnen, Infrastruktur, Bildung, Soziales |
| JEL: | E65 H75 R11 R58 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:60&r= |
| By: | Christian Hauenstein; Karlo Hainsch; Philipp Herpich; Christian von Hirschhausen; Franziska Holz; Claudia Kemfert; Mario Kendziorski; Pao-Yu Oei; Catharina Rieve |
| Abstract: | Mit einem Kohle-Embargo erhöht die Europäische Union den Druck auf Russland. Nach einer Übergangsfrist soll im August keine russische Kohle mehr importiert werden. Jüngere Studien zeigen, dass Deutschland die Einfuhren aus Russland bis zum Sommer durch Importe aus anderen Ländern ersetzen kann. Da aber auch ein Aus für die russischen Erdgaslieferungen droht, müssen Pläne zur Versorgungssicherheit entwickelt werden. Das DIW Berlin hat in Szenariorechnungen analysiert, wie das deutsche Stromsystem auf einen Stopp russischer Energielieferungen (insbesondere Kohle und Erdgas) reagieren kann, ohne den beschleunigten Kohleausstieg beziehungsweise den Atomausstieg 2022 in Frage zu stellen. Es zeigt sich, dass im kommenden Jahr 2023 auch ohne russische Energielieferungen eine sichere Stromversorgung möglich ist; die Abschaltung der letzten drei Kernkraftwerke kann und sollte wie geplant im Dezember 2022 erfolgen. Kurzfristig müssen Kohle-kraftwerke aus der Netzreserve genutzt und die Sicherheitsbereitschaft einiger Kraftwerke verlängert werden. Mittelfristig ist bei dem von der Bundesregierung im Osterpaket angestrebten beschleunigten Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien ein rückläufiger Bedarf an Erdgas- und Kohleverstromung bis 2030 zu beobachten. Somit bleibt das im Koalitionsvertrag angestrebte Ziel eines auf 2030 vorgezogenen Kohleausstiegs erreichbar. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwakt:84de&r= |