|
on Confederation of Independent States |
|
Issue of 2017‒04‒16
25 papers chosen by |
| By: | Aleksandr Vashchilko |
| Abstract: | This paper looks at the effects of the trade wars that followed 2014 events in Ukraine on Belarus. The estimation of the model predicts the increase in the tariff revenue collected by Belarus. Because of ban on imports, the tari§ revenue of Russian Federation declines. Being a part of Customs Union, Belarus needs to participate in the tariff revenue redistribution. The need to participate in the tariff revenue redistribution and the decline in the tariff revenue collected by Russian Federation lead to the decrease in the welfare of Belarus. To avoid this decrease, Belarus should argue for the modification of the redistribution schedule. |
| Keywords: | trade wars, FTA, CU |
| JEL: | F13 F14 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bel:ppaper:37&r=cis |
| By: | Park , Joungho (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy); Sung , Weon-Yong (Incheon National University); Kang , Boogyun (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Korean Abstract: 현재 러시아의 경제상황은 급속도로 악화된 상태이다. 우크라이나 위기 이후 대외경제 환경의 변화가 러시아 경제 전반에 엄청난 충격을 가했기 때문이다. 그 결과 2015년 러시아는 -3.7%라는 경제성장률을 기록하는 등 2009년 이후 최악의 경제상황에 직면해 있다. 본 연구의 목적은 서방의 대러시아 경제제재와 저유가라는 두 가지 핵심 요인을 통해 우크라이나 위기 발발 이후 러시아 경제상황의 변화를 분석하는 데 있다. 우크라이나 위기는 유라시아 국제관계의 성격을 근본적으로 변화시켰다. 러시아와 우크라이나 관계가 소연방 해체 이후 최악의 상태에 머물러 있음은 물론이고, 러시아와 서방 관계 역시 첨예한 갈등상태를 유지하고 있다. 특히 러시아와 서방 세계 간에 경제제재 전쟁이 여전히 진행 중인 상황인데, 서방의 대러 경제제재의 주요한 특징은 다음과 같다. 먼저, 유럽연합과 미국은 전면적인 무역 엠바고나 외환거래 차단이 아닌 러시아 경제의 핵심 분야를 대상으로 하는 표적 제재를 추구하고 있다는 점이다. 둘째, 유럽연합의 경우 경제제재 조치의 세부 범위가 미국보다는 상대적으로 협소하다는 점이다. 한편 2014년 8월 7일 러시아 정부는 대러 경제제재에 참여한 서방 국가들을 대상으로 지정품목에 대해 수입금지 및 제한 조치를 취했다. 러시아의 대서방 경제제재의 핵심 특징은 제재 대상을 주로 대러시아 수입품에만 한정하고 있다는 점이다. 이는 서방의 경제제재와 저유가 상황 속에서 수입대체를 통해 국내 산업을 육성하려는 전략방안이었다. 서방의 경제제재와 저유가는 러시아 경제에 부정적 파급효과를 끼쳤다. 전자는 대외교역의 위축, 금융부문의 불안정성 증대, 러시아 시장에 대한 불확실성 고조뿐 아니라, 러시아에 대한 서방의 군용 및 전략 물자의 수출 금지, 에너지설비 및 첨단기술의 수출 제한 등을 포함하고 있었다. 따라서 제재 대상 기업들의 자본유입 감소, 환율 리스크 증대, 기업활동의 위축뿐 아니라, 러시아 시장의 신뢰 하락에 따른 자본 유출과 투자 감소 등이 초래되고 있다. 후자는 러시아 경제상황 변화에 가장 큰 영향을 미쳤다. 러시아의 수출은 GDP의 약 30%에 해당되는데, 그중에서 원자재 수출은 전체 수출의 90%에 달하며, 이 중에서 3분의 2는 석유와 천연가스 수출이다. 러시아의 산업구조 및 수출품목의 특성상 저유가는 에너지 자원 수출의 감소, 경제성장률 하락, 재정수지 악화, 루블화 가치 폭락, 주가지수 급락, 투자 감소, 산업생산 감소, 내수 부진 등을 초래하면서 러시아의 경기침체 현상을 부추기고 있다. 결국 우크라이나 위기 발발 이후 촉발된 국제경제 환경의 주요한 변화 요인들, 즉 서방의 경제제재와 국제유가의 하락은 러시아 경제상황 악화에 핵심 동인으로 작용했다. 저유가 기조가 러시아 경제 전반에 가장 큰 악영향을 미쳤으며, 서방의 경제제재 요인은 상대적으로 제한된 파급효과를 나타냈다고 정의해볼 수 있겠다.(후략) English Abstract: The Russian economy has recently taken a sharp turn for the worse because of the shift in the global economy following the crisis in Ukraine and its critical impact on the Russian economy in general. As a result, Russia is facing the worst economic condition since 2009, recording a negative 3.7% growth in 2015. The purpose of the following research is to analyze the change in the Russian economy following the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in terms of two core causes: Western economic sanctions against Russia and the decline in oil prices. The crisis in Ukraine has fundamentally altered the international relations within Eurasia. Not only that, Russia and Ukraine are sitting in their worst disunion since the dissolution of Soviet Union, but the Russian-Western relation also remains to be sharply discordant. Most notably, the economic sanction war is still in progress between the Russian and the Western world, and the following are the key elements of Western sanctions against Russia. First, the European Union and the United States are pursuing target sanctions upon the core areas of the Russian economy, rather than the trade embargos or the block in currency exchange. Secondly, in the case of the European Union, the specific range of economic sanction is comparatively narrower than that of the United States. On the other hand, the Russian government has imposed an import embargo and restrictions on select items upon the Western nations that are participating in the economic sanction. The core characteristic of the Russian economic sanction against the West is that the embargo is only restricted to items imported by Russia; this was a strategical plan aimed to promote the national industry amidst the Western economic sanctions and dropped oil prices through import substitution. The Western economic sanctions and the decline in oil prices had negative effects on the Russian economy. The former of the two including the prohibition of the Western sale of military or strategic resources to Russia and the restriction of sale on energy facilities and advanced technology-discouraged foreign trade, led to financial instability and built uncertainty regarding the Russian market. Accordingly, a decreased inflow of the capital for businesses affected by the sanction, increase in currency exchange risk, discouraged business activity, capital outflow caused by lowered Russian market confidence, and decrease in investment have followed. The latter of the two had the greater impact on the shift in Russian economy. Approximately 30% of Russia’s GDP relies on exportation, and raw material export constitutes 90% of the entire exportation activity, wherein two-thirds are oil and natural gas. Due to the nature of the Russian industry structure and export items, the decline in oil prices is reinforcing an economic recession in Russia by inevitably contributing to the decrease in energy resource export, decline in economic growth, worsening of financial expenditure over revenue, devastation in value for Russian Ruble, sharp decline in stocks, reduced investments, diminished productivity in industries, and weakened domestic market. Ultimately, it was the key shifting points in the post-Ukrainian crisis international economy (viz. Western economic sanctions and decline in oil prices) that worked as the core cause of the deterioration of Russia’s economy. It can be asserted that the basic conditions of lower oil prices had the worst effect on Russian economy as a whole, while the Western economic sanctions relatively had limited effects. (The rest omitted). |
| Keywords: | Economic Outlook; Economic Cooperation; Russia; Ukraine |
| Date: | 2016–09–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepre:2016_005&r=cis |
| By: | Olexandr Nekhay; Manuel Alejandro Cardenete Flores; Adolfo Cristobal Campoamor; Olexandr Nekhay |
| Abstract: | A Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) was signed in 2014 between Ukraine and the EU, although it was only partially enforced immediately after signature. The full implementation of the DCFTA was delayed as Russia alleged that the agreement posed a threat to its economy. However, during 2015 the two sides (the EU & Ukraine on one side and Russia on other side) could not reach an agreement. Subsequently, the Ukraine-EU DCFTA was fully implemented from January 1st 2016. In response, Russia unilaterally broke out a FTA with Ukraine signed in 2011 as well as banning all imports of agricultural products from the latter country. Simultaneously, Russia additionally restricted the transit of all goods from Ukraine to other CIS countries. We used a static comparative GTAP CGE model based on the GTAP 9 database to assess the impact of several possible scenarios, based on to the current trade relationships. We calibrated the economic model with data from the year 2015, which was especially important for Ukraine due to the sharp changes in its GDP and endowments. Our first scenario consists of the abolishment of the tariff and non-tariff barriers between the EU and Ukraine, as implied by a complete implementation of DCFTA. Our second scenario includes the first scenario, plus a ban on Ukrainian agricultural goods and some tariffs on industrial goods, according to Russia´s WTO commitments. Our third scenario includes our first scenario plus a ban on the importation of Ukrainian agricultural goods by all the Russia-led Euro-Asian Custom Union. And our forth scenario includes the first scenario plus a ban on the importation of Ukrainian agricultural goods by all the CIS members of the Russia-led FTA. The tariffs for industrial goods in our third and fourth scenarios are set at the level of the Russian tariffs in our second scenario. The results of these simulations allow us to asses the impact on GDP, welfare and trade balances of the implementation of the DCFTA, together with the Russian restrictive measures. This work should also add to the discussion regarding the benefits and drawbacks of FTAs in general and bring light to claims that these type of FTAs between two countries can hurt a third country’s interests. |
| Keywords: | The European Union, Ukraine and Russia, Trade issues, General equilibrium modeling |
| Date: | 2016–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:009007:9326&r=cis |
| By: | Jeh, Sung Hoon (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy); Min, Jiyoung (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy); Kang , Boogyun (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy); Lukonin, Sergey (Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Soon after the start of the third term of the Russian president Vladimir Putin in May 2012, the Ministry for the Development of Russian Far East was established as the first ever federal ministry dedicated to the development of a specific region. In addition, a national program called the 'Socio-Economic Development of the Far East and Baikal Region' was adopted in March 2013 which was revised in April 2014. All of this is an indication of Russia's unprecedented interest in developing the Far East and the Baikal region. Adjacent to the Korean peninsula, Russian Far East and the Baikal region stood up as a priority target for Korean cooperation activities in Eurasia. These regions constitute a geographical link in trilateral Northern cooperation (South Korea-North Korea-Russia) and Eurasian cooperation under the Korean government's national agenda, 'The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative'. And experts in Korea have already pointed out that the Russian government's development plan for the Far East and the Baikal region is a key factor that must be considered in securing future growth engines of the Korean economy. In a similar context, on October 18, 2013, President Park Geunhye proposed the 'Eurasia Initiative' with the vision of transforming the region into 'One Continent', a 'Creative Continent', and a 'Peaceful Continent' at the international conference on 'Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia' hosted by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP). This was followed by an announcement from the Korean government of the 'Eurasia Initiative Roadmap' on December 10, 2014. This paper systematically analyzes the third-term Putin administration's development policy for the Far East and the Baikal region, and presents detailed policy responses while taking into account its geopolitical and geoeconomic significance for the region. |
| Keywords: | Russia; Regional Development Policy; Far East; Baikal |
| Date: | 2015–08–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2015_017&r=cis |
| By: | Jamal Bouoiyour (CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour); Refk Selmi (CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour) |
| Abstract: | There certainly is little or no doubt that politicians, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, exert a significant impact on stock markets. The evolving volatility over the Republican Donald Trump's surprise victory in the US presidential election is a perfect example when politicians, through announced policies, send signals to financial markets. The present paper seeks to address whether BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) stock markets equally vulnerable to Trump's plans. For this purpose, two methods were adopted. The first presents an event-study methodology based on regression estimation of abnormal returns. The second is based on vote intentions by integrating data from social media (Twitter), search queries (Google Trends) and public opinion polls. Our results robustly reveal that although some markets emerged losers, others took the opposite route. China took the biggest hit with Brazil, while the damage was much more limited for India and South Africa. These adverse responses can be explained by the Trump's neo-mercantilist attitude revolving around tearing up trade deals, instituting tariffs, and labeling China a " currency manipulator ". However, Russia looks to be benefiting due to Trump's sympathetic attitude towards Vladimir Putin and expectations about the scaling down of sanctions imposed on Russia over its role in the conflict in Ukraine. |
| Keywords: | event study,stock markets,BRICS,US presidential election,Trump's agenda,social media,search queries,public opinion polls |
| Date: | 2017–01–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01429537&r=cis |
| By: | Choi , Jangho (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy); Kim , Junyoung (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy); Lee , Boram (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Korean Abstract: 중국 동북 3성은 2010년부터 대대적으로 통상구(세관)의 현대화와 함께 주변국과의 철도, 도로, 교각 등 교역로 정비사업을 추진하고 있다. 주변국인 북·러·몽도 이에 호응하여 다양한 협약을 통해 초국경 인프라 개발사업을 추진하였고, 일정 부분 성과를 거두고 있다. 반면 한국은 이런 동북아 인프라 개발에 참여하지 못하고 있다. 이들 국가와 국경을 마주하지 않아서 사업에 직접적인 이해관계를 갖고 있지 않으며, 북한과의 정치안보 이슈로 이들 접경지역과 낮은 수준의 경제교류를 하고 있기 때문이다. 동북아의 초국경 인프라 개발은 동북아 경제통합을 통해 새로운 경제협력 분야를 개척하고 새로운 성장 분야를 모색한다는 측면에서 보면 중요한 사업이다. 그러나 한국의 참여는 낮은 수준에 머물고 있고, 참여방안을 개발하는 데 기초가 되는 관련 정보도 거의 알려진 바가 없다. 이에 본 연구는 동북아시아의 초국경 인프라 개발사업의 현황과 재원조달 실태를 조사하여 기초자료를 구축하는 것을 목적으로 하였다. 이에 따라 중국 동북 3성을 중심으로 중·러, 중·몽, 북·중 간에 추진되고 있는 교통, 물류, 에너지 분야의 초국경 인프라 개발사업의 현황과 재원조달 실태를 조사하였고, 중국 지린대학의 동북아연구원과의 공동연구로 인프라 개발 쟁점과 전망의 현실 적합성을 높였다. 먼저, 제2장 ‘동북아 초국경 인프라 개발 연구’에서는 동북아 인프라 개발에 필요한 투자 추정액과 관련된 선행연구를 검토한 뒤, 동북아 인프라 개발에 대한 주요 계획과 쟁점을 점검하였다. 동북아 개발에 필요한 투자 추정액은 연 75~1,260억 달러로 각 연구방법론, 연구 범위 및 기간에 따라 차이가 있었다. 주요 수요추정 연구의 인프라 범위에는 교통, 에너지(전력), 환경, 통신(ICT)이 포함되는데, 이 가운데 에너지(전력)와 교통(철도, 도로) 순으로 투자 비중이 컸다. 다만 투자액 추정이 GDP와 소득에 대한 가정 중심의 거시적 방법론 위주로 수행되어 지역의 정치?경제 여건 등 미시적인 사항은 반영하지 않아 현실적합성이 떨어지는 문제점이 있었다. 동북아 개발에 대한 논의는 1991년에 시작되었으나, 개발방안에 대한 논의만 많았을 뿐 실질적인 성과는 미미한 상황이다. 동북아 초국경 인프라 개발 사업의 추진이 더딘 것은 투자 자금 부족과 러시아와 북한의 개발의지 부족과 주변국에 대한 신뢰 부족, 국가간 큰 경제격차 때문이다. 최근에는 역내의 부족한 투자자금을 조달하기 위하여 AIIB 등을 위시한 국제금융기구의 재원을 유치하여야 한다는 내용의 연구가 수행되었다. 제3장 ‘초국경 인프라 전개 과정’에서는 중?러, 중?몽, 북?중 간의 물류, 교통, 에너지 인프라 건설을 중심으로 인프라 개발 현황을 조사?정리하였다. 동북아 인프라 개발의 핵심은 국가간 철도 연결이었다. 중?러는 천연가스관과 철도 건설, 중?몽은 철도와 도로 건설, 중?북은 철도와 항구, 교량 건설사업이 주를 이룬다. 국가간 인프라 건설의 장애요인으로 중?러는 중국 견제로 인한 러시아 경제불황과 소극적인 인프라 개발의지, 극동러시아 인구감소, 일관된 정책추진 시스템 결여가 제기되었다. 중?몽은 몽골의 낙후한 하드웨어, 미흡한 정책추진 시스템, 중?북은 북한의 계약 미 이행, 양국간 제도 불일치, 불안정한 한반도 상황이 제기되었다. 제4장 ‘재원조달 특징과 다자금융협력 현황’에서는 제3장에서 조사된 재원조달의 특징을 정리한 뒤, 동북아 개발을 위한 역내 다자금융협력의 현황을 소개하였다. 동북아 인프라 개발을 위한 재원조달은 첫째, 상당 부분 중국 주도로 추진되고 있다. 최근 중국의 경기가 둔화되면서 역내 재원조달이 어려워져 일부 사업의 기간연장, 신규 사업 발주 감소의 문제가 발생하고 있다. 둘째, 중국 발주 사업의 추진속도가 상대국보다 현저히 빨랐으며, 이로 인해 사업 협력관계가 악화되는 사례가 많았다. 셋째, 대부분의 역내 초국경 인프라사업은 경제성보다는 정치적 판단에 의해 추진되고 있다. 결과적으로 계획구상을 넘어 실질적으로 추진된 사례는 미미하였다. 넷째, 다자개발은행의 동북아 투자 사례로 검토한 아시아개발은행도 동북아 인프라 개발에 제한적인 수준의 투자만 하고 있는 것으로 파악되었다. 끝으로, 제5장 ‘요약 및 결론’에서는 본 연구의 시사점을 정리하였다. 중국의 ‘일대일로’ 정책 발표와 국제사회의 대러시아 제재가 이어지면서, 중?러 간 동북아 초국경 인프라사업이 더욱 탄력을 받을 것으로 전망된다. 이 지역의 발전은 한국의 유라시아 대륙 경제권 접근성 개선, 통일비용 경감 등이 기대되므로, 한국도 중?러 간의 초국경 인프라 건설에 적극적으로 참여할 필요가 있다. 동북아 초국경 인프라 개발사업은 국가간 입장 차이와 투자 예산 부족으로 답보상태에 있으나, 장기적으로는 더욱 발전할 것으로 전망된다. 이에 대한 대안으로 다자협의체 성격의 광역두만강개발사업(GTI)을 활용한 사업 추진이 필요하며, 이를 뒷받침할 수 있는 새로운 금융협력기구와 기금 설립이 필요하다. English Abstract: The Northeastern China actively started implementing customs facility modernization along with transport development projects since 2010. Countries which borders with the Northeastern China, Russia Far East, Mongolia and North Korea also joined cross-border infrastructure projects mostly initiated by China while Korea’s participation is still limited. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the recent cross-border infrastructure projects and the financial source in the Northeast Asia. In particular, this paper investigates the current status of transport, energy, customs construction projects, planned and implemented at the northeastern part of China which borders with the Russian Far East, Mongolia and North Korea. The characteristics of the recent cross-border infrastructure projects can be summarized as follows. At First, the recent implemented projects were mainly initiated and funded by China. Secondly, projects initiated and funded by China were better being implemented. Third, a majority of projects were initiated based on political reasons rather than economic feasibility. Cross-border infrastructure projects in Northeast Asia have produced limited results so far due to different national interest, but as economies in this region are highly complementary, infrastructure development is expected to gain momentum in the long run. In this aspect, the paper suggests to utilize all possible financial cooperation options which includes the GTI (Greater Tumen Initiative) scheme, an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism among four Northeast Asian countries as well as bilateral, existing funding cooperation scheme to further promote infrastructure projects in the region. |
| Date: | 2016–11–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepre:2016_009&r=cis |
| By: | Anton Orlov |
| Abstract: | COP21 meeting in Paris ended up with a global climate (non-binding) agreement, which proposes a very ambiguous, if not unrealistic, target of 2 °C. Among other countries, Russia proposed a reduction in GHG emissions. Russia’s pledge submitted to the UN is a 25-30% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 (Carbon Brief , 2015). At present, Russia is one of the largest producers of GHG emissions: Russia’s share in total GHG emissions accounted approximately for 5% in 2012 (WRI , 2012). Recently, a few publications address economy-wide effects from climate and energy policy in Russia (e.g., Heyndrickx et al., 2012). Yet their analyses are based on single-country models, which are unable to depict the response of other economies. Moreover, those studies do not show how the Russian economy could be affected, when other countries implement stricter climate policies. This study aims to fill this knowledge gap. From an economic point of view, what matter is overall welfare costs arising from climate policy. Therefore, many CGE studies typically focus on welfare effects from climate policy. But competitiveness, sectoral effects, and income distribution effects are also vital to policy-makers. It also should be noted that, according to results from CGE models, welfare costs of climate policy are typically moderate. In this study, we focus on competiveness and sectoral effects from climate policy. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to quantify the sectoral effects resulting from a stricter climate policy in Russia and the rest of the word (RoW). Our analysis is based on a dynamic multi-region multi-sector CGE model, GRACE (Aaheim and Rive , 2009). We modify the core version of the model by disaggregating the electricity generation sector into seven sub-sectors: coal-fired, oil-fired, gas-fired, nuclear, hydro, bioenergy, and renewables. The model is calibrated around Version 9 of the GTAP database. We consider the following countries/regions: Russia, FSU, EU, Asia, and RoW. Two main experiments are carried out: In the first experiment, we implement climate policy in all regions excluding Russia, and in the second experiment, climate policies are implemented in all regions and Russia. The core simulations are supplemented by several sensitivity analyses to investigate the robustness of results with respect to key parameters. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an informal description of the model. Section 3 presents the results and discussion. Section 4 concludes. a stricter Russia's climate policy encourages of development of less energy-intensive sector. A removal of subsidies on domestic energy consumption results in energy efficiency improvement and a reduction in GHG emissions. |
| Keywords: | Russia, General equilibrium modeling, Developing countries |
| Date: | 2016–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:009007:9436&r=cis |
| By: | KAWABATA Nozomu |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this study is to identify the location of excess capacity in the world iron and steel industry. Excess capacity is a production capacity that is inferior in competition, surviving due to factors other than competitive advantages, under the condition that world production capacity exceeds demand. As a result of analysis, China was found to have the highest scale of excess capacity, while NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) members, Europe, CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) members, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members were found to have a moderate scale of excess capacity. In China, Russia, Ukraine, Japan, and South Korea, excess capacity coexists with large-scale steel exports. However, excess capacity is considered to promote the exports of low value-added steel products only in China, Russia, and Ukraine. The iron and steel industry in China is not necessarily export-oriented, and its capacity utilization rate is not low compared with other regions. However, the production scale in China is outstanding among all economies. As a result, the scale of excess capacity and steel exports are the largest in the world. Moreover, low value-added products occupy a high share in the total iron and steel exports from China. In the cases of Russia and Ukraine, iron and steel industries are export-oriented. Furthermore, compared with China, low-value added products constitute a higher proportion in their export mix. However, the scale of excess capacity and exports are lower than China, in parallel with their production scale. In the cases of Japan and South Korea, iron and steel industries are export-oriented. However, the most exported products are high-grade flat products and high-grade host materials for business partners and subsidiaries abroad. In other words, the steel exports from Japan and South Korea are not commodity-based. An increasing number of construction projects involving steelworks is in progress or being planned worldwide, especially in Asia. Thus, reduction of excess capacity would become difficult. Furthermore, as state-of-the-art technologies will be embodied in newly installed steelworks, the competition for survival in the iron and steel industry will intensify in the future. |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:17026&r=cis |
| By: | Lim, Ho Yeol (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy); Kim, Junyoung (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | SEZ development typically proceeds with the Rason and Mt. Kumgang SEZs – the two central SEZs that represent twin pillars – in the lead, with regional SEZs following suit by borrowing and tailoring the development plans of central SEZs. At the center of focus since Kim Jong Un took power, the Rason SEZ is seeking to induce investment from China and Russia as an effort to develop the Chinese Northeast and Russian Far East regions; the ultimate goal is to transform the area into Northeast Asia's logistics, transport and tourist hub. The Mt. Kumgang Special Tourist Zone is likewise being given greater consideration under the Kim Jong Un regime as a development zone focusing on tourism. As a major source of the DPRK's foreign currency, tourism is an area towards which the DPRK devotes much care and attention. The regional SEZs with highest growth potential are the Waudo Export Processing Zone, neighboring the DPRK's largest trade port Nampo, and the Chongjin Economic Development Zone, which is situated near Chongjin port, which comes in second. The DPRK government's determination toward SEZ development is remarkably strong, but at the same time is faced with sizable challenges. Learning from China's SEZ examples, it is evident that clear vision, revenue-securing mechanisms for investors, safeguard measures for protection of property rights, and successful case examples at the corporate level, are necessary. The Korean government should focus on the long term when formulating cooperative measures with SEZs in the DPRK. |
| Keywords: | DPRK’s Special Economic Zone; Kim Jong Uns External Economic Strategy |
| Date: | 2015–08–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2015_016&r=cis |
| By: | Sofya Donets (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Alexey Ponomarenko (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation) |
| Abstract: | We analyse two debt burden measures - credit-to-GDP and debt service ratio. For that purpose we calculate equilibrium debt ratios on the basis of fundamental macroeconomic indicators and compare them with international data. We conclude that the current value of this ratio in Russia is likely to be close to the equilibrium or exceed it. |
| Keywords: | debt burden; equilibrium credit-to-GDP ratio; debt service ratio (DSR); Russia |
| JEL: | E44 E51 G01 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bkr:wpaper:wps5&r=cis |
| By: | Alexey Porshakov (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Elena Deryugina (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Alexey Ponomarenko (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation); Andrey Sinyakov (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation) |
| Abstract: | Real-time assessment of quarterly GDP growth rates is crucial for evaluating an economy's current prospects given that the relevant data are normally subject to substantial delays in publication by the national statistical agencies. Large information sets of real-time indicators which could be used to approximate GDP growth rates in the quarter of interest are characterized by unbalanced data, mixed frequencies, systematic data revisions, as well as a more general curse of dimensionality problem. The latter issues could, however, be practically resolved by means of dynamic factor model-ing, which has recently been recognized as a useful tool to evaluate current economic conditions by means of higher frequency indicators. Our main results show that the performance of dynamic factor models in predicting Russian GDP dynamics appears to be superior to other common alternative specifications. At the same time, we empirically show that the arrival of new data seems to consistently improve DFM’s predictive accuracy throughout sequential nowcast vintages. We also intro-duce an analysis of nowcast evolution resulting from the gradual expansion of the dataset of explanatory variables, as well as the framework for estimating contributions of different blocks of predictors into nowcasts of Russian GDP. |
| Keywords: | GDP nowcast, dynamic factor models, principal components, Kalman filter, nowcast evolution |
| JEL: | C53 C82 E17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bkr:wpaper:wps2&r=cis |
| By: | Belke, Ansgar H. (University of Duisburg-Essen); Dreger, Christian (DIW Berlin); Dubova, Irina (Ruhr Graduate School in Economics) |
| Abstract: | The financial crisis led to a deep recession in many industrial countries. While large emerging countries recovered relatively quickly from the financial crisis, their performance deteriorated in the recent years, despite the modest recovery in advanced economies. The higher divergence of business cycles is closely linked to the Chinese transformation. During the crisis, the Chinese fiscal stimulus prevented a decline in GDP growth not only in that country, but also in resource-rich economies. The Chinese shift to consumption-driven growth led to a decline in commodity demand, and the environment became more challenging for many emerging markets. This view is supported by Bayesian VARs specified for the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. The results reveal a strong impact of international variables on GDP growth. In contrast to the other countries, China plays a crucial role in determining global trade and oil prices. Hence, the change in the Chinese growth strategy puts additional reform pressure on countries with abundant natural resources. |
| Keywords: | business cycle divergence, Chinese transformation, Bayesian VARs |
| JEL: | F44 E32 C32 |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10634&r=cis |
| By: | Ira N. Gang (Department of Economics, Rutgers University); Kseniia Gatskova (IOS-Regensburg); John Landon-Lane (Department of Economics, Rutgers University); Myeong-Su Yun (Department of Economics, Inha University) |
| Abstract: | We examine vulnerability to poverty in Tajikistan during the global financial crisis, focusing on the roles played by international migration and remittances, using a formal, practical, and easily decomposable vulnerability measure. Our strategy is to estimate a Markov transition probability matrix with the aim of identifying the vulnerability of households to poverty. Importantly, by introducing the index of vulnerability as the weighted probability of a household falling into poverty over a given time horizon, we can use the estimated dynamics to assess the short, medium and long-run vulnerability. We find that during the "recession transition" almost all households were vulnerable to poverty while almost none were during the "recovery period". Overall, urban households, more educated households and households receiving remittances from international labor migrants were less vulnerable to poverty. While households with a current or very recent migrant did not have a significantly lower measured vulnerability to poverty, those households receiving remittances from migrants had a lower vulnerability to poverty. Our findings stress that the international labor migration from Tajikistan may not be considered as a reliable means of welfare security for the households because external economic shocks and internal political decisions may negatively affect Russian economy and lead to a reduction of remittances flow to Tajikistan. |
| Keywords: | mobility measurement, vulnerability, poverty, inequality, measurement, Tajikistan |
| JEL: | J60 D63 I32 |
| Date: | 2017–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inh:wpaper:2017-2&r=cis |
| By: | Yury Achkasov (Bank of Russia, NRU HSE, Russian Federation) |
| Abstract: | This work presents a modification of the model of GDP short-term estimation based on current macroeconomic statistics initially offered in the paper titled 'Nowcasting and Short-Term Forecasting of Russian GDP with a Dynamic Factor Model' by Alexey Porshakov and co-authors [8]. The model modification presented in this work considers factors separately for each of the three groups of indicators - agents' expectations and their estimate of the current economic situation; financial variables, world market and foreign economic activity indicators; real sector indicators. This model can be used to get GDP estimates for the previous and current quarters, which allows researchers to obtain information on output dynamics in the economy in addition to estimates under other models and expert judgments. Also, the model helps decompose GDP quarterly growth rates into various factors. |
| Keywords: | GDP short-term estimation, nowcast, dynamic factor models. |
| JEL: | C38 C53 C82 E27 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bkr:wpaper:wps8&r=cis |
| By: | Alexey Ponomarenko (Bank of Russia, Russian Federation) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the money creation mechanisms in emerging markets with special focus on external transactions. We argue that one should not rule out the possibility that fluctuations in the loans-to-deposits and non-core liabilities ratios are driven by the banks. We also argue that, under a flexible exchange rate regime in which the central bank is not trying to accumulate foreign reserves, external transactions are unlikely to contribute significantly to money growth. To make our argument, we analyze a historical episode of these flows in Korea and Russia and conduct a canonical correlation analysis for a cross-section of emerging market economies. |
| Keywords: | Money supply, non-core liabilities, loans-to-deposits ratio, emerging markets |
| JEL: | E51 F30 G21 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bkr:wpaper:wps10&r=cis |
| By: | Lyazzat Nugumanova |
| Abstract: | Kazakhstan has one of the highest CO2 emissions per GDP in the world. Kazakhstan has taken a leadership role in the Central Asian region in terms of climate change policies and greener economy. Kazakhstan has ratified Kyoto Protocol in 2009. Kazakhstan has committed to reduce emissions by 15% below 1992 GHG levels by year 2020. In 2013 by decree of President of Kazakhstan a concept of Green Growth was adopted. Environmental regulations in Kazakhstan inherited from the planned economy need to be modified to correspond to current economic situation and climate change goals. Carbon tax and emissions trading are two of the main instruments to curb GHG emissions. There is an ongoing debate regarding which policy instrument is the most optimal towards reduction of emissions. The main difference between the two instruments are levels of uncertainty with regards to the carbon price and thus emissions reductions. Carbon tax provides more carbon price certainty, while emissions trading carbon prices are more volatile. Carbon tax mechanism is more easily to implement and operate, than ETS. Kazakhstan has opted and implemented emissions trading scheme in January 2013.. The ETS covers 55% of total CO2 emissions in Kazakhstan, and includes energy, mining and chemical industry. The average price of allowances was KZT 406 (US$2). Carbon tax in Kazakhstan would provide stability of carbon price, moreover carbon tax is easier to implement and monitor. The objective of this paper is using computable general equilibrium (CGE) model evaluate macroeconomic and environmental impacts of different carbon tax levels in Kazakhstan. Standard multiregion, multisector static CGE model, GTAP is used to simulate the impact of different carbon tax levels in Kazakhstan. GTAP is a standard CGE model based on assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. GTAP data base with latest version 9 is used in this study. The base year of the data base is 2010. The data base for the purpose of this study is aggregated to 11 sectors, out of which six are energy sectors, and six regions. Six regions are Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, China, EU and Rest of the World. Three sets of scenarios are simulated where carbon tax is priced at US$5, US$10 and US$20 per tCO2. Carbon tax is implemented in the CGE model as ad valorem equivalents. Carbon tax is implemented for all energy sectors and chemicals and heavy manufacturing sectors. Initial findings show macroeconomic effects of carbon tax in Kazakhstan. Preliminary findings allow to identify sectors which would benefit or loss from the implementation of carbon tax in Kazakhstan. It is expected that in all scenarios CO2 emissions will reduce, though magnitude of CO2 emissions reductions is expected to differ. |
| Keywords: | Kazakhstan, Energy and environmental policy, General equilibrium modeling |
| Date: | 2016–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:009007:9175&r=cis |
| By: | Dzmitry Kruk |
| Abstract: | This work is devoted to the analysis of output downturn in Belarus in 2015. It is shown that economic downturn is not the consequence of only cyclical hesitations, but also of structural compression. Moreover, the structural component of recession in 2016 began to dominate. Downturn became the natural continuation of the long-run tendency of growth attenuation as the result of decrease in productivity. Furthermore, key cause of productivity decrease is endogenous mechanisms of "efficient production repression". External exogenous shocks in 2014-2015 only increased the tendency of productivity decrease speeding up and deepening inevitable structural downturn. In 2015-2016 economic adaptation to productivity decrease was only partial. Broader set of adaptational responses may take place in the future pointing out the protracted nature and the aggravation of the downturn. From economic policy perspective the structural nature of the recession means that "automatic" exit from crisis due to business cycle phase will not happen. In addition, standard tools of economic policy can not effect structural component of the downturn. Thus, measures for stimulating of long-run growth should become the priority of economic policy. The lack of such measures and/or postponing of this measures can lead not only to losses in long-run growth, but will generate losses in the short run. |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bel:ppaper:42&r=cis |
| By: | Miriam Frey |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effects of Ukraine's trade liberalization with the EU on income inequality using a computable general equilibrium (CGE)-microsimulation model for Ukraine. Special focus is thereby given to between- and within-parts income inequality to study whether the Western and the Eastern part of Ukraine are affected differently. Even though overall income distribution effects are rather small, Ukraine's unilateral tariff elimination turns out to act more on the within- rather than on the between-parts income inequality. Taking into account the distributional effects of trade liberalization requires an appropriate modeling approach. Thus, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is linked with a microsimulation model for Ukraine in a sequential way (top-down approach). This means that Ukraine’s trade integration with the EU is first simulated in the CGE model to obtain changes in factor returns and prices. In the second step, those are used as exogenous variables in the microsimulation model to simulate the effects on endogenous variables like labor income and labor market status. Based on this outcome, the main variable of interest - real income per equalized person - is calculated for all households in the sample. As indicated by the Gini index, overall income distribution effects in Ukraine are rather small. However, looking at the impact on income inequality measured by the Theil index gives some interesting insights as it allows for a decomposition across the western and the eastern part of Ukraine. The biggest share of total income inequality in Ukraine is explained by within-parts inequality. Accordingly, trade liberalization affects total income inequality in Ukraine only via its impact on within-parts inequality. It turns out that the more relevant grouping criterion to identify between-groups income inequality effects is a rural/urban rather than a west/east division of households. In this respect, the answer to the initial question whether there are 'two Ukraines' must be 'no'. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine, General equilibrium modeling, Microsimulation models |
| Date: | 2016–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:009007:9664&r=cis |
| By: | Anastasia Luzgina (Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC)) |
| Abstract: | This paper reveals the essence of the concept of "e-Government" and provides a brief overview of the main trends and areas of implementation of the public administration principles based on new technologies. Most of the work is devoted to studying the experience of the application of information and communication technology in public administration of the Visegrad Group countries (evidence from the Czech Republic and Hungary), Georgia and Belarus. As part of the analysis performed, this article highlights the main achievements, which the said states reached in the study area, identifies problems and provides recommendations to accelerate the implementation of E-government framework in the near future. |
| Keywords: | e-Government, public administration, information and communication technology, electronic document management, electronic signature |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bel:ppaper:39&r=cis |
| By: | Yadulla Hasanli; Adalat Muradovd; Yadulla Hasanli; Nazim Hajiyev |
| Abstract: | It is for a long time oil since an energy source has got crucial role for the development of the countries. Economy of the all countries create demand to oil and oil products. It has been already extracting oil in more than hundred countries. Oil volume and its prices is always in the limelight of the consumers and producers. Changing of the oil prices affects production indicators in all areas of the economy as well as the level of the prices.Political issues also affect oil prices taking into account the reason of the neccesity of oil and oil prices in the vital fields of the economy.Therefore prediction of the oil prices is always in the limelight of the oil producer and consumer countries as well as the politicians. From this point of view prognosis of the oil prices is in the agenda as a urgent problem. Oil prices also have got impact on the formalization of the prices of the alternativ energy products. Exact prediction of the oil prices is very complex. Prediction of the well-known international institutions about the oil prices has been considerably deviation from the real facts. Nevertheless investigations is continuning in this direction. Complexity of the prognosis of the oil prices is related the impact of political issues to oil prices as well as economic factors. More deviation of the prognosis of the oil prices is observing in the crises and the political ambitions. For main purpose it is necessary to fulfill the following problems: • To decompose and learn the factors which influence oil prices; • Analysis of the prognosis with ARIMA,TREND and HOLT methods; • To collect data and fulfill descriptive analysis; • To establish an econometric model for dependence of oil price on factors, including non-qualitative factors those influence as well and defining the significant factors through proper tests. Dynamics of the oil prices are influenced by some factors those may be decomposed as follows: • Economic(World GDP growth, economic growth of USA, China and India, oil production volume etc); • Natural climate; • Military-political (intergovemental conflicts etc.). Recently economic growth factor of high demographicly developed China and India will increase its importance in forecasting of the oil prices. In the research linear-logarithm trend model of the dependence of the daily oil prices on the influencing factors was econometrically evaluated and defined that in spite of increase propensity of the daily oil prices between 0.022 % and 0.025%, some new factors has changed this positive increase to negative. These factors include liquidatation of the prohibition of oil exports of the USA and Iranian oil exports to world markets. |
| Keywords: | Azerbaijan and world, Macroeconometric modeling, Macroeconometric modeling |
| Date: | 2016–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:009007:9602&r=cis |
| By: | Anastasia Luzgina (Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC)) |
| Abstract: | The uncontrolled inflow of foreign investment in the country can have both positive and negative effects. In this regard, national governments develop and implement measures to attract foreign capital, taking into account the characteristics and interests of a particular state. With a view to better understanding the logic of the FDIs movement, the paper gives a brief description of the FDIs dynamics in the Republic of Belarus, as well as the study of the international experience based on the analysis of the FDIs attraction policies of the Visegrad Group countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland) and Georgia. |
| Keywords: | foreign direct investments, the Visegrad Group countries, a free economic zone, tax relief, privatization |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bel:ppaper:36&r=cis |
| By: | Yaraslau Pryhodzich |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bel:ppaper:44&r=cis |
| By: | Tetiana Bogdan; Vladimir Gligorov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Peter Havlik (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Michael Landesmann (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Abstract The study analyses the dynamics and the structure of Ukraine’s public finances. It assesses the medium-term impact of fiscal austerity 2014-2016, examines fiscal sustainability and estimates further fiscal adjustment efforts. It evaluates the economic and social implications of current fiscal policies especially on education, health and other social indicators. It examines the benefits and costs of the medium-term budget for 2017‑2019 with an emphasis on evolving challenges and puts forward policy recommendations aimed at a successful implementation of growth-enhancing economic reforms. |
| Keywords: | Ukraine, fiscal policy, impact on growth, human capital, health, poverty and inequality, fiscal multipliers, sustainability of fiscal policy measures, Ukraine’s economic reforms |
| JEL: | E62 E60 E65 H12 H30 H50 H62 H63 H68 P52 |
| Date: | 2017–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rpaper:rr:417&r=cis |
| By: | Maryia Akulava |
| Abstract: | The issue of gender equality in Belarus labor market is still unclear. On the one hand the rate of female participation is high. At the same time there is evidence of the rising gender pay gap that grew from 16.5% in 2005 to 24% in 2014. The decomposition of the wage gap during 2005- 2014 time period using Oaxaca-Blinder, Juhn-Murphy-Pierce and Machado-Mata techniques revealed that differences in income function (the difference in a way efforts of men and women are remunerated) are the main factors affecting the growth of gender inequality, while the personal characteristics are losing the influencing power. The role of the factors differs depending on the quantile of income distribution. I also find no association between wages and marriage for females, while there is a 10.5% wage premium in case of married males. The parenthood wage penalty is attributed to women and equals approximately 14.4%. Moreover, children from 0 to 6 provide the most severe drop in wages. In addition, the paper reveals that educated women are suffering the most and face 20.4% decline in wages, while penalty for women with the secondary school or lower amounts to just 8%. |
| Keywords: | Gender wage gap, marriage premium, maternity penalty |
| JEL: | J31 J12 J13 J16 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bel:wpaper:38&r=cis |
| By: | Dzmitry Kruk |
| Abstract: | Inflation expectations play a crucial role for macroeconomic dynamics and more specifically for monetary environment. However, inflation expectations is an unobservable variable. So, the quality of the correspondent measure in a great extent predetermines its feasibility for macroeconomic analysis. Today, survey-based measures of inflation expectations prevail in macroeconomic analysis. However, the drawbacks and/or unavailability of such measures give a rise to other identification strategies. Extracting inflation expectations from the actual data (e.g. series of interest rate and actual inflation) basing on SVAR identification approach has become a valuable alternative/supplement for measuring inflation expectations. In this paper I show that the existing strategy of inflation expectations identification through SVAR approach is very sensitive to the state of monetary environment. When a monetary environment is unstable (e.g. high and volatile inflation), the assumptions of the baseline approach are not hold, and it produces biased estimations. I emphasize two sources of this bias in estimations and suggest procedure for obtaining unbiased estimates. My identification strategy includes a number of steps. I suggest applying Markov regimeswitching framework for extracting an unbiased mean for ex ante real interest rate. Further, I use two-stage SVAR identification strategy. First, I identify an unexpected shock to actual inflation, which is crucial for obtaining a proper measure of inflation expectations. Further, I net the series of ex post interest rate from this ?noise?. Second, I run a baseline SVAR procedure, for which I use the data adjusted at the first step. Finally I obtain an unbiased and informatively rich series of inflation expectations. |
| Keywords: | inflation expectations, monetary shock, SVAR identification, Markov regime-switching model, Belarus |
| JEL: | C22 C32 C82 E43 E47 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bel:wpaper:39&r=cis |