nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2016‒05‒14
seven papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Автоматизация заправочных терминалов как фактор повышения конкурентоспособности АЗС By Kharitonenko, Yuliya
  2. An Exploration of a Strategic Competition Model for the European Union Natural Gas Market By Zaifu Yang; Rong Zhang; Zongyi Zhang
  3. Social Media and Corruption By Enikolopov, Ruben; Petrova, Maria; Sonin, Konstantin
  4. Foundations of the Soviet Command Economy, 1917 to 1941 By Harrison, Mark
  5. Ukraine; Technical Assistance Report-Self-Funding of the National Securities and Stock Market Commission By International Monetary Fund
  6. The rise of the dual labour market: fighting precarious employment in the new member states through industrial relations (PRECARIR) Country report: Latvia By Māra Bukovska; Marija Krūmiņa; Alf Vanags; Linda Vildava
  7. Historical Shocks and Persistence of Economic Activity: Evidence from a Unique Natural Experiment By Michael Fritsch; Alina Sorgner; Michael Wyrwich; Evguenii Zazdravnykh

  1. By: Kharitonenko, Yuliya
    Abstract: In this article the problem of improving the competitiveness of gas stations by automating the sales of petroleum products on the Russian enterprises. The author analyzes the features, advantages and disadvantages of automation of petrol stations in Russia. Particular attention is paid to the comparative performance of different types of gas stations.
    Keywords: automation, marketing tactic, competitiveness, profit, efficiency, savings, automatic filling station, the customer.
    JEL: M30
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:71183&r=cis
  2. By: Zaifu Yang; Rong Zhang; Zongyi Zhang
    Abstract: Following Jansen et al. (2012), we examine an unconventional Cournot model of the European Union natural gas market with three major suppliers Russian Gazprom, Norwegian Statoil, and Algerian Sonatrach. To re ect Russia's other strategic consideration besides profit, we incorporate a relative market share into Gazprom's objective function. We prove that when Gazprom pursues the control of market share along with profit, it will be good news for consumers but bad news for its pure profit maximising rivals. We further show that by seeking a proper market share, Gazprom can achieve the same profit of a Stackelberg leader in a simultaneous move model as in the standard sequential move leader-follower model. Compared with Jansen et al.'s, our approach makes the analysis considerably simpler and more transparent.
    Keywords: Natural gas market, Cournot model, Stackelberg leader's advantage, Non-profit incentive, Relative market share, European Union
    JEL: C62 C72 L13 L95 Q41
    Date: 2016–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:16/06&r=cis
  3. By: Enikolopov, Ruben; Petrova, Maria; Sonin, Konstantin
    Abstract: There is ample evidence that in democratic countries traditional mass media affect people’s behavior and foster political and corporate accountability. Do new media such as blogs play a similar role in non-democratic countries, where offline media are often suppressed? We study consequences of blog posts about corruption in Russian state-controlled companies. We show that anti-corruption blog posts by Aleksei Navalny, a popular Russian civic activist, had a negative causal impact on market returns of state-controlled companies. For identification, we exploit the analysis of the precise timing of blog posts combined with quasi-random variation in access to blog platform caused by hacker attacks. The effect becomes less pronounced and even positive for the posts that attract the most attention, consistent with disciplining effect of social media. Furthermore, the posts have a long-term impact on returns and are associated with higher management turnover and less minority shareholder conflicts. Taken together, our results suggest that social media can discipline corruption even in a country with limited political competition and heavily censored mass media.
    Keywords: financial markets; governance; political economy; social media
    JEL: L82 L86 P16
    Date: 2016–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11263&r=cis
  4. By: Harrison, Mark (University of Warwick)
    Abstract: In a command economy, centralized political priorities take precedence over market equilibrium, and government purchases cannot be refused. This chapter describes the antecedents, origins, evolution, and outcomes of the Soviet command economy from the Bolshevik Revolution to World War II. The Soviet command economy was built in two phases, 1917 to 1920, and 1928 onward, with a ‘breathing space’ between. The present account gives prominence to features of a command economy that, while missing from the first phase, were developed during the breathing space, and then helped to ensure the relative success of the second phase. These were features that assured secrecy, security, and the selection of economic officials for competence and party loyalty. Like any economy in the international system, the command economy had a comparative advantage: the production of economic and military power.
    Keywords: command economy, communism, corruption, economic growth, incentives, personnel, policy reform, power, secrecy, security, Soviet Union, violence, war economy JEL Classification: H12, N44, P21
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:283&r=cis
  5. By: International Monetary Fund
    Abstract: There are a number of challenges with the adequacy of the NSSMC’s funding and the constraints placed on it through the Ukrainian government budget process. These challenges were described in detail in a previous IMF TA report that encouraged the Ukrainian authorities to consider moving to self-funding of the NSSMC through administrative fees and annual supervisory fees paid by regulated entities.
    Keywords: Civil society organizations;Revenue sources;Resource allocation;Securities markets;Securities regulations;Stock markets;Technical Assistance Reports;Ukraine;
    Date: 2016–04–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:16/108&r=cis
  6. By: Māra Bukovska; Marija Krūmiņa; Alf Vanags; Linda Vildava
    Abstract: This report was financed by European Comission grant no. VS/2014/0534.
    Date: 2016–04–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cel:report:16&r=cis
  7. By: Michael Fritsch (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena); Alina Sorgner (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena); Michael Wyrwich (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena); Evguenii Zazdravnykh (National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Saint-Petersburg)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the persistence of entrepreneurship in the region of Kaliningrad between 1925 and 2010. During this time period the area experienced a number of extremely disruptive shocks including; devastation caused by World War II, a nearly complete replacement of the native German population by Soviets, and 45 years under an anti- entrepreneurial socialist economic regime followed by a shock-type transition to a market economy. Nevertheless, we find a surprisingly high level of persistence of industry-specific self-employment rates in the districts of the Kaliningrad region. Our analysis suggests that persistence of entrepreneurship is higher in regions with a history of successful entrepreneurship. That is, in regions where a specific industry was particularly efficient and entrepreneurial activity was especially pronounced.
    Keywords: Entrepreneurship, regional culture, persistence
    JEL: L26 N94 P25 P5
    Date: 2016–04–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2016-007&r=cis

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