|
on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Bratanova, Alexandra; Robinson, Jacqueline; Wagner, Liam |
| Abstract: | The Russian heat sector faces crucial problems including underinvestment, below cost pricing, generation capacity and infrastructure depletion. While the Russian electricity sector has gradually progressed through liberalization, the heat sector is still waiting for similar reforms to occur. The modernisation of the sector requires analysis of energy generation costs to suggest feasible technological solutions and secure an increase of investment in the industry. This study presents a modification of a levelised cost of energy (LCOE) model with cost separation coefficients based on Ginter triangles. The modified LCOE model is applied to a regional case study (Moscow, Russia) providing a comparison of generation technology according to cost estimates for electricity and heat under regionally specific economic and technological conditions. We consider five combined heat and power (CHP) generation technology types for two natural gas price scenarios. The modelling outcomes demonstrate cost competitiveness of gas based CHP technology and provide valuable information to assist decision making for the management of the energy sector in Russia. |
| Keywords: | cogeneration, levelised cost, heat generation, Ginter triangle, Russia, Moscow |
| JEL: | C52 Q41 Q47 |
| Date: | 2015–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:65925&r=cis |
| By: | Igor Shagalov (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Taking into consideration the underdevelopment of the Russian civil community it is of essential interest to touch upon local communities (known as TOS). Local governments and TOS communities could provide similar services and as such cooperate or compete with each other. Community initiatives could supplant poorly performing government services, or governments could outsource to communities some of its functions. Based on empirical Russian data, collected in the city of Kirov this research shows that the prevailing initial incentive to establish TOS is driven by the prospect of obtaining seed money from the government. We detected sources of TOS advantages over municipal authorities: ratio of costs and benefits, sensitivity to the demands of consumers, social capital, and voluntary nature of TOS. TOS are more likely to emerge in communities where people are sceptical about the efficacy of conventional mechanisms of democratic accountability, and prefer to collaborate with municipal governments on specific projects |
| Keywords: | TOS, non-profit organization, efficiency, social capital, local authorities, civil community, Russia |
| JEL: | L31 L33 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:97/ec/2015&r=cis |
| By: | Yana Vaziakova |
| Abstract: | Since 1995 when OECD began conducting Economic Surveys of the Russian Federation many policy recommendations relating to structural reform and framework conditions have been made. This paper is an update of an earlier paper that described actions taken up to October 2011 (Vaziakova et al., 2011). It expands the Annex A.1 of the 2013 OECD Economic Survey of the Russian Federation and provides a summary table of the policies implemented. This Working Paper relates to the 2014 Economic Survey of the Russian Federation www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-russian-federation.htm<P>Russie : Progrès des réformes structurelles et des conditions-cadres 2011-13<BR>Depuis 1995, date à laquelle l'OCDE a commencé à mener des Études économiques de la Fédération de Russie, un grand nombre de recommandations politiques relatives aux réformes structurelles et aux conditions-cadres ont été mises en oeuvre en Russie. Ce document est une mise à jour d'un document de travail antérieur qui décrit les mesures prises jusqu'en Octobre 2011 (Vaziakova et al., 2011). Il élargit l'annexe 1.A1 de l’Étude économique de la Fédération de Russie 2013 et fournit un tableau récapitulatif des politiques adoptées. Ce document de travail se rapporte à l’Étude économique de l’OCDE 2014 sur la Fédération de Russie www.oecd.org/fr/eco/etudes/etude-economi que-russie.htm. |
| Keywords: | labour markets, energy sector, structural reforms, fiscal policy, social policy |
| JEL: | E5 E62 F13 H1 H2 H82 H83 I18 I2 J2 J3 K20 K21 L1 L3 L4 L5 L9 P3 Q1 |
| Date: | 2015–08–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1252-en&r=cis |
| By: | Catherine Locatelli (équipe EDDEN - PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - CNRS - Grenoble 2 UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - Grenoble 1 UJF - Université Joseph Fourier) |
| Abstract: | Gas security is a key factor in the European Union's energy policy. Contractual relations based on long-term contracts during the 1970s and 1980s led to relative stability in energy trade between the EU and its gas suppliers. But since the mid-1990s, the process of opening up the EU's gas industries to competition and the desire to create a single gas market has led to an in-depth reorganization of the sector. The EU now intends to redefine the way in which it manages its relations with its main suppliers, such as Russia, by attempting to impose a model based on competition, unbundling of network industries and privatization. Russia does not intend to implement this "EU model" in its gas sector, despite the big changes taking place in its domestic market. An approach based on the preferential use of state instruments conflicts with the multilateralism and principles of competition upheld by the EU. The EU's normative power is thus in contradiction with the institutional environment of the Russian energy sector. It is therefore unlikely that energy relations between the EU and Russia will be structured solely on standards stemming from international rules and institutions. |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01131203&r=cis |
| By: | Kazuhiro Sugie; Massimo Geloso Grosso; Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås; Sébastien Miroudot; Frederic Gonzales; Dorothée Rouzet |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for logistics services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for logistics services and captures regulations in force in 2014. The scores range from 0.08 to 1 for cargo-handling services, 0.04 to 1 for storage and warehouse services, 0.02 to 0.58 for freight transport agency services and 0.03 to 1 for customs brokerage services. It is observed that the regulatory profile differs across countries. In cargo-handling and storage and warehouse services, one country reserves all services provision to a statutory monopoly while another country reserves cargo-handling to a monopoly at port. Freight transport agency has the lowest average score among four subsectors while restrictions on foreign entry, restrictions on the movement of people and regulatory transparency significantly contribute to the results. One country is completely closed to foreign participation in customs brokerage services. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results. |
| Keywords: | logistics services, services trade, services trade restrictions, regulation |
| JEL: | F13 F14 K33 L87 L89 L91 |
| Date: | 2015–08–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:traaab:183-en&r=cis |
| By: | Alexandr Susyev (Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University) |
| Abstract: | The urgency of this problem is caused by particularly acute hazards associated with the misuse of insider information and market manipulation. Disclosure of information not intended for a wide range of people or the use of illicit trading technologies, when some competitors enjoy significant advantages over others, seriously threatens the normal functioning of the domestic financial market. The paper notes that in addition to direct financial loss - compensations, fines and costs aimed to eliminate the impact of unauthorized disclosure of valuable internal (insider) information regarding various nuances of activities and deliberate manipulation of the market - the company (companies) experience huge consequential damages. This results in drawing away clients, increasing competition, losing business reputation. In conclusion, the article discusses in detail the institutional forms and methods of combating these negative phenomena, used in Russia and other developed countries. |
| Keywords: | insider information, insider trading, market manipulation |
| JEL: | D E G G G |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upa:wpaper:0020&r=cis |