nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2014‒11‒07
four papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Informal Employment in Russia: Definitions, Incidence, Determinants and Labor Market Segmentation By Hartmut Lehmann; Anzelika Zaiceva
  2. Russia Economic Report, No. 32, September 2014 : Policy Uncertainty Clouds Medium-Term Prospects By World Bank
  3. Price versus Quantities versus Indexed Quantities By Frédéric Branger; Philippe Quirion
  4. Looking Beyond Europe with a Special Focus on Japan By Fumitoshi Mizutani

  1. By: Hartmut Lehmann; Anzelika Zaiceva
    Abstract: This paper takes stock of informal employment in Russia analyzing its incidence and determinants, developing several measures of informal employment and demonstrating that the incidence varies widely across the different definitions. We, however, show that the determinants of informal employment are roughly stable across the different measures. We also estimate an informal-formal wage gap at the means and across the entire wage distributions. We find only weak evidence for labor market segmentation in Russia for salaried workers but establish a segmented informal sector with a lower free entry tier and an upper rationed tier when including the self-employed and entrepreneurs
    Keywords: Informal employment, transition economies, labor market segmentation, Russia
    JEL: J31 J40 P23
    Date: 2014–03
  2. By: World Bank
    Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policies Finance and Financial Sector Development - Currencies and Exchange Rates Economic Theory and Research Private Sector Development - Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development - Debt Markets Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Environment
    Date: 2014–09
  3. By: Frédéric Branger (AgroParisTech ENGREF et CIRED); Philippe Quirion (CNRS et CIRED)
    Abstract: We develop a stochastic model to rank different policies (tax, fixed cap and relative cap) according to their expected total social costs. Three types of uncertainties are taken into account: uncertainty about abatement costs, business-as-usual (BAU) emissions and future economic output (the two latter being correlated). Two parameters: the ratio of slopes of marginal benefits and marginal costs, and the above-mentioned correlation, are crucial to determine which instrument is preferred. When marginal benefits are relatively flatter than marginal costs, prices are preferred over fixed caps (Weitzman’s result). When the former correlation is higher than a parameter-dependent threshold, relative caps are preferred to fixed caps. An intermediate condition is found to compare the tax instrument and the relative cap. The model is then empirically tested for seven different regions (China, the United States, Europe, India, Russia, Brazil and Japan). We find that tax is preferred to caps (absolute or relative) in all cases, and that relative caps are preferred to fixed caps in the US and emerging countries (except Brazil where it is ambiguous), whereas fixed cap are preferred to relative cap in Europe and Japan.
    Keywords: Instrument, Price, Quantity, Intensity Target, Regulation, post-Kyoto, Uncertainty, Climate Policy
    JEL: Q58
    Date: 2014–09
  4. By: Fumitoshi Mizutani (Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University)
    Abstract: This chapter summarizes regulatory structure and reforms in the rail industry in non-European countries. I have selected four regions-East Asia, Oceania, North America, and the former socialist countries-with Japan, Australia, he United States and Russia chosen for each region, respectively. Although the structure of the rail industry in all four countries will be summarized, this chapter focuses on Japan because its rail regulatory structure is quite different from that of European countries. Because of its differences from others, the experience of regulatory reforms in Japan could provide useful lessons for policy makers and practitioners in Europe. One distinctive feature of regulation in Japan is its relative moderation. Second, competition policy is different: instead of direct competition for rail track, a yardstick regulation (or competition) scheme is applied to the rail industry in Japan, resulting in indirect competition (i.e. competition among different rail service markets). Third, most rail operators are privately owned in Japan. Fourth, as for structure, rail operation and infrastructure are integrated. Of course, there are cases in Japan of vertical separation, but the purpose of vertical separation in these cases is quite different from that in Europe. Finally, in Japan passenger services are dominant, and freight services are more limited than in Europe. This chapter consists of the following five sections. In the second section, I will briefly describe regulation and regulatory reforms, market structure and competition policy in the four chosen countries above mentioned. After the second section, by focusing on Japan, I will discuss regulation policy and competition policy. Beginning with the third section, I will explain the situation in Japan, focusing on entry and fare regulations. The fourth section will cover regulatory reforms in Japan since 1987. In this section, after a description of major regulatory changes, there will be a summary of the 2004 privatization of Eidan, now called Tokyo Metro. In the fifth section, competition policy in Japan will be discussed. The yardstick regulation scheme as a competition tool will be explained and its effects discussed. The sixth section will contain an explanation of Japanese-style unbundling policy. The four types of unbundling will be described, and the purposes and characteristics of each type will be explained. The seventh section will discuss possible lessons for European railways based on the results of the previous sections. The last section summarizes the points made in this chapter.
    Date: 2014–09

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