nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2014‒06‒22
four papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. The Underwriting, Choice And Performance Of Government-Insured Mortgages In Russia By Evgeniy M. Ozhegov
  2. Russian policies in support of innovation: elusive quest for efficiency By Simachev, Yuri; Kuzyk, Mikhail; Feygina, Vera
  3. An Ongoing Reversal Of Fortune Among Russian Cities: City Age, Natural Resources, And Changing Spatial Income Distribution By Alexander S. Skorobogatov
  4. Methods for Multicountry Studies of Coporate Governance: Evidence from the BRIKT Countries By Black, Bernard; De Carvalho, Antonio Gledson; Khanna, Vikramaditya; Kim, Woochan; Yurtoglu, Burcin

  1. By: Evgeniy M. Ozhegov (National Research University Higher School)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the mortgage borrowing process from a Russian state-owned provider of residential housing mortgages concentrating on the choice of having government insurance. This analysis takes into account the underwriting process and the choice of loan limit by the bank, the choice of contract terms and the performance of all loans issued from 2008 to 2012. Our dataset contains demographic, financial, loan terms and the performance information for all applications. We use a multistep nonparametric approach to estimate the determinants of bank and borrower choice. The main finding that the probability of having government insurance is linked to riskier loans, but insured loans also are more likely to be approved by the bank. The bank, when approving a borrower, takes into account not the probability of default but the difference between the probability of default and having government insurance.
    Keywords: mortgage, terms choice, default, nonparametrics.
    JEL: C14 C30 C51 G21
    Date: 2014
  2. By: Simachev, Yuri; Kuzyk, Mikhail; Feygina, Vera
    Abstract: Focused on the efficiency of the Russian innovation-fostering policy, the research is based on an empirical analysis of how policy instruments impact firms’ behavior. The data is obtained from two surveys of more than 600 Russian industrial companies in 2011-2012. The analysis shows that tax incentives are more conducive to innovations with a longer payback period, whereas public funding is more likely to facilitate launching new innovative projects. At the same time, both kinds of innovation support tools are affected by crowding out private funds by public ones. Besides, innovation policy design and administration are not friendly to young companies.
    Keywords: innovation; firm behavior; tax incentives; public subsidies and grants; evaluation of government innovation policy
    JEL: L20 O31 O32 O38
    Date: 2014–01
  3. By: Alexander S. Skorobogatov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: This paper documents the negative link between the age of Russian cities and their average wage. This link is robust to various definitions of city age and sample censuring, the inclusion of regional and time fixed effects, dependent variable spatial lag and many urban characteristics. This link is revealed especially for cities founded after the Soviet industriali-zation and for upper quintiles of cities by their average wage. To determine a mechanism behind the established fact, hypotheses as to spatial patterns of economic performance are discussed, including the increasing return hypothesis, the institutions hypothesis and the geography hypothesis. Following the sophisticated version of the geography hypothesis, a model of growth in n-city and two-sector economy is developed. The model replicates the link between age and per capita income and contains testable hypotheses that enable one to check whether a mechanism outlined in the model is behind the link between city age and wage. Our empirical strategy is based on a quasi-experiment, in which the treat-ment effect is made by time and various age groups of the cities are broken up into treatment and control groups. The results are strongly in favor of the sophisticated geography hypothesis. The revealed mechanism suggests that the chang-ing spatial patterns of wage differentials are explained by the changing remaining stocks of natural resources. Older cit-ies are getting relatively poorer due to the shrinking of their remaining resource stocks, while new cities are emerging in resource-rich territories with the respective income advantages.
    Keywords: quasi-experiment, exhaustible resources, internal colonization, differences-in-differences, urban development
    JEL: R12 Q32 O13
    Date: 2014
  4. By: Black, Bernard; De Carvalho, Antonio Gledson; Khanna, Vikramaditya; Kim, Woochan; Yurtoglu, Burcin
    Abstract: We discuss empirical challenges in multicountry studies of the effect of firm-level corporate governance on firm value, focusing on emerging markets. We assess the severe data, “construct validity,” and endogeneity issues in these studies, propose methods to respond to those issues, and apply those methods to a study of five major emerging markets -- Brazil, India, Korea, Russia, and Turkey. We develop unique time-series datasets on governance in each country. We address construct validity by building country-specific indices which reflect local norms and institutions. These similar-but-not-identical indices predict firm market value in each country, and when pooled across countries in firm fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) regressions. In contrast, a “common index” that uses the same elements in each country, has no predictive power in FE regressions. For the country-specific and pooled indices, FE and RE coefficients on governance are generally lower than in pooled OLS regressions; and coefficients with extensive covariates are generally lower than with limited covariates. These results confirm the value of using FE or RE with extensive covariates to reduce omitted variable bias. We develop lower bounds on our estimates which reflect potential omitted variable bias.
    Keywords: Brazil, Korea, India, Russia, Turkey, corporate governance, boards of directors, disclosure, shareholder rights
    JEL: G18 G30 G34 G39 K22 K29
    Date: 2014–03

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