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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Steven Nafziger (Department of Economics, Williams College) |
| Abstract: | Serfdom is often viewed as a major institutional constraint on the economic development of Tsarist Russia, one that persisted well after emancipation occurred in 1861 through the ways that property rights were transferred to the peasantry. However, scholars have generally asserted this causal relationship with few facts in hand. This paper introduces a variety of newly collected data, covering European Russia at the district (uezd) level, to describe serfdom, emancipation, and the subsequent evolution of land holdings among the rural population into the 20th century. A series of simple empirical exercises describes several important ways that the institution of serfdom varied across European Russia; outlines how the emancipation reforms differentially affected the minority of privately owned serfs relative to the majority of other types of peasants; and connects these differences to long-run variation in land ownership, obligations, and inequality. The evidence explored in this paper constitutes the groundwork for considering the possible channels linking the demise of serfdom to Russia’s slow pace of economic growth prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. |
| Keywords: | Russia, economic history, serfdom, inequality, land reform, institutions |
| JEL: | N33 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2013-14&r=cis |
| By: | Steven Nafziger (Department of Economics, Williams College) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the local political economy of early agronomic efforts in Tsarist Russia by undertaking a two-part analysis of the role of the zemstvo – a 19th century institution of local self-government – in improving local agricultural conditions. First, we investigate the agronomic activities of various levels of government in Russia over the last fifty years of the Tsarist era. After discussing the relatively limited role played by the central ministries and peasant institutions of self-government, we follow Nafziger (2011) in undertaking a qualitative and cross-district empirical analysis of how variation in economic conditions and the political structure of the zemstvo assemblies may have motivated zemstvo expenditures on agriculture. This exercise finds evidence suggesting that the peasantry – the population most likely affected by agronomic efforts – had an influence on the policies of the zemstvo, despite rarely holding majority positions in the assemblies. To explore the mechanisms underlying these results, we turn to a case study of agricultural development and zemstvo policies in Nizhnii Novgorod province. We draw on archival records, contemporary publications, and newspaper accounts to document these factors, both at the provincial level and for one relatively non-agricultural district (Semenov). Our findings suggest that the policy preferences of the local elites and of leaders of the executive committees of the institution likely mattered more than the composition of the zemstvo assembly for the resulting outcomes. By shedding light on the political mechanisms behind local public support for agronomic efforts, this chapter makes an initial step towards a fuller account of the early stages of Russia’s agrarian transformation. |
| Keywords: | Russia, agronomy, political economy, agriculture |
| JEL: | N33 N43 N53 O13 H41 H72 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2013-15&r=cis |
| By: | World Bank; National Research University – Higher School of Economics |
| Keywords: | Education - Access & Equity in Basic Education Education - Education For All Education - Educational Sciences Education - Knowledge for Development Education - Primary Education |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:16100&r=cis |
| By: | Kossov, Vladimir; Kossova, Elena |
| Abstract: | For the large majority of goods, the price dispersion between countries does not exceed 1:10. Diesel fuel stands out, with a dispersion which exceeds 1:100. Given a constant oil price the difference in diesel fuel prices between countries is caused by the different taxes. The average share of taxes in the price determines the normal price. An estimation of the normal price of diesel fuel is made using an econometric model (using 79 countries, 1998-2008 by even years). Of greatest interest to economic policy are normal prices for countries with economies in transition and developing countries. This paper is organized as follows. In the introduction a definition of the term "normal price" and why it is important are presented. The first chapter is devoted to the notion of "price level" both international and national. The normal price is calculated using an econometric model. The estimation of the normal price of goods is determined by the international component and deviation of the normal price by the national one. In the second chapter the results of evaluating the parameters of the econometric model and the values of normal prices are given. In the third chapter price deviations in Russia and Kazakhstan are discussed and it is concluded that they have reached the maximum value, above which mass protests may result. |
| Keywords: | budget revenue; diesel fuel price; motor fuel tax; mass protests; normal price; oil rent; price level |
| JEL: | C23 D49 E37 Q48 |
| Date: | 2013–03–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48667&r=cis |
| By: | Christoph Bohringer; Jared Carbone (University of Calgary); Thomas F. Rutherford |
| Abstract: | Unilateral carbon policies are inefficient due to the fact that they generally involve emission reductions in countries with high marginal abatement costs and because they are subject to carbon leakage. In this paper, we ask whether the use of carbon tariffs—tariffs on the carbon embodied in imported goods—might lower the cost of achieving a given reduction in world emissions. Specifically, we explore the role tariffs might play as an inducement to unregulated countries adopting emission controls of their own. We use an applied general equilibrium model to generate the payoffs of a policy game. In the game, a coalition of countries regulates its own emissions and chooses whether or not to employ carbon tariffs against unregulated countries. Unregulated countries may respond by adopting emission regulations of their own, retaliating against the carbon tariffs by engaging in a trade war, or by pursuing no policy at all. In the unique Nash equilibrium produced by this game, the use of carbon tariffs by coalition countries is credible. China and Russia respond by adopting binding abatement targets to avoid being subjected to them. Other unregulated countries retaliate. Cooperation by China and Russia lowers the global welfare cost of achieving a 10% reduction in global emissions by half relative to the case where coalition countries undertake all of this abatement on their own. |
| Date: | 2013–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2013-25&r=cis |
| By: | Schaffer M.E.; Dohmen T.J.; Lehmann H. (ROA) |
| Abstract: | We use a rich personnel data set from a Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002 to analyze how the firm adjusts wages and employment during this period in which local labor market conditions changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1998. We relate the development of turnover and wages for various employment categories to alternative models of wage and employment determination. We argue that the firms behavior is consistent with the predictions of efficiency wage models of the shirking and turnover type. |
| Keywords: | Labor Demand; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials; Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population; |
| JEL: | J23 J31 P23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umaror:2013012&r=cis |
| By: | John Bonin (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University); Iftekhar Hasan (Fordham University, 5 Columbus Circle, 11-22, New York, NY 10019); Paul Wachtel (Stern School of Business, New York University, New York NY 10012) |
| Abstract: | Modern banking institutions were virtually non-existent in the planned economies of central Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the early transition period, banking sectors began to develop during several years of macroeconomic decline and turbulence accompanied by repeated bank crises. However, governments in many transition countries learned from these tumultuous experiences and eventually dealt successfully with the accumulated bad loans and lack of strong bank regulation. In addition, rapid progress in bank privatization and consolidation took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s, usually with the participation of foreign banks. By the mid 2000s the banking sectors in many transition countries were dominated by foreign owners and were able to provide a wide range of services. Credit growth resumed, sometimes too rapidly, particularly in the form of lending to households. The global financial crisis put transition banking to test. Countries that had expanded credit rapidly were vulnerable to the macroeconomic shock and there was considerable concern that foreign owners would reduce their funding to transition country subsidiaries. However, the banking sectors turned out to be resilient, a strong indication of the rapid progress in institutional development and regulatory capabilities in the transition countries. |
| Keywords: | transition banking, bank privatization, foreign banks, bank regulation, credit growth |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wes:weswpa:2013-008&r=cis |