nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2013‒09‒06
four papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Religious identity, public goods and centralization: Evidence from Russian and Israeli cities By Grigoriadis, Theocharis; Torgler, Benno
  2. A political theory of Russian orthodoxy: Evidence from public goods experiments By Grigoriadis, Theocharis
  3. Transmission of China's Shocks to the BRIS Countries By Mustafa Yavuz Cakir and Alain Kabundi
  4. Natural resources, physical capital and institutions : evidence from Eurasia By Vandycke, Nancy

  1. By: Grigoriadis, Theocharis; Torgler, Benno
    Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the effects of religious identity - defined both as personal identification with a religious tradition and institutional ideas on the provision of public goods - on attitudes toward central government. We explore whether citizens belonging to collectivist rather than individualist religious denominations are more likely to evaluate their central government positively. Moreover, we explore whether adherence to collectivist norms of economic and political organization leads to a positive evaluation of central government. Surveys were conducted in Russia and Israel as these countries provide a mosaic of three major world religions - Judaism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Sunni Islam. The information gathered also allows us to study whether attitudes towards religious institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church, the Chief Rabbinate in Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf, and the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem in Israel are able to predict positive attitudes toward centralized forms of governance. We find strong support for the proposition that collectivist norms and an institutional religious identity enhance positive attitudes towards central government. --
    Keywords: Religious identity,public goods,collectivism,individualism,local government,centralization,Russia,Israel
    JEL: P16 P17 P21 P35 P51 P52 Z12
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201313&r=cis
  2. By: Grigoriadis, Theocharis
    Abstract: In this paper, I test the effects of religious norms on the provision of public goods. My evidence is drawn from public goods experiments that I ran with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. I introduce three treatments, which I define as degrees of Eastern Orthodox collectivist enforcement: 1. Solidarity, 2. Obedience, and 3. Universal discipline. I argue for the existence of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy in the Russian bureaucracy that facilitates the delivery of public goods under conditions of universal discipline and the principal´s overfulfillment. Eastern Orthodox hierarchy is enforced through universal disciplinary monitoring, which induces collective punishment when the public good is not delivered. Contrary to conventional wisdom about freeriding in administrative institutions, higher ranks in Russian bureaucracies are associated with less freeriding. --
    Keywords: public goods experiments,bureaucracy,enforcement,Russia,religion,incomplete information,hierarchy
    JEL: C91 C92 D72 D73 P21 P26 P32 P51 Z12
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201314&r=cis
  3. By: Mustafa Yavuz Cakir and Alain Kabundi
    Abstract: This study examines the impact of China’s dominant position among the BRIS countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. Particularly, by using a dynamic factor model estimated over the period 1995Q2-2009Q4, it investigates how supply and demand shocks from China are transmitted to these economies. The results show that China's supply shocks are more important than its demand shocks. Supply shocks produce positive and signifiant output responses in all BRIS countries. International trade is an important channel for the transmission of shocks across China and BRIS countries indicating that supply and demand shocks in China do not have similar e¤ects on the BRIS countries and therefore they require different policy responses.
    Keywords: Dynamic Factor Model, Supply and demand shocks, Sign restrictions, BRICS
    JEL: C3 E32 F40 O57
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rza:wpaper:362&r=cis
  4. By: Vandycke, Nancy
    Abstract: Natural resource abundance can lead to strong economic growth if resource rents are well invested in physical assets and other forms of productive capital. This paper focuses on the case of the resource-abundant economies in Eurasia, which has been less documented in the literature on natural resource-led development than other parts of the world. The analysis shows that the stock of productive physical assets is relatively low, contrary to common perceptions about the Soviet system. The infrastructure that was inherited from the Soviet system primarily serves to meet basic human needs; few assets support the development of competitive and sustainable economies. At a deeper level, the paper documents that low accumulation of physical capital over the past two decades has been driven by weak institutions and economic policies associated with the presence of resource rents, along with a poor public investment management process. This paper complements existing empirical studies by presenting evidence on the mechanisms through which natural resources and physical capital have interacted in setting Eurasian economies on a fragile development path.
    Keywords: Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics,Investment and Investment Climate
    Date: 2013–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6586&r=cis

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