nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2013‒07‒05
six papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Le système territorial d’innovation en Russie : du soviétisme au capitalisme The Territorial Innovation System in Russia: Sovietism to Capitalism By Guillem ACHERMANN
  2. Agriculture and economic security of Russia: retrospective research By Fyodorov, Mikhail; Kuzmin, Evgeny
  3. Time to BRIC it? Internationalization of European family firms in Europe, North America and the BRIC countries By Vivien D. Procher; Diemo Urbig; Christine Volkmann
  4. The effect of product standards on agricultural exports from developing countries By Ferro, Esteban; Wilson, John S.; Otsuki, Tsunehiro
  5. Revisiting Jansen et al.’s Modiï¬ed Cournot Model of the European Union Natural Gas Market By Zaifu Yang; Rong Zhang; Zongyi Zhang
  6. Economic regulation and state interventions: Georgia's move from neoliberalism to state managed capitalism By Timm, Christian

  1. By: Guillem ACHERMANN (Laboratoire de Recherche sur l'Industrie et l'Innovation. ULCO)
    Abstract: Le système territorial russe hérite d’une grande partie du système territorial de l’URSS. Les Soviétiques ont organisé l’espace selon une logique de planification étatique verticale. La transition économique des années 1990 a permis au marché de rationaliser le système productif russe. Le processus d’innovation soviétique s’en retrouve ainsi grandement touché. La Russie dispose de ressources naturelles abondantes et d’un parc industriel important. Restructurer le système territorial d’innovation devient un enjeu pour l’ensemble des acteurs du processus d’innovation. The Russian territorial system inherits the greatest part of the Soviet territorial system. The Soviets have organized the space according to the vertical state planning. The economic transition in the 1990s allowed the market to rationalize the Russian productive system. The Soviet innovation process is deeply affected. Russia has abundant natural resources and an important industrial park. Rebuild the territorial innovation system is a challenge for all the actors of the innovation process.
    Keywords: système territorial d'innovation, transition économique, Russie
    JEL: O3 P21 O52
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rii:riidoc:268&r=cis
  2. By: Fyodorov, Mikhail; Kuzmin, Evgeny
    Abstract: The article is focused on problems of economic security of Russia from prospective of trade and production relations in the sector of food commodities that form the nation’s food provision. It also provides a method of identification whether the economic conditions are safe or dangerous tested on statistical data of 2007-2011 years and analyses the derived values of agriculture and economic security by the commodity groups.
    Keywords: food provision, agricultural sector, economic security, economic autarchy
    JEL: F52 Q02 Q10
    Date: 2013–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:47895&r=cis
  3. By: Vivien D. Procher (Jackstaedt Center of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal); Diemo Urbig (Jackstaedt Center of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal); Christine Volkmann (Jackstaedt Center of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal)
    Abstract: For a sample of 1243 European companies, we analyse the link between firm type and foreign direct investment (FDI) locations. We find substantial empirical evidence that being a family firm does not only affect the overall propensity for FDI but that this effect is also specific to target regions. Overall, family firms invest more than managerial-led firms, particularly in Europe and North America. Furthermore the BRIC countries Brazil, Russia, India and China do not constitute a homogenous attractiveness cluster for FDI.
    Keywords: foreign direct investment, family firms, BRIC
    JEL: D21 F23 L22
    Date: 2013–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwu:schdps:sdp13004&r=cis
  4. By: Ferro, Esteban; Wilson, John S.; Otsuki, Tsunehiro
    Abstract: The authors create a standards restrictiveness index using newly available data on maximum residue levels of pesticides for 61 importing countries. The paper analyzes the impact that food safety standards have on international trade of agricultural products. The findings suggest that more restrictive standards are associated, on average, with a lower probability of observing trade. However, after controlling for sample selection and the proportion of exporting firms in a gravity model, the analysis finds that the effect of standards on trade intensity is indistinguishable from zero. This is consistent with the assumption that meeting stringent standards increases primarily the fixed costs of exporting. Once firms enter the market, however, standards do not impact the level of exports. The analysis also finds a greater marginal effect of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) standards on the probability of trade, relative to other countries'standards, keeping in mind however that on average BRICS standards are less restrictive. The analysis also suggests that exporters in low-income countries are more adversely affected by stricter standards.
    Keywords: Free Trade,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies,Food&Beverage Industry,Trade Law
    Date: 2013–06–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6518&r=cis
  5. By: Zaifu Yang; Rong Zhang; Zongyi Zhang
    Abstract: In this paper we reconsider Jansen et al.’s (2012) Cournot model of the European Union natural gas market with three major suppliers Russian Gazprom, Norwegian Statoil, and Algerian Sonatrach. To reflect Russia’s geopolitical consideration, we incorporate a relative market share to Gazprom’s objective function. Compared with Jansen et al.’s use of standard market share, our study shows that the introduction of relative market share makes it not only possible to derive the same results in a more general environment, but also permits us to obtain clear-cut quantitative analysis results for equilibrium solution, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Our analysis also demonstrates for this modiï¬ed Cournot model that by seeking a proper market share, Gazprom can achieve the same profits of a Stackelberg leader in a simultaneous move model as in the classical sequential move leader-follower model. When Gazprom pursues the control of market share besides proï¬ts, it will be good news for the EU’s consumers but bad news for its rivals.
    Keywords: Natural gas market; Cournot model; Stackelberg leader’s advantage; Nonproï¬t incentives; Relative market share; European Union
    JEL: C62 C72 L13 L95 Q41
    Date: 2013–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:13/12&r=cis
  6. By: Timm, Christian
    Abstract: This paper explores the change in the Georgian economic policy from neo-liberalism to state-managed capitalism that occurred between 2003 and 2012. Centering on the distributive effect of institutions, the analysis reveals the underlying dynamic of that policy change. The paper argues that the introduction of a radical liberal regulatory environment contributed significantly to the development of informal state interventions in the economy. However, the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 destroyed the increasingly undermined FDIoriented liberal development model and forced the government to alter its economic policy. By relying on established informal instruments of intervention and the development of an official economic development agenda, a specific form of state-managed capitalism evolved in Georgia in the period that followed. --
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:pfhrps:201303&r=cis

This nep-cis issue is ©2013 by Alexander Harin. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.