nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2012‒01‒10
three papers chosen by
Koen Schoors
Ghent University

  1. Financial dollarization in Russia: causes and consequences By Ponomarenko, Alexey; Solovyeva, Alexandra; Vasilieva, Elena
  2. Job Separations and Informality in the Russian Labor Market By Lehmann, Hartmut; Razzolini, Tiziano; Zaiceva, Anzelika
  3. Post-communist Welfare Capitalisms: Bringing Institutions and Political Agency Back In By Alfio Cerami; Paul Stubbs

  1. By: Ponomarenko, Alexey (BOFIT); Solovyeva, Alexandra (BOFIT); Vasilieva, Elena (BOFIT)
    Abstract: We review some aspects of financial dollarization in Russia, applying the main relevant theories to analyze the dynamics of several dollarization indicators. An econometric model of the short run dynamics of deposit and loan dollarization is estimated for the last decade. We find that ruble appreciation was the main driver of the de-dollarization that occurred then and of the later episode of renewed dollarization. We estimate the overall (and sectoral) currency mismatches of the Russian economy. The results show a gradual improvement of the net foreign currency position of the public sector, where we have seen significant accumulation of international reserves by the Bank of Russia and repayment of government debt. Evidence is also presented for the significant currency risk vulnerability of the nonbanking private sector. Several existing empirical studies are examined in order to assess the growth losses of the Russian economy following the crisis of 2008, which was linked with the financial dollarization.
    Keywords: financial dollarization; currency mismatch; balance sheet effects; Russia
    JEL: E44 F34 G32
    Date: 2012–01–02
  2. By: Lehmann, Hartmut (University of Bologna); Razzolini, Tiziano (University of Siena); Zaiceva, Anzelika (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia)
    Abstract: In the years 2003-2008 the Russian economy experienced a period of strong and sustained growth, which was accompanied by large worker turnover and rising informality. We investigate whether the burden of informality falls disproportionately on job separators (displaced workers and quitters) in the Russian labor market in the form of informal employment and undeclared wages in formal jobs. We also pursue the issues whether displaced workers experience more involuntary informal employment than workers who quit and whether informal employment persists. We find a strong positive link between separations and informal employment as well as shares of undeclared wages in formal jobs. Our results also show that displacement entraps some of the workers in involuntary informal employment. Those who quit, in turn, experience voluntary informality for the most part, but there seems a minority of quitting workers who end up in involuntary informal jobs. This scenario does not fall on all separators but predominantly on those with low human capital. Finally, informal employment is indeed persistent since separating from an informal job considerably raises the probability to be informal in the subsequent job.
    Keywords: job separations, informality, Russia
    JEL: J64 J65 P50
    Date: 2011–12
  3. By: Alfio Cerami (Independent Researcher); Paul Stubbs (The Institute of Economics, Zagreb)
    Abstract: This article explores the post-communist worlds of welfare capitalism in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, including the successor states of the former Soviet Union. It discusses recent developments, whilst offering some additional theoretical reflections on the key factors that have shaped welfare state change over time. The text explores key institutional features characterising these worlds of welfare capitalism in transition. In order to highlight the actions of political elites in the market, we discuss the notions of “state-enabled”, “state-influenced” and “state-interfered” market economies. In this article, we introduce the term “captured welfare systems” to refer to the ways in which some states and political elites interfere in the market in order to capture resources. In the conclusion, we move beyond classical approaches to institutional change based on path-dependency and lock-in arguments, drawing attention to the importance of bringing institutions and political agency back into the analysis of welfare and its transformations.
    Keywords: political economy of welfare capitalism, captured welfare system, Central and Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union
    JEL: D60 D72 H53 I38 P20 P30
    Date: 2011–12

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