nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2011‒01‒23
five papers chosen by
Koen Schoors
Ghent University

  1. Great War, Civil War, and Recovery: Russia’National Income, 1913 to 1928 By Andrei Markevich; Mark Harrison
  2. Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia By Ruben Enikolopov; Maria Petrova; Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
  3. Property Rights and Internal Migration: The Case of the Stolypin Agrarian Reform in the Russian Empire By Eugenia Chernina; Paul Castaneda Dower; Andrei Markevich
  4. To devalue or not to devalue? How East European countries responded to the outflow of capital in 1997-99 and in 2008-09 By Popov, Vladimir
  5. Ownership concentration, institutional development and firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe By Balsmeier, Benjamin; Czarnitzki, Dirk

  1. By: Andrei Markevich (New Economic School (Moscow), University of Warwick); Mark Harrison (University of Warwick, University of Birmingham, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University)
    Abstract: The last remaining gap in the national accounts of Russia and the USSR in the twentieth century, 1913 to 1928, includes the Great War, the Civil War, and postwar recovery. Filling this gap, we find that the Russian economy did somewhat better in the Great War than was previously thought; in the Civil War it did correspondingly worse; war losses persisted into peacetime, and were not fully restored under the New Economic Policy. We compare this experience across regions and over time. The Great War and Civil War produced the deepest economic trauma of Russia’s troubled twentieth century.
    Keywords: Civil War, GDP, Russia, Soviet Union, World War I
    JEL: E20 N14 N44 O52
    Date: 2010–11
  2. By: Ruben Enikolopov (New Economic School (Moscow)); Maria Petrova (New Economic School (Moscow)); Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Paris School of Economics and New Economic School)
    Abstract: This paper compares electoral outcomes of 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia among geographical areas with differential access to the only independent from the government national TV channel. It was available to three-quarters of Russia’s population and its signal availability was idiosyncratic conditional on observables. Independent TV decreased aggregate vote for the government party by 8.9 percentage points, increased the combined vote for major opposition parties by 6.3 percentage points, and decreased turnout by 3.8 percentage points. The probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals who watched independent TV even controlling for voting intentions measured one month before elections.
    JEL: J0 D0 H0
    Date: 2010–12
  3. By: Eugenia Chernina (Toulouse School of Economics); Paul Castaneda Dower (New Economic School and CEFIR); Andrei Markevich (New Economic School and Department of Economics, University of Warwick)
    Abstract: While economists have little question about the potential for liquidity constraints to influence the migration decision, the relative importance of these constraints has resisted empirical verification. The unique nature of the Stolypin agrarian reform in Russia provides a natural experiment with exogenous variation in liquidity constraints. The reform gives peasants the right to withdraw from the commune and to sell one's share of land. Previously liquidity constrained households could then take this opportunity to migrate to less populated areas. Some communes were not affected by the reform, permitting difference-in-differences analysis. Using a panel of historical data from 1901-1914 on regional migration, we find a strong positive correlation between the reform and migration. We employ instrumental variables to address the possible endogeneity due to omitted factors that might drive both commune exit and migration.
    JEL: J61 N33 N53 O12 O13
    Date: 2010–11
  4. By: Popov, Vladimir
    Abstract: If there is a negative terms of trade or financial shock leading to the deterioration in the balance of payments, there are two basic options for a country that has limited foreign exchange reserves. First, a country can maintain a fixed exchange rate (or even a currency board) and wait until the reduction of foreign exchange reserves leads to the reduction of money supply: this will drive domestic prices down and stimulate exports, raise interest rates and stimulate the inflow of capital, and finally will correct the balance of payments. Second, the country can allow the devaluation of national currency – flexible exchange rate will automatically bring the balance of payments back into the equilibrium. Because national prices are less flexible than exchange rates, the first type of adjustment is associated with the greater reduction of output. The empirical evidence on East European countries and other transition economies for 1998-99 period (outflow of capital after the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian currency crises and slowdown of output growth rates) suggests that the second type of policy response (devaluation) was associated with smaller loss of output than the first type (monetary contraction). 2008-09 developments provide additional evidence for this hypothesis.
    Keywords: Devaluation; capital account shocks; fixed and flexible exchange rates; macroeconomic response to shocks
    JEL: F42 F32 F41 F31 F43
    Date: 2010
  5. By: Balsmeier, Benjamin; Czarnitzki, Dirk
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship of ownership concentration and firm performance in the context of different institutional environments in 28 Central and Eastern European transition economies. Using the BEEPS data for the period from 2002 to 2009 we find an inverted u-shaped relation of ownership concentration and firm performance for those firms that operate in non-EU-member countries as well as those firms that are situated in less developed legal systems according to Freedom House ratings. We interpret these findings as evidence for a classic agency problem in the lower part of the ownership concentration distribution that is dominated by a 'private benefits of control' problem with rising ownership concentration. --
    Keywords: corporate governance,firm growth,transition economies,ownership concentration
    JEL: G32 L25 O16 P31
    Date: 2010

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